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Stellingen behorende bij het proefschrift Modern Territorial Statehood van 
Nicholas Hansen 
1. The concept of the ‘nation-state’ has no function in a legal framework. 
2. The definitional criteria for statehood related to ‘effectiveness’ are comparably 
more fluid than those related to ‘territory’. 
3. The legal principle of uti possidetis juris is of chiefly historical application, whereas 
the legal principle of self-determination of peoples is continually perpetuated 
through Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR. 
4. Although minority rights regimes and peoples’ rights are largely separate legal re-
gimes, regional instruments such as Article 20 of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights can demonstrate juridical linkages between the concepts. 
5. The concept of self-determination may in some circumstances be equated with that 
of self-defence. 
6. While many postcolonial states seek to vertically consolidate their effectiveness 
across their territory, postcolonial self-determination of peoples also reflects a hori-
zontal societal preservation function. 
7. A ‘people’ can be formed as a direct response to specific, predatory actions of a 
state. 
8. When clear manifestations of (postcolonial) effectiveness can be readily observed, 
in juridical decisions involving territorial disputes, this should mitigate the domi-
nance of the concept of original title, in determining sovereignty. 
9. In modern territorial statehood, the ‘effectiveness’ of a state is not only measured 
by its credentials to legitimate claim over territory, but also the ability of that terri-
tory to administer itself in conformity with the precepts of modern public interna-
tional law. 
10. Promoveren buiten de faculteit geeft slechts een beperkte toegang tot een acade-
mische carrière. 
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Nederlandse samenvatting 
De moderne territoriale staat 
Deze studie onderzoekt de relatie tussen aan de ene kant klassieke vormen van soevereini-
teit - met name het suprema potestas model, dat in essentie inhoudt dat een staat kan doen en la-
ten wat hij wil op zijn eigen grondgebied - en moderne vormen van soevereiniteit. In die laatste 
worden rechten en verantwoordelijkheden erkend van individuen, vooral in die staten  die par-
tij zijn bij het Internationaal Verdrag inzake Burger- en Politieke Rechten (IVBPR) en het Inter-
nationaal Verdrag inzake Economische, Sociale en Culturele Rechten (IVESCR). Deze groep 
staten vormt een grote meerderheid. 
Het belangrijkste juridische vraagstuk dat wordt onderzocht is het belang van gemeen-
schappelijk artikel 1 van deze twee mensenrechtenverdragen, dat bepaalt dat alle volken het 
zelfbeschikkingsrecht bezitten, voor de aard van soeverein optreden. Kort gezegd is binnen het 
kader van de Verenigde Naties die de twee genoemde mensenrechtenverdragen heeft opge-
steld, de oorspronkelijke antikoloniale betekenis van “zelfbeschikking van volken” vervangen 
door een aanspraak op toegang tot het staatsbestuur voor de onderdanen van een territoriale 
staat.  
Zelfbeschikking als wapen tegen kolonialisme is één van de grootste wapenfeiten van de 
Verenigde Naties geweest. Toch zal worden betoogd dat de manier waarop een aantal, met 
name postkoloniale, staten tot stand zijn gekomen grote uitdagingen met zich mee brengt voor 
zelfbeschikking in de zin van toegang tot het staatsbestuur. Het concept soevereiniteit komt min 
of meer overeen met het concept staat, in die zin dat de territoriale staat de primaire entiteit is 
waaraan internationale rechtspersoonlijkheid wordt toegekend. Een essentieel onderscheid 
tussen soevereiniteit en de staat is echter dat de staat per definitie een territoriaal element bezit, 
terwijl soevereiniteit het recht van de staat op onafhankelijkheid op het internationale vlak weer-
spiegelt. Dientengevolge kan een fundamenteel verschil worden waargenomen tussen staats-
vorming als gevolg van koloniale activiteit en staatsvorming van Europese (en dus 
koloniserende) staten. De laatste zijn meer organisch gevormd. Verder kan worden geconsta-
teerd dat dit verschil bepaalde gevolgen heeft voor zelfbeschikking in de zin van toegang tot het 
staatsbestuur als moderne vorm van soevereiniteit. 
Het concept staat als juridisch fenomeen is van Europese oorsprong, en is over de gehele 
wereld geëxporteerd via imperialistische hegemonie. Hegemonie is een kernfactor in maat-
schappelijke ordening, en is daarom ook een factor in het moderne concept van de staat. Deze 
factor nam een voorname positie in bij de verspreiding van de Europese staat als overheersend 
model door middel van kolonialisme. Europees kolonialisme was gericht op het beschaven van 
de “onbeschaafden” door niet-Europese gebieden binnen de Europese gemeenschap te bren-
gen door waar mogelijk het opleggen van de Europese rechtsvorm. Het is geen toeval dat dit 
plaatsvond op het hoogtepunt van het klassieke rechtspositivisme, hoewel het moderne interna-
tionaal recht nu probeert de meest dwingende vormen van inter-gemeenschappelijke hegemo-
nie teniet te doen. De moderne territoriale staat moet echter niet verward worden met de 
natiestaat. De verdeling door de Europese kolonisten, bijvoorbeeld die van Afrika aan het einde 
van de 18e eeuw, leidde tot verregaande transformaties van gemeenschappen. Deze transforma-
ties werden gevolgd door de vorming van nieuwe soevereine gebieden door middel van deko-
lonisatie. Dit leidt tot een interpretatiemethode van het moderne concept van de staat die 
territoir als iets vaststaands beschouwt. De bestuurlijke capaciteiten van dergelijke staten, die 
veel meer fluïde zijn, staan hiermee in schril contrast. Deze fluïditeit wordt door het internatio-
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naal recht erkend, wat impliceert dat een “beschaafde”  moderne staat in theorie zeer beperkte 
bestuurlijke capaciteiten kan hebben. Ook lijken dergelijke staten vaak een bijzonder dwingen-
de vorm van hegemonie te beheren. De moderne territoriale staat wordt dus niet noodzakelij-
kerwijze empirisch gevormd, maar is vooral ontwikkeld als gevolg van het feit dat een zich 
ontwikkelend, formalistisch, en in naam allesomvattend “positivistisch” internationaal publiek-
recht moet omgaan met een potentiële tegenstelling tussen “natie” en “staat” onder één en de-
zelfde noemer.  
Aan het begin van de 20e eeuw vond het begrip “zelfbeschikking” ingang, in een aantal 
verschillende definities en contexten. Vanuit een juridisch perspectief werd het in de context 
van de Verenigde Naties een politiek postulaat. Dit hield in dat een volk het recht had op toe-
gang tot het bestuur. Dit nam in eerste instantie de vorm van dekolonisatie aan. Zelfbeschikking 
vond echter tegenwicht in het beginsel van uti possidetis, dat koloniale administratieve grenzen 
tot grenzen van moderne territoriale staten maakte. De kern van dekolonisatie is dat de vorming 
van postkoloniale staten door middel van het recht op zelfbeschikking een imperatief is. Het is 
als algemene regel aanvaard, met name in Afrika,  dat dit gebeurd is zonder de koloniale gren-
zen te wijzigen. Het is ook gesuggereerd dat een “volk”  bestaat uit de gehele bevolking van een 
grondgebied. Tegelijkertijd is zelfbeschikking een voortdurend recht. Na afloop van dekoloni-
satie neemt het een “interne” vorm aan, die een regering vereist die het gehele volk vertegen-
woordigt zonder onderscheid naar soort, in het bijzonder ras, geloof of kleur. Een hoofdvraag 
betreffende de relatie tussen zelfbeschikking en het primaat van bestaande dan wel geërfde 
grenzen is de vraag naar de betekenis van “interne zelfbeschikking”. Wat dit betreft is het denk-
baar dat een territoir ervoor kan kiezen  binnen een  postkoloniale staat te blijven (“postkolonia-
le interne zelfbeschikking” ). Een territoir kan er ook voor kiezen erkenning te zoeken als 
onafhankelijke eenheid (“externe postkoloniale zelfbeschikking”), of voor een meer aangepaste 
vorm van zelfbeschikking die alle etnische en culturele groeperingen aan vaste, territoriale 
vorm, bindt. De conceptuele dominantie van de laatste vorm wordt tegenwoordig getemperd in 
die zin dat een “volk”  kan worden gezien als een territoriale eenheid die kleiner is dan de gehele 
bevolking van een staat. Dat een “volk”  moet worden gezien als de optelsom van de individuen 
die zich binnen de grenzen van een postkoloniale staat bevinden is dus binnen het internatio-
naal recht een gedateerd idee. Ten slotte volgt uit de Friendly Relations Declaration dat het begrip 
“volk” een raciaal of religieus element heeft. Dit is een belangrijke constatering bij het opnieuw 
richting geven aan het debat over enkele van de meer moderne aspecten van de postkoloniale 
staat. 
Op basis van bovenstaande is het mogelijk de staat in juridische termen te conceptualise-
ren vanuit zowel een top-down, territoriaal perspectief, als vanuit een bottom-up perspectief ge-
baseerd op de delen waaruit de staat is opgebouwd. Dit concept van “collectieve groeperingen” 
ontleent haar specifieke juridische waarde aan de statenpraktijk in de Economische en Sociale 
Raad en de Algemene Vergadering van de Verenigde Naties. Internationaal recht is het recht 
van staten. Gezien vanuit het perspectief van de internationale “Bill of Rights” en de Friendly Re-
lations Declaration echter zijn de bescherming van individuen en bepaalde verwachtingen aan 
hoe staten zich gedragen ook geldend recht geworden. Het recht van collectieve groeperingen is 
verder versterkt door de Algemene Vergadering die in het vervolg op de Milleniumverklaring 
vaststelde dat staten de verantwoordelijkheid hebben om hun bevolking tegen ernstige schen-
dingen van de mensenrechten te beschermen. Nu zelfbeschikking van volken niet langer be-
perkt is tot gevallen van dekolonisatie en territoriale grenzen kunnen worden aangepast met 
instemming van de betrokken partijen, rijst de vraag naar de erkenning van nieuwe staten. Hoe-
wel het geen verbazing zal wekken dat de internationale gemeenschap terughoudend is bij het 
erkennen van nieuwe postkoloniale staten, is territoriale afscheiding als gevolg van een gebrek 
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aan interne zelfbeschikking niet bij voorbaat uitgesloten. Het meest recente voorbeeld is de ver-
wijzingsvraag naar het Canadese Hooggerechtshof betreffende de eenzijdige afscheiding van 
Quebec. Daarnaast kan worden geconstateerd dat het realiseren van zelfbeschikking snel kan 
worden gekanaliseerd in de richting van externe zelfbeschikking wanneer  op grote schaal en 
systematisch de mensenrechten van een deel van de bevolking worden geschonden, zoals bij-
voorbeeld in Bangladesh. Collectieve groeperingen – “volken”, “minderheden”, “inheemse vol-
ken” en andere territoriale collectiviteiten die relatief minder vastomlijnd zijn – overlappen 
vrijwel zonder uitzondering enigszins in vorm en omstandigheden. Zij zullen echter alleen een 
kans maken op adequate erkenning van hun claims door ze vorm te geven in overeenstemming 
met de rechtsregels die op een bepaald feitencomplex van toepassing zijn, en als zodanig wor-
den aanvaard door nationale en internationale juridische autoriteiten. 
Na de totstandkoming en de inwerkingtreding van het IVBPR en het IVESCR werden de 
rechten van “collectieve groeperingen” juridisch tastbaar, aangezien de bijna universele ratifica-
tie van deze verdragen is gebaseerd op de vrije wil van staten. In de praktijk wordt van alle vol-
ken met een integrale territoriale component verwacht dat zij in eerste instantie hun rechten als 
volk collectief via de bestuurlijke en administratieve mechanismen van hun eigen staat proberen 
te realiseren. Tegelijkertijd worden echter “minderheden” die gelijke rechten als de meerder-
heid nastreven, los van collectiviteit en territoir, gezien als vormgegeven door de mensenrech-
ten. De aandacht gaat in eerste instantie uit naar Azië en Afrika wanneer gekeken wordt naar 
postkoloniale praktijksituaties waarin de collectieve groeperingen “minderheden” en “volken” 
centraal staan. Vanwege het bestaan van een regionale intergouvernementele organisatie, de 
Afrikaanse Unie, heeft Afrika echter een duidelijk voordeel op Azië wat betreft de diepgravend-
heid van de juridische analyse. Het Afrikaanse Handvest voor de Rechten van Mens en Volken 
bevestigt dat alle volken bestaansrecht hebben. Dit laat zien hoe regionale inzichten behulp-
zaam kunnen zijn voor begrip van het concept “collectieve groepering” , aangezien de concep-
tueel gescheiden regimes betreffende de rechten van “minderheden”  en “volken” elkaar 
potentieel overlappen. In de Afrikaanse context kan het onduidelijk zijn of een collectieve groe-
pering moet worden aangeduid als “volk” of als “minderheid”, omdat het concept “volken” ex-
tra, regionale, betekenissen heeft. In de regio’s in kwestie is er grote kans op het bestaan van 
gewapende conflicten. In de meest extreme van zulke omstandigheden kan een “volk” ontstaan 
door middel van tegenstand tegen extreem optreden van de staat, met name wanneer zulk op-
treden herhaald en opzettelijk gericht is tegen een bepaald segment van de eigen bevolking.  Het 
lijkt er op dat beter inzicht in de postkoloniale staat kan worden verkregen door de spanning tus-
sen staat en gemeenschap op een conceptueel vlak te deconstrueren.  
Eén manier waarop de postkoloniale territoriale staat kan worden voorgesteld is door de 
uitoefening van soevereiniteit door de staat op te delen in verticale en horizontale elementen. 
Daarbij wordt het territoriale aspect van de staat als vaststaand gezien, zonder af te doen aan een 
eventuele aanpassing van de uti possidetis regel. Het verticale aspect vertegenwoordigt het cu-
mulatieve effect van de staat die zijn onafhankelijke soevereiniteit manifesteert. Het horizontale 
aspect vertegenwoordigt het vermogen van collectieve groeperingen om effectief te reageren op 
het territoriale bestuur van de postkoloniale staat. Het internationaal recht geeft in het algemeen 
de voorkeur aan bestuursvormen die leiden tot algemene verkiezingen. Vooral in het geval van 
postkoloniale staten echter is een kijk op democratie waarin verkiezingen centraal staan moge-
lijk onvoldoende om tegemoet te komen aan de vereisten van toegang tot het staatsbestuur uit 
het huidige internationale recht. Er lijkt zich een notie te ontwikkelen van wat kan worden ge-
manifesteerd door houders van een legitieme claim op “civil society”. Interne zelfbeschikking 
komt echter grotendeels overeen met het recht van een volk op toegang tot het bestuur. Een der-
gelijke formulering leidt mogelijk in de praktijk tot uitsluiting. In het postkoloniale tijdperk ech-
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ter, vooral in het nieuwe millennium, heeft de legitimiteit van een dergelijk principe gevolgen 
voor een recht op democratie, vooral omdat territoriale omstandigheden in de praktijk het recht 
op interne zelfbeschikking kunnen beperken. Het kan gebeuren dat territoriaal afgebakende ju-
ridische entiteit bepaalde administratieve tekortkomingen laat zien die voortvloeien uit tekort-
komingen op de grond. Het is daarom voorstelbaar dat claims op territoriaal bestuur worden 
erkend door zowel de bevolkingsgroepen op de grond als door de internationale gemeenschap, 
door middel van bepaalde vormen van erkenning. Langs dezelfde lijnen laat ook de statenprak-
tijk zien hoe staten bepaalde vormen van bestuur uitoefenen waaraan juridisch gewicht wordt 
toegekend zodanig dat dit bestuur op lokaal niveau in de weg staat. Kortom, de postkoloniale 
staat kan met regelmaat in een situatie terecht komen die zowel door territoriale als administra-
tieve (d.w.z. “democratische”) omstandigheden wordt gekenmerkt. Deze studie bepleit dat de 
territoriale omstandigheden niet noodzakelijkerwijze de dominante variabele vormen in deze 
relatie. 
De “moderne” aspecten van het concept staat, die zijn ontleend aan de mensenrechten, 
hebben de paradox van territoriaal bestuur nog verder gecompliceerd. In het algemeen is dit 
een welkome ontwikkeling. Echter, het weerspiegelt de mate waarin de internationale samenle-
ving zich heeft ontwikkeld uit de buurt van de étatism van suprema potestas. Toch kunnen com-
plicaties worden geconstateerd wanneer bevolkingen worden gezien als rechtssubject door de 
lens van staten, volken, minderheden, inheemse volken, andere groeperingen en individuen. 
De hoofdvraag is in hoeverre de staat wordt gedefinieerd door de bevolking, of de bevolking 
door de staat?  
Toegang tot het bestuur blijft het uitgangspunt van de analyse van zelfbeschikking van 
volken. Uti possidetis juris is vooral van historische waarde, hoewel dit beginsel de koloniale 
grenzen naar de postkoloniale staat heeft overgezet. Het recht op zelfbeschikking daarentegen is 
permanent, in overeenstemming met artikel 1 van het IVBPR en het IVESCR.  
    Territoriale wijzigingen kunnen daarom optreden, zelfs in postkoloniale staten, als 
wordt geaccepteerd dat: zelfbeschikking van volken relevant blijft ook na dekolonisatie; een 
“volk” meer kan zijn dan de som van de inwoners van een staat; het recht op zelfbeschikking de 
keerzijde is van de rechten van minderheden; en de rechten van “volken” als onderwerp van ju-
ridische analyse zich blijft ontwikkelen in het licht van claims van delen van een territoriale staat 
jegens die staat en de internationale gemeenschap. Dit leidt tot de conclusie dat een effectieve 
administratieve structuur die niet formeel de status van regering heeft, beter gepositioneerd is 
om het formele bestuur over een grondgebied uit te oefenen dan wanneer de gouvernementele 
(en mogelijk ook de territoriale) status quo zou worden gehandhaafd. 
Deze studie stelt dat het leggen van een verband tussen het concept zelfbeschikking en het 
concept zelfverdediging kan leiden tot een effectiever staatsbestuur. De reden hiervoor is dat er 
een gevaarlijke situatie kan ontstaan wanneer een postkoloniale staat zichzelf “verticaal” pro-
beert te consolideren, onder meer door gedwongen assimilatie. In zulke omstandigheden moet 
binnen de staat op horizontaal vlak tegenwicht worden geboden zodat volken, minderheden, 
inheemse volken en andere kwetsbare groeperingen kunnen reageren. Dit houdt niet noodza-
kelijkerwijze overmatige kritiek in op het concept assimilatie an sich. Het staat immers vast dat 
collectieve groeperingen ook onderling assimileren. Het houdt wel in dat assimilatie onder 
dwang – in de praktijk betekent dat het voorrang geven aan “territoir” boven “effectiviteit” – af-
doet aan het recht op zelfbeschikking, en dat de internationale gemeenschap daar adequaat op 
moet reageren.  
Dit is vooral duidelijk in die gevallen waarin een staat niet bij machte is om de “responsi-
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bility to protect” – op zichzelf een onduidelijke internationale verplichting - waar te maken, dan 
wel in andere gevallen van acute dreiging zoals in Darfur. Dit kan leiden, op een abstracter ni-
veau, tot erkenning voor de gedachte dat het internationaal recht rekening moet houden met de 
wil van het volk. Dit blijkt ook uit sommige aspecten van de Kameroen v. Nigeria zaak voor het 
Internationaal Gerechtshof, vooral betreffende het Bakassi schiereiland. Soortgelijke omstan-
digheden zouden in toekomstige zaken voor het Internationaal Gerechtshof aan een kritischer 
onderzoek moeten worden onderworpen. In het concept van de moderne territoriale staat kan 
“verticaliteit” in het staatsbestuur gelijk staan aan assimilatie. Dit kan zo ver gaan dat het beginsel 
van instemming (consent) in het democratische bestuur van een bevolking wordt verlaten. Aan 
de andere kant is “horizontalisme” in het moderne concept van de territoriale staat grotendeels 
ondergeschikt aan het gewicht dat de staat juridisch in de schaal legt. Dit is met name het geval 
wanneer men kijkt naar het vermogen van juridische entiteiten als “volken” en “minderheden” 
om tastbare veranderingen in het staatsbestuur teweeg te brengen. 
 De “effectiviteit” van een staat wordt in het moderne concept van de territoriale staat niet 
alleen afgemeten aan de kracht van claims op grondgebied, maar ook aan het vermogen van dat 
grondgebied om zichzelf te besturen in overeenstemming met de beginselen van het moderne 
internationaal publiekrecht. In dit verband kan spanning ontstaan tussen de doctrines van “oor-
spronkelijke titel” (original title) en “historische consolidatie” (historical consolidation), zoals 
ook blijkt uit de contrasterende jurisprudentie van het Internationaal Gerechtshof in de zaken 
Kameroen v. Nigeria en Nicaragua v. Honduras. Deze studie beargumenteert dat het toepassen 
van de doctrine van historische consolidatie in juridische besluitvorming beter rekening houdt 
met het recht op zelfbeschikking van volken, en daarom aanmoediging verdient. Dergelijke 
toepassing draagt bij aan de versterking van de mensenrechten en aan een objectieve juridische 
erkenning van het non-étatisme in modern internationaal publiekrecht. Oorspronkelijke cessie-
verdragen, net als uti possidetis juris, hebben een functie in het recht betreffende de vorming van 
staten. Het recht op zelfbeschikking kan echter drie decennia na de inwerkingtreding van het 
IVBPR en het IVESCR niet meer als inopportuun of als een vergissing worden gezien waar het 
juridische besluitvorming met territoriale toepassing betreft. Het analytische startpunt voor ana-
lyse van de rechtspraak zou meer gericht moeten zijn op een continue feitelijke beoordeling van 
het vermogen van een staat om zichzelf te besturen als basis voor het bestaan van de staat, dan 
op koloniale activiteit. Daarbij moet rekening worden gehouden met basale burger-, politieke-, 
economische-, sociale- en culturele rechten, en met de vraag of dergelijke individuele rechten 
algemeen erkend en nageleefd worden op het betreffende grondgebied. Uiteraard zullen admi-
nistratieve en juridische beslissingen steeds worden genomen op grond van de feitelijke om-
standigheden van het concrete geval.  
De staat, het volk, de minderheid, het inheemse volk, de onafhankelijke groepering en het 
individu zijn algemeen geaccepteerde en juridisch gefundeerde verklaringen van de condition 
humaine. Op dit vlak heeft het concept van de mensenrechten - ooit ondenkbaar, genegeerd of 
verworpen - zich zodanig ontwikkeld dat het nu centraal staat zowel in het discours van de men-
selijke gemeenschap als in het lexicon van internationaal recht. Zodoende kan de staat, zowel in 
termen van samenstelling als in termen van postkoloniale substantie, worden voorgesteld als 
niet meer dan een imaginair domein, met name in sommige postkoloniale omstandigheden.  
De multi-dimensionale werkelijkheid van de postkoloniale staat wordt nog steeds gepro-
jecteerd op de standaard staatsvorm als juridische constructie. Tegelijkertijd versterkt de staten-
praktijk steeds meer de rol van het individu in het internationale recht. Bij het beoordelen van 
situaties waarin staten of collectieve groeperingen binnen een staat een stuk grondgebied opei-
sen, kan het nuttig zijn om de relatief vaststaande elementen van het concept staat – een bepaald 
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grondgebied dat permanent wordt bewoond – te verzachten door middel van de relatief fluïde 
elementen – controle door de regering en onafhankelijkheid – als dit een aantoonbaar effectie-
vere staat tot gevolg heeft. De belangrijkste doelstelling van het moderne concept van de territo-
riale staat als juridische constructie is het scheppen en in stand houden van een staat die, in het 
kader van sociale cohesie, bij machte is om de verschillende bevolkingsgroepen te ondersteu-
nen.  
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Brigitte Stern: “My first question is, What have been your main mistakes—as a 
lawyer, I mean?” 
Oscar Schachter: “Gosh…a couple come to mind…because they indicate 
what a lawyer in international life faces. In 1948, nearly fifty years ago, at the 
United Nations, the architects planning the future headquarters asked me how 
many seats they should make in the General Assembly. Now is that a lawyer’s 
question? Probably only a lawyer was thought able to answer. The United Na-
tions then had only fifty-one members. An international lawyer would be ex-
pected to know how many sovereign states existed and were potential 
members. I confidently answered the architects (after checking some text-
books) that they could safely add twenty seats to the fifty-one. It did not take 
long for my estimate to be mistaken and for costly renovations to be needed. A 
simple point, perhaps, but can lawyers confidently take the world as it is at a 
given moment when we know that it is in constant change? Could anyone 
have foreseen the breakup of colonial empires and the Soviet Union? The real 
problem, of course, does not involve guessing numbers but how to develop 
ideas and proceedings to cope with the unexpected changes that are inevitable. 
International lawyers and international organization specialists could give 
that challenge more attention.” 
 – A Conversation with Oscar Schachter, 1997 ASIL Proceedings 344 
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 INTRODUCTION 
States and sovereignty in classical and modern forms 
Statehood is a paradox. As the primary foundation of international law, it is simultane-
ously a monolithic construction by virtue of its conceptual ubiquity, and, when viewed in terms 
of its practical effectiveness, a highly variable circumstance. This study seeks to explore certain 
aspects of this paradox, particularly in view of the widespread establishment of international 
human rights law, as part of public international law generally. As one scholar observes, the re-
lationship between statehood per se and international human rights protection is ironic due to 
the relationship of the state with the voluntarist nature of international human rights law itself. 
Philip Alston writes: 
States alone are the subjects of international law; human rights treaties are negotiated among 
states and with only limited involvement by other actors; the majority of human rights trea-
ties are adopted on the basis of a consensus among states, thus giving any government at 
least a potential veto power and certainly the ability to delay the drafting process; human 
rights obligations attach directly only to states and not to other entities; the international im-
plementation machinery is a creature of states and is dependant upon them legally, politically, 
and financially; national-level implementation is a function for states to perform; when inter-
national bodies monitor compliance, they focus only on governmental compliance; and when 
sanctions are applied they are imposed upon states and enforced by (or, more commonly, 
undermined with the acquiescence of) states. Indeed, it has often been said that the interna-
tional human rights system makes an important contribution to the legitimacy of states both 
by enabling them to claim the moral high ground and by giving them the opportunity to take 
on obligations which, in effect, legitimize a more activist or interventionist role for the gov-
ernment within society.1 
What this study seeks to explore more specifically is the relationship between the classical 
models of sovereignty, most readily identified as the ‘suprema potestas’ model which essentially 
reflects the notion that a state’s actions are wholly unrestrained within the confines of its own ter-
ritorial boundaries, and the modern models of sovereignty, to which rights and responsibilities 
are attributed to individuals, particularly in states-parties to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—
that is to say, the clear majority of all states in the world. 
The fundamental legal argument being considered is the relevance of common article 
one of these two principal human rights covenants, which proclaims that ‘all peoples have the 
right to self-determination’, to the nature of sovereign activity. Broadly, under the United Na-
tions framework, which established the two human rights covenants, the original anti-colonial 
meaning of ‘self-determination of peoples’ has come to be supplanted by an expectation of ac-
cess to government, for nationals of a territorial state. 
Although self-determination as an anti-colonial measure has been one of the greatest ac-
complishments of the United Nations, it will be asserted that the nature of the construction of 
some, particularly postcolonial, states has demonstrated profound challenges to this latter, ‘ac-
cess to government’ meaning of self-determination. The concept of sovereignty, itself, is rela-
tively synonymous with statehood, in that the territorial state is the primary global element to 
which legal personality is attributed. But an essential distinction between sovereignty and state-
hood is immediately made, in that statehood has an inherently territorial element, whereas sov-
                                                                  
1 P. Alston, Downsizing the State in Human Rights Discourse, in N. Dorsen and P. Gifford (eds.), Democ-
racy and the Rule of Law 358-359 (2001). 
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ereignty is reflective of a state’s right to independence on the global plane. As such, it may be ob-
served how a fundamental difference exists in the construction of states that have been formed, 
as a result of colonial activity, as compared with those essentially European (and therefore colo-
nising) states, which have been formed more organically. It may be further observed that this 
constructional difference has certain implications for the ‘access to government’ provisions of 
self-determination, in the modern form of sovereignty. 
To be certain, colonial activity globalised the phenomenon of sovereign statehood. State-
hood was readily spread worldwide through an expansionist European colonialism that coin-
cided with the apex of the formalised, chiefly European science of international legal positivism. 
The state was a European conception; the system expanded through European advocacy, and 
the administrative structures of all states today are of nominal European provenance. The estab-
lishment and export of positivism, in the form of sovereign statehood, it is assumed, by viewing 
the vast corpus of written public international law, was tremendously successful. The concept of 
statehood was, to positivists, a perfect formula for the fact that power and immediate self-interest 
ruled the world. Given that reality, a specific form and personality was helpful in developing the 
set of rational expectations that derive from the purportedly uniform mix of international legal 
personality and the basic criteria of statehood, namely a permanent population, a defined terri-
tory and an independent government. Adding the sanctity of contract (pacta sunt servanda) and 
the expectation of good faith amongst states in the discharge of their affairs, specific expectations 
of behaviour could be obtained, particularly when colonial activity incorporated the vast ma-
jority of the world’s territory into sovereignties. This was positivism’s greatest attraction, and it 
asserted itself with genuine force throughout the course of its own substantive development and 
administrative implementation, both in European states and their overseas colonial territories. 
To examine international law’s sources is to examine international law’s power as an op-
erative system in an otherwise anarchical world, not least because the sources of international 
law define the thresholds of established legality. The fact is that these thresholds have shifted so 
considerably in recent decades that many positivist jurists of a past era would likely be shocked 
at what has become ‘legal’. Decolonisation happened with such great speed and resolute con-
viction, and manifested itself on such a largely voluntarist basis, that the role of pure legal posi-
tivism was greatly diminished as a defining entity. The crest of the great positivists had fallen with 
the creation of the United Nations, and, in the end, ‘classical positivism’ simply outdid itself. 
Statehood, as a legal conception, was now controlled by a genuine multiplicity of sources, and 
once so many newly-decolonised states were able to earn recognition as sovereign states per se, 
international law rapidly became infused with a greater diversity of opinion and a widening of 
focus.  
Thus international law is guided simultaneously by the principle of ‘sovereign equality’ of 
states and the shared expectations of the ‘international community’. Earlier positivism had made 
statehood the highest imaginable judicial form, but post-war positivism (i.e., ‘modern interna-
tional law’) made allowances for the fact that supranational legal structures were conceived and 
implemented by sovereign states, themselves, as a direct result of the global decisions taken im-
mediately following the two world wars. That colonial states very quickly acquiesced into a new 
political reality, whereby the holding of colonial possessions became undesirable on a global 
scale. The planet was thus left with, essentially, two conceptual forms of statehood, bound to-
gether under the monolith of the ‘sovereign equality of states’ so familiar in public international 
law discourse. In essence, a distinction between ‘empirical’ and ‘juridical’ states has been made, 
most famously by Robert Jackson, in 1990.2 In this sense, it may be seen as unsurprising that 
                                                                  
2 See generally R.H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World 69 
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states defined more in terms of their national cohesion than their territorial composition would 
be comparatively more likely to achieve a fuller level of access to government for its nationals.  
The conceptual distinction between ‘empirical’ and ‘juridical’ states serves to negate the 
existence of the ‘nation-state’ as a matter of circumstance, but not as a matter of necessity. It does 
so by separating statehood into the intangible and tangible elements related to territorial ad-
ministration, and then considers the relationship of current legal statehood to the collective 
weight of past decisions. There are nations, there are states, and there is an international legal 
system. This is to say that, although sovereign statehood forms the main part of the international 
legal system, the operational effectiveness of that system is dependent upon the successful func-
tion of its constituent parts. For this to happen, ‘the nation’ and ‘the state’ should coincide, at least 
nominally. Yet this is a circumstance not always observed in postcolonial states, particularly 
when the ‘nation’ neglects the ‘state’ (or vice-versa). 
What is brought under examination on a more specifically juridical level, however, is the 
relationship between the sources of law and the effects of their actions over time. This is of par-
ticular concern to the African region, because its independence from European territorial pos-
session and administration is still relatively new. What is most significant for jurists is the extent 
to which the sources and evidence of international law have adapted to changing intertemporal 
circumstances. 
International human rights law as part of modern territorial statehood 
What comes most clearly under examination is the common article one to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. The first covenant positively defines the circumstances necessary for 
the fullest implementation of all international human rights, such as access to food, housing and 
education, while the second covenant fundamentally rejects acts of state which degrade the 
human person, such as acts of torture and attacks on the independence of state judiciaries by 
governmental agents. At this stage of international legal development, no state could credibly 
withdraw from the core provisions of these treaties, as they serve to define customary interna-
tional human rights law in general. International engagement, viewed as the product of the af-
termath of the second world war, is a matter of eternal and fundamental importance. Thus 
human rights is Realpolitik in the modern world. 
However, territorial sovereignties, endowed with written legal systems and the legislative 
and juridical forums inherent in statehood, are charged with the demonstrable manifestation of 
governmental authority. A recurring theme in the present study will be the relatively uncontro-
versial assertion that classical legal positivism acted without regard to issues such as culture and 
ethnicity. Classical legal positivism assumes the creation of a universal system of sovereignties 
with readily-identifiable political and legal systems. This thesis asserts that such systems are not 
automatically forthcoming, despite the elation felt amongst the populations of decolonising ter-
ritories worldwide. Although the indifference to concepts such as ‘culture’ and ‘ethnicity’ was 
largely inconsequential during the era of colonialism, as it coincided with the positivists’ great 
influence, this indifference has been dramatically minimised in a world in which international 
human rights law has evolved into the core of the larger public international law. 
‘Modern territorial statehood’, in its fullest conceptualisation, means something palpably 
more than that emanating from the international legal personality allocated to a governmental 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(1990). 
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entity possessed with, and concerned only with preserving, a title to territory and its own sover-
eign equality amongst peers. The definitional contradiction between historical forms 
(≈classical positivist) and modern forms (≈so-called ‘access to government’) lies within the 
immediate transition from ‘newly independent states’ to ‘states’. The reason for this is that state-
hood is a binary proposition in its classical, positivist form: states were both ‘discovered’ and 
‘civilised’ by European states or they were terrae nullius. Positivist statehood exists as a product of 
its recognition per se, and it will only be recognised per se by other states if it is able to assume the 
responsibilities of statehood, and consequently enjoy statehood’s benefits. That this is an exclu-
sionary formula under purely positivist-defined statehood must not go overlooked, but what 
will be brought under closer examination is the extent to which statehood perpetuates itself un-
der the circumstances least likely to reflect ‘social development’. Indeed, the question of state 
failure cannot be excluded either. Yet, to the contrary, when, through state practice, ‘interna-
tional human rights law’ reaches such a specific level of development that it is possible to talk, in 
legal terms, about ‘democratic entitlements’ and so-called norms of ‘global governance’, it be-
comes increasingly difficult to view the varying conceptualisations of statehood through the ex-
clusive prism of that of the early 1900s. 
The underpinning of any discussion on statehood is the legal principle of ‘effectiveness’, 
which guarantees the stability of the positivist international legal order. Effectiveness refers to the 
actual situation on the ground, in a state. It is here wherein the legal fiction of juridical statehood 
must find translation to the practical reality of empirical nationhood. Actions that demonstrate 
acts of territorial administration or other legitimate manifestations of state power are effectivités. 
Positivist international law is deeply receptive to such actions as a matter of principle, in that it 
may be presumed that higher levels of effectiveness within a state imply a greater reliability of le-
gal norms and a greater clarity of expected behaviours amongst states. The established doctrine 
of effectiveness has much less to say, however, about the particularities of postcolonial states. 
The inherent conservatism of positivism, and indeed international law in general, serves the 
specific and worthwhile purpose of aiming towards expected behaviour, but the question for 
postcolonial states is: At what point does this conservatism assume responsibility for the ‘wrong’ 
type of behaviour—genocide, widespread and systemic human rights violations, corruption 
and lesser forms of governmental malfeasance? Indeed, particularly in geographic areas far re-
moved from the power centre of the capital, the static form of positivist statehood may give dis-
proportionate power to agents of the state, as compared to local populations. Here the first 
nebulous ideas of ‘peoples’ or other forms of collectivités can be introduced. Identifying overlaps 
in content, between these concepts, can help develop effectiveness doctrine to reflect the chal-
lenges of postcolonial statehood. 
It is here where ‘self-determination of peoples’ plays a significant, if subtle, role in public 
international law. In most states, it has become relatively uncontroversial to observe that a citi-
zen’s right of access to government, through specific democratic procedures, has become a re-
quirement of modern statehood, and, as such, the cultural elements of statehood are brought 
comparatively closer to the territorial elements. This stems primarily from the 1970 UN General 
Assembly Declaration on Friendly Relations, which itself was the product of a decade-long 
preparatory process. This significant declaration has been used extensively in recent interna-
tional legal arguments, employing the underlying assumption that states operate as functional 
systems, and therefore a state’s citizenry should be able to administer the state in a representative 
manner. With this comes an expectation of behaviour that a state, itself, will act in the interest of 
their own populace, by guaranteeing its citizens’ access to government and reaffirming a positive 
commitment to the international community to provide basic sustenance of life, in the form of 
‘economic, social and cultural’ rights, and a negative obligation to avoid measures, in the course 
Nicholas Hansen 
Introduction 
Page 21 
of government, which violate individual ‘civil and political’ rights. However, ‘modern territorial 
statehood’ concurrently operates from primarily the same basic form of mutually exclusive ter-
ritorial-based sovereignty, from which the international legal personality of statehood is de-
rived. The problem is that, while international law has evolved since the end of the second 
world war to broadly embrace human rights, the structures to implement such rights remain the 
product of classical legal positivism, which paid no heed whatsoever to the status of individuals 
within a state, as reflected in Alston’s earlier commentary. 
Thus modern international human rights law, which has seen a forceful amount of stan-
dard-setting and substantive development in the past four decades, has had to evolve through 
the static instrument of positivist statehood. At the core of the argument, there remains no com-
pulsory measure to guarantee human rights protection and promotion under all circum-
stances—there is no global super-state. Yet self-determination of peoples undoubtedly exists as 
a global phenomenon. Its emergence as a supranational legal structure is bolstered by possible 
overlaps with peremptory norms of international law and the extent to which it is invoked by 
states against other states, but its power can easily be dampened by the sovereign acts of inde-
pendent states. This is not an inconsequential formula, and the machinery of the UN human 
rights programme is thus fragile.  
Employing this broad terminology, linkages have been made between the expectation of 
citizens having access to the administration of a territory through a democratic process, and the 
expectation that such governments will promote and protect basic human rights in return. Cer-
tainly, however, given the newfound welcoming of criticism and concrete suggestions for im-
provement of governmental behaviour worldwide that is the product of the work of both non-
governmental organisations and the intergovernmental machinery of the United Nations, these 
linkages remain tenuous, despite the increasingly vociferous proclamation of their existence. 
Although the scope of human rights violations is most likely the greatest in sub-Saharan Africa 
and Southwest Asia, human rights violations and governmental malfeasance are global phe-
nomena. However, what makes Africa so interesting for analysis is the fact that it is a region of 
the world affected by uti possidetis juris, or the transfer of the internal administrative boundaries 
of colonial possessions into external frontiers of a sovereign state, at the moment of a ‘critical 
date’. Nevertheless, the problem is that the ‘one-size-fits-all’ model of positivist statehood has 
been an inhibiting imposition on the African continent, generally, and the mechanisms existing 
in the separate legal formulae of a ‘peoples’ right to self-determination’, ‘minority rights’, and ‘the 
rights of indigenous peoples’ have been largely insufficient in serving their purposes. This is 
most evident when trying to put into perspective the variables of newly-independent statehood, 
vast economic underdevelopment, widespread human rights violations, internecine civil con-
flict and self-affected governments, in a framework advocating a closer connection between a 
territory and its citizens. 
Current scholarship has channelled the dissatisfaction resulting from the discord between 
state and society in the postcolonial world.3 A recent LL.D. thesis critically appraising peoples’ 
rights and the rights of minorities in modern international law concludes on a decidedly pessi-
mistic note as to the responsiveness of states towards the implementation of these rights, particu-
                                                                  
3 Some attempt to reduce this discord may be observed through actions on the international level seeking 
to establish the role of good governance in the promotion of human rights. See e.g. UN Commission on 
Human Rights resolution 2001/72, at operative paragraph 1, recognising “that transparent, responsible, 
accountable and participatory government, responsive to the needs and aspirations of the people, is the 
foundation on which good governance rests, and that such a foundation is a sine qua non for the promo-
tion of human rights, including the right to development”. 
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larly in postcolonial states: 
Imagine a huge pond of frogs, the water in which is being slowly warmed up one degree Cel-
sius at a time. How will the frogs react when the amount of heat becomes life-threatening? 
Try to jump out? No, they will simply simmer until, after a while, the pond will be seething 
with boiled or cooked frogs. Why? Because the slow, gradual accruement of the temperature 
would dampen their intellectual vigor and survival instinct, making the dangerous heat ‘toler-
able’, even ‘comfortable’, and lead, as a sequitur, to their premature death. The steam-bath 
hazard, however, could have been avoided had the frogs encountered the already boiling wa-
ter at the outset of their dangerous adventure: they would be shocked and thrown reflex-
ively out from the dangerous medium. The essence of their tragic misconception lies in the 
lack of sensory acuity and the belief that it is sufficient to keep fine-tuning ad infinitum to the 
gradual at the surface […].4 
The central conclusion of Skurbaty’s thesis implies that the chief after-effect of colonial 
domination existing as an accepted form of governance has been neo-colonial discord crystal-
lised between state and society within newly independent states. It is therefore of interest to ex-
amine the existing legal criteria in such a way as to attempt to bridge this discord. This is even 
more the case when recalling that international law is a constantly evolving system, responding 
to developments in international society. It seems that the viewpoints of jurists on statehood, 
viewed as perfect and essential in classical positivism, have admitted of comparable fallibility, in 
the postcolonial, post-positivist world, through the strengthened position of international hu-
man rights law generally. Economic, social and cultural rights are aspirational in nature, posi-
tively formulated to be progressively implemented, while civil and political rights are 
immediate, negatively formulated restrictions on state behaviour. This is to acknowledge that 
modern statehood is a less perfect institution than was originally imagined in its original Euro-
pean positivist formulation. While statehood retains its central role in the international system, it 
must contend with the fact that a large number of sovereignties were created through decoloni-
sation in a very short period, that competition for resources within these states would be fierce, 
that the territorial frontiers of the state may be incongruous to the local population, that entire 
regions may have no experience whatever with ‘deliberative democracy’, that a government 
may not have effective control of its entire territory and, most significantly, that, as a result, the 
bureaucratic institutions of these states can tend towards dysfunction, incapacitation or hijack-
ing by the state’s chief executive.  
The very emergence of a body of rights, designed to protect individuals and collectivités 
within states, reflects the fallibility of territorially delineated, mutually exclusive sovereignties. 
While this was a distinction to be overlooked in classical legal positivism, placating dichotomies 
between state and society in the postcolonial state through the progressive implementation of all 
human rights has become a full part of the modern public international law. The present study 
will therefore be primarily concerned with (re-) introducing ‘the nation’ and ‘the state’ in the 
postcolonial world by linking an expansive definition of a state’s effectivités with the existing col-
lective human rights. These are bundles of rights formed by pragmatic amalgams of ‘peoples’ 
rights’, the existing rights of individuals belonging to minority groups, and, as ancillary sources, 
the rights of indigenous peoples.  
The innate ability of humanity to adapt to differing circumstances and achieve both indi-
vidual and communal self-preservation reflects the fact that self-determination is a right, of on-
going scope, that runs well beyond the colonial context. The central argument for any modern 
study on statehood will inevitably include discussion on postcolonial self-determination, or ‘in-
                                                                  
4 Z. Skurbaty, As if Peoples Mattered: A Critical Appraisal of ‘Peoples’ and ‘Minorities’ from the Interna-
tional Human Rights Perspective and Beyond 446 (2000); LL.D. thesis submitted to the Raoul Wallenberg 
Institute, University of Lund. 
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ternal self-determination’, in its more recognisable legal terminology. This reflects the rise in 
voluntarism as a source of international law and emergence of the International Bill of Rights 
(peoples’ rights) and the Friendly Relations Declaration (minority rights), through the United 
Nations. In this study, the point emphasised is that collectivités have earned legal recognition in 
ways previously unimaginable to classical legal positivists, and this is a welcome development as 
it contributes to the effectiveness of postcolonial statehood. The underemployment of peoples’ 
rights and the rights of minorities by state actors should be reconsidered. In the developing 
world, and particularly in Africa, those who are able to uphold the responsibilities of modern 
governance, derived from international human rights law and UN practice, and reflecting the 
will of states, generally, may increasingly be recognised as holding legitimate title to ‘effective 
governance’ and should receive, on a gradient scale, legal recognition as such, through access to 
government and the state’s international legal personality, and under conceivable but highly re-
strictive circumstances, to independent statehood on its own. 
Methodology, breakdown of argument and brief chapter synopsis 
The core of legal analysis, in the present thesis, revolves around the interplay between the 
legal principle of uti possidetis juris and the ‘right of peoples to self-determination’. In the first in-
stance, it could be imagined how these principles are prima facie in conflict with each other, as 
uti possidetis created decolonising states on colonial lines, yet self-determination was the legal 
basis for decolonisation. However, further examination of these two legal principles, through 
the practice of the International Court of Justice, will reveal a more nuanced juridical interpreta-
tion that demonstrates how the definition of ‘self-determination of peoples’ has evolved over 
time. This study’s basic method of analysis is to view the development of self-determination 
through an inter-temporal prism: from political formulation, to initial form of implementation 
and to subsequent adaptations and modifications.  
The legal principle of uti possidetis juris lies latent behind all questions of self-
determination of peoples, as was most famously demonstrated by the outcome of the Badinter 
Commission, the familiar name of the EC Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia. This study 
will contrast uti possidetis juris with similar variables to produce a result which may draw into 
question its probative application in both literally and figuratively setting the lines of decolonisa-
tion. Wholesale retroactive abandonment of uti possidetis juris would be a most unlikely occur-
rence, but the question of whether the effects of boundary lines formed through uti possidetis is 
both eternal and irrefutable is an open one, and can only be adequately considered by the inter-
national community of states taking intelligent decisions on specific cases.  
As such, the thesis first discusses how universal statehood is the product of a legal for-
mula, whereby elements related to a state’s administration are seen as more malleable than 
those related to its territorial definition. The implication is that a so-called ‘civilised’, modern 
territorial state could be critically deficient in its governance capability. But ‘self-determination 
of peoples’, referred to as common article one in the covenants on civil and political, and eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights, has meant both decolonisation and access to government. 
This has led to considerable development of the law relating to ‘collective groupings’, of peo-
ples, minorities and indigenous peoples. In Africa, as elsewhere, the phenomenon of state fail-
ure must be examined in the context of particularities of geography to be properly understood. 
In the parts of a state not manifestly under the control of a central government, or where gov-
ernmental activity is malfeasant, collective groups that are demonstrably contributing to the im-
plementation of international human rights law, including the right to development, should be 
viewed as the de facto manifestation of effectivités. The objective, in doing so, is to contribute to 
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horizontal societal preservation, in light of the vertical homogenisation process of postcolonial 
state-building in these nascent sovereignties. State practice has, unsurprisingly, been cautious in 
the recognition of developments in the field of sovereignty, but significant milestones have been 
passed governing the legal relationship between a state and its citizens and residents. In sum, this 
study seeks to demonstrate how these substantive developments have transpired whilst the un-
derlying legal machinery has remained relatively constant. 
In chapter one, ‘positivist statehood’ is shown to be contradictory, arbitrary and spread by 
colonialism. In chapter two, the implications of decolonisation in the modern state are consid-
ered. The challenges to recognising the rights of collective groupings, in modern international 
law, is then considered in chapter three, and particular application to the African continent fol-
lows, in chapter four. Chapter five concludes with an analytical deconstruction of the modern 
territorial state, by observing certain factors and tensions existing in postcolonial statehood; it 
then considers a number of practical observations, with regard to the issue of ‘access to govern-
ment’ and ‘democratic governance’, and observes approaches taken by the ICJ and other legal 
bodies in responding to the self-determination/uti possidetis rubric.  
This study emphasises international human rights law so as to reinforce its basic provi-
sions, while giving proper consideration to the underlying collectivités of so-called ‘third genera-
tion rights’. While development of peoples’ rights in international law can be seen to be stagnant 
at present, the existence of the underlying concept cannot be refuted. The international com-
munity will thus need to formulate coherent answers to complicated circumstances on the 
ground, particularly in the least-developed states. Taken to its outermost extremes, ‘answers’ to 
these ‘problems’ will involve the re-assessment of the ways and means by which established in-
ternational human rights law undergoes its progressive implementation. This is to say that state-
hood, remaining at the pinnacle of entities possessed with international legal personality, is 
unlikely to disappear. However, assessing the extent to which this most fundamental of legal 
structures allows itself to adapt to modern realities, such as the inescapable emergence of collec-
tive rights as a product of international human rights law, is the objective of this product of re-
search.  
 
 CHAPTER ONE 
Formulating the modern territorial state 
Hegemony is a primal factor in societal ordering, and thus it is also a factor in modern terri-
torial statehood. It assumed a paramount position in the expansion of the European state to 
worldwide dominance through colonialism. European colonialism aimed at ‘civilising’ the ‘un-
civilised’ by bringing non-European lands into European society through the imposition of the 
European legal form, wherever possible. That this occurred at the apex of classical legal posi-
tivism is not coincidental, although modern international law now aims to negate the most 
coercive forms of inter-societal hegemony. However, the modern territorial state should not 
be confused with a nation-state. As evidenced inter alia by the partition of Africa in the late 
1800s, this partition by European colonialists caused deep societal transformations. These 
transformations were followed by the creation of new territorial sovereignties through de-
colonisation. This leads to a method of interpretation of modern legal statehood which views 
territorial considerations as distinctly ‘fixed’. This is contrasted with the governance capabili-
ties of such states, which are considerably more ‘fluid’. As this fluidity is recognised by inter-
national law, it implies that a ‘civilised’, modern territorial state could potentially have critical 
deficiencies in governance capability. It may be that such states tend to administer an exces-
sively coercive form of hegemony as well. The modern territorial state is thus one which is 
not necessarily formed through empiricism, but more predominantly developed as a result of 
the need for an emerging, formalistic, and purportedly all-encompassing ‘positivist’ public in-
ternational law to address a potential contradiction between ‘nation’ and ‘state’ under a 
common chapeau. The tensions between ‘empirical’ and ‘conceptual’ formulation of state-
hood as a legal precept will form, in the main, the basis for this study. 
The relationship between statehood and social order: Identifying early founda-
tions 
The present analysis begins with a brief commentary about the difficulties in generally 
thinking about states and statehood. This is perhaps self-apparent when considering the enor-
mity of the task at hand, as statehood is probably the foremost universal instrument. 
Planet Earth has been divided into a comprehensive series of entities attributable to one 
particular state, to the exclusion of another. Explorers have landed far and wide throughout 
‘modern times’, i.e., the Common Era. What one thinks of ‘history’ is a reality largely tainted by 
the reality of universal statehood. One would have to think very carefully to identify a geo-
graphic region of Planet Earth that is ‘undiscovered’ or ‘undefined’ and, as such, unincorporated 
into the functional system of public international law.1 
Every part of the planet is assigned to, or affiliated with, a state. Concurrently, every state is 
of specific legal construction. All states are known to have international legal personality, or 
standing before, and obligation to, a body of law directed at states. This ‘international law’ is, it-
self, largely consent-based, something formed as the amalgamation of convention, custom and 
other specific theoretical principles inherent within the states of the world. One would not go 
too far wrong in considering international law, generally, as being the sum of history’s decisions. 
Yet most likely as an after-effect of the twentieth century’s two world wars, this international law 
also reflects a societal will for the consensual imposition of restraint in one’s actions within that 
                                                                  
1 With exception of the high seas and the sui generis entity that is Antarctica. 
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society. On the international level, that society is comprised of political actors, and those politi-
cal actors are sovereign states.2 
This political underpinning of states represents a delineated repository of power not sub-
ordinated to other religious or secular authorities. As from the 1970s, it is furthermore impossi-
ble to deny that ‘an age of rights’ is inherent in modern times. This phrase is meant to reflect the 
ascendancy of universal protections of individual rights, and all responsibilities associated 
therein, to global society. Holders of state power are not unlimited in their choice of actions in 
state activity. In times of armed conflict, customary international humanitarian law, coupled 
particularly with that specified by the four Geneva Conventions and their optional protocols, 
serves to set a certain benchmark of legal standards obliging basic standards of conduct towards 
individuals acting under the rubric of state authority related to the use of armed force. Interna-
tional human rights law similarly establishes a framework for individuals to have recourse to the 
rights and responsibilities set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subse-
quent state practice. 
‘Statehood’, as a legal construction, tolerates the possibility that different circumstances, in 
otherwise similar cases, may produce different results. The reality is that throughout its jurisdic-
tion, yet regardless of its formation and composition, the state will play a supreme role in mani-
festing its legal personality. This reflects the interesting dichotomy of public international law at 
the outset of the 21st Century. Although states are no longer wholly unconstrained in their own 
actions, they remain the largest and highest repositories of legal power. The underlying question 
is that, if states are sovereign, then sovereign states may do as they will, yet it is similarly obvious 
that there exists sufficient judicial will to safeguard the roles of citizens within the state. State-
hood is intrinsically linked to a functional judiciary capable of deciding specific questions put to 
it in the established forums. Statehood thus presumes, in some way, that each judicial forum is 
able to translate such state activity into binding jurisprudence, all the while upholding ‘interna-
tional’ standards of behaviour vis-à-vis individuals. 
Statehood often fails at this task, however. Statehood, whether overtly, or by exploiting the 
underlying juridical premise supporting its own existence, puts itself before its own subjects. A 
state may even impose its own will on individuals to better serve specific interests that it deems 
sufficiently significant to enforce or regulate. Nevertheless, that the reality of modern life may, 
on occasion, gravitate towards the Hobbesian floor never negates the existence of the Kantian 
ceiling. With limited exceptions, individuals are subjected to a basic core of protections through 
customary international human rights law and international humanitarian law. Regardless of 
circumstances, customary international human rights law and international humanitarian law 
establish the clear and absolute minimums necessary to paint a fuller picture of law. Indeed 
most states supplant these bare minimums with their signature, accession to, and ratification of, 
separate covenants on human rights and humanitarian law. 
State power in the 21st Century is composed differently than that of the 19th, and that this 
is so deserves specific mention. In strictly normative terms, if a law is designed to be a law, then it 
is a law and will, over time, develop jurisprudence. This is as true for human rights law and hu-
manitarian law as it is for penal law, contract law or other legal forms. In practice, jurispruden-
tial development will favour some principles over others. If it were to be assumed that the 
cumulative force of international humanitarian law and international human rights law has de-
veloped sufficient jurisprudence so as to work as a grounding force, the dichotomy of modern 
                                                                  
2 Cf. L. Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, 216 Rec. des Cours 22 (1989): “First, 
law is politics.” 
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public international law is apparent. Speaking to the example at hand, penal law enjoys, and 
may tend to exhibit, a structural dominance. However, the practical dominance of e.g. penal 
law over e.g. human rights law does not constitute a normative relativism between these two 
forms. That is to say, both conceptualisations of the law are of equal merit and validity, as both 
conceptualisations form part of the total legal sphere as such.  
Thus there exists an external counterweight against state malfeasance towards individu-
als, such as that of the internationally-established core provisions of humanitarian and human 
rights law.3 With that rubric in mind, let it then be presumed that there are benefits for individu-
als to the socio-juridical construction of ‘statehood’, and those benefits of statehood are over-
arching, at least conceptually.4 One operates, furthermore, from the basis that a state is, or 
certainly purports to be, an everlasting entity. This is reflected through perhaps the foremost as-
sumption, in analysing international affairs, that of the presumption in favour of the continuity 
of the state. This is most likely due to the fact that states, themselves, are practical guarantors of 
the concept of sovereignty, or the employment of legitimate authority by a specific entity. In 
terms of legality, an entity exercising sovereignty over a portion of territory is viewed as uphold-
ing ‘territorial integrity’ over its portion of the earth. Seen in aggregate, the fact that each state ex-
ercises sovereignty over its own portion of the earth (i.e., its own ‘territory’ is ‘administered’) is 
reinforcing territorial integrity as a highly important variable in the statehood equation. By 
forming a system governed by peer relations, linkages have been made to such an extent that the 
phrase an ‘international community’ of states is universal and common parlance. When each 
state upholds its own territorial integrity through the exercise of its own sovereignty, a self-
reinforcing system of such statehood is formed throughout the planet. Over time, expected be-
haviours flowing from this system are established. 
Thus, the roots of this system run deep, and statehood remains at its consistent core. Ac-
cording to Wolfgang Friedmann, a state would give up its basic primacy in international rela-
tions (and therefore its privileged access to the international stage) “only if national entities were 
absorbed in a world state”.5 The United Nations is indeed the legitimate and globally recognised 
generator of legal texts concerning states and their peer interactions, but it was never designed to 
be a ‘world state’ per se. Therefore, the importance of the concept of territorial integrity becomes 
inherently apparent: everyone currently would readily agree that one singular global state 
hardly exists, and yet the existence of an ‘international community’ is often proclaimed on the 
global stage. Hence, the reality that states, themselves, play a primal role within that ‘community’ 
becomes apparent; it is further implied that the inherent precepts of ‘statehood’, as the basis of 
that community, are projected throughout that community, international or otherwise. 
The precepts of ‘statehood’ must be reconsidered. It may be that they can be distilled both 
to animate and inanimate notions, as a state certainly is more than a piece of land or a group of 
similarly minded individuals. Yet, here, a truth is revealed: because of the essential importance 
attached to it, statehood also implies a strong human link, both within the municipal amalgama-
                                                                  
3 Such a statement draws heavily upon the work of the United Nations Organization, in that the ratification 
of international humanitarian law was facilitated by the United Nations, and the codification and estab-
lishment of international human rights law was catalysed by the UN. Operating from the basis of five dec-
ades of UN practice, all states now are bound to the notion that all individuals possess a battery of certain 
indelible rights regardless of the state of their residence or citizenship. 
4 For example, the predisposition in mentality that one would rather be a citizen of a state than a stateless 
person is borne out by the establishment, during the considerable period of postwar international legal 
development through the United Nations system, of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of State-
less Persons (ECOSOC Resolution 526A (XVII), 26 April 1954). 
5 W. Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law 214 (1964). 
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tion of itself as well as through the interactions of these municipal amalgamations collectively on 
the world stage.6 This may account for some of the difficulties in defining and, particularly, cate-
gorising statehood, as is manifested in the often-divergent views expressed in academic litera-
ture and in general understanding of international affairs. 
The ‘nation-state’: An imprecise yet omnipresent fusion of two independent concepts 
This hybrid notion of connection between a portion of the earth’s land and its own in-
habitants can be seen as taking on its own form, in a contemporary setting. The underlying as-
sumption herein is often to equate statehood with the idea of a ‘nation-state’, implying an intense 
connection between a people, or a collective grouping of individuals, and its ‘own’ territory. 
Whether this is actually the case is worthy of closer examination, however, not just because state 
boundaries and borders can be obviously artificial and arbitrary, such as in much of Africa and 
in Southwest Asia. The prevalence of this assumption in a modern global context is seen by 
some as being undesirable, however, as it is seen as something that constitutes a real detriment 
to the establishment of a true ‘global society’.7 It is therefore not unreasonable to assume that, at 
least in some circumstances of statehood,8 ‘nationality’9 is a subset of statehood, subjugated to its 
own terms and demands. Under a global human rights regime, no person can be deprived of a 
nationality.10 However, given that, with nominal frequency, some individuals do change their 
nationality between one or more states, whereas it is a much rarer occasion when states ex-
change territory with each other, the inherent distinction between the two concepts is exposed. 
The potential dominance of ‘statehood’ over ‘nationality’ within the concept of a ‘nation-
state’ presupposes an inherent link between the specific categorisation of a territory’s organisa-
tion according to the will of its inhabitants, in spite of the fact that this may or may not be 
grounded in actual fact: for example, it is one thing to be ‘French’, or ‘Japanese’, or ‘American’ 
(wherein real ‘nations’—constructed or indigenous—are equated with different ‘states’); it is ar-
guably less distinct to be ‘Ivorian’ or ‘Rwandan’ or ‘Angolan’ (wherein different societies have 
markedly less clearly-defined relations with their ‘states’ in other regions). 
The variables at hand involve the earth’s territory, the ‘things’ on that territory and the in-
dividuals in existence on that territory. Given the fragile nature of global society, it would hardly 
come as a surprise to see how conflicts can arise through the interaction of these independent 
variables. And yet, the idea of ‘nation-state’ has become a colloquial and seemingly ubiquitous 
fusion of the legal concepts of ‘statehood’ and ‘nationality’. Nevertheless, the phrase is techni-
cally imprecise, because the concepts are not necessarily synonymous. Therefore, the question 
of the hybrid ‘nation-state’ is something that must be addressed directly from the outset. 
                                                                  
6 See e.g. U.S. Restatement (Third) at § 206, stating that the capacities, rights and duties of states include, 
inter alia, sovereignty over its territory and general authority over its nationals (emphasis added). 
7 Cf. D.P. Calleo, Reflections on the Idea of the Nation-State, in C.A. Kupchan (ed.) Nationalism and Na-
tionalities in the New Europe 15 (1995): “The nation-state remains the dominant political formula of our 
century, a reality regretted by many enlightened analysts of international affairs.” 
8 Statehood as a legal subject is discussed extensively in this chapter, infra at text accompanying note 139 
et seq. 
9 See e.g. Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Article 15.  
10 The right to a nationality was less controversial in the drafting of the UDHR than was the right to a 
freedom of movement. But, obviously, changing one’s nationality would be nearly impossible without 
freedom of movement, and protections against arbitrary deprivation of one’s own nationality are needed 
for a state’s citizens returning from abroad. See V. Boutkevitch, Freedom of Movement, working paper for 
the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/22, 22 July 1997. 
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A nation-state, in its most unadorned formulation, can be seen as existing when a 
demonstratively historical link can be established between a measure of the earth’s territory and 
those who inhabit it. The historical link by the inhabitants comprises the nation; the territory 
comprises, in the main, the state. Although it would be perhaps unwise to enter into the minu-
tiae of nationalism at this stage, thereby heeding Eric Hobsbawm’s oft-repeated warning that 
“the problem is that there is no way of telling the observer how to distinguish a nation from other 
identities a priori, as we can tell him or her how to recognize a bird or to distinguish a mouse 
from a lizard”11, it would be misleading to imply that the concept of nation-state is monolithic. 
Although one individual human being has a specific legal right to take possession of one nation-
ality, or perhaps multiple nationalities due to personal circumstances, when multiple individual 
human beings are grouped together, as a result of cultural factors and geographic proximity, 
such specific legal rights become more complicated to define inter-temporally.  
This study attempts to identify and evaluate the effects of such complications through the 
‘coloniser’ / ‘colonised’ relationship. It begins with a general assessment of the traditional criteria 
for statehood and becomes progressively more focused on the relative legal weight of these cri-
teria in the postcolonial period. In doing so, the relative weight of the various criteria for state-
hood can be contrasted with the status quo, under varying practical circumstances, to determine 
whether benefit may be derived from greater legal weight being attached to variables of greater 
contemporary importance, as contrasted with the colonial period.  
This general methodology is of interest because, in the academic literature on the topic, it 
is hard to identify one singularly-accepted specific juridical definition of the ‘nation’, as it is ag-
grandised into a collective element, as opposed to one specific individual possessing a national-
ity. The wide diversities of peoples and ways of life across the planet cannot be ignored when 
attempting to think generally about states and statehood. Despite this, the singular concept of ‘na-
tion-state’ remains in common parlance, with the ‘state’ having a specific legal definition and the 
‘nation’ tending to take the form of Walter Bagehot’s famous observation: “We know what it is 
when you do not ask us, but we cannot very quickly explain or define it”.12 
Legal consequences of the interactions between ‘nations’ and ‘states’ cannot be ignored 
under modern international law. The concept of the nation-state must be addressed with preci-
sion, and it is here where political theory can play a useful role in beginning to channel a separa-
tion of the concepts. A theoretical ‘deconstruction’ is provided by Barry Buzan, who has 
identified four specific models of ‘nation-states’.13 The first model, working from the bottom up, 
is one of a (pure) ‘nation-state’, where a ‘nation’ historically predates the ‘state’ and contempo-
rarily the ‘state’ protects the ‘nation’; Hungary, Italy and Japan are cited as examples. The second 
model, or the ‘state-nation’, follows a top-down approach whereby the state fosters the devel-
opment of a nation; the states of the ‘new world’ (the Americas, Australia) are given as examples. 
Buzan’s third model is the ‘part nation-state’, whereby one nation is divided amongst two or 
more states; the Korean, Chinese and Greek nations are cited as examples. Finally, his fourth 
model, the ‘multination-state’ can be further broken down into two subgroups. The first sub-
group is that of the ‘federative state’, whereby the state is completely un-rooted in one specific 
nationalism, thereby allowing multiple nationalities to exist within the state (Canada and—his 
book having been written in 1991—Yugoslavia are examples). The second subgroup is known 
                                                                  
11 E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality 5 (1990) [hereinafter 
Hobsbawm]. 
12 W. Bagehot, Physics and Politics 20 (1887), as quoted in Hobsbawm, supra note 11, at 1. 
13 See B. Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold 
War Era (1991), at 72 et seq. 
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as the ‘imperial state’ wherein one nation demonstrates active dominance of the state, usually to 
the detriment of other national groups within the state (Russians within the Tsarist and Soviet 
states, Punjabis in Pakistan and Tutsis in Burundi are Buzan’s examples). 
‘Statehood’, interacting as it somehow must with ‘nationhood’, takes on a spectrum of 
contextually-defined meanings, on the one hand, yet retains its almost dogmatic meaning of 
doctrinal simplicity, on the other.14 For now, four points will be made which may help to clarify 
lines of thinking. In the first instance, statehood can be seen in both inanimate and animate 
forms, reflecting two distinct concepts. The inanimate view quite simply delineates geographic 
territory (roughly equivalent to ‘the state’), whilst the animate view identifies specific linkages 
between land and inhabitant (roughly equivalent to ’the nation’). Moreover, as has been dis-
cussed, there also exists some undefined linkage between the concurrently existing animate and 
inanimate concepts of statehood. Thus, while the intellectual confusion, which tends to equate 
statehood with some sense of a nation-state, does seem quite prevalent, it is also important to 
bear in mind that statehood can also be legitimately viewed in a much more restrictive manner.  
Individual states are usually well set to preserve their own independence—as well as that 
of all states collectively—to the highest extent possible. This quest for independence leads to two 
important implications for the international legal system, forming the aforementioned points 
three and four. 
The presumption in favour of the continuity of the state forms the core of international 
law. As such, the modern notion of ‘state failure’ is anathema to classical legal positivism. This 
reflects the very strong legal presumption that once a state is created it continues to exist in per-
petuity as a specific legal person. Bilateral treaty-making would be of little relevance if statehood 
were conceived on the basis of excessive malleability. Classical international law also makes this 
assumption because of the great importance placed in demonstrating state practice, for the pur-
pose of creating customary international law. Such state practice must consider issues such as: 
generality of the practice, its duration of time, the consistency and uniformity of its application, 
et al. Furthermore, in assessing the validity of state practice, opposing state actions such as si-
lence, acquiescence, protest and contrary practice may all be employed. The stability of the in-
ternational legal system is thus predicated upon a clear understanding of what constitutes 
legality per se, which reinforces the expectation of irrevocability inherent in statehood’s classical 
legal formulation.  
The fourth point simply draws marked attention to extent to which states preserve their 
independent decision-making authority, even in an environment otherwise conducive to, and 
encouraging of, multilateralism.15  
As the discussion progresses, it will be of interest to present a historical overview of the in-
stillation of the territorial state across the globe. The consensus in the international legal com-
                                                                  
14 Cf. particularly United Nations Charter at Article 2(1): “The Organization is based on the principle of 
the sovereign equality of all its members”; UN Charter at Article 4(1): “Membership in the United Na-
tions is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter 
and, in the judgement of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations”; Montevi-
deo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933). 
15 As the university professor and former executive staff member in the cabinet of UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan, John Ruggie, writes: “[N]o state goes out of its way to construct international collective ar-
rangements. Where possible, unilateral or bilateral arrangements are preferred. Collective arrangements 
are turned to only when national objectives cannot be achieved in their absence. Thus, collective arrange-
ments are derivative and their purpose is to compensate for the ‘imperfections’ in the state system”. Cf. 
J.G. Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization 55-56 (1998). 
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munity would be that the 1648 Peace of Westphalia,16 which marked the advent of sovereign 
states both with legal personality and territorial limits. The system of international relations, 
which persisted and evolved until the creation of the United Nations,17 was thus established and, 
prior to the two world wars, bore witness to the development of the positivist international legal 
system of comprised sovereign, exclusive and so-called ‘civilised’ states. The Peace of West-
phalia was a series of treaties that cemented the modern territorial state in law and politics. Al-
though the historical proximity of this aspect of international law to the law of modern 
statehood is obvious, care should be taken not to ignore that the concepts of statehood pre-
dated the Westphalian state, which are also worthy of consideration. 
Anticipating and acquiring modern statehood: The role of hegemony as a com-
ponent of territorial ordering and administration 
When the Holy Roman Empire began to crumble and an increasing number of States became 
independent of the Emperor in law as well as in fact, chancelleries had at their disposal a rea-
sonable number of standard forms of treaties and even fragmentary rules of international 
customary law which had long been in use, even though they were not necessarily consid-
ered as a branch of law separate from municipal law. This continuity, as well as the gradual 
character of the transition from the medieval order to the modern State, deserves being em-
phasized, as these significant aspects of the evolution of present-day international law have 
been unduly neglected.18 
The limitations of this study prohibit a detailed discussion on forms of statehood before 
the emergence of the modern European state. Thus, the primary purpose of this section is to 
demonstrate the existence of some forms of statehood as precursors to the modern state system 
as defined by the Peace of Westphalia. It should be noted, however, that, as the pathway to con-
temporary globalised statehood is European in origin, only the most direct precursors to the de-
velopment of the Westphalian state would be feasibly addressed in this analysis. Even within this 
limitation, however, a series of relevant observations could be made about the foundations of 
societal order and, specifically, the ways of guaranteeing such order. The sub-text throughout 
this period is one of hegemony, or the presence of dominance, either by acquiescence or by 
force, of one collective grouping over other collective groupings such that the interests of the 
weak are subjugated to those of the powerful. 
The question of hegemony is thus a recurring theme throughout this study. To begin such 
explorations, it may be asserted from an early stage that hegemony, through colonialism, fol-
lowed by a rapid abandonment of colonial rule, preserved the colonially-administrative status 
quo in the postcolonial state. This is to say that, in later history, many states affected by colonial-
ism did not automatically revert to pre-existing realities following independence. Colonialism 
was a largely transitory force, and yet such transitory influence also tended to find a juridical 
base, as a result of the actions taken by local administrators in guaranteeing the legitimacy of the 
colonialists’ actions. The international rôles played by colonising states and their eventual ad-
ministrative subjects are particularly governed by treaties of cession entered into by indigenous 
governing officials and European powers, particularly at the height of colonial expansion, at the 
latter half of the 17th Century.19 
                                                                  
16 Discussed extensively infra this chapter at text accompanying note 34.  
17 See A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (1995) [hereinafter Cassese], at 325. 
18 G. Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law, Book 1, 7 (4th ed., 1960) [hereinafter Schwarzen-
berger]. 
19 It will be important to observe throughout that reciprocity is a fundamental underpinning of public in-
ternational law, most colonial histories can date back to a specific treaty, from where ‘original title’ can be 
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The present analysis aims at remaining cognisant of these historical realities and attempts 
to reframe them in a modern form. What should therefore come under closer scrutiny is the ex-
tent to which colonial hegemony becomes internalised in the postcolonial state. A true exami-
nation of statehood in vogelvlucht cannot exist without considering the extent to which societies 
have been inter-temporally modified by juridical, positivist statehood. The question of what af-
fect such historical interactions have on modern society is not insignificant. Although it is true 
that international law gives foremost respect to the purely juridical definition of statehood, it 
would, however, also be correct to say that ‘statehood’ per se has taken on numerous recognised 
forms prior to the ascendancy of the specific legal authority of a recognised government, across 
a defined territory.  
Identifying socio-cultural fusions, from antiquity to Westphalia 
Although linkages between ancient Greek civilisation and modern territorial statehood 
are conceivable, in analysing the early European context, it follows that Rome was an even 
greater pre-Westphalian ‘state’. It began as a minute settlement in central Italy. From roughly 
500 BCE, Rome was organised in the form of a republic, and soon began a gluttonous, vainglo-
rious, yet not wholly unsuccessful, expansion. The conquest of the entire Italian peninsula was 
followed by Sicily, Spain, North Africa and, later, the Hellenic area, thereby acquiring control of 
the entire Mediterranean. By the year 475, it stretched from England to Arabia, having shed the 
republic for an empire, under Caesar. Along the way, grandiose physical and political infra-
structures, of legendary importance, developed from what first originated as a conservative, 
agrarian society. Toward the end of the Roman Empire, the challenges of governing over such 
an expansive geography made it partially anarchical, and it eventually collapsed as a political 
body, although its cultural dynamic would prove to have great centrifugal force.  
Although these antiquarian experiences find nominal parallel with the global expansion 
of the colonial European legal system, the changing nature of Roman history, over time, defies 
broad generalisations.20 This discussion limits itself to establishing a fundamental underlying 
point: ancient Rome was a hugely impressive force for societal homogenisation, via the em-
ployment of its own hegemony throughout its spheres of influence.21 Homogenisation is a so-
cietal force potentially laden with hegemony. Rome, in antiquity, did largely as it wished, as 
have later states, many of which have suffered from similar inter-temporal instability. Yet this 
does not negate the fact that homogenisation was the prime antecedent for future European so-
cieties. This thereby makes it the prime antecedent for future global state societies, as well. 
This is to say that Roman society instilled, developed and refined the imperial domina-
tion by one superior culture over others of its time. It undoubtedly evolved the concept of he-
gemony to a higher level than previously observed. The powers of Roman assimilation were 
profound: it was able to incorporate hugely divergent peoples into its society—particularly early 
on, during the Empire—by making the idea of Roman citizenship a political one. As Roman so-
ciety expanded and exercised hegemony over others, those dominated by Rome were seen as 
barbarians, in the first instance. Only by embracing the Latin language and identifying with 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
seen to have been derived. 
20 For commentary on the earlier Roman civilisation, see e.g. J.M. Roberts, History of the World (2d. ed, 
1993) [hereinafter Roberts], at Book 1, Chapters 6-9; for later Roman civilisation, see e.g. W.W. Buckland, 
A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian (3d. rev. ed. 1963). And see generally M. van 
Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (1999). 
21 Cf. Roberts, supra note 20 at 219: “If we no longer look back on the Roman achievement as our ancestors 
often did, feeling dwarfed by it, we can still be puzzled and even amazed that men could do so much.” 
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‘Roman’ ways would this citizenship become complete indeed, by no means were all subjects of 
Roman rule ever to be considered as full citizens anyway. The pathway to Roman civilisation 
was laden with tyrannical, exclusive processes. The strict societal hierarchy within Roman civi-
lisation was, in many ways, reflected through Roman law (although early Roman law was 
hardly immune to the emperor’s whim) and subjugated to administrative structures within such 
law. As the empire expanded, a central bureaucracy was then developed and expanded to sup-
port it, which became an essential feature of governance. Ultimately, the level of homogenisa-
tion, as well as the level of implied consent to such homogenisation, on the part of citizens (and 
even to a certain extent, the outsiders commonly viewed as so-called ‘barbarians’), was high. As 
Adam Watson comments: 
[E]thnic and civil loyalties increasingly found their place within an imperial political and cul-
tural horizon. The will and the capacity to assimilate subject peoples, and their eagerness to 
be assimilated, were greater in the Roman Empire than in any other imperial system of antiq-
uity. In this respect the only empire comparable to Rome has been China.22 
Thus ancient Rome was active in cementing defined territorial borders as cornerstones of 
societal development. From the earliest Roman settlements, territorial divisions became some-
thing constructed from human decision rather than as an inheritance from local surroundings. 
The geography and topography of ancient Latium was open and surprisingly unconstrained for 
the landscape. Furthermore, from the earliest times, the centre of the Italian peninsula was a 
meeting point for varied groups of peoples, such that the idea of constructing formal demarca-
tions of territory seemed natural. As Rome expanded, so did the practice of accommodating in-
dividuals from differing national backgrounds under a common rubric. This certainly was a 
discriminatory and aspirational system, whereby newcomers hoped to find societal places 
alongside autochthonous inhabitants. Over time, throughout Roman lands, this led to “a hierar-
chy of territorial divisions, commencing with the pagus at the base, then the civitatis, and at the 
apex, the provincia or regio”.23 In ancient Rome, each division had its own internal structure, 
from which collective control structures developed in a discriminate, yet unsystematic, manner 
throughout its spheres of influence. Rome expanded rapidly, and soon the Roman world be-
came a known, and defined, entity. A concept of terra nullius—land attributed to no one—did 
not exist in the highly structured regions of direct Roman governance.  
Thus a territory under direct Roman rule was directly accounted for and administered by 
Rome.24 Two observations may be made on the nascent foundations for future international law 
concerning territory. The first is the emergence of a concept of territorial integrity. The Romans 
themselves saw the totality of the Roman Empire as a specific concept—the imperium, which 
was the apex of Roman hierarchy as a whole, from which the modern notion of sovereignty was 
derived.25 Seen another way, control over territory is reflective of ownership of territory, from 
which an administering authority would exercise sovereignty, and a failure to occupy territory 
would preclude that entity from either being owned per se, or as being treated as sovereign. Ergo, 
the absence of terra nullius is to be found within Roman society, and this further implied a cohe-
sive, sovereign, territorial unit. Of course things were more complicated in reality, as the emer-
gence of procedural rules related to possession of territory within the Roman legal system show. 
As could be imagined, on occasion, two or more parties might claim ownership of the same bit 
of territory. When this occurred, provisional possession of the land was given to the actual pos-
                                                                  
22 See A. Watson, The Evolution of International Society (1992), at 102. 
23 M. Anderson, Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World 13 (1996) [hereinafter 
Anderson]. 
24 Id. at 14. 
25 Id. 
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sessor, thereby shifting the burden of proof before a praetor regarding ownership to the non-
possessor.26  
Thus the second observation is that this early Roman uti possidetis has set the stage for fu-
ture thinking about possession. Modern uti possidetis juris will be seen to operate chiefly in the 
sense that recognised possession of a territory means everything to its juridical form. However, 
‘modern’ possession of a territory will always beg the question of how is the preservation (and 
thus who is the preserver) of the ‘peace and dignity of the state’ to be continually upheld. That a 
state reinforces peace and dignity, as a matter of practice, is demonstrated, for example, by 
criminal indictments throughout common law jurisdictions. Uti possidetis juris is free to borrow 
terminology from its antiquarian past employing a usage irrelevant to its past construction. Uti 
possidetis, in Roman antiquity meant that, if one held an object in one’s own physical posses-
sion, such possession could be claimed as evidence of ownership were one to be called before a 
judiciary. Uti possidetis juris, in modernity, means that, when constructing a universalism, such 
as a coherent system of public international law, the effects and indeed the after-effects of colo-
nialism are likely to reflect a dominant predisposition towards continuity. To speak colloqui-
ally, both the historical and modern forms of uti possidetis draw from the notion of ‘finders’ 
keepers’. This was the ambition—that post-colonial states would achieve a form of genuine 
competence to manifest independence; however, such independent forms would only be wit-
nessed long after imperial Rome’s own demise. 
Interpreting specific concepts derived from pre-Westphalian socio-cultural fusions  
The sheer size of the empire implied that its effects were geographically far-reaching and 
profoundly influential. As the formal Roman civilisation peaked and declined with the splitting 
of the empire into east and west, its societal vibrancy carried on. Furthermore, the rise of Latin 
Christianity throughout the region perpetuated the notion of universalism, which further con-
tinued homogenisation in a way not far removed from the original Roman tradition. Mean-
while, individuals simultaneously began to organise themselves in societal groupings which 
were more immediately based on local reality than universal principle, and a different type of 
state was formed. As Anderson writes: “With hindsight, there is a sense of historical inevitability 
about the shift to state sovereignty; but absolute control of territory by rulers recognizing no su-
perior authority was for a long time challenged by various forms of universalism.”27 
Basic elements of modern territorial statehood—e.g. assimilation, consent, governance, 
hegemony, sovereignty and territoriality—were framed in ancient times. Additional clarity to 
these concepts would be developed further along the pathway that led the dominance of 
Europe on the global level. However, the increasing convolution of history makes it a different 
exercise to distil into brief, written form the period between the death of the Roman Empire and 
the birth of an international community of sovereign states. Still, in Europe, the refinement of 
concepts of nationality and statehood were the prime developments of the medieval period,28 as 
                                                                  
26 The declaration by a praetor between two contending parties was that “uti eas oedes de quibus agitur, nec 
vi, nec clam, nec precario, alter ab altero possidetis, quominus ita possideatis vim fieri veto”, meaning, 
roughly: “as you possess the [properties] referred to, without having obtained possession thereof, one 
from the other, by force, or clandestinely, or by sufferance, I forbid that you be hindered in continuing so 
possessed”. It is more concisely summarised is uti possidetis, ita possideatis: as you possess, so may you 
possess. See J.B. Moore, Costa Rica-Panama Arbitration: Memorandum on Uti Possidetis (1913), at 6. 
27 Anderson, supra note 23, at 17. 
28 See Watson, supra note 22, at 142 et seq. 
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manifested through the social stratification of nobility, clergy, tradesmen and commoners.29 As 
Latin Christianity expanded, so did the collective European territorial space, but with a more 
autonomous character than ever before seen. This is implied through the disappearance of a 
central bureaucracy in Rome, coupled with the continuity of a unifying force of religion—and 
indeed, religions, given the reformation of Catholic traditions during this time period.  
The Holy Roman Empire itself was, at first, an attempt to revive the collapsed western half 
of the original Roman Empire.30 In that regard, and in spite of the fact that it ‘existed’ in various 
forms for roughly a thousand years (800-1806), its success may be questioned, as it was territori-
ally limited roughly to present-day Germany and some of the statos of northern Italy. Its overall 
authority was dubious, as the Roman emperor’s power was limited from around circa 1250. By 
the 1400s, power was almost completely vested in the Hapsburg family.31 Capitalism and trade 
were prominent features of the period, and societal developments, such as the Protestant refor-
mation, were also highly significant. Here, overt linkages between the state itself and the society 
within that state are made. Watson, for example, points out the need for Lutheran-minded lead-
ers of German statos to ensure loyalty from their subjects, to prevent conflict at this time of flux, 
and to take preventive steps in order to extract this loyalty.32 This, then, obviously was a far cry 
from the power and influence once effected by Rome directly and through its soldiers posted 
throughout its empire. Indeed, power and influence were generally manifested in a quite differ-
ent manner, as the time period was marked by extreme warfare with monotheistic religion and 
monarchical power at its core.33 
The Peace of Westphalia: Socio-cultural fusions crystallised into a juridical ‘statehood’ 
As time passed, it can be observed how the pinnacle of this phenomenon was the multi-
faced, brutal Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648).34 Although it was fought mainly in modern-day 
Germany, practically all of Western Europe had a hand in the conflict, as powerful European 
societies such as France and Sweden were keen to limit the power and influence of the now-
fractured Holy Roman Empire. Religion did indeed play a large role in the early stages of the 
war; however, towards the end, it became an overt contest for hegemony between the 
Hapsburgs and France, in particular. In the end, the conflict became haphazard and confused. 
In signing the Peace of Westphalia, the parties to the conflict recognised the independence of 
each its signatories as sovereign states. As the emperor in Rome was therefore made formally 
redundant, the political climate of the time tended towards consolidation in France, the Nether-
lands and Switzerland, whilst the Hapsburg dynasty and the Holy Roman Empire were left 
                                                                  
29 See generally Roberts, supra note 20, at book 2, chapter 5. 
30 But cf. Voltaire’s famous comment that, at the end, it was “neither Holy, nor Roman, nor an Empire”. 
31 See Roberts, supra note 20, at 549, 579. 
32 Cf. Watson, supra note 22, at 173: “The essence of the politique (of the Augsburg compromise of 1555) 
[…] was to allow rulers large and small, and even some individual towns, the right to choose the religious 
denomination of their stato, and to allow dissatisfied subjects to ‘vote with their feet’. An extensive trans-
fer of populations within Germany followed.” 
33 Viz. The Christian Crusades (1096-1291), the Hundred Years’ War (1337-1453), the War of the Roses 
(1455-1485), the Dutch Revolt (1554-1648), the English Civil War (1642-1651) and the Thirty Years’ 
War (1614-1648).  
34 Cf. Roberts, supra note 20, at 581: “With a brief lull as it opened, European rulers and their people in-
dulged in the seventeenth century in an orgy of hatred, bigotry, massacre, torture and brutality which has 
no parallel until the twentieth [century].” 
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fragmented and beaten. But therein lay the basis for territoriality-defined statehood and the right 
for a sovereign to govern that state. This set the stage for future global society.35 
Westphalia, if not negating overt hegemony in the European area outright, at least made it 
a bit more subtle. It is generally accepted that the Peace of Westphalia represented the birth of 
the modern state system,36 and therefore the birth of the ‘imperfect’ system of contemporary 
public international law with its fixed borders and sovereign equality of states. Essentially, the 
peace legitimised a society of sovereign states, which were not juridically equal. It saw the de-
velopment of an ‘anti-hegemonial order among states’ which “in practice recognized each 
other’s independence and dealt with each other on an equal plane”.37 In the post-hegemonial 
period it was realised that, absent a ‘true’ balance-of-power between sovereign states, negotiated 
rules of expected behaviours to which states bind themselves were necessary. Such rules began 
to develop, largely based on customary practice.38 One must be minded, however, to keep the 
accomplishments of the Westphalian peace in its proper perspective. Hedley Bull writes that the 
peace “marked the end of Hapsburg pretensions to universal monarchy”,39 which is, itself, sig-
nificant as explicitly legitimised partitioning the ‘universal’ Christendom into Catholic and Pro-
testant worlds. This may be the grandest legacy of Westphalia, as it led to, in Bull’s terms, a 
‘Christian international society’ which would, over time, develop into a ‘European international 
society’ and eventually a ‘world international society’ based on the sovereign territorial state. 40 
However, this is hardly cause for utopian celebration. As Stephen Krasner writes, “There 
has never been some golden age of the Westphalian state. The Westphalian model has never 
been more than a reference point or a convention; it has never been some deeply confining 
structure from which actors could not escape”.41 It has, however, cemented—more or less—the 
notion of sovereignty as the basis for legitimising governance. This seems clear when consider-
ing that the Westphalian peace legitimised the religious partition of Europe. In accepting Protes-
tantism, Westphalia opened the door to the notion of tolerance, by providing a limited measure 
of protection for religious minorities (even if the minimum guarantee of that protection was lim-
ited to being able to ‘vote with one’s feet’).42 It also gave rise to ways of using this sovereignty to 
guarantee the terms of the peace.43 
                                                                  
35 For discussion of the history of the Peace of Westphalia, see N.J. Schrijver, The Changing Nature of 
State Sovereignty, 70 BYIL 1999 65 (2000). And see R.G. Asch, The Thirty Years War: The Holy Roman 
Empire and Europe (1997). 
36 Cf. Damrosch et al, International Law: Cases and Materials xxii (4th ed., 2001) [hereinafter Damrosh et 
al, Int’l Law]; A. Cassese, International Law in a Divided World 34 (1986). 
37 Watson, supra note 22, at 187. 
38 Cf. Id. at 203: “The rules of the European commonwealth were there therefore not immutable ethical 
commandments; they could be modified by negotiation to keep pace with changing practice. Their func-
tion was to make international life more orderly and more predictable, safer and more civilized […].” 
39 H. Bull, The Anarchical Society 31 (1st ed., 1977). 
40 Id. at 27 et seq. But consider that this society existed only within Christendom collectively and was be-
ing in the process of being defined internally. 
41 S.D. Krasner, Compromising Westphalia, 20(3) Int’l Security 115 (Winter 1995-1996) [hereinafter 
Krasner]. 
42 Cf. L. Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AJIL 20, 23 (1948) [hereinafter Gross], citing the 
Treaty of Osnabrück which stated that, on all commissions of the Diet, equality between Catholicism and 
Protestantism was required ‘where possible’. 
43 Cf. Id. at 24, citing D.J. Hill, A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe, Vol. 
II, 605 (1925). Hill stated that Europe obtained “what may fairly be described as an international constitu-
tion, which gave to all its adherents the right of intervention to enforce its engagements”. 
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Herein one finds the philosophical underpinnings of statehood. This study will therefore 
draw repeated reference to the notion of ‘international legal positivism’, which is a primarily 
state-sponsored event, in that international law is the sum of the actions of states, and that legal 
positivism assumes that the validity of any law recognised as law per se is presumed independ-
ently of moral concerns or ethical values. As will be reiterated throughout the course of the pre-
sent discussion, if law is defined completely independently of morality, and the law of states 
largely defines the public international law, to what extent must the state itself uphold and reflect 
the basic standards of humanity?44 Or, conversely, to what extent must the state exist so as to dic-
tate and proscribe human activity though its sovereign acts?45 While it may even be possible to 
observe that modern international law has become sufficiently developed to construct nominal 
bridges between Hegel’s bottom-up and the Oppenheim’s top-down approaches, such discus-
sions find their genesis in Westphalia. 
Although the Westphalian peace caused the direct hegemony of one society over another 
to fall into disfavour, the Europe of those times was largely the antithesis of today’s pacific, con-
sensus-oriented ‘union’ of sovereign states subjected to a supranational legal hierarchy. Raw 
power still mattered a great deal, and the manifestation of such power in many ways mattered 
even more. These were the formations of a nascent, state-centred public international law, 
which indeed is the starting point for contemporary international law.46 The manifestation of 
this power was through the governance of the state. European states of the era were highly for-
malised and particular in their actions, and through the accumulating force of these actions, 
Europe began emerging into a community of sovereign states. That said, however, any idealism 
related to the use of the word ‘community’ must be kept firmly in check. This ‘community’ was 
one borne largely out of competitiveness and mistrust from one state to another, and of absolut-
ism vis-à-vis the subjects of any one particular state by that state itself. The community, as such, 
was grounded in the defensive manifestation of power by one Christian European state towards 
other Christian European states. Herein lies the origins of the balance-of-power system, which 
came to dominate European affairs more or less until the modern, post-war era. Leo Gross pro-
vides a succinct assessment: 
Instead of creating a society of states, the Peace of Westphalia, while paying lip-service to the 
idea of a Christian commonwealth, merely ushers in the era of sovereign absolutist states 
which recognized no superior authority. In this era the liberty of states becomes increasingly 
incompatible with the concept of the international community, governed by international law 
independent of the will of states. On the contrary, this era may be said to be characterized 
by the reign of positivism in international law. This positivism could not admit the existence 
of a society of states for the simple reason that it was unable to find a treaty or custom, pro-
ceeding from the will of states, which could be interpreted as the legal foundation of a com-
munity of states.47 
                                                                  
44 To develop the point somewhat, consider Hegel’s ‘philosophy of right’, reflecting his belief that law is a 
reflection of the daily activities of humankind. Legal norms, which are the product of natural human inter-
actions, are those having the best likelihood of obedience, and, from this, it can be inferred that the state 
exists in reflection of these activities and interactions. See particularly T. Knox, Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right (1942), at 136-148. 
45 Cf. L. Oppenheim, 1 International Law: A Treatise (2d ed., 1912), at 115: “In spite of all the differences in 
defining sovereignty, all authors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries agree that sovereignty is indi-
visible and contains the centralization of power in the hands of the Sovereign, whether a monarch or the 
people itself in a republic.” 
46 Cf. Gross, supra note 42, at 26: “[Westphalia] undoubtedly promoted the laicization of international law 
by divorcing it from any particular religious background, and the extension of its scope so as to include, 
on a footing of equality, republican and monarchical states.”  
47 Id. at 39. 
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Examining legal positivism, administrative governance and the underlying state 
The rise of positivism, as a legal form, will be put under close examination when the ‘civi-
lisation’ process is discussed later in this chapter.48 Anticipating this, for the moment it will be of 
interest to consider broadly the concept of governance. Soon after the end of the Thirty Years’ 
War, as the autonomous European societies confirmed by Westphalia began to take shape, 
governance primarily implied the advancement of the governor’s interests, whatever those 
might be. Usually, those interests were in some way related to defining and consolidating the 
state. Placing sovereignty in the hands of supreme individuals (indeed, numerous such indi-
viduals existed even within single ‘states’, in the early stages of the Westphalian peace) with little 
accountability for how that sovereignty was exercised, led to a different set of tensions. Sover-
eigns obtained their monopoly of force by extracting individual power and collectivising that 
power throughout their state, making various territorial and monarchical claims and generally 
taking actions as they saw fit.49 While, over time, this added definition to European territorial 
boundaries, it also caused this nascent international system to be inherently competitive and 
calculating. A system of absolute sovereignty disbursed amongst mutually-exclusive territorial 
states had arrived. Krasner crystallises sovereignty in four different, yet interrelated, ways which 
reflect this reality.50 He sees it, first, as the taking of decisions related to regulation of territorial 
borders, as well as decisions related to people and goods crossing those borders.51 Actions taken 
by sovereigns in the name of the state on the international plane are further seen as manifesta-
tions of sovereignty (and the conceptual basis for treaty-making and a parallel system of interna-
tional law). Finally, Krasner presents a conception of the ‘Westphalian model’ of sovereignty 
whereby political life is based on the concepts of territoriality and autonomy governed by do-
mestic political authorities. This certainly was something completely new in the historical de-
velopment of public international law.52 
These developments secured the position of the state in Christian European international 
society. Actions taken by sovereigns in the name of their state contributed to the development of 
a true international law. Although a sort of international law, as such, had had its adherents 
from the times of St. Thomas Acquinas and his just war theories and Grotius’ natural law rea-
soning, it was the rise of state-based and state-focused legal positivism on the international plane 
which established the permanence of statehood as a specific construction. It was the expansion 
of this model, by European colonialism and subsequent decolonisation, which globalised the 
phenomenon. This is why the territorial state is the baseline unit of analysis for contemporary 
international affairs. 
                                                                  
48 See generally B.V.A. Rolling, International Law in an Expanded World (1960). 
49 Cf. K.J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War 3 (1996): “The result was that as states became more 
established in their sovereignty, they became greater threats to their neighbors. Their rulers demanded 
that others recognize their status as sovereigns, but they did not always reciprocate the favor, for some as-
pired to reorganize the states system under principles different than that of sovereign equality of inde-
pendent states. They thought in terms of hierarchies and domination. Dreams of empire and hegemony 
did not die out with Charles V and the Treaties of Westphalia.”  
50 See Krasner, supra note 41, at 118-119. 
51 Cf. Anderson, supra note 23, at 19: “As far as crossing frontiers was concerned […] the right [of entry to 
a territory] was the gift of the sovereign, who could impose any conditions on foreigners who sought it.”  
52 Cf. Krasner, supra note 41, at 119: “A Westphalian state system is different from an empire, in which 
there is only one authority structure; it is different from tribes, in which authority is claimed over groups 
of individuals but not necessarily over specific geographic areas; it is different from European feudalism, 
where the Catholic Church claimed authority over some kinds of activities regardless of their location; 
and it is different from a system in which authority structures over different issue areas are not geo-
graphically coterminous, one possible description off the European Union.” 
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First, from Westphalia comes territoriality and sovereignty. Next, from more modern 
world history, comes the imposition of this socio-juridical construction onto non-European 
societies throughout the planet. Finally, a system of states upholding territorial integrity and en-
joying sovereign equality is at the cornerstone of contemporary international affairs. This is the 
reality under examination at present, as the next main substantive section of this study will ex-
amine the wholesale incorporation of the African continent into the emerging European 
model. For now, it would suffice to observe that a system of order has progressed, through the 
emergence of basic provisions of a positivist international law, of which states are both the prin-
cipal subjects and greatest beneficiaries. 
Bull has identified three functions of international law vis-à-vis international order: to 
identify a supreme way of universal political organisation (if such a task can indeed be done), to 
state the basic rules of coexistence of international society, and to promote compliance with 
these rules (and those of co-operation) in international society.53 These theoretical perspectives 
were only beginning to emerge in the post-Westphalian peace and may seem more theoretical 
than practical, even in contemporary times.54 This reality is fundamentally important when con-
sidering both the time required for a real, actual solidification of the Westphalian state system in 
Europe, and its imposition in lands world-wide. 
One last conceptual foundation of contemporary statehood should be considered 
through a prism of duality: both within the individual state as such and throughout all of the in-
dividual states as a whole. Aspects of Western statehood representing the very essence of origi-
nal Western traditions were transferred, by the growth and expansion of the European state 
system, even to lands having no contact with, or connection to, Western society. Perhaps this 
reality would be more benign if the Western state was not such an effective conduit for the mani-
festation of power. As the sociologist Michael Mann suggests, working from a mainline Webe-
rian perspective, power is diffused to an abstraction, through both religious and secular 
institutions, such as the contemporary state. While Mann has no romantic illusions about the 
causes for this—he finds its source more through the need to form credible external military op-
position than in an inherent desire for a truly enabling internal bureaucratic administration—he 
does identify a number of elements which were brought about by the eventual dissolution of the 
Holy Roman Empire and the birth of the state system. These are: “(a) a differentiated set of insti-
tutions and personnel, which embody (b) centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate 
outward to cover (c) a territorially demarcated area, over which it exercises (d) a monopoly of 
authoritative, binding rule-making, backed up by a monopoly of the means of physical vio-
lence”.55 
Towards an understanding of modern international law 
Some time has been spent setting the framework for the legal analysis at hand in its 
broader, socio-historical context. Such perspectives will be of particular usefulness in promul-
gating the notion that certain inter-societal relationships were in evidence prior to the significant 
expansionist activity, undertaken by the European colonialist powers, in the 1800s, and, there-
fore, although the law of sovereign states was, is and most likely will continue to be the primary 
foundation of public international law, it is not the case that inter-societal groupings, as may be 
                                                                  
53 Bull, supra note 39, at 135. 
54 Although the dynamic changes in international law since the end of the second world war negate this 
statement to an ever-growing degree. 
55 M. Mann, States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology 4 (1988). 
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observed through ‘statehood’, are the direct result of the global form of statehood as established 
through global colonialism. 
In this sense, this study is broadly seeking to explain the phenomenon of global statehood 
in three inter-temporal perspectives: pre-colonial, whereby natural groupings self-identified an 
a ‘national’ sense; colonial, whereby the planet was ‘carved up’ and integrated into a global sys-
tem of law, as defined by colonial activity; and post-colonial, whereby colonies widely obtained 
their independence, and international society began a process of accepting and incorporating 
what would become known as international human rights law into its established international 
legal framework. 
Specifically, the perspectives put forth by the authors mentioned heretofore are useful 
both in the social sciences generally, and in the present international legal analysis. When 
viewed through an inter-temporal prism, it will be observed how, as a direct consequence of 
colonial activity, by European states, all geographic areas of Planet Earth have come under a 
common juridical structure, as defined by European colonialism. This, certainly, is ‘the state’ in 
its global form. The problem necessitating the widest historical conceptualisations possible of 
the phenomena underlying statehood, is that statehood’s interactions with colonial territories 
per se are, in the first instance, a matter of conquest, or territorial acquisition, followed by acqui-
escence to an anti-colonial reality, supplemented by a system of international human rights law 
holding self-determination of peoples at its essential core. Surely it is uncontroversial to chart 
these evolutions from the baseline of the pre-colonial antecedents of global statehood, so as to 
understand completely the territorial (i.e., imposed) and thematic (i.e., postcolonial) aspects of 
statehood, under international law. 
The point being made is that the ‘nation’—a concept which, prior to the imposition of the 
territorial state globally would have been relatively obvious, or, at the very least, possible to ob-
serve—will have been wholly subsumed into the legal phenomenon of the sovereign state, as a 
direct result of colonial activity. Ironically, in its concurrence to decolonisation, international 
law has also come to encompass various individual civil and political rights, such as the right to 
political participation and some minority rights guarantees, as well as certain collective rights, 
such as the right of peoples to self-determination. Thus, the groundwork is preliminarily laid for 
a contemporary examination of state-creation, in a manner capable of identifying the causal re-
lationship between the state’s overlapping roles in the manifestation of power and the posses-
sion of a monopoly of the means of physical violence. The cause and effect of such interactions, 
and international law’s evolving responses to the degrees of power manifested by a state against 
its subjects, including the exercise of physical violence by agents of the state, will form the bed-
rock of the overall discussion. 
From Barbaroi to Berlin: Colonialism and the process of ‘civilising’ 
A man born in 1800 who lived out the psalmist’s span of three-score years and ten could 
have seen the world more changed in his lifetime than it had been in the previous thousand 
years. […] No one could deny that it had produced wealth on an unprecedented scale and 
that it dominated the rest of the globe by power and influence as no previous civilization had 
ever done. Europeans (or their descendents) ran the world. […] As for the non-European 
countries still formally and politically independent of Europe, most of them had in practice to 
defer to European wishes and accept European interference in their affairs. Few indigenous 
peoples could resist, and if they did Europe often won its subtlest victory of all, for successful 
resistance required the adoption of European practices and, therefore, Europeanization in 
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another form.56  
J.M. Roberts entitles Book Six of his world history “The Great Acceleration”. By Book 
Seven, it is “The End of the Europeans’ World”. The effects of this reality are significant not only 
for Europeans but also for those who ‘adopted European practices’. It will come as no surprise 
that the greatest of these practices was the inheritance of the European state as a system of socie-
tal organisation—again, whether one liked it or not. The further development and refinement of 
a system of public international law, which reinforced this reality, soon followed. The political 
conditions within Europe, however, were profound. The continent was undergoing a pro-
nounced period of economic and population growth and industrial development, such that it 
reigned supreme. As Europe expanded, it also became an exporter of population, as it had in 
more limited measure, since the days of the first forays of the European explorers. It also recog-
nised the potential for colonialism to be the fuel powering its own growing industrial machine.  
Territorial cession though colonialism: The manifestations of European state power 
European expansionism, as a wholehearted phenomenon, dated from circa 1500 and 
transformed the planet many times over. The Americas, southern Asia and Africa (i.e., a great 
deal of non-European world) were the targets, in various measures, of this assault. In the New 
World, indigenous populations were subsumed into the colonial apparatus or were massacred 
outright due to their comparatively weak position against the Europeans. Asian societies, par-
ticularly those easily accessible by sea, came under the dominance of Europeans, although gen-
erally their Hinterlands proved to be less penetrable. Africa, however, was completely different. 
Despite the fact that Europeans had to sail around the entire continent to reach Asia, Africa was 
initially difficult for the Europeans to penetrate, particularly beyond their coastal slaving instal-
lations. Later, in the 19th century, however, the overt colonisation of Africa as a whole became 
of fundamental importance to the European balance-of-power system. 
In terms of financial cost, Africa certainly was not the only recipient of a series of transac-
tions greatly favouring the Europeans.57 On a global level, colonialism was something of a mal-
leable concept, in that some societies, such as the Ethiopians, the Liberians, the Ottomans, the 
Thais and the Japanese were able to repel European advances and remain independent, even as 
their neighbouring societies came under direct European influence and rule. If overt European 
hegemony ‘at home’ was made more subtle by its distillation into the abstraction of the Euro-
pean state, its hegemony overseas was blatantly manifest. As time passed, the great European 
colonialists were the British, Dutch (and the Belgians, following their secession from the Neth-
erlands, in 1830), French, the increasingly-unified Germans, in the 1800s, Italians, Portuguese 
and Spanish. In its own manner, quite separate from the expansionism of the West, Russia be-
gan its own process of eastward territorial expansion through tsar Nicholas I’s forceful ‘official 
nationality’ concept. When territorial expansion by Europeans extended in earnest to Africa 
through its colonial partition, the world bore witness to arguably the first truly globalised phe-
nomenon, European world hegemony, a reality which was quite easily rationalised by its own 
peoples.58 
                                                                  
56 Roberts, supra note 20, at 671-72. 
57 Indeed it is commonly established in American mentality, for example, that the colonial territorial 
acquisition of Manhattan amounted to a land grab indicative of a most astonishing terms of trade. 
58 Cf. Roberts, supra note 20, at 781-82: “Europeans witnessed these things happening and did not stop 
them. It is too simple to explain this by saying they were all bad, greedy men. […] The answer must lie 
somewhere in mentality. Many Europeans who could recognize that the native populations were damaged, 
even when the white contact with them was benevolent in intention, could not be expected to understand 
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The effects of colonialism worldwide, causing a hybrid of peoples, ideas, animals, goods, 
plants, raw materials, disease and seemingly countless other things, were profound. Perhaps the 
most profound effect—at least in terms of lasting practical consequence—was the transference 
of the Westphalian state system beyond Europe to the overseas European colonies. This is par-
ticularly important, as in the emerging international legal positivism of the time, these colonies 
were considered constituent parts of the colonising state. By the mid-1800s, the competitiveness 
inherent in the balance-of-power system manifested itself in the grand scramble by European 
powers for Africa. While many European societies had colonial activities in Africa prior to the 
mid-1800s, from this point on, the continent as a whole fell within the totality of Europe’s do-
main. Herein was the basis for European hegemonic power to be manifested in a form which 
was both tangible, on the one hand, and undisruptive of the nominally anti-hegemonic societal 
system, which was now operating in full force on the European continent, on the other hand. 
No prior colonial excursion took on such deeply meaningful implications ‘back home’, for it 
was the partition of Africa by European powers which reflected the actual hegemonic capacity 
of these powers themselves. For Europe, it was the natural expression of its own political game. 
Imperialism was inherent amongst the rival powers, within the European system; thus, it fol-
lows that imperial rivalry would not be irrational. For Africa, it was “a time of profound up-
heaval and irreversible change for all of Africa’s peoples. Nothing would ever be the same 
again”.59  
While not entering into the minutiae of the political situation between European powers, 
in the mid-1800s, Africa was partitioned, through the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, and, 
more substantively, the rise of positivism as a legal construction, which served to support the 
decisions taken in this conference, and developments in the Euro-centric field of public interna-
tional law. That statehood’s most common definitional reference-point, the Montevideo Con-
vention on the Rights and Duties of States, dates from only 1933, demonstrates how the 
Convention’s antecedents are also worthy of examination. Particular attention will be drawn to 
the ways in which the sovereignty of colonised territories was transferred from indigenous to ex-
ternal powers, as well the corresponding establishment of an ‘international community’ of indi-
vidual sovereignties holding ‘civilised’ European legal systems at its core. 
Considering Africa’s partition as a consequence of the Berlin Conference  
The Berlin Conference was the ultimate expression of an age whose newfound enthusiasm 
for democracy had clear limits, and slaughtered game had no vote. Even John Stuart Mill, the 
great philosopher of human freedom, had written, in On Liberty, “Despotism is a legitimate 
mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement.” 
Not a single African was at the table in Berlin.60 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the corrosive effect of this culture on established structures. [The European] knew he was on the side of 
Progress and Improvement, and might well see himself as on the side of the Cross, too. […] This was a 
confidence which ran through every side of European expansion. […] The confidence in belonging to a 
higher civilization was not only a licence for predatory habits as Christianity had earlier been, but the 
nerve of an attitude akin, in many cases, to that of the crusaders. It was their sureness that they brought 
something better that blinded men all to often to the actual and material results of substituting individual 
freehold for tribal rights, of turning the hunters and gatherers, whose possessions were what they could 
carry, into wage-earners.” 
59 B. Davidson, Modern Africa: A Social and Political History 4 (1989). And cf. C.H. Alexandrowicz, The 
Afro-Asian world and the law of nations: (historical aspects) 123 Rec. des Cours (1968-I) 117-214. 
60 A. Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa 84 
(1998). 
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The basic legitimisation for colonial activities was derived from the original Roman law 
doctrine equating res communis with res nullius, which is to say that the concept of common 
lands simply did not exist, and that, therefore, the ‘civilised’ European state was not precluded 
from making claims to them.61 Within Europe, all lands were accounted for. Outside Europe, 
however, all lands were ‘owned’ by nobody,62 as they were ‘uncivilised’. Herein lies the insular 
nature of the original European ‘community’, in that Europe was what it meant to be civilised. In-
ter-European politics became European law, which was the only law unquestionably recog-
nised by Europe. Legal personality was inherently European, to the exclusion of non-European 
societies; it could be obtained in a territory only from Europe. Some highly functional non-
European societies, such as the Ottoman Empire and Japan were granted nominal exemptions 
from the ‘barbarianism rule’, because of their comparatively well-developed societal status. The 
rest of the world, however, was forced to face Europe on terms dictated by its individual great 
powers: le pouvoir a créé le droit.  
Discovery and occupation contrasted with the transfer of territorial title as incorporation 
methods 
If a territory has never formed part of a state, or was abandoned by a state, international 
law has permitted original title to territory to be acquired through occupation. This is demon-
strated by a state’s occupation of a territory ‘belonging to no one’ (terra nullius), and under 
“open, continuous, effective and peaceful” administration,63 as stated by Judge Max Huber, act-
ing as arbitrator, in the landmark case on territorial sovereignty, the Island of Palmas case. 
Huber awarded the island to the Netherlands on the basis of the fact that the continuous and 
peaceful display of the functions of a state form the ‘constituent element’ of territorial sover-
eignty.64  
The possession of a territory must be effective; that is, it must be, in some way, tangible. 
Yet international law recognises a great level of tolerance, on the actual levels of such tangibility 
required. It is the specific and particular intent of the administering state to exercise or manifest 
sovereignty, particularly through the creation and maintenance of legal structures, which must 
not go overlooked.65 
                                                                  
61 Cf. M. Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues 32 (1986) [hereinafter Shaw]: “In 
Roman Antiquity, any territory which was not Roman was terra nullius. In the fifteenth and sixteenth cen-
turies any territory which did not belong to a Christian sovereign was terra nullius, and in the nineteenth 
century any territory which did not belong to a civilized State was terra nullius. Such a historical survey is 
used to demonstrate how law has followed on meekly from power, while the development of the concept 
in the nineteenth century saw it primarily as a method of adjusting relationships between the colonizing 
powers themselves, rather than as between the colonizer and the colonized. It was used to emphasize that 
might was right.” (The concepts of res nullius and terra nullius can be equated.) 
62 It would be uncontroversial to say that the legal principle of terra nullius, as ‘land belonging to no one’, 
ignores the fact that indigenous populations are now most certainly subjects of consultation when deter-
mining final outcomes of territorial delineation processes. An implication of this may be that, whereas in 
previous times, possession of recognised claim to territorial sovereignty, as well as a nominal manifesta-
tion of such, was sufficient to reflect judicial fiat, but in present times counteractions from civil society 
groups cannot be politically ignored and may well indeed imply direct legal consequences. 
63 Permanent Court of Arbitration, Island of Palmas case (Netherlands v. United States), 2 RIAA 829 (sole 
arbitrator: Huber) (1928) [hereinafter Island of Palmas case]. 
64 Id. at 840. 
65 Cf. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case (Denmark v. Norway), 53 PCIJ Rep. Ser. A/B (1933), at 45-
46, noting two elements required for a continued display of authority, namely the intention and will to act 
as a sovereign, and some actual exercise or display of such authority.  
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All territories in modern statehood must, in principle, be defined, although, in practice, a 
state may also exist without a fixed definitional form. In order to be defined, however, a state will 
have first been discovered through the movements of mankind over time. Whereas at the time 
of colonial expansion, in Europe all lands were accounted for, we can now say that in the entire 
world, all lands are accounted for, at least in juridical formulation. A glance at a political map 
will confirm that territories are delineated against each other, in conformity with the strength of 
their definition. To speak in practical terms, definitional strength could be measured in the 
sense that the boundary between e.g. Switzerland and its neighbours is considerably more de-
fined than that between e.g. India and Pakistan. Once territories have been defined and deline-
ated, then they undergo a procedure of being physically demarcated. Again, the circumstances 
at hand will define the extent to which the physical demarcation corresponds to the ‘actual’ defi-
nition of the territory. Certainly the final demarcation will be of greatest practical importance, 
and it is here where the strength of the territorial definition will be measured. 
The main traditional modes of acquiring title to territory are occupation, or the acquisi-
tion of original title; prescription, or the transference of title; accretion and avulsion, or the natu-
ral movement of established legal frontiers; conquest, or territories acquired in means contrary 
to rules proscribing or otherwise restraining the use of force; and cession, or the transfer of terri-
tory from one legal entity to another. The last of the above forms related to territorial delinea-
tion—that of cession—is of greatest importance at present because of the fact that, during the 
1800s, it should not be assumed that the African continent constituted wholesale terra nullius. 
Colonising states were therefore, in the main, precluded from outright conquest of overseas ter-
ritories. A pattern of interactions between coloniser and colonised began to emerge whereby an 
actual transaction would have to take place to solidify the form of future territorial administra-
tion.  
If ‘might made right’, as such, then it was Europe which then ‘held’ the territory through its 
sovereignty over that territory, as well as control of the governance of that sovereign territory. 
The governance factor is of enormous significance. Europeans wanted guarantees that, if they 
would enter into formal relations with other societies, those societies would be of a similar cali-
bre as their own, with particular regard to situations related to recognition of the legitimacy of a 
territorial title. Reciprocity was something European colonialists were not particularly minded 
to grant freely, particularly to those who did not share their own cultural or values system (i.e., 
Christianity and the ‘civilisation’ of Europe).66  
In practice, a rapidly industrialising Europe was exporting skilled workers to its foreign 
colonies, some of which, along African coasts, for example, had now been in existence for hun-
dreds of years. Capitalism was a driving force, both in necessitating the extraction of raw materi-
als from colonies, as well as projecting intra-European economic rivalries onto the colonised 
lands themselves. Racism, of course, was pronounced and omnipresent.67 As European states 
                                                                  
66 Cf. C.H. Alexandrowicz, The European-African Confrontation (1973), at 6 [hereinafter Alexan-
derowicz]. 
67 Cf. B. Freund, The Making of Contemporary Africa 76 (2d. ed, 1998) [hereinafter Freund]: “The new 
‘scientific’ racism, built around a vulgarised interpretation of Charles Darwin’s theory of the survival of 
the fittest as the key mechanism of human (and biological) evolution, suffused European culture.” One of 
the most striking practical examples of this reality is the Belgian colonialist attitude towards the Tutsi 
ethnic group in Rwanda. The Tutsis, already versed in hegemonic dominance over the Hutu ethnic group, 
profited from the favoured treatment they received from the Belgians, who thought of them as their “no-
ble European cousins”. Cf. also F. Reyntjens, L’Afrique des Grands Lacs en Crise 18-19 (1994). See also 
Duke Adolphus Frederick of Mecklenberg, Into the Heart of Africa (1910) for the first accounting of theo-
ries of racial superiority by Europeans of the Tutsi over Hutu. 
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manifested their influence according to their power, the potential for disrupting the balance of 
these states was ever-present. European colonial activity in Africa was a well-established phe-
nomenon, which provided a clear indicator of a European society’s power and influence. The 
pace of European expansion inland, beyond the original coastal colonial settlements, increased. 
As was becoming increasingly accepted, the actions of a European state took on a set of certain 
legal implication as well. Europeans began to realise that the best way to advance their interests 
was to bring these colonised territories formally into the domain of their own statehood. In so 
doing, colonialists both clearly demarcated their own claims to power and influence and le-
gitimised in their own eyes the overseas expansion of their legal structures.68 
Mostly this was achieved through the practice of ‘cession’, or the agreed territorial transfer 
of one part of a state to another.69 To be reconciled at present is the fact that cession is a means of 
passing derivative title, and as such, defects in such title are passed along to the recipient, and the 
fact that it would be controversial to characterise the ‘treaties of cession’, between coloniser and 
colonised, as wholly legitimate treaties per se. Indeed, along these lines, in the Island of Palmas 
case, in referring to territory ceded by Spain to the United States under the Treaty of Paris (1898), 
Judge Huber broadly established that a ceding state sets the validity of title at the time of territo-
rial cession, and does so for the reason that “Spain could not transfer more rights than she herself 
possessed”.70 Yet complicating matters further is international law’s concern with reciprocity of 
status and its reliance upon a system of expected behaviours amongst sovereignties (e.g. pacta 
sunt servanda). As such, cession of territory to colonialists may not necessarily be seen as occur-
ring at a sufficient level of legality, as those colonised were not, strictly speaking, sovereign states. 
As observed by Surya P. Sharma,71 some authors viewed them as legislative acts of individual 
colonising states, therefore lacking in international significance, whereas others assumed Euro-
pean powers acquired African territory by occupying terra nullius.72 But Sharma presents more 
a persuasive analysis derived from M.F. Lindley73 and J.A. Andrews,74 to conclude that: 
[f]ew parts of Africa were unilaterally annexed and European state practice does not show 
that the European powers thought of Africa as terra nullius. Thus, while the fact of European 
                                                                  
68 Cf. R.H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World 69 (1990) 
[hereinafter Jackson]: “Europeans and Africans for centuries engaged in treaty-making along the coasts, 
but whether it had the same meaning and significance for both parties is open to doubt. Europeans signed 
treaties with an eye on other Europeans and with the aim of acquiring trading rights or territorial claims 
which conformed with international law. Africans probably made them to gain commercial and political 
advantage over local rivals. They could hardly have realized the European international legal implications 
of what they were doing.” 
69 See e.g. J.H.W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective 366 (1970), categorising cession as 
(a) a gratuitous transfer; (b) a transfer by ‘sale’ involving the exchange of money; or (c) a mutual transfer 
through exchange. 
70 Island of Palmas case, supra note 63, at 842. 
71 See e.g. A. Keller, O. Lissitzyn and F. Mann, Creation of Rights of Sovereignty Through Symbolic Acts 
1400-1800 (1938), at 14-32, as cited in S.P. Sharma, Territorial Acquisition, Disputes and International 
Law (1997) [hereinafter Sharma], at 139. 
72 See A.D. McNair, The Law of Treaties 52-54 (1961), as cited in Sharma, Id. at 140, and particularly at 
note 437. 
73 Cf. M.F. Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law 176 
(1926) [hereinafter Lindley], as cited in Sharma, Id.: “It is difficult to see how, having regard to the univer-
sality of the practice of grounding a colonial protectorate upon an agreement with the local authority, and 
to the importance attached by the European powers to these agreements in their relations inter se, the re-
quirement for such an agreement can be regarded otherwise than as a rule of law.” 
74 Cf. J.A. Andrews, The Concept of Statehood and the Acquisition of Territory in the 19th Century, 94 
LQR 408, 419 (1978), as cited in Sharma, Id.: “Either [African] rulers had a sovereign title and sufficient 
personality to cede this in international law or the territory was occupied as terra nullius.” 
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powers acquiring substantial African territory through treaties of cession is beyond doubt, 
the genuineness of many of these cessions is questionable. It is believed that the rulers were 
often subjected to considerable pressure and may well have been ignorant about what was 
happening.75 
It is then not unreasonable to think of Africa, at the time of its colonisation, as finding itself 
occupying a nominal middle ground between ‘discovery’ by, and ‘cession’ to, European pow-
ers, but gravitating much more towards the latter. Certainly the most interior lands would have 
been ‘discovered’ per se, save perhaps for the explorations of Livingstone and his contemporar-
ies. The settlement of Africa by Europeans formed an inverted territorial core-periphery model. 
This is not insignificant when the nature of territorial demarcation in Africa is fully considered, 
in that newly-formed territorial boundaries may well stretch far inland from costal ports. 
None of this was of great consequence to the agents acting on behalf of the colonising 
state, who were generally unconcerned with the juridical competence of those signing the pa-
pers resulting in territorial cession.76 Furthermore, treaties signed under duress by an African 
leader were generally seen as still being valid,77 regardless if a treaty’s signatory was genuinely 
competent to undertake such authority. This is demonstrated by Jeffrey Herbst, referring to Fre-
derick Lugard’s 1922 study, partially replicated here: 
Treaties were produced by the cartload in all the approved forms of legal verbiage—
impossible of translation by ill-educated translators. It mattered not that tribal chiefs had no 
power to dispose of communal rights, or that those few powerful potentates who might per-
haps claim such authority looked on the white man’s ambassador with contempt.78 
Herbst, however, asserts that the colonial state had ‘limited ambitions’, and in the imme-
diate aftermath of the Berlin Conference, the partition of Africa was a largely European event, of 
greatest concern to European lawyers, politicians and mapmakers.79 This was the collective he-
gemony of the balance-of-power system in action, as developing the colonial societal structures 
was essentially to the benefit of the colonial power and to the indifference of the local needs. 
Such a particular hegemonial form served to permanently orient dependence towards the colo-
nial power. Instances of decision-making drawn from the concepts of consent and consensus 
were fundamentally contradictory to the colonial experience. Indeed, the main purposes of the 
colonial partition of Africa by European powers were commercial exploitation (often through 
chartered companies), strategic interests and, according to Dan Smith of the International Peace 
Research Institute, greed.80 For this system of collective hegemony to take on a practical form as 
colonial administration developed a greater competence and scope, the exercise of effective 
control on a territory would have to be manifested in some recognised manner. 
                                                                  
75 Sharma, supra note 71, at 140. 
76 But see Hertselet, The Map of Africa by Treaty 996-998 (3d. ed. 1909), as cited in Shaw, supra note 61, 
at 36. In the Delafoa Bay case, for example, Portugal claimed a local chief lacked capacity to enter into a 
treaty with the British and therefore contested Britain’s title to that territory. 
77 See Shaw, supra note 61, at 43.  
78 F.J.D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa 15 (1922), as cited in J. Herbst, States and 
Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control 75 (2000) [hereinafter Herbst] 
79 Cf. Herbst, Id. at 77: “[i]f the European powers had fought significant wars in Africa, either against each 
other or Africans, part of the inevitable detritus of those conflicts would have been the establishment of 
some kind of security establishment with the accompanying infrastructure of roads, railroads, and ex-
tended administrative systems that armies need to fight. Without such conflict, the infrastructure of rule 
was slow in coming. As a result, for many rural areas of Africa, formal colonial administration can be 
counted only lasting the sixty years starting from the turn of the century.”  
80 D. Smith, The State of War and Peace Atlas 52 (1997). 
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A diplomatic conference constructed in the balance-of-power fashion 
The Berlin Conference of 1884-85 was the cynically-motivated initiative of the German 
chancellor Bismarck who began to identify the commercial benefits that could be provided if 
Germany would play more active role in European colonial life. By the time of the conference 
itself, the African continent began a process of being delineated into spheres of influence for the 
European states.81 The job was completed by 1902.82 Although there was, by necessary implica-
tion at least, a sense of some sort of sovereignty extracted from the part of African leaders from 
whom title to territory was obtained,83 the tangibility of such sovereignty was categorically dis-
carded by the terms of the colonialists’ subsequent practice. This demonstrates a tangible malle-
ability in the context of reciprocity in that, although reciprocity is a highly prized principle to be 
shared amongst sovereign equals, the level of capacity to act as a sovereign equal would be set 
considerably much lower, if the end result would be the colonial acquisition of an overseas ter-
ritory for the purposes of ‘civilisation’ and administration.  
It is therefore little wonder that the level of administrative competence required to dem-
onstrate that an overseas territory came under a European power’s legitimate sphere of influ-
ence was decidedly set very low. Looking to the terms of the General Act of the Berlin 
Conference of 1884-85,84 it is clear how a prime objective of the conference itself was to afford its 
participants the possibility to make anticipatory territorial claims in colonial regions so as to be 
able to preclude similar claims from competing European powers.85 This laid the foundation 
for the doctrine of ‘effective occupation’. What is further implied is a correlation between the ex-
istence of a recognised territorial claim and the tangible elements of manifested sovereignty by 
those, at that time. This is so because to relinquish sovereignty—as was the case when treaties of 
cession were concluded, between colonisers and the colonised—a modicum of manifested 
sovereignty would need to be demonstrated in reinforcement of the territorial lines drawn at 
Berlin. African statehood is rife with historical examples manifesting the limited inward territo-
rial reach of European colonialists. The point being emphasised here is that “[w]hat is most re-
markable about the scramble for Africa is not that it happened, but that it occurred so late, so 
fast, and without significant fighting between the colonialists”.86 It may be observed that this sen-
timent reflects the concept of ‘spheres of influence’ is established in the Berlin Act. Taking pos-
                                                                  
81 Cf. Alexanderowicz, supra note 66, at 7: The Berlin Congress “was in the first instance not a race for the 
occupation of land by original title, but a race for obtaining derivative title deeds which the European 
powers had to acquire according to the rule of international law relating to negotiation and conclusion of 
treaties”. 
82 See Freund, supra note 67, at 84-90. Germany, of course, lost its colonial possessions as a result of the 
first world war. 
83 Cf. Shaw, supra note 61, at 38: “The General Act of the Berlin Conference of 1884-5 itself recognized 
implicitly the existence of African sovereign entities.” 
84 The General Act of the Berlin of 26 February 1885 was merged with the General Act and Declaration of 
Brussels of 2 July 1890 (aimed at counteracting the slave trade as specified by the 1885 Berlin Act). The 
convention revising both documents is readily reproduced in 17 Aust. Treaty Series (1920). 
85 Cf. General Act of the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, at articles 34 and 35: “Any power which hence-
forth takes possession of a tract of land on the coasts of the African Continent outside of its present pos-
sessions, or which, being hitherto without such possessions, shall acquire them and assume a protectorate 
[. . .] shall accompany either act with a notification thereof, addressed to the other Signatory Powers of the 
present Act, in order to enable them to protest against the same if there exists any grounds for their doing 
so. The Signatory Powers of the present Act recognize the obligation to insure the establishment of 
authority in the regions occupied by them on the coasts of the African Continent sufficient to protect ex-
isting rights, and, as the case may be, freedom of trade and of transit under the conditions agreed upon.” 
86 Herbst, supra note 78, at 66. 
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session of a territory already claimed by another European power was to be, strictly speaking, 
precluded by international law. 
It would not be unexpected that the emergence in the 1800s of a tangible, obvious interna-
tional legal positivism would serve to reinforce the ‘spheres of influence’ concept, as the colonial 
activities of a sovereignty would want to be subjected to a stable, sustaining form. Writing in 
1938, James Simsarian notes a shift in attitudes from about the year 1700, reflective of an increas-
ing acceptance of territorial occupation as being demonstrative of legal title, as compared to dis-
covery per se as being satisfactory to constitute the taking of possession of terra nullius. While 
focusing generally on North America as the subject of his overall study (and chiefly the lucrative 
nature of commerce therewith), he observes that the diplomatic correspondence of the time re-
flected a widespread sense that occupation of a territory was sufficient to reflect legitimate title 
both to commerce and also “the extent of asserted legal title to the territory in dispute”.87 Prior to 
1700, it could readily be assumed that concern for the assertion of legal title was predated by a 
fixation on conquest as comprising a legitimate form of territorial acquisition, particularly 
through the methods of subjugation or debellation, whereupon legitimacy is overtly derived 
from the spoils of military victory, or perhaps from implied abandonment, where a military 
force acquiesces to an obviously greater power, in the course of hostile interactions.  
Given that accepted territorial borders in colonised Africa were now to span consider-
able geographic and therefore cultural separations, and mindful of the assertion heretofore that 
the ‘nation-state’ per se may have the potential to take on mythological proportions, colonial 
‘statehood’, as a legal concept, was considerably stretched by its transcendence from Europe to 
e.g. Africa. That this is so is demonstrated by the limited extent to which European colonialists 
were actually able to physically penetrate the African continent. The legitimacy of territorial 
claims asserted and recognised at the Berlin Conference would be readily accepted, regardless 
of how deep the colonial presence was able to grow beyond the usual coastal instillations. Any 
fresh act of taking possession on any portion of the African coast would have to be notified by 
the power taking possession, or assuming a protectorate, to the other signatory powers. 
Furthermore, as observed by Lindley,88 whereas the balance-of-power framework in 
Europe had the genuine potential to provoke overt hostilities, the overseas expansion of Euro-
pean colonialists was largely guided by the anticipation and accommodation of competing 
states’ needs. The result of this is the uneasy stability that accompanied the international affairs of 
the period, generally. Greater clarity on the exercise of effective control and the manifestation of 
sovereign activities would need to be jurisprudentially developed as the implications of colonial 
actions made their way into burgeoning legal systems. Similarly, all colonising states would keep 
close watch on the activities of other, competing colonising states. 
Introducing the concepts of effective control and sovereign activities (effectivités) 
The question of whether Africa was terra nullius prior to colonisation is not entirely un-
controversial, despite widespread evidence of transactions reflecting transfer of territory from 
colonised to coloniser, even if the ‘transfers’ could be viewed only in the most nominal sense 
possible. Most significant is the 1975 Western Sahara case before the ICJ,89 as the subject of terra 
nullius arises directly. The main question brought to the Court was this: “Was Western Sahara at 
                                                                  
87 J. Simsarian, The Acquisition of Legal Title to Terra Nullius, 53(1) Political Science Quarterly 111 
(1938). 
88 See Lindley, supra note 73, at 210. 
89 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) [hereinafter Western Sahara], 1975 ICJ Rep. 12, 39. 
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the time of colonisation by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)?” Algeria argued 
that this was the case, but the ICJ, in analysing the state practice of the colonial period, ruled 
“that territories inhabited by tribes or peoples having a social and political organisation were not 
regarded as terra nullius”, before ruling that “agreements with local rulers, whether or not con-
sidered as an actual ‘cession’ of treaty, were regarded as derivative roots of title, and not original 
title obtained by occupation of terra nullius”.90 Western Sahara itself, the Court declared, was 
not terra nullius due to the social and political organisation of local residents.  
Questions from this example seek to determine the actual meaning of the taking of posses-
sion from circumstances of terra nullius (or, indeed, circumstances similar to terra nullius, as 
observed from the formal malleability of the territorial title ceded to colonialists). Could the 
possession be physical alone, or would there have to be some additional form of political or 
administrative structure? In what way should state authority be manifested so as to make it tan-
gibly recognisable for both the colonised subjects within a territory and for competing powers 
looking on, in a manner befitting the balance-of-power system? 
In the literature, the clearest answers to such questions are found in Malcolm Shaw’s text-
book on international law. In it, he recalls the most memorable component of the Island of 
Palmas arbitration requires an “actual, continuous and peaceful display of state function”.91 
Shaw claims, however, that “[c]ontrol, although needing to be effective, does not necessarily 
have to amount to possession and settlement of all of the territory claimed”.92 The circumstances 
of a particular case, primarily geography and international responses to the actual situation, will 
play considerable roles in determining outcome. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Shaw characterises 
the legal challenges of the time as being rife with opportunistic competition, but refers to the 
Clipperton Island arbitration,93 whereby, although the arbitrator required an actual (not nomi-
nal) taking of possession, for a territorial occupation to be seen as valid, “a proclamation of sov-
ereignty by a French naval officer later published in Honolulu was deemed sufficient to create 
valid title”.94 In reality, however, this should reflect less upon the frivolous nature of certain 
claims and more upon a genuine willingness to incorporate local factors into legal decision-
making. Shaw makes this observation explicit when discussing Western Sahara. He writes: 
While international law does appear to accept a notion of geographical or natural unity of 
particular areas, whereby sovereignty exercised over a certain area will raise the presump-
tion of title with regard to an outlying portion of the territory compared with the claimed 
unity, it is important not to overstate this. It operates to raise a presumption and no more 
and that within the wider concept of display of effective sovereignty which need not apply 
equally to all parts of the territory. Neither geographical unity nor contiguity are as such 
sources of title with regard to all areas contained within the area in question.95 
Therefore, the manifestation of sovereign activities will depend on the existence of a valid 
legal title to the territory being administered. This premise was reaffirmed in the ICJ Frontier 
Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) judgment, whereby legal title was shown to be of superior legal 
weight than was effective possession, in forming a basis for sovereignty.96 Where this is the case, 
                                                                  
90 Id. But cf. Lindley, supra note 73, at 11-20. 
91 Island of Palmas case, supra note 63, at 839. 
92 M.N. Shaw, International Law 432 (5th ed., 2003) [hereinafter Shaw, Int’l Law]. Shaw naturally draws 
upon work published in the aforementioned Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues (1986), 
as well as his earlier Africa Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia (1979). 
93 See 26 AJIL 390 (1932). 
94 Shaw, Int’l Law, supra note 92, at 434. He continues, Id.: “[t]he effectiveness of the occupation may in-
deed be relative and may in certain rare circumstances be little more than symbolic.” 
95 Id. at 435. 
96 The case dovetails with the discussion of the colonial uti possidetis juris and is discussed more exten-
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the effectivités manifested will serve to confirm the existence of valid legal title. In cases where the 
legal title is in doubt, or does not specifically exist, effectivités are not to be ignored. 
It will be important to bear this perspective in mind as the discussion progresses, since 
there could be implications for determining state practice in the event of contradictory, incom-
plete or non-existent title claims or confusion over the exact point of territorial limits. Shaw’s 
conclusion reinforces this assertion. He writes: 
[E]xamples of state practice may confirm or complete but not contradict legal title estab-
lished, for example, by boundary treaties. In the absence of any clear legal title to any area, 
state practice comes into its own as a law-establishing mechanism. But its importance is al-
ways contextual in that it relates to the nature of the territory and the nature of competing 
state claims.97 
European positivism and the emergence of state sovereignty as a global construction 
The basic structures of colonialism, I conclude, are reproduced in all the major schools of in-
ternational jurisprudence: naturalism, positivism and pragmatism. If this is the case, then we 
must surely rethink the prevalent history of the discipline, which sees each of these schools 
of jurisprudence as being significantly different from the others. My argument is that while 
these schools are distinctive, what is disturbing is that they all have served to reproduce co-
lonial relations. It is in this sense that I argue that, far from being ancillary to the discipline, 
colonialism is central to its very constitution. Formal sovereignty is very important, and pro-
vides Third World states with a vital means of protecting and furthering their interests. But 
the enduring vulnerabilities created by the processes by which non-European states acquired 
sovereignty pose an ongoing challenge, not only to the peoples of the Third World, but also 
to international law itself.98 
The discussion heretofore has revolved around the fact that European states were formed 
from a complex web of socio-cultural practices and traditions, and that European states readily 
exported this form of societal administration, globally, through colonial activity. It was generally 
asserted that European states were formed as nation-states largely on the basis both of consent 
and consensus. By the time of the European scramble for overseas colonies, Schwarzenberger’s 
original two conditions for the formulation of international law—a ‘reciprocated equality of 
status’ and a ‘level of contact which necessitates regulation of conduct’—appear to be met, par-
ticularly as Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria agreed to further solidify territorial 
boundaries through the ‘Concert of Europe’, for example. 
A significant problem that remained was how to bring the newly-partitioned African 
continent into this European international legal system. This problem, from a conceptual 
standpoint, at least, is profoundly vexing, as, although Africans may have given an element of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
sively in chapter two. Cf. Case concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali), Judge-
ment, 1986 ICJ Rep. 544, at para 63: “Where the [sovereign] act corresponds exactly to law, where effec-
tive administration is additional to the uti possidetis juris, the only role of effectivité is to confirm the 
exercise of the right derived from a legal title. Where the act does not correspond to the law, where the 
territory which is the subject of the dispute is effectively administered by a State other than the one pos-
sessing the legal title, preference should be given to the holder of the title. In the event that the effectivité 
does not co-exist with any legal title, it must invariably be taken into consideration. Finally, there are 
cases where the legal title is not capable of showing exactly the territorial expanse to which it relates. The 
effectivités can then play an essential role in showing how the title is interpreted in practice.” 
97 Shaw, Int’l Law, supra note 92, at 435. 
98 A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law 195 (2004) [hereinafter 
Anghie]. This draws upon ideas originally formulated in A. Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty 
and Colonialism in Nineteenth Century International Law, 40 Harvard Int’l L.J. 1-80 (1999) [hereinafter 
Anghie HILJ]. 
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consent (through the cession treaties of often-dubious circumstances creating African depend-
encies in the now-European territories), the actively reaffirming element of consensus within 
colonial societies certainly did not exist. This notion will be of fundamental importance, as it is 
an original point of a more contemporary phenomenon known as ‘negative sovereignty’, which 
remains a prime feature of contemporary African statehood. Regardless of the particular logic 
of the situation, the problem remained, and the way Europeans got around this was by con-
structing a ‘scientific’ form of international legal positivism to explain, justify and control colo-
nial activities. In terms of legal effect, what had been a considerably more informal activity 
became formalised by the Berlin Conference. In this sense, parallels could be drawn between 
the effects of the 1648 Peace of Westphalia on Europe to those of the outcome of the Berlin Con-
ference on Africa in 1885, in that social structures were solidified under the pretence of provid-
ing bellwethers for future behaviours. 
The rise of ‘positivism’ as a legal phenomenon per se is both complicated and intricate, as 
voluntarism gradually replaced naturalism as the dominant force in managing international af-
fairs, through the establishment of positivism as the dominant definitional form of the law of na-
tions, from the late 18th century to the early 20th century. This study reaffirms the established 
distinction between that which is deemed to be ‘naturally’ derived as an established source of 
law (jus naturale), and that which is a recognised source of law, either by custom or conduct (jus 
gentium and jus voluntarium, respectively).99 Certainly, between the 18th and 20th centuries, this 
definitional shift was readily evidenced and, therefore, it seems reasonable to assume the exis-
tence of a correlation between the rise of positivism as a legal philosophy, and the imperial ac-
tions of 18th century European powers. While it is commonly thought that the colonial 
experience universalised international law, it can also be seen that so-called ‘scientific’ positivist 
jurisprudence was developed in an arbitrary manner, based primarily on the whims of the 
European powers. The least controversial aspect of legal positivism revolves around the fact 
that, as a theory, it requires a law to be able to be traced back to a source of some kind, which has 
been accepted as authoritative by the parties to that law, or is a consistent product of decisions 
taken by such authority. The existence of a true European international legal community and 
the mad scramble for Africa, within that community, had the effect of a Petri dish in the devel-
opment of this ‘scientific’ method.  
Antony Anghie has, in a major work of recent scholarship entitled Imperalism, Sover-
eignty and International Law, presented an analysis of this phenomenon. This study follows a 
similar line of argumentation, in the sense that a valid legal definition of ‘statehood’ per se could 
be formed through established legal variables, which allocate greater weight to animate notions 
of statehood. Anghie generally argues that, as colonialism played such a prevalent role in the 
development of statehood in a positivist legal sense, it deserves to be an additional theoretical 
principle through which modern territorial statehood is viewed in the juridical definition of 
states. One may begin with a central tenet of legal positivism, H.L.A. Hart’s famous statement 
that “the ‘law as it is’ should be kept conceptually distinct from ‘the law as it ought to be’”.100 What 
is meant to be revealed, through an examination of Anghie’s argument, is the contradictory real-
ity of public international law—that the ‘is’ of European state sovereignty also contains aspects of 
the ‘ought’. The ‘is’ reflects the evolutionary process emanating from the roughly two hundred 
years of history between European states, dating specifically from Westphalia in 1648. The 
                                                                  
99 Furthermore, it observes how the international law, of the last quarter of the 20th century, witnessed 
considerable overlaps between what was once exclusively ‘natural’ and what was once exclusively ‘posi-
tivist’. To this end, see generally the discussion infra chapter five. 
100 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 222 (1961). The interplay between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ with regard 
to self-determination of peoples is discussed in depth infra chapters two and four. 
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‘ought’ reflects the outcome from Berlin, in 1885, in that non-European territories were to be in-
tegrated into European systems of administration. Anghie’s categorisation of the separation be-
tween European and non-European societies, under the umbrella of state sovereignty, is 
innovative and serves to reveal the logical difficulties involved in the reconciliation of these re-
alities. 
Overall, the patterns of colonialism demonstrate the transplantation of European law pat-
terns to areas outside of Europe. This reflects the state-centred perspective, which is also largely 
inherent in classical legal positivism. Within that state, there existed a set of principles not unlike 
Hobbes’ mythical state of nature. But the Hobbesian approach was becoming wholly discred-
ited by the growth of European state activity. As Anghie writes, “within the [positivist ap-
proach], the myth of the state of nature is replaced in positivist jurisprudence with the myth of a 
fixed set of principles and a scheme of classifications that reveals itself to the scrutiny of the ex-
pert jurist who uses this scheme to establish and develop international law”.101 Many positivists 
wanted to reconstitute the entire framework of international law on the basis of the sovereign 
state, due to the lack of an obvious global sovereign. Overseas expansionism was therefore a 
fundamental part of international law’s own development. 
The foremost positivist of his time, John Austin, said that law, generally, was a form of 
positive morality drawn directly and explicitly from a sovereign source, and that international 
law, while lacking a such a sovereign source per se, was something on which a scientific juris-
prudence could be built, particularly through the discrediting of natural law as a legitimate 
source of law.102 Austin’s credentials as the foremost positivist amongst his contemporaries are 
firmly established in that he held this view so strongly that he negated custom as a legitimate 
source of law. From this perspective, the non-European ‘state’ (as it were)—that is to say, the 
colony—was lacking in sovereignty and therefore lacked legal personality. From that, the rise of 
positivist international law was fuelled by colonialism. The relationship between colonial and 
colonised was to be managed by positivism, in that overseas colonies were legal entities of colo-
nising states. A recurring theme is exposed when discussing statehood generally, that being the 
interaction between land and population. Austin disclaimed the existence of custom as a legal 
source, thus implying that the interactions between land and population in colonised areas 
were without juridical merit or weight. In terms of legal effect, colonised lands had no history, 
and their inhabitants formed no society. It is therefore not surprising that counterarguments to 
Austin’s theory were readily promulgated, particularly concerning the very existence of inde-
pendent cultural patterns, regardless of whether they have surpassed a sufficient threshold of le-
gality so as to be recognised as (customary) international law.103 
A filtering process then occurred, whereby the colonised territories, which needed to be 
incorporated into the established legal structures of the colonisers, became so incorporated and 
established. This was the process of ‘civilisation’. Its procedures simultaneously conformed to 
the rigours of scientific positivism and to the necessity for social exclusion inherent in colonial-
ism. Martti Koskenniemi calls the international law formed from ascendant positivism a ‘collec-
                                                                  
101 Anghie HILJ, supra note 98, at text accompanying note 69. 
102 See Anghie, supra note 98 at 45 et seq, and cf. J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 
(1954), at 201: “The law obtaining between nations is not positive law: for every positive law is set by a 
given sovereign to a person or a person in a state of subjection to its author.”  
103 Cf. T.J. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law 3 (1895) [hereinafter Lawrence]: “Without soci-
ety no law, without law no society. When we assert that there is such a thing as international law, we assert 
that there is a society of states: when we recognize that there is a society of states, we recognize that there is 
international law.” 
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tive European conscience’ which was “understood always as ambivalently either consciousness 
or conscience, that is, in alternatively rationalistic or ethical ways”.104 
It can be seen that jurists used positivism to create a cultural gap between civilised and 
uncivilised European and non-European worlds—a gap which they then tried to bridge by ‘civi-
lising the uncivilised’. In so doing, not only would they be legitimising colonialism in legal 
terms, but they would also be assimilating colonial subjects into European social structures. The 
core of Anghie’s argument is that, in fact, the problems of colonialism challenged the institution 
of positivism to such an extent that the very so-called scientific European positivists ended up re-
stating and writing the laws to explain how a positivist system could exist, even in regions which 
were so culturally distinct from Europe. This serves to demonstrate that ‘civilisation’ is both an 
inconsistency and an ambiguity in a system which aims to scientifically separate the ‘ought’ from 
the ‘is’. It is, essentially, a negatively-composed definitional form.105 In Berlin, it was decided that 
colonial territories ought to be incorporated into the structures of the colonising states, and in-
deed, by the early 20th century, they largely were. The stringency associated with positivism’s 
own ascendance was itself built upon a fundamental change in underlying predicate (i.e., that it 
is even possible for an ‘uncivilised’ territorial possession even to become ‘civilised’ per se), and 
furthermore tended to reflect the disfavour into which natural law fell during this period. 
Over the roughly seventy years between 1850 and 1920, the ‘ought’ did become the ‘is’, as 
the juridical process of ‘civilisation’ became completed, as observed by the general independ-
ence of colonial entities and their admission as sovereign states into intergovernmental organi-
sations, such as the United Nations. The point remains, however, that the ‘civilisation’ process is 
negative in terms of its definitional composition. The threshold for determining its existence is 
inherently exclusionary, by virtue of having been set by the ‘civilisers’. As such, when approach-
ing the circumstance through the prism of ‘modern territorial statehood’, the ‘scientific’ aspect of 
the dominant legal positivism of the time can be drawn into question, as being viewed through 
the long lens of 21st century history and jurisprudence, the obsession for global order following 
European exploration, and overseas settlement. Eventual imperial control would also appear to 
have certain tangible hegemonic effects which modern international law would disallow on the 
basis of individual and collective international human rights law. Yet these are precisely the cir-
cumstances which classical legal positivism sought to preserve. 
The dichotomy thus exposed, which will be repeated and reinforced throughout the 
course of this study, is that the colonising states’ structures evolved organically over centuries in 
Europe, while Africa, for example, was both colonised and decolonised within one century, 
and thus was left with the form, but not necessarily the function, of European society. 
 
                                                                  
104 M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 51 
(2002) [hereinafter Koskenniemi]. After crediting Anghie for the argument’s formulation, he continues, 
Id.: “This view emerged less as a reaction to Austin than an independent stream of historical jurispru-
dence, linked with liberal-humanitarian ideals and theories of the natural evolution of European societies. 
Even in the absence of a common sovereign, Europe was a political society and international law an inex-
tricable part of its organization.”  
105 Cf. Id. at 103: “[M]uch of what the lawyers behind the Institut de droit international had to say about the 
conditions of international society related to the degrees of civilization possessed by its members. That 
‘civilization’ was not defined beyond impressionistic characterizations was an important aspect of its 
value. It was not part of some rigid classification but a shorthand for the qualities that international law-
yers valued in their own societies, playing upon its opposites: the uncivilized, barbarian, and the savage.”  
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The concept of ‘society’ within the ‘civilisation’ process 
Koskenniemi’s view of sovereignty in The Gentle Civilizer of Nations is that it is a ‘gift of 
civilization’.106 This runs parallel to the irony faced by modern international lawyers when com-
ing to terms with the well-known Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice; it states that one of the primary sources of international law is “the general principles of law 
recognised by civilized nations” (emphasis added). 
Although some non-European states have been recognised by established, sovereign 
states as forming part of the law of nations even in the early 1800s,107 the point being extracted 
from Anghie’s study is that only European law counted as law, and so it follows that discrimina-
tion would be the end result. Different standards could therefore easily be applied to different 
sets of peoples, and, from a legal perspective, as non-European entities had no legal personality 
of their own, they were excluded from the increasingly significant realm of sovereignty, and, 
therefore, had no capacity to make specific claims under international law. This is what Anghie 
calls the ‘dynamic of difference’,108 and it refers to the gap which would need to be bridged to go 
from barbarian to burgher. This gap would tend to be bridged by the pure positivist perspective 
that control over territory is what constitutes sovereignty, and that a failure to occupy territory 
would preclude that entity from being treated as sovereign.109 
Anghie also demonstrates a problem associated with the assumption of sovereignty 
through colonialism, namely, that there were also many otherwise ‘uncivilised’ states in Africa 
(e.g. Benin, Ethiopia, Mali) and Asia (e.g. India), which would meet the requirements of sover-
eignty, if only the product of their formal administrative structures were to have equal status with 
European positive law. To meet this challenge, positivists developed the concept of ‘society’ to 
make the distinction between the civilised and uncivilised. The members of society, by and 
large, were the amalgam of the individual European sovereigns, their territorial possessions and 
their citizens. Faced with the task of civilisation, the distinction between colonial society and 
colonised society had to be maintained. From here, the cultural distinction Anghie terms as the 
‘dynamic of difference’ is developed. He summarises this argument as such: 
The problem of cultural difference, then, antedated the problem of how order is maintained 
among sovereign states, the problem that has preoccupied the discipline since at least the 
Peace of Westphalia and the emergence of the modern state system. Indeed, it could be ar-
gued that the Peace of Westphalia was precisely an attempt to resolve this problem of differ-
ence, the internecine warfare resulting from religious divisions within Europe. Sovereignty, I 
argue, did not precede and manage cultural differences; rather, sovereignty was forged out of 
the confrontation between different cultures and, at least in the colonial confrontation, the 
appropriation by one culture of the powerful terms ‘sovereignty’ and ‘law’. Perhaps, then, 
Westphalia and the model of colonial sovereignty structured by the ‘civilizing mission’ that I 
have sketched here might be understood as two different responses to the same problem of 
                                                                  
106 See generally Id. at chapter two. 
107 See generally US Supreme Court case The Antelope 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825). 
108 See generally Angie, supra note 98, at 52-65. Cf. Id. at 64 the assertion that colonialism was “an encoun-
ter, not between two sovereign states, but between a sovereign European state and an amorphous uncivi-
lized entity; and enforcement posed no real difficulties because of massively superior European military 
strength. Having stripped the non-European world of sovereignty, then, the positivists in effect con-
structed the colonial encounter as an arena in which the sovereign made, interpreted and enforced the law. 
In this way, the colonial arena promised international jurists a chance to develop a jurisprudence which 
demonstrated the efficacy, coherence and utility of international law free of the ubiquitous and unanswer-
able Austinian objections. In short, the colonies offered international law the same opportunity they tradi-
tionally extended to the lower classes—and the dissolute members of the aristocracy—of the imperial 
centre: the opportunity to make something of yourself, to prove and rehabilitate yourself.” 
109 See Id. at 37 et seq. 
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cultural difference.110 
Given that each colonial European state manifested its own sovereignty and self-
identified the members of its own society, there is a predisposition for their actions to be seen as 
being inherently within the law, and, indeed, the foremost extraction from Austin’s form of ab-
solutist legal positivism probably revolves around the fact that he denied the specific existence of 
public international law per se. Austin nevertheless would not be strongly minded to disprove 
the emergence of a proper system of public international law that developed in the absence of a 
universal sovereign. Fundamentally, as the level of reciprocity in expected behaviours amongst 
European societies was naturally high, contact between states was relatively formal and societal 
exclusion towards non-European societies was held constant, state practice began to accumu-
late, as official interactions between governments of sovereign states transpired. In aggregate, 
this serves to reinforce the notion that a system of international law was theoretically conceiv-
able by granting individual European societies the legal competences associated with state sov-
ereignty, even in the absence of a universal sovereign. Bilateral treaty-making amongst 
neighbouring, and indeed competing, sovereign European states greatly increased under the 
dominant positivism. This state practice demonstrated further evidence of international law’s 
existence in the absence of an overarching, global sovereign state. 
If it is therefore accepted that a system of international law was conceivable under classi-
cal legal positivism, if only through voluntarist activity undertaken by the governments of sover-
eign states, the question then turns to the ways in which ‘non-sovereign’ territories are to be 
incorporated into this framework. Rejoining Anghie’s argument, he asserts that non-Europeans 
are outside international law not so much because they lack sovereignty, or indeed the capacity 
to undertake acts akin to formal sovereignty, but more so because that they lack a place at the so-
cietal table. Positivists asserted that no law existed in uncivilised, that is, non-European regions. 
Second, positivists asserted that, even if some societies did have their own systems of law, there 
were not European systems of law and, as such, were not valid. Finally, positivists constructed 
the colonial encounter as an arena in which the sovereign made, interpreted and enforced the 
law. Colonialism promised jurists a chance to develop a jurisprudence that demonstrated the 
coherence and utility of an international legal system. As few jurists of the time would be 
strongly minded to see anything wrong in colonial activity in the first place, positivism—and 
European jurists—must have had a privileged position within this burgeoning European society 
and this position must have been reflected in the structures promulgated by the positivist inter-
national law of the colonial/imperial period. 
The theory of ‘quasi-sovereignty’ and the process of assimilation 
And yet, while the positivist system aimed at the subservient incorporation of the non-
European world into international society, positivists developed a theory of ‘quasi-sovereignty’, 
to assist in the assimilation of the uncivilised into the civilised framework.111 This assimilation 
took place through four basic, and often interrelated, techniques: by treaty, by colonisation, by 
official recognition by European states, and by protectorate agreements. 
In terms of treaty relations, the ultimate manifestation of this was the aforementioned 
Berlin Conference, which marked a new phase in colonial enterprise, because it formulated a 
structural framework for the management of the colonial scramble for Africa, which otherwise 
                                                                  
110 Id. at 311.  
111 See Id. at 76-78, and see also R.H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the 
Third World (1990). 
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threatened the European balance-of-power system. In many cases, treaties were conducted 
with African chiefs, from which European states claimed to derive their title rights.112 Jurists, in 
the positivist tradition, put all their effort in demonstrating the binding effect of such treaties. 
This does, then, imply some sort of quasi-sovereignty for the non-European entity with which 
the treaty is concluded, in that it does confer a sort of recognition upon the entities with whom 
treaties were concluded. But such actions always played into the hands of the Europeans 
through their system of collective hegemony over their African colonies, as they were able to de-
rive rights from such treaties, but refused to accept associated responsibilities from them. The 
practical effect of this is to draw the positivists approach into question, as problems arising from 
the interpretation of such treaties were settled on a largely ad hoc basis. Anghie writes: 
Positivists grandiosely claimed that while their system was based on empirical science, it nev-
ertheless remained autonomous from the messy world of politics, society and history that it 
had imperiously and decisively ordered. The complex realities of late-nineteenth-century 
politics and the ambiguous character of the native overwhelmed the positivist system; its fail-
ure to coherently place and incorporate the non-European entity into its overall scheme, ne-
gated its much-vaunted claims of being comprehensive, systematic and consistent. The 
ambivalent status of the non-European entity, outside the scope of law and yet within it, lack-
ing in international personality and yet necessarily possessing it if any sense was to be made 
of the many treaties which European states relied on, was never satisfactorily defined or re-
solved […].113  
Alternatively, European powers could turn to outright colonisation, which would com-
pletely solve the problem of legal personality, in that the colonising power assumed sovereignty 
over the non-European entity, and any European state carrying on business with that territory 
would deal with the colonial power. The third technique that could be employed is by official 
recognition. This was primarily the case in states such as Japan and Siam, whereby European 
standards were agreed to in these countries’ external and internal relations, at least as applies to 
Europeans.114 In essence, non-European states had to provide extra-territorial jurisdiction to 
Europeans as conditions for recognition. Finally, there could be a creation of a protectorate 
which appears to be little more than ‘colonialism lite’, in that European states exercised extensive 
control over non-European states without fully assuming sovereignty over those states. Britain 
was keen on this technique, in that it allowed it to exercise economic control over a non-
European state that was nominally sovereign.115 
The overall practical effect of these four techniques again relates back to the concept of 
society, in that it allowed for a distinction to be made between types of states. To conclude this 
point, it may be observed that reliance on the concept of ‘society’, as discussed by Anghie, to es-
                                                                  
112 One needs only to consider the Treaty of Nanking between Britain and China to observe the fact that it 
was legal to compel parties to enter into legally-binding treaties. See Treaty of Nanking, Treaty of Peace, 
Friendship and Commerce Between Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland and the Emperor 
of China, 29 August 1842, G.B.-I.R.-P.R.C., 93 Consol. T.S. 467.  
113 Angie, supra note 98, at 81. 
114 Cf. J. Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International law 140 (1894): “When people of European 
race come into contact with American or African tribes, the prime necessity is a government under the 
protection of which the former may carry on the complex life to which they have been accustomed in their 
homes […].” Cf. also Id. at 144, as cited in Anghie, supra note 98, at 75: “We find that one of [European 
colonisers’] first proceedings is to conclude treaties with such chiefs or other authorities as they can dis-
cover: and very properly, for no men are so savage as to be incapable of coming to some understanding 
with other men, and whatever contact has been established between men, some understanding, however 
incomplete it may be, is a better basis for their mutual relations than force. But what is the scope which it 
is reasonably possible to give to treaties in such a case, and what effect which may be reasonably attributed 
to them?”  
115 See discussion in Angie, supra note 98, at 80-90. 
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tablish sovereignty casts doubt on the claim that sovereignty is the core principle of international 
law, and that everything within the international legal system derives from sovereignty. 
Sovereignty, society, assimilation and the colonial experience: A recapitulation 
Given that the interaction between European and non-European societies was one not 
between equals, but between sovereign and non-sovereign, this in many ways draws into ques-
tion the paradigm of ‘order among sovereign states’ that is inherent in modern territorial state-
hood. But the concepts of sovereignty differ significantly in terms of underlying motivation. For 
European states, the issue is how conflicts between sovereigns can be resolved in the absence of 
an overarching sovereign, but for non-European territories that would become states the issue is 
how to obtain sovereignty in the first instance. Ironically, in this sense, legal personhood was 
achieved precisely when a society was absorbed into European colonial empires or altered its 
own practices to fit the needs of Europeans. Anghie is correct to observe the difficulties positiv-
ism faced in reconciling the ‘mission’ of ‘civilising the uncivilised’, and the core of his argument 
is structurally valid and highly relevant for the purposes of this study. However, the strength of 
his argument as it stands must be mitigated somewhat, however, in that Anghie may be over-
stepping his bounds by positing an essentialist dichotomy between Europeans and non-
Europeans. An ample restatement of Angie’s argument follows: 
Achieving the European ideal becomes the goal of the non-European states. Consequently, 
for the non-European world, the achievement of sovereignty was a profoundly ambiguous 
development, as it involved alienation rather than empowerment, the submission to alien 
standards rather than the affirmation of authentic identity. […] The question of the enduring 
effects for non-European societies of the history of exclusion is related to the issue of the 
legacy for the discipline as a whole. Lawrence’s definition of international law reflects both 
the view prevalent at the time and the fundamental nexus between race and law: “Interna-
tional law may be defined as The rules which determine the conduct of the general body of civilized 
states in their dealing with one another”. A century later, international law is defined by Henkin 
and his colleagues in their major textbook on the subject as ‘the law of the international 
community of states’. The notion of ‘community’ is retained, but no distinctions are made be-
tween civilized and non-civilized states. […] [T]he nineteenth century is something of an em-
barrassment to international law, for a number of reasons. Its monolithic view of sovereignty, 
its formalism and rigidity, were important causes of the First World War in the view of dis-
tinguished inter-war jurists such as Lauterpacht and Alvarez, who set about the task of re-
constructing a New International Law. Its complete complicity with the colonial project has 
led to its denunciation as an international law of imperialism. Subsequent generations of in-
ternational lawyers have strenuously attempted to distance the discipline from that period, in 
much the same ways that positivists distanced themselves from naturalists. And as with that 
previous attempt at distancing, the results are ambiguous.116 
Such a formulation fails in large measure to take account of the fact that colonialism was 
and is a fait accompli, and certainly has been recognised as such in terms of history, politics and, 
indeed, law. Anghie’s argument does a good job in demonstrating the inherent contradictions 
and problems in the ways in which sovereignty has come to be conferred upon all parts of the 
world. However, that position itself is inherently modern, in the sense that it looks backward 
through the prism of, and therefore is fundamentally defined by, the ‘right of peoples to self-
determination’, decolonisation and the rise of international human rights law, through the 
United Nations and other intergovernmental organisations. In terms of history, culture and 
logical reasoning, difficulties are caused by viewing all non-European entities as existing com-
pletely in a vacuum. All societies develop and evolve, all peoples witness changes to their own 
                                                                  
116 Anghie, supra note 98, at 108-109, citing Lawrence, supra note 103, at 1, and Henkin 3e, supra note 2, at 
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cultures and traditions over time. The fact that Angie tends to de-emphasise, throughout the 
course of his otherwise challenging and interesting analysis, is that, although colonialism hap-
pened, so did decolonisation, inherent with the creation of a right of self-determination, and in 
Africa, for example, the decision was taken by the Africans themselves that the effects of coloni-
alism, that is, their arbitrary borders, were also accepted.117 To be certain, from this right came 
many other universal rights. 
In sum, while the present state system may well have been created through morally indif-
ferent legal positivism, the inclusion of more natural law perspectives in modern (positivist) in-
ternational law, i.e., the core tenets of customary international human rights law, tends to negate 
these effects. The complications in incorporating such wildly divergent societies under one 
overarching rubric were not lost on even the most progressive of international lawyers from the 
positivist period. Koskenniemi cites Pasquale Fiore’s Le droit international codifié et sa sanction 
juridique, and suggests that Fiore held the collective European conscience to be “the highest 
form of civilization ever known”.118 Koskienniemi posits that, under Fiore’s worldview, “law was 
not an effect of sovereign decision, but a spontaneous outgrowth of society”,119 but such ‘spon-
taneous outgrowth’, itself, was completely European in composition. The existence of imperial 
dominance is unmistakable, as Koskenniemi observes, again referring to Fiore: 
Only fully civilized States could be members of the Magna civitas, the juridical community. For 
“[t]his community is already a product of civilization. To the extent that it expands to savage 
countries, it gives rise to needs and interests that united the civilized nations with barbaric or 
other peoples less advanced in the path of progress.” Full membership in the legal community 
required the possession of “un certain niveau de culture.” This level was first attained in 
Europe but through commerce and other contacts it was slowly spreading. Fiore made the 
commonplace distinction between the somewhat civilized cultures of Asia (such as Turkey 
and the “great Oriental empires”) and the less civilized (“peut-être barbares”) of Asia and Af-
rica that did not possess a stable political organization that would make the development of 
juridical culture possible.120 
The reality remaining is that, through the exercise of the right of self-determination, in 
conjunction with other universal rights, peoples within these states have more tools available to 
them to defend themselves within these state structures than they did during the times of impe-
rial dominance by European powers. While the following chapter will be devoted to consider-
ing decolonisation in detail, a simple point is made for the moment: colonialism spread the 
European state system far throughout the globe. By the 20th century, the bloodiest in human 
history,121 the entire planet was now ‘civilised’. 
A globalised ‘system’ of statehood which underpins all modern legal analysis 
Much as barbarianism originally meant that barbaroi were people who could not be 
properly understood, ‘civilised’ society was originally simply a reflection of the accumulation of 
inter-European contact. Both concepts, then, took on secondary meanings of greater impor-
tance than their origins. Thus came colonialism, followed by the eventual global decolonisa-
tion, which will be considered in-depth, in the next chapter. 
                                                                  
117 See discussion infra at chapter two. 
118 Koskenniemi, supra note 104, at 54, citing P. Fiore, Le droit international codifié et sa sanction ju-
ridique (1890) [hereinafter Fiore]. 
119 Id. at 55. 
120 Id. at 56, citing Fiore, supra note 118, at 74-94. 
121 Observations about the outset of the 21st century, notwithstanding. 
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By the time the two world wars took place, colonialism was firmly implanted and legiti-
mised worldwide. The first truly ‘globalised’ phenomenon had occurred. As once-colonised 
lands began to assert and gain their independence, as a general rule they did so as a constituent 
whole, as per the rule of uti possidetis juris. However, Krasner’s ‘Westphalian model’ of sover-
eignty, whereby political life is based on the concepts of territoriality and autonomy, governed 
by domestic political authorities, was transplanted, along with the external Westphalian state, 
with much less vigour. Although this will be seen to have considerable implications regarding 
the effectiveness of the nascent post-colonial state, for the moment, it will be useful to take a step 
back and get an overview of contemporary reality. 
This reality, simply, is that there are more than three and a half times the number of sover-
eign states in the world at the outset of the 21st century than existed some fifty years earlier. Every 
part of the globe, from the most densely-settled metropolitan areas to the most sparsely-
populated Hinterlands, is attributed to one sovereign state derived from the original West-
phalian model. There are, of course, obvious examples of boundary disputes (viz. Ecuador-
Peru), liberation movements (viz. Palestine-Israel) and other self-determination claims (viz. 
Western Sahara) being exceptional situations, but, in general, the statement is conceptually 
valid. The aforementioned global territorial integrity model came into place largely as a result of 
the sudden political unpalatability of colonialism following the second world war. This reality 
was catalysed with the bipolar global political climate of the times, marked by the superpower 
rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. Contemporary events have left a chang-
ing series of political interpretations for conceptualising the purported ‘international commu-
nity’, as well as a series of legal institutions to reinforce that community. It is within this context 
that the decolonisation experience should be viewed. 
The world, now a purported ‘community’ of sovereign states, is a strikingly different place 
from region to region. African states, for example, are marked by their relatively low population 
densities, often challenging climates, natural environments and general difficulty in projecting 
power over distances.122 Their boundaries, so arbitrary and artificial, have remained more or 
less fixed in spite of the nature of their imposition and the relatively brief amount of time spent 
actually under colonial rule.123 Yet The Gambia, for example, is as much an inanimate, territo-
rial state as is the United Kingdom; Senegal is as much an inanimate, territorial state as is France. 
But The Gambia exists as an independent state today only because it was the British who ex-
plored up the Gambia River into Africa, whilst France controlled the periphery of that territory.  
In situations like this, it is very difficult to see how any semblance of animate statehood, 
even remotely comparable to that of their former colonial masters, existed in The Gambia or 
Senegal. The challenge to be addressed in upcoming chapters is to address the reality that, 
clearly, in some places statehood means one thing, and in other places statehood means some-
thing completely different, but all states are part of the same ‘international community’. This 
point will become clearer as it is observed, in the next chapter, that e.g. African states are, in the 
main, consisting of the ‘right of peoples to self-determination’, the contemporary rule of uti pos-
sidetis juris and some largely piecemeal attempts at ‘nation-building’ over a few decades of inde-
pendent statehood. 
                                                                  
122 See generally Herbst, supra note 78, at chapter one (‘The Challenge of State Building’). 
123 Cf. C. Young, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective 9-10 (1994): “The colonial state 
in Africa lasted in most instances less than a century—a mere moment in historical time. Yet it totally re-
ordered political space, social hierarchies and cleavages, and modes of economic production. Its territorial 
grid—whose final contours congealed only in the dynamics of decolonization—determined the state units 
that gained sovereignty and come to form the present system of African politics.” 
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The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States: Critically evalu-
ating the most commonly-accepted definition of statehood 
In a rapidly changing world, the definition of ‘a state’ has remained virtually unchanged and 
continues to be well described by the traditional provisions of the Montevideo Convention 
on the Rights and Duties of States. […] But it should not be thought that, because the formal 
definition of statehood has remained unchanged, the concept of statehood is rigid and immu-
table. Its component elements have always been interpreted flexibly, depending on the cir-
cumstances and the context in which the claim of statehood is made.124 
Developmental history and overview of the convention’s substantive provisions 
The progression of international society beyond the historical notion of rex est imperator 
in regno suo (‘the King is Emperor within his own realm’),125 toward the more contemporary de-
velopment of the Westphalian-based statehood system, led to the identification and enthrone-
ment of the most fundamental legitimising concept of state-based sovereignty in public 
international law: the role played by the state as an international legal person.126 From this fol-
lows the specific designation of the state as the primary subject of the corpus of public interna-
tional law, as possessing certain rights and obligations and an entitlement to take certain specific 
actions with regard to its own foreign relations. Given that the capacities and obligations of states 
include, inter alia, “the capacity to make treaties and agreements under international law, the 
capacity to make claims for breaches of international law, and the enjoyment of privileges and 
immunities from national jurisdiction”,127 and particularly, in view of the rise in importance of 
legal positivism in the 19th and early 20th centuries, it stands to reason that, at some point, inter-
national society would want to codify what it is to be a state.  
The Monevideo Convention itself128 dates from the 1933 Eighth Pan-American Confer-
ence129 (Montevideo, 3-27 December 1933), which culminated prior work done at the sixth and 
                                                                  
124 R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It 39 (1994). 
125 Cf. S. von Pufendorf, VII De Jure Naturae et Gerntium Libri Octo, Ch. 3, para. 690 (1672, Oldfather 
trans. 1934): “Just as a king owes his sovereignty and majesty to no one outside his realm, so he need not 
obtain the consent and approval of other kings or states, before he may carry himself like a king and be re-
garded as such.” 
126 Cf. 1 Oppenheim’s, International Law: A Treatise 117, § 63 (H. Lauterpacht, 8th ed. 1955) [hereinafter 
Oppenheim]: “The conception of International Persons is derived from the conception of the Law of Na-
tions. As this law is the body of rules which the civilised States consider legally binding in their dis-
course, every State which belongs to the civilised States, and is therefore a member of the Family of 
Nations, is an International Person.” 
127 Damrosch, et al, Int’l Law, supra note 36, at 241.  
128 See Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933) 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881, 165 
L.N.T.S. 19. [hereinafter Montevideo Convention] The Convention entered into force one year later, on 26 
December 1934. Bolivia was the only participant in the Conference which did not sign the Convention. 
Brazil, Peru and the United States offered reservations to the Convention, primarily concerning the issue 
of intervention by one state into another state; however, as Article 8 of the Convention, dealing with non-
intervention in the internal and external affairs of states, was reaffirmed by protocol on 23 December 
1936, these reservations have become moot points. Nevertheless, by the time of the adoption of this pro-
tocol in 1936, only five states had actually ratified the convention itself.  
129 The Pan American Conference, predecessor of the Pan American Union and the Organization of 
American States, was first established in 1890 at the initiative of James G. Blaine, a controversial Republi-
can political leader (including two terms as Secretary of State) in the post-Civil War United States. He 
cast a particularly strong eye on international relations between the United States and Latin America, par-
ticularly involving commercial interest. The Pan American Conference was designed as a standing forum 
to bring together Latin American and United States leaders at five-year intervals; however, the often con-
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seventh conferences in working toward defining ‘a state’ in international law. The US Restate-
ment (Third), at §201, recapitulates the most salient parts of the Montevideo definition, as pri-
marily found in Article 1 of the Convention itself.130 According to the Restatement, “under 
international law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent population, 
under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, 
formal relations with other such entities”. The formulation provided by the Restatement is of 
particular interest, in that the provisions of §201 are to be read in conjunction with those at §206, 
which state that the capacities, rights and duties of states include: “(a) sovereignty over its terri-
tory and general authority over its nationals; (b) status as an international legal person, with ca-
pacity to own, acquire, and transfer property, to make contracts and enter into international 
agreements, to become a member of international organizations, and to pursue, and be subject 
to, legal remedies; and (c) capacity to join with other states to make international law, as cus-
tomary law or by international agreement.” 
Although there seems to be a large measure of general agreement that, in James Craw-
ford’s words, the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States has become the 
“best known formulation of the basic criteria for statehood”,131 two rather striking points about 
the convention can be identified. The first is that it is a product of a specialised regional confer-
ence, a point not lost in the literature of the time. As J.G. Guerrero, the then-Vice President of 
the Permanent of International Justice pointed out: 
Il est bien évident que la Convention sur les “Droits et Devoirs des Etats” […] produira la plénitude 
de ses effets entre les Républiques et un Etat non américain. Nous toucherons ici au point faible de 
la codification du droit international réduite a l’usage d’un seul continent. Ses règles demeurent to-
talement dépourvues de l’autorité universelle que doit constituer l’essence même de la codification du 
droit international.132 
Despite Guerrero’s concerns, and his grouping of North and South America, however, it 
seems clear that the Montevideo provisions have been widely accepted through state practice, 
and now find themselves at the centre of the customary international law defining statehood. 
This does not mean that the provisions are adequate, exhaustive or able to be equally applied. 
This observation thus leads into the second point to be made about the convention, namely that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
tentious political and military climate between the regions led to a rather limited effectiveness of the fo-
rum, particularly following the pronouncement of the Monroe Doctrine in 1895, although later this was 
somewhat mitigated by Franklin Roosevelt’s ‘Good Neighbor Policy’ of the 1930s. For discussion, see e.g. 
D. Healy, James G. Blaine and Latin America (2001).  
130 Article 1 of the Convention is as follows: “The state as a person of international law should possess the 
following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capac-
ity to enter into relations with the other states.” Caution should be made in over-interpreting the implica-
tions of the meaning of the word ‘should’ in the text (as opposed to a more definitive terminology such as 
‘shall’), in view of the French translation of Article 1: “L’État, en tant que personne de droit international, 
doit réunir les conditions suivantes […].” (emphasis added)  
131 J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law 36 (1979) [hereinafter Crawford, Creation]. 
But cf. J. Crawford, The Criteria for Statehood in International Law, 48 BYIL 93, 107 (1976-77) [hereinaf-
ter Crawford, Criteria]: “…there is nevertheless no generally accepted and satisfactory contemporary le-
gal definition of statehood. This may well because the question normally arises only in the borderline 
cases…” And see particularly, J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law 37-45 (2d. ed, 
2006). 
132 J.G. Guerrero, La VIIe Conférence Panaméricaine : Montevideo, 3-27 décembre 1933, XLI Rev. Gén. de 
Droit Int’l Public 401, 411 (1934). Author’s translation: It is certainly evident that the Convention on the 
“Rights and Responsibilities of States” will produce considerable effects between Republics and non-
American states. We are touching upon a weak point in the codification of international law reduced to its 
usage in only one continent. Its rules remain completely deprived of the universal authority which must 
constitute the essence of international law’s codification. 
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it was originally formulated with little substantive development of the logical elements which 
would come to shape its provisions.133 This point is succinctly made in a more contemporary 
context by Thomas Grant, in his critique of the Montevideo Convention: 
That the framing of the Montevideo Convention has gone largely unexamined may reflect the 
fact that its content was a restatement of ideas prevalent at the time of the framing. So ap-
parent were the Montevideo criteria to contemporary observers that few thought to inquire 
as to their basis or origin. At the crux of the Montevideo criteria lay the concepts of effec-
tiveness, population, and territoriality. In the late 1930s, these may have seemed a long-
established feature of international law. They certainly were not new. Georg Jellinek, writing 
in the late nineteenth century, had posited a Drei-Elementen-Lehre—a “doctrine of three 
elements”—and this was the essential core of the Montevideo criteria. By the 1930s, the 
three elements were widely assumed to be a mainstay of statehood. Reflecting their preva-
lence, the elements of effectiveness, population, and territoriality were enumerated as a basis 
for statehood (or of sovereignty) by many leading publicists of the half-century leading up to 
the Montevideo Convention.134 
While the principal substantive issue at hand concerns defining which entities are to be 
instilled with international legal personality, the US Restatement also demonstrates how, in 
more recent years, states have lost their exclusive—but not primary—claim to being an interna-
tional legal person. While contemporary international law remains principally centred on the 
law governing interstate relations, it must be simultaneously observed that there exists an ever-
growing number of intergovernmental organisations existing as international legal persons.135 
For example, §101 of the Restatement is of use in determining the scope of modern international 
law itself; it states that international law deals “with the conduct of states and of international or-
ganizations and with their relations inter se, as well as with some of their relations with persons, 
whether natural or juridical”. Thus clearly some intergovernmental organisations have freely 
appropriated the concept of international legal personality from the exclusive domain of states 
to serve their own interests.  
Nevertheless, the primary international legal person, and the focus of the analysis at hand 
is the sovereign state, and at the very least, the Montevideo Convention must be seen as the start-
ing point for a discussion of the legal elements incorporated into the rubric of ‘statehood’. Fur-
thermore, subsequent practice demonstrates the importance of the Montevideo formulation in 
                                                                  
133 Cf. R.R. Wilson, International Law In Treaties of the United States, 31 AJIL 271, 284 (1937): “The na-
ture of the five specific references to international law in [the Montevideo Convention] […] suggest that 
the Convention on Rights and Duties was, except for the important provisions on intervention, intended 
to be mainly declaratory rather than legislative.”; G. Fitzmaurice, General Principles of International Law, 
92 Rec des Cours 5, 13 (1957): “To give a strict definition of [states] would be to encounter the same kind 
of logical difficulties as are involved in defining an international person—that is to say, it tends to involve 
the use of terms which themselves require definition but can only be defined by reference to the very con-
cept it was originally sought to define.” See also R. Higgins, The Development of International Law 
Through the Political Organs of the United Nations 13 (1963) [hereinafter Higgins] and J.E.S. Fawcett, 
The British Commonwealth in International Law 92 (1963). 
134 T.D. Grant, Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents, 37 Colum. J. Trans-
nat'l L. 403, 416 (1999) [hereinafter Grant]. The ‘doctrine of three elements’ is extracted from G. Jellinek, 
Allgemeine Staatslehre, at 396 et seq. (3d ed. 1914). 
135 This is particularly clear with regard to the United Nations, viz. Advisory Opinion on Reparations for 
Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 ICJ Rep. 3, concluding, broadly, that if an or-
ganisation was expressly intended to have international legal personality or has other implied powers in-
volving international legal personality, dependant upon the purposes and functions of the organisation, 
including, inter alia, the capacity to bring claims for injuries suffered by the organisation as a whole or 
the seeking of reparations for injuries against agents of the organisation, then the organisation itself must 
have international legal personality. 
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defining statehood.136 In so doing, it may be observed that the greatest practical function of the 
convention was to identify particular elements governing interactions between humans and the 
land on which they live. This is particularly clear given the interrelated equation identified by 
Jellinek and Grant (and reinforced by the US Restatement) that the law of statehood is ‘terri-
tory + population + effectiveness (≈  territorial integrity) = sovereignty (≈  
statehood)’ . Finally, it cannot be ignored that recognition of a state by other states and the ef-
fects of such recognition are fundamental to the actual determination of a ‘defined’ state, and in-
deed Articles 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Convention speak to this reality.137 Although the recognition 
of new states and the roles played by the governments of these states are important for a com-
plete understanding of statehood, for the moment, it will suffice to discuss the four criteria used 
in defining statehood as extracted from Montevideo Convention, with a slight reordering to fa-
cilitate the discussion at hand.  
The substantive provisions of the convention: The totality of statehood as an 
equation of balance oscillating between ‘fixed’ and ‘fluid’ concepts 
The elements of the Convention may be grouped in two separate categories, so as to re-
flect the interactions between humans and the land on which they live. The first category is rela-
tively ‘fixed’, reflecting a degree of permanence related to the territorial nature of statehood, and 
the other relatively ‘fluid’, reflecting a degree of variability related to specific actions taken in the 
actual management of that particular territory’s municipal and international affairs. 
The first grouping involves the relatively ‘fixed’ provisions of statehood—the ‘defined ter-
ritory’ and ‘permanent population’ elements—in that the main issue at hand is related to external 
boundaries of a specifically-defined sovereign state, and the union of the inhabitants of that state 
to this specific territory. In a modern context, there exists no terra nullius, or so-called ‘undis-
covered’ territory which has thus not been incorporated into the global system of sovereign 
states. Therefore, the totality of global territory is, with the exception of generally uninhabited 
Antarctica,138 subject to the jurisdiction of one particular state. However, it is also the fact that, as 
stated in 1945 and a fact today, “very few states are completely free from disputes relating to terri-
tory, either along their frontiers or in their dependencies. Every continent contains an astonish-
ing number of areas that either have been or are now in heated controversy”.139 
                                                                  
136 The admission of Israel as a Member-State of the United Nations in 1948 is an illustrative example, and 
Phillip Jessup, the US representative to the Security Council relied heavily upon the Montevideo criteria 
in making his case that Israel should be admitted. Cf. 3 UN SCOR, 383 Mtg., 2 Dec. 1948, No. 128, at page 
10 [hereinafter Jessup]: “We are all aware that, under that traditional definition of a State in international 
law, all the great writers have pointed to four qualifications: first, there must be a people; second there 
must be a territory; third, there must be a government and, fourth, there must be capacity to enter into re-
lations with other States of the world.”  
137 For discussion, see J.B. Scott, The Seventh International Conference of American States, 28 AJIL 219, 
226 (1934). 
138 Antarctica is a sui generis entity lacking any indigenous human population or government and is not 
subject to the direct sovereignty of any one state. It is primarily governed by the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, 
402 UNTS 71 (entered into force on 23 June 1961), stating that Antarctica is to be used for peaceful (non-
military and non-nuclear) purposes. Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the 
United Kingdom all claim some measure of territorial sovereignty, including some overlapping claims, 
over some sectors of Antarctica, but in practice these amount to little more than mere claims to sover-
eignty rather than an actual manifestation of sovereignty per se. See A. Watts, International Law and the 
Antarctic Treaty System (1992), particularly at 111 et seq. 
139 N. Hill, Claims to Territory in International Law and Relations 28 (1945). 
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Territorial regions may happen to find themselves existing under contested sovereignty, 
as is the case in e.g. Jammu and Kashmir. Regions may find themselves under occupation by an 
administering power, as in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Or, or due to controversial circum-
stances effectuated in the process of decolonisation, as in Western Sahara, territorial conflicts 
may exist. Furthermore, the numerous border disputes to be found in practically all regions of 
the globe may be of lesser comparable intensity, yet still qualify as regions dominated by territo-
rial disputes. 
The global prevalence of territorial disputes demonstrates how the frontiers of states are 
not immutable, and as such may be changed with the consent of those involved, provided that 
the threat or use of force is not invoked.140 Nevertheless, it is inherent in statehood that some sort 
of frontiers must exist within a state, because states themselves are, in the first instance, territori-
ally-defined entities. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the vast majority of states have 
been established in a contemporary sense within relatively static frontiers with a rational expec-
tation of continuity. States exist to perpetuate their own existence and, broadly speaking, do so 
within defined and accepted, but somewhat adjustable, territorial limits.  
Similarly, the permanent population of a state is an element which remains relatively 
fixed. Certain demographic requirements, such as the specific population of a territory, are 
largely irrelevant in this sense, given that there exist both highly populated states with popula-
tions of over one billion persons, such as China or India, as well as UN member-states with very 
small populations, such as Palau, a tiny group of islands off the coast of the Philippines with a 
population of 18,000, or Nauru, an equatorial Pacific island with a population of just 12,000. 
What is at issue here is the existence of such a population and not the size of that population per 
se.141 Neither is the issue related to the granting of nationality at birth through jus solis or jus san-
guinis or through naturalisation. Thus, the concept of a ‘permanent population’ invites a ra-
tional expectation of continuity as does the concept of a ‘defined territory’.  
Such expectations of continuity are less likely to be found in the separate criteria of gov-
ernment and of capacity to enter into international relations—broadly grouped in the sover-
eignty equation as ‘effectiveness’—for it may be envisaged that a defined territory with a fixed 
population might, at some point, lose the latter two criteria. Such a proposition exists not only in 
the hypothetical realm, but in actual fact, as occurred most vividly in Rwanda, Sierra Leone and 
Somalia during the 1990s.142 What is more speculative, yet nevertheless of interest to consider in 
the African context, is the possibility that the state itself is unable to project its own authority 
from its capital throughout the totality of its own territory, thus leaving certain regions under the 
perpetual circumstance of nugatory ‘state governance’, within the otherwise integral, territori-
ally-defined sovereign state. For the moment, such a notion should be kept separate from the 
otherwise more clearly-identifiable legal elements at hand in the present discussion. It will, 
however, be addressed in chapter four of this study. Thus, the second grouping of the Montevi-
deo criteria involves the provisions of statehood which are more ‘fluid’ and fall under the broad 
chapeau of effectiveness: the requirement that the territorial entity possesses a capacity to take 
certain actions on the municipal and international levels so as to be considered a state, thereby 
holding a specific title to exercise domestic sovereignty to govern itself as well as a licence to take 
                                                                  
140 Cf. UN Charter articles 2(3), 2(4), 33-38. See also I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by 
States (1963), at 380. 
141 See generally J.C. Duursma, Self-Determination, Statehood and International Relations of Micro-States 
(1996). 
142 Indeed, in the outset of the 21st century, it remains arguable whether Somalia, in particular, demon-
strates the capacity for effectiveness in government and the capacity for international relations. 
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specific actions, on the international plane, by virtue of being instilled with international legal 
personality. 
The relatively fixed provisions of statehood reflect the territorial nature of statehood 
As is being asserted, statehood per se, as a legal concept, is a complicated entity. The four 
distinct Montevideo Convention criteria, imperfect as they are, do reflect the baseline criteria for 
statehood in international law. If one is allowed to assess the component parts of the most read-
ily-accepted definition of legal statehood, it can be seen how certain components tend more 
towards the objective and other components tend more towards the objective. What is at hand 
is, indeed, the fact that, across many states, a permanent population and a defined territory may 
be readily observable, and yet, simultaneously, the obvious existence of a government and the 
capacity to enter into relations with other states may be more readily obscured. This apparent 
incongruity reveals the need for such delineation between the groupings of population and ter-
ritory, and that of government and independence. 
Defined territory as a prerequisite for a permanent population 
Given that states themselves are territorially-defined entities, the requirement of having a 
defined territory is arguably the most important provision of statehood. In the words of Philip 
Jessup before the UN Security Council, with regard to the admission of Israel as a Member-
State: “[T]he reason for the rule that one of the necessary attributes of a State is that it shall pos-
sess territory is that one cannot contemplate a State as a kind of disembodied spirit”.143 
There does appear, however, to be a certain amount of flexibility allowed in considering 
the territory of a state as having been ‘defined’. Again, the US Restatement provides a foundation 
for deeper discussion, through the provisions of §201: 
An entity may satisfy the territorial requirement for statehood even if its boundaries have 
not been finally settled, if one or more of the boundaries are disputed, or if some of its terri-
tory is claimed by another state. An entity does not necessarily cease to be a state even if all 
of its territory has been occupied by a foreign power or if it has otherwise lost control of its 
territory temporarily.144 
Prior to the formulation of the Montevideo Convention, some commentators were of the 
opinion that a fixed territory was not essential for the existence of ‘statehood’ per se,145 a relatively 
understandable position given the roughly concurrent historical evolution away from empires 
into fixed states in some regions. A more nuanced view can be seen later on, in returning to Jes-
sup’s statement regarding Israel before the Security Council, namely that that strict definition of 
territorial limits has not been seen as an absolute prerequisite for the acceptance of statehood. 
He said: 
One does not find in the general classic treatment of this subject any insistence that the ter-
ritory of a State must be exactly fixed by definite frontiers. We all know that, historically, 
many States have begun their existence with their frontiers unsettled. Let me take as one ex-
ample, my own country, the United States of America. Like the State of Israel in its origin, it 
had certain territory along the seacoast. It had various indeterminate claims to an extended 
territory westward. But, in the case of the United States, that land had not even been ex-
                                                                  
143 Jessup, supra note 136, at 12. 
144 Similarly, Cf. Id. at § 201, reporter’s note 1, citing Israel in 1948, Kuwait in 1963 and Estonia, Latvia 
and Albania in 1919 as similar examples of highly contested ‘states’. 
145 See e.g. H. Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität (1920), at 70-76, J. Salmond, Jurisprudence (7th ed., 
1924) and C. Donati, Stato e territorio (1924) at 27-30. 
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plored, and no one knew just where the American claims ended and where French and Brit-
ish and Spanish claims began. To the North, the exact delimitation of the frontier with the 
territories of Great Britain was not settled until many years later. And yet, I maintain that, in 
the light of history and in the light of the practice and acceptance by other States, the exis-
tence of the United States of America was not in question before its final boundaries were 
determined.146 
Nevertheless, it must also be recognised that, at that time of his statement, great portions 
of the planet remained under colonial rule which, upon being broken up, solidified territorial 
definition, as internal colonial administrative boundaries were transformed into international 
frontiers. In a more historical framework, the process of ‘civilising the uncivilised’, through the 
incorporation of lands seen as terra nullius into the European positivist international legal sys-
tem, brought those territories into the domain of fixed territoriality in the first instance.  
One would be hard-pressed to identify any particular territory in a contemporary context 
which has yet to be ‘discovered’ and subsequently ‘occupied’ per se: the odds of any new, habit-
able land mass on the planet suddenly emerging for the first time seem remarkably low. A re-
flection of this is the use of cession during times of colonialism as an often-repeated tool for 
territorial incorporation. Simply put, the practical effects of global colonialism and de-
colonisation cannot be ignored, and all bits of territory on the globe have now been ‘discov-
ered’. Thus Jessup’s comment regarding the historical allowance of the birth of states with unset-
tled frontiers seems not inaccurate, but relegated primarily to a historical perspective.147 In a 
contemporary perspective, to do so would necessitate putting an acceptable claim of statehood 
to the international community for an entity with an open-ended territorial definition; as such, 
an entity would be, in nomenclature and actual fact, ‘undefined’. But it is difficult to see how this 
would be possible, if all global territories have, in some manner or other, been heretofore ‘de-
fined’. Jessup’s point regarding the lack of certainty of delimitation of American, versus French, 
versus British, versus Spanish claims to territory must be seen as of decreased relevance in a con-
temporary context, because to allow such extreme definitional latitude is akin to providing an 
open invitation for perpetual allegations of violations of the purported territorial limits (and, 
therefore, the sovereignty and statehood itself) of the purported ‘state’. 
That is not to say, however, that such a contemporary preclusion of the existence of 
‘open-frontier’ statehood would apply to circumstances involving relatively more definition of 
the territorial limits of the state than observed, in the historical cases of the United States or Is-
rael. Such would be the case involving, for example, a border dispute, or, perhaps, a dispute in-
volving something less than the totality of the territory of the entire state. Under such 
circumstances, the dictum of the Germano-Polish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, dating from 1929, is 
seen as authoritative in determining the appropriate rule, as later confirmed by the ICJ in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases:148 
                                                                  
146 Jessup, supra note 136, at 12. 
147 It is true that both the existing state of Israel and a future Palestinian state lack defined borders at pre-
sent. However, these are the examples which prove the rule, as the circumstance arises, due to a highly 
specific local conflict. The lack of similar states with undefined borders to such a great magnitude further 
reinforces this assertion. 
148 Cf. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of 
Germany v. the Netherlands), 1969 ICJ Rep. 3, 32: “The appurtenance of a given area, considered as an en-
tity, in no way governs the precise delimitation of its boundaries, any more than uncertainty as to bounda-
ries can affect territorial rights. There is for instance no rule that the land frontiers of a State must be fully 
delimited and defined […].” The question of Albania’s external borders and its entry into the League of 
Nations is mentioned herewith; for greater discussion, see Question of the Monastery of Saint-Naorum 
(Albanian Frontier) (Advisory Opinion), PCIJ Ser. B No. 9, 10. Similarly, see also Article 3, Paragraph 2 
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Whatever may be the importance of the delimitation of boundaries, one cannot go so far as 
to maintain that as this delimitation has not been legally effected the State in question cannot 
be considered as having any territory whatever. The practice of international law and histori-
cal precedents point to the contrary. In order to say that a State exists and recognised as 
such […] it is enough that this territory has a sufficient consistency, even though its bounda-
ries have not yet been accurately delimited, and that the State actually exercises independent 
public authority over that territory. There are numerous examples of cases in which States 
have existed without their statehood being called into doubt […] at a time when the frontier 
between them was not accurately traced.149 
Thus, as regards the defined territory criterion, it can be concluded that, at the moment of 
the pronouncement of ‘statehood’, there will exist a geographically-congruous political com-
munity reasonably capable of making such a pronouncement. Such a circumstance links the 
territorial requirement with the population requirement, existing within a reasonably well-
defined territorial configuration, even though the territorial boundaries of such an entity might 
not be completely delimited. Furthermore, the successful establishment of a territorially-
defined sovereign state is in many ways a fait accompli, in that future boundary or territorial dis-
putes alone do not automatically raise questions of statehood, in that particular state. 
Permanent population as inherent in the statehood equation 
The Montevideo Convention governs interactions between humans and the land on 
which they live. Attention in this relationship must now be drawn from ‘the land’ to ‘the hu-
mans’. Oppenheim wrote that the first criterion for statehood must be a ‘people’, although in the 
contemporary sense, this conceptualisation exists not to that which is granted a ‘right of self-
determination’, but in something potentially quite the opposite: “A people is an aggregate of in-
dividuals of both sexes who live together as a community in spite of the fact that they belong to 
different races or creeds, or be of different colour.”150 Asbjørn Eide succinctly makes this distinc-
tion, as he states that “from the standpoint of international law, the ‘permanent population’ is 
synonymous with ‘the nation’. From a social or anthropological perspective […] this is not al-
ways so”.151  
Perhaps what is most substantial about the permanent population criterion is that the 
population, whether large or small in number, is able to organise itself into some sort of coher-
ent, stable political entity, so as to be able to make a specific claim to project that political com-
munity across the defined territory of the state. When this happens, and the state comes into 
existence, it is then able to confer upon this permanent population its own nationality, as na-
tionality flows directly from the state to its citizens. To that end, it seems logically impossible to 
envisage a circumstance where a functioning state would be in actual existence while lacking a 
demonstrable permanent population; thus all states must have their own nationals.152 Neverthe-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of the Treaty of Lausanne (Frontier between Turkey and Iraq) (the Mosul Boundary Case), PCIJ Ser. B No. 
12, 21. 
149 Deutsche Continental Gas-Geshellschaft v. Polish State (1929), 5 Annual Digest of Public International 
Law Cases (ILR) 5, 14-15 (1929-30). The case report went on to discuss, Id. at 15, the relationship between 
a state’s capital and its Hinterland, stating that because the contentious issue of the case was manifested at 
Warsaw, and not, for example, along the eastern boundary of Poland, the measure was “in other words in a 
territory the national Polish character of which could not be doubted by anyone since the end of 1918. It 
was there that the new State was born; there was the seat of its governmental and public power.” 
150 1 Oppenheim, supra note 126, at 118. 
151 A. Eide, Minority Protection and World Order: Towards a Framework for Law and Policy, in A. Phil-
lips and A. Rosas (eds.) Universal Minority Rights 96 (1995). 
152 A discussion along these lines can be observed in early Israeli jurisprudence. In A.B. v. M.B., as cited in 
17 ILR 110-111 (1950), the presiding judge disregarded a previous decision in Re Goods of Shippers, 
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less, it is not an absolute requirement for a new state to extend nationality to its population, al-
though in practice this generally does occur.153 Moreover, there appears to be even a degree of 
flexibility in the extent to which the ‘permanent population’ is, in actual fact, permanent. While 
it seems clear that the permanent population of a state must demonstrate an active willingness to 
be normally resident within the defined territory of a state, the ICJ, in the Western Sahara advi-
sory opinion, seems to take the position that a largely nomadic population does not inherently 
fall outside the requirements of a permanent population. In Western Sahara, such a way of life 
came, in large part, out of necessity, due to the “sparsity of the resources and the spasmodic 
character of the rainfall”,154 leading further to specific customs reflecting basic ways of life in the 
region,155 which one commentator assesses as comprising “a method of linking people and terri-
tory in a legal relationship […] while the identity of the people was reflected to the almost fever-
ish claim to territory”.156  
The relatively fluid provisions reflect the juridical weight of the principle of effectiveness  
The main reason why the principles of statehood related to ‘effectiveness’ are relatively 
more fluid, vis-à-vis the relatively more fixed principles of territoriality and population, are be-
cause one must make distinctions between the states themselves and the governments of those 
states. There exists an important logical distinction between the two concepts. Consider Ian 
Browlie’s commentary regarding incidence and continuity of statehood: 
(a) Population: This criterion is intended to be used in association with that of territory, and 
connotes a stable community. Evidentially it is important, since in the absence of the physical 
basis for an organized community, it will be difficult to establish the existence of a state. 
(b) Defined territory: There must be a reasonably stable political community and this must be 
in control of a certain area.157 
Thus according to Brownlie’s formulation, it is clear that some specific community must 
take certain actions in the first instance to organise itself as a state per se. The relatively ‘fixed’ char-
acter is thus defined, more or less, by the existence of its population to which nationality can be 
given, and the state’s own territorial limits. Beyond that, the question turns more to the ongoing 
administration of that territory by the permanent population within the state. As will be seen, 
this is more of an open-ended question, as the requirements of international law with regard to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
cited Id., which held that citizens resident from the termination of the Palestine Mandate until the 1952 
enactment of the Nationality Law were stateless. The judge in A.B. v. M.B. basing his views on Oppenheim 
(Lauterpacht) and Schwarzenberger, stated that “So long as no law has been enacted providing otherwise, 
my view is that every individual who, on the date of the establishment of the State of Israel was resident in 
the territory which today constitutes the State of Israel, is also a national of Israel. Any other view must 
lead to the absurd result of a State without nationals—a phenomenon the existence of which has not yet 
been observed.” 
153 Cf. Case Concerning Acquisition of Polish Nationality, 1923 PCIJ, Ser. B, No. 7, at 15: “One of the first 
problems which presented itself in connection with the protection of […] minorities was that of prevent-
ing […] States from refusing their nationality, on racial, religious or linguistic grounds to certain catego-
ries of persons, in spite of the link which effectively attached them to the territory allocated to one or the 
other […] States.” Poland ultimately would cease to participate in the League’s minority protection sys-
tem, after the Permanent Court concluded that its minority rights obligations were integrated into its 
own independence and sovereignty. See Declaration of Polish Delegate Beck to the League Assembly, 
League of Nations OJ, Spec.Supp. 122 at 42 (1934).  
154 Western Sahara, supra note 89, at 42. 
155 Id. at 64. 
156 M. Shaw, The Western Sahara Case, 49 BYIL 119, 137 (1978). 
157 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 67 (1966). 
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the governance of a territory, and with regard to the actual independence of that territory, are 
vague. Again, the ‘community’ element is reflected in Brownlie’s formulation: 
(c) Government: The shortest definition of a state for present purposes is perhaps a stable po-
litical community, supporting a legal order, in a certain area […] However, the existence of 
effective government is in certain areas either unnecessary or insufficient to support state-
hood […]. The relevant question may now be: in whose interest and for what legal purpose 
is government ‘effective’?158 
Similarly, with regard to capacity to enter into relations with other states, Brownlie writes: 
(d) Independence: The practice of states has been to ignore—so far as the issue of statehood is 
concerned—various forms of political and economic blackmail and interference directed 
against the weaker members of the [international] community. Whilst it is a matter of appre-
ciation, there is a distinction between agency and control, on the one hand, and ad hoc inter-
ference and ‘advice’, on the other.159 
Therefore, through the prism of Brownlie’s analysis, the point being made at present can 
be more clearly observed—namely, that much greater latitude is offered in the legally-
sanctioned administration of a territory than in the legally-sanctioned definition of that territory. 
Nevertheless, it follows that the definition and administration of such territories are co-
dependent, that is, revolving around some specific community. Thus, the point at hand is not to 
imply that some states, lacking effective governance or practical independence in the conduct of 
their foreign affairs, are not exercising statehood per se; rather, it is to demonstrate that the re-
quirements of the Montevideo Convention, and, therefore, the traditional criteria in interna-
tional law for defining the existence of statehood, are substantially more flexible with regard to 
the administration of territory rather than the definition of territory. This leads to the question: at 
what point does this juridical allowance of such a wide spectrum of administrative flexibility 
serve, in actual fact, to cause actual harm to the territory and its associated population, in spite of 
the ongoing perpetuation of that entity as a specific state? (For example, if the administering en-
tity did not actually possess effective control of the totality of its territory, or was practically inca-
pable of exercising its own independence on the international plane, what, other than the 
specific appellation of statehood in the territory in question, ensures the continuity of that state 
per se?) Such a question might seem, at first glance, to be beyond the realm of juridical consid-
eration, or confusing the law as it (perhaps) ought to be with the law as it is, but in actual fact, 
such a viewpoint is unsustainable in a contemporary context, for the existence of global human 
rights standards—including the universal right of all peoples to self-determination—cannot be 
denied.160 Thus, in the course of this study, it will be important to bear the points made by 
Brownlie in mind, particularly when the discussion turns to the practical effects of post-colonial 
state creation in the African context, in chapter four. That said, one must now draw attention to 
a substantive discussion of the remaining Montevideo criteria. 
Under the control of its own government 
Clearly, then, some sort of administering entity is needed for there to be a state; obviously, 
such an entity is a government. Such an entity would be most commonly recognised by having 
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specific organs for administration and legislation of the population of the territory.161 From that, 
certain edicts in the form of laws are pronounced, which must be effectuated on the population. 
Thus a government is, in principle, an integrated bureaucratic system which manifests a legiti-
mate use of power, in abstract and concrete forms, across its territory, to those on its territory. 
Associated with that notion is a sense of actual territorial sovereignty, which Crawford terms as 
“not ownership of, but governing power with respect to, territory”.162 This seems to be in con-
formity with the commentary of the US Restatement on the topic, at §201(c), that “there must be 
some authority exercising governmental functions and able to represent the entity in interna-
tional relations”. Indeed, to continue along those lines, although a state is not under any specific 
legal obligation to accord formal recognition to the government of any state, or to maintain dip-
lomatic relations with any state, a state “is required to treat as the government of another state a 
regime that is in effective control of that state,” except if that effective control came about 
through the threat or use of armed force, as prohibited by the UN Charter.163 Thus the effective-
ness criteria for the government of a state begin to emerge, in that the integrated bureaucratic 
system must be able to broadcast its power throughout the territory for the government in ques-
tion to be considered ‘effective’.164 
Such a perspective seems to reflect the will of the Commission of Jurists on the Åland Is-
land Dispute, which was appointed by the League of Nations in 1920, following the 1917 civil 
war and secession from the Russian Empire. The Ålanders were Swedish-speaking, and follow-
ing the secession of Finland from the Russian Empire, asked to be reunited with Sweden. Fin-
land itself was unresponsive to the request and made a counteroffer of an autonomy 
arrangement, but this was deemed unacceptable to Ålanders. Therefore, the issue was referred 
to the newly-formed League of Nations. The Jurists appointed by the Council of the League 
were of the opinion that Finland’s statehood only began following the establishment of an effec-
tive government. Their opinion stated that: 
[f]or a considerable time, the conditions required for the formation of a sovereign State did 
not exist. In the midst of revolution and anarchy, certain elements essential to the existence 
of a State, even some elements of fact, were lacking for a fairly considerable period. Political 
and social life was disorganized; the authorities were not strong enough to assert themselves; 
civil war was rife; further, the Diet, the legality of which had been disputed by a large section 
of the people, had been dispersed by the revolutionary party, and the Government had been 
chased from the capital and forcibly prevented from carrying out its duties; the armed camps 
and the police were divided into two opposing forces, and Russian troops, and after a time 
Germans also, took part in the civil war. […] It is therefore difficult to say at what exact date 
the Finnish Republic, in the legal sense of the term, actually became a definitely constituted 
sovereign State. This certainly did not take place until a stable political organization had been 
created, and until the public authorities had become strong enough to assert themselves 
throughout the territories of the State without the assistance of foreign troops. It would ap-
pear that it was in May 1918, that the civil war was ended and that the foreign troops began 
to leave the country, so that from that time onward it was possible to reestablish order and 
normal political and social life, little by little.165 
Their opinion also seems well-rooted in historical perspective, as earlier writers, such as 
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162 Crawford, Criteria, supra note 131, at 116. 
163 Restatement (Third), at §203. 
164 See Higgins, supra note 133, at 20-25. 
165 League of Nations, Commission of Jurists on Aaland Islands Dispute, League of Nations OJ, Spec.Supp. 
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James Lorimer, had long since asserted that “in order to be entitled to recognition, a State must 
presumably possess: (a) the will to reciprocate the recognition which it demands; and (b) the 
power to reciprocate the recognition which it demands”.166 Thus, a government must both ab-
sorb and reflect the symbols of state legitimacy, and it seems clear that, in effectuating its seces-
sion from the Russian Empire, Finland did not have the capacity to do so until some time after it 
began that process.  
Thus, it seems increasingly clear that the effectiveness criteria is one of the dominant fac-
tors in the discussion and evaluation of the existence of a government, and that, in theory at least, 
until such a time that a stable political organisation makes itself known, and asserts itself 
throughout the territory of the state, disconnected from the activities or assistance of foreign 
troops, the entity does not exist as an independent, sovereign state. It therefore follows, as Craw-
ford suggests, that “there is thus a strong case for regarding government as the central criterion of 
statehood, since all the others are dependant on it”.167 However, without negating the co-
dependent nature of statehood between administration and territory, such a formulation can 
equally be seen in the inverse: that territoriality is actually the central element, in the first instance 
and that all other criteria follow from it. 
This could be so because the standard of effective government appears to be demonstra-
bly less stringent due to the granting of independence in a more contemporary context than was 
observed with the independence of Finland from the Russian Empire. Such an assertion is 
guided, again, by the US Restatement, at §201, reporter’s note 2: “Some entities have been as-
sumed to be states when they could satisfy only a very loose standard for having an effective gov-
ernment, e.g. the Congo (Zaire) in 1960 […] A state may continue to be regarded as such, even 
though, due to insurrection or other difficulties, its internal affairs become anarchic for an ex-
tended period of time.” 
The reason why such a loose standard for effective government was accepted by the in-
ternational community was because of the political necessity of the recognition of decolonising 
territorial entities as independent states following the end of the second world war and the trans-
lation of the notion of self-determination from a multifaceted conception to an ongoing ‘right of 
peoples’. Such was the practical implication of allowing an emerging, universal principle of self-
determination to manifest itself as universal political reality as colonial possessions by European 
states began to fall out of political favour. This will be demonstrated most clearly in considering 
how, due to political expediency, colonial possession came to be disallowed, first, in political 
sentiment and, subsequently, in legal fact, through the emergence of a ‘right of peoples to self-
determination’. For the present discussion, however, it will be of interest to see how the colony 
of the Belgian Congo became an universally-recognised independent state, in spite of the fact 
that, at the time of its independence from Belgium, within the territory of the colony emerging 
into nascent statehood through the decolonisation process, “anything less than effective gov-
ernment it would be hard to imagine”.168 
The decolonisation of the Belgian Congo was marked by: (a) the formation of an indige-
nous, albeit fractured, political opposition to colonial rule; (b) the shift in global political men-
tality away from the sanction of colonial rule; (c) the emerging temporal reality that the 
perceived absurdity on the part of the international community in favour of the wholesale 
abandonment of colonial possessions by European states was being replaced by the nascent es-
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tablishment of a wholly different ‘perceived absurdity’, this time for the continued recognition of 
colonial possessions by European states; (d) the practical effect, in some colonial territories, that 
self-government was practically untenable due to the ongoing colonial preclusion of such 
measures and the speed in which such measures were to be abandoned by colonial powers 
(particularly during the 1950s and 60s); (e) the demonstrated, fundamental lack of ability for self-
government in some of the previously colonised territories to which ex-colonial independence 
would be granted in general measure—as manifested in particular by the Congo; and (f) the es-
tablishment of an ongoing pattern of economic and political interactions between the newly in-
dependent states and their colonisers.169 Most significant, however, was the lack of any 
substantial attempt by African states at the wholesale replacement of the inherited legal systems 
and judiciaries. The European systems which were the products of hundreds of years of societal 
development became African systems overnight. 
This all constituted was an obvious démarche by the international community, away from 
the fundamental importance of the juridical principle of effectiveness (i.e., ‘effective’ govern-
ment), so apparently manifested in the secession of Finland from the Russian Empire, to the se-
cession of the Belgian Congo (i.e., the ‘State of Congo’; i.e., ‘Zaire’; i.e., ‘the Democratic Republic 
of Congo’, or ‘Congo-Kinshasa’), to the juridical principle of territorial integrity. The observa-
tion of such a démarche is of absolute and intrinsic importance to this study, for although it is 
logically inaccurate to state that such juridical principles are in inherent opposition to each 
other (that is to say that effectiveness and territorial integrity are not mutually exclusive), it is 
logically inaccurate to state that such juridical principles are synonymous. The principle of ef-
fectiveness implies that there exists a governmental entity with the capacity to project its author-
ity through a reasonably well-defined territory. Nascent Finland, for example, was not able to 
demonstrate this requirement to the ‘international community’ at the time by virtue of the fact 
that it took a number of years, after the initial ‘secession’ of Finland from the Russian Empire, for 
such an action to be officially recognised. This was due to, inter alia, the existence of foreign 
troops on Finnish territory, as well as the lack of a universally-recognised political community 
operating in a putative Finnish state. Thus, circa 1920, actual effectiveness was a fundamental 
and unavoidable criterion for statehood. 
If one could analytically fast-forward some forty years, to the secession of the Congo from 
Belgium in 1960, it may be observed how the conceptualisation of effectiveness was supplanted 
by the political reality of the urgency of global decolonisation (i.e., the profoundly swift emer-
gence of a right to self-determination, equated to decolonisation). When such decolonisation 
took place, the practical effect was that it took place largely within colonially-defined territorial 
borders. As will be demonstrated, this is due to the so-called ‘habillement’ of the principle of uti 
possidetis juris from the earlier Latin American decolonisation experience to the later African 
experience. But what is fundamentally distinct between the more historical Finnish experience, 
as compared to the more recent African experience, is the fact that, in the latter circumstance, 
what ‘mattered’ was not necessarily the existence of a stable political community, as was the case 
in the more historical Finnish experience, but, instead, the existence of a defined territorial en-
tity and an overriding sense of expediency for such actions, due to the sudden political unpalat-
ability of ongoing colonial possessions by European state. Thus, with regard to the ‘under the 
control of its own government’ criterion of the Montevideo definition of statehood, the shift 
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from the primacy of the more historical principle of effectiveness to the more contemporary 
principle of territorial integrity is observed. Anything less is to fall into a logical conundrum to 
accept how such entities as Finland and Congo-Kinshasa could possibly have the same juridical 
appellation. It must also be reaffirmed at this point how such a reality contributes to the distinc-
tion of the ‘effectiveness’ (i.e., administrative) aspects of the Montevideo Convention as being 
necessarily seen as more ‘flexible’ than the more territorial (i.e., definitional) aspects of the same 
convention. 
In light of the Congo example, Crawford has demonstrated a profound divergence in 
what is actually meant, and juridically required, for the ‘effective government’ criterion. He pre-
sents three possibilities: one, that Congo was never a State and was improperly recognised as 
such (which seems prima facie to be a possibility in light of its comparison with Finland forty 
years earlier, but cannot be accepted due to the fact that Congo has existed, in some juridical 
measure at least, as an independent state since 1960); two, that Congo was recognised as a state 
simply by virtue of such acts of recognition by other states; or three, that the requirement that a 
state is ‘under the control of its own government’ is “less stringent than has been thought”.170 The 
aforementioned analysis of the secession of Finland, vis-à-vis the Russian Empire and the seces-
sion of Congo-Kinshasa vis-à-vis Belgium, does nothing to reinforce the first two notions and 
does, in actual fact, reinforce the third. There must exist some sort of sliding scale, therefore, be-
tween effectiveness and territorial integrity to address the demonstrated ambiguity in the defini-
tional criterion of government in the Montevideo provisions. Moreover, given the general 
acceptance by the international community of Congo as an actual state at the time of its inde-
pendence from Belgium, there similarly must be the acknowledgement of a definitional shift 
away from the primacy of effectiveness, in the direction of the primacy of territorial integrity as 
incumbent within the definition of the governmental criterion.  
Capacity to enter into relations with other States 
On the surface, capacity to enter into relations with other states is one of the principal 
elements in defining statehood because were this not to be true, states in federal unions, prov-
inces, cantons or other specific entities possessing their own legislative powers could be seen as 
states. Thus, on the surface, it seems logical to include this criterion in the Montevideo defini-
tion. But what is of particular interest and significance are the implications of the inclusion of 
such a provision, within the context of the three other Montevideo criteria. Under the earlier 
‘equation’ of statehood, the grouping of the population and territorial aspects together is quite 
reasonable, although they cannot be integrated into one single variable, due to the fact that they 
are rooted in separate practical notions. However, with regard to the notion of ‘effectiveness’, as 
the third variable in the statehood equation, the duality of statehood manifests itself. A state must 
have a government: to do so is to exercise sovereignty on the municipal level. But a state must 
also have an element of control over its own foreign affairs: to do so is to exercise sovereignty on 
the global level. It is undoubtedly so that no state exists in a vacuum; that is, no state can act 
completely without regard to the existence of other states on the planet, and, over time, the cor-
responding political and legal actions taken by those states. Thus as it is impossible to com-
pletely sever the domestic from the municipal actions of a state, it seems logical to include a 
specific provision on having a capacity for international relations. As was seen earlier in this 
chapter, such a guarantee of a capacity for reciprocity with regard to legal actions taken by states 
undergoing the process of ‘civilisation’ was seen as paramount by European states in colonial 
times, yet colonising Europeans also kept the reciprocity principle flexible enough to enter into 
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agreements seemingly of sufficient legal validity to term them ‘treaties of cession’, when these 
treaties were not strictly speaking between two or more different states per se. 
The capacity for international relations requirement does involve “a conflation of the re-
quirements of government and independence”,171 and, thus, it follows that the implications of a 
requirement for capacity to enter into international relations involves the demonstration of 
some practical measure of independence—a notion which is nuanced in its conception, in that 
both ‘formal’ and ‘actual’ components can be identified. The classic formulation of this idea is 
taken from the 1931 Customs Regime between Germany and Austria Case, whereby Austria, 
having already in the 1919 Treaty of Saint Germain and a 1922 protocol172 agreed to remain eco-
nomically independent from Germany, agreed to a customs union with Germany. The Council 
of the League of Nations requested an advisory opinion on whether such a union would violate 
Austria’s previous pledges for economic independence, and the Permanent Court found that it 
would not. However, the judgement was highly controversial and Judge Anzilotti’s Separate 
Opinion has become exemplary in defining the concept of ‘independence’. He writes: 
With regard to [the meaning of ‘independence’], I think the foregoing observations show that 
the independence of Austria within the meaning of Article 88 is nothing else but the exis-
tence of Austria, within the frontiers laid down by the Treaty of Saint-Germain, as a Separate 
state and not subject to the authority of any other State or group of States. Independence as 
thus understood is really no more than the normal condition of States according to interna-
tional law; it may also be described as sovereignty (suprema potestas), or external sovereignty, by 
which is meant that the State has over it no other authority than that of international law. 
The conception of independence, regarded as the normal characteristic of States as subjects 
of international law, cannot be better defined than by comparing it with the exceptional and, 
to some extent, abnormal class of States known as ‘dependent States.’ These are States sub-
ject to the authority of one or more States. The idea of dependence therefore necessarily 
implies a relation between a superior State (suzerian, protector, etc.) and an inferior or sub-
ject State (vassal, protégé, etc.); the relation between the State which can legally impose its 
will and the State which is legally compelled to submit to that will. Where there is no such 
element of superiority and subordination, it is impossible to speak of dependence within the 
meaning of international law. It follows that the legal conception of independence has nothing 
to do with a State’s subordination to international law or with the numerous and constantly 
increasing states of de facto dependence which characterize the relation of one country to 
other countries. It also follows that the restrictions upon a State’s liberty, whether arising 
out of ordinary international law or contractual engagements, do not as such in the least af-
fect its independence. As long as these restrictions do not place the State under the legal 
authority of another State, the former remains an independent State however extensive and 
burdensome those obligations may be.173 
One question to be borne in mind in the progression of the present discussion involves 
the question of the distinctions between ‘formal’ or ‘actual’ independence, whereby ‘formal’ in-
dependence is related to the juridical instillation of governmental power into the organs of a 
state, and ‘actual’ independence is related to the comparably less ‘legal’, but potentially impor-
tant, question of the actual capacity of an entity to govern and enter into relations with other 
states. It will be argued later in this study that some circumstances in the African context demon-
strate the outermost extremities of the disparity between the ‘formal’ and ‘actual’ aspects of inde-
pendence, or the concepts of ‘juridical’ and ‘empirical’ statehood. Before undertaking that 
analysis in chapter four, however, it will be important to develop a more comprehensive legal 
framework. Therefore, chapter two will address the law of decolonisation and, in anticipation 
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of the incongruities between postcolonial states and their societies, chapter three will consider 
the question of collective groupings in international law. 
Observations from chapter one 
Statehood, as a pervasive element of international society, has many different meanings. 
This chapter recognises that statehood takes on a definitional multiplicity of forms, and suggests 
that conceptual delineations should be recognised between the territorial aspect (‘inanimate 
statehood’), and the more broad-based conception of statehood, which emphasises the con-
nections between a land and its peoples (‘animate statehood’). Historically, animate statehood, 
which evolved from early European societies, was the product of centuries of social develop-
ment, while inanimate statehood is an important legal precept that forms the backbone of the 
modern territorial state, and by extension, the principles of sovereignty and effectiveness. This is 
why it would be more accurate to replace the notion of the ‘nation-state’ with a basic formula of 
‘territory + population + effectiveness (≈ territorial integrity) = sovereignty (≈ statehood)’. Doing 
so would allow for greater accuracy in defining the state and will allow for a deeper level of 
analysis in the present study. 
The growth of European empires was a profound manifestation of global hegemony, 
which blended colonialism and positivism, and brought colonised territories into the European 
legal framework. Decolonisation made them sovereign state members of the ‘international 
community’ in the blink of an eye. This was completely contrary to the state-building experi-
ence in the original European model. Concurrent with the decolonisation of African societies 
was a “coexistence of old and new patterns”174 of international law. The old pattern, equated 
with a ‘statist’ perspective has had the new pattern, equated with a ‘universalist’ perspective, su-
perimposed onto it.175 The situation which remains is the appearance that some newly-
decolonised states may sustain questionable ability to participate fully in both ‘statist’ and ‘uni-
versalist’ conceptions of state existence. The findings of such an assertion would be particularly 
troubling in sub-Saharan Africa, given the tangible and widespread dysfunction in modern ter-
ritorial statehood that is to be continually observed in the least-developed countries. In modern 
territorial statehood, levels of socio-economic development, particular geographic factors and 
the difficulties in consolidating governing power, over distance, may be factors of significance 
which were largely irrelevant at positivism’s apex. By consequence, questions may then emerge 
as to the extent to which these circumstances have contributed to regional strife and internecine 
conflict, produced serious questions of governmental illegitimacy and have led to the perpetra-
tion of systemic human rights violations and violence directed against certain segments of Afri-
can peoples by others. 
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 CHAPTER TWO 
‘Self-determination of peoples’ and the law of decolonisation 
Self-determination became a ‘political postulate’ in the United Nations context. This meant a 
‘people’ had a right of access to its own government. In the first instance this meant decolo-
nisation. But self-determination was counterbalanced by the uti possidetis juris principle which 
transformed colonial administrative boundaries into the boundaries of modern territorial 
states. Therefore, the principal law of decolonisation is that the formation of postcolonial 
states through a peoples’ right to self-determination is an imperative. That this was done 
without modification to colonial boundaries has been affirmed as a rule of general scope, par-
ticularly in Africa. It also has been implied that the ‘people’ comprises the entire population 
of a territory. But self-determination of peoples is also confirmed as an ongoing right. Follow-
ing decolonisation, it takes an ‘internal’ form, requiring a government representing the whole 
people without distinction of any kind, particularly as to race, creed or colour. A primary 
question concerning the interplay between ‘self-determination’ and the primacy of existing, 
or indeed inherited, borders in territorial statehood is formed through the concept of ‘inter-
nal self-determination’, whereby it is conceivable that a territory may choose self-association 
within an existing postcolonial state (‘postcolonial internal self-determination’), a territory 
may attempt recognition as an independent entity (‘postcolonial external self-determination’), 
or a territory could pursue a more assimilated precept of self-determination which would 
hold all ethnic and cultural groupings to be bound to a territorially-based definitional form. 
The conceptual dominance of the lattermost form can now be seen to have been mitigated 
to such an extent that a ‘people’ may also be seen to comprise a territorial unit smaller than 
the entire population of a state. Thus, it is a chiefly historical notion in public international 
law that a ‘people’ must by necessity comprise the amalgam of the individuals found within a 
postcolonial state’s boundaries. Furthermore, based upon the Friendly Relations Declaration, 
‘peoplehood’ has been seen as having a racial or religious component, an important consid-
eration to be borne in mind when refocusing the discussion on some of the more contempo-
rary realities of postcolonial statehood. 
The globalised state and the non-European world: Addressing relations between 
state and society 
The previous chapter addressed some of the historical antecedents of how the modern 
positivist legal state came to contemporary prominence throughout the world, including a con-
ceptualisation of the formation of a global ‘international community’ comprised of such states. 
This community has certain universal expectations of behaviour, as a result of actions taken by 
its members. These actions are undertaken, in large part, through multilateral institutions of 
states’ own creation, in particular the United Nations, but, similarly, through regional intergov-
ernmental organisations. Such actions are voluntary in nature, in that norms within the interna-
tional community are determined by varying levels of consent on the part of individual states 
within the community, in support of such norms.  
As was introduced in the previous chapter, one of the most striking changes within the 
early post-war international community was the wholesale export of European state sovereignty 
from the colonialist powers to overseas territories, guided by the principle of European society 
as a superior form of civilisation. As colonised states earned their independence, the effects of 
the imposition of a form of statehood, rooted in positivist legal terms onto overseas territories, 
changed them forever. Few, if any, societies wholly abandoned the trappings of statehood in-
herited through colonialism and reverted to pre-colonial systems of administration. This chap-
ter will therefore consider the practical implications of the decolonisation process, which was 
catalysed through United Nations.  
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The dramatic shift toward colonial independence was brought about as a result of the 
principle of self-determination’s rise to importance the 20th century, particularly following the 
second world war. During that time, self-determination developed from a political hypothesis 
espoused by competing, self-interested world powers into a legal tool made available to all 
colonised peoples. This tool was created by the UN General Assembly, the most democratic of 
institutions within that intergovernmental organisation, and an organ which itself witnessed 
dramatic changes, as ever-greater numbers of newly independent states became UN member 
states. These newly decolonised states catalysed the decolonisation process in powerful ways, as 
they acted in concert to promote a right to decolonisation as having a global imperative. The 
framing of decolonisation within the context of a ‘right to self-determination’ will be seen as the 
most widely-accepted meaning of ‘self-determination of peoples’. 
Identifying the legal tool for decolonisation: The ‘right of peoples to self-determination’ 
An underlying theme of the first chapter of this study was the assertion that the ‘scientific’ 
European positivism coincided with the imperial ambitions of the period, causing a significant 
change of circumstances in a system specifically designed to reaffirm voluntarist decisions by 
sovereign states. European sovereignties progressively integrated their overseas territorial pos-
sessions into their territorial control, and in so doing, brought a system of administration de-
rived from the ‘most civilised’ society to comparatively ‘less civilised’ lands. As the underlying 
fabric of inter-societal relations was fundamentally changed through colonialism, in this chap-
ter, it will be observed how colonised societies achieved their independence through decoloni-
sation, formed from an emergent ‘right of peoples to self-determination’. 
As political independence was the result of the emergence of the legal principle of self-
determination, the concept itself was also of evolutionary definitional formulation. In modern 
territorial statehood, self-determination first meant decolonisation, but has continued to exist as 
a legal principle following the widespread abandonment of colonial rule. In its most contempo-
rary form, self-determination can even conceivably be seen to go so far as to provide juridical 
weight towards international enforcement of basic standards of governance in all states, from 
long-established to newly-formed, as governed by the bedrock international legal principle of 
the sovereign equality of all states. 
In hindsight, however, it is difficult to specify with absolute precision the first origins of 
the concept of self-determination. Self-determination may be seen as a continuous individual 
longing for self-fulfilment rooted in natural law. It would not be an overstatement to say that one 
of the fundamental elements of the human condition is a desire for self-preservation and stabil-
ity—elements that find themselves at the heart of self-determination as a normative concept. Yet 
immediately predating the emergence of this inherently human-oriented precept was the rise of 
legal positivism centred on the basic importance of the European state, which provides a certain 
counterbalance to such ‘natural law’ perspectives. The tension between states, as a positivist le-
gal formulation, and the societies within those states can be tangibly observed, particularly in 
postcolonial states. Over time, as the law of statehood evolved to incorporate anti-colonialist 
perspectives, this very anti-colonialism, which took the form of ‘self-determination of peoples’, 
emerged as a legal precept in its own right. 
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The ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ of emergent anti-colonialism: Conceptualising pre-UN forms of self-
determination 
A recurring theme in this study revolves around the extent to which juridical themes, 
which may have been exclusively associated with the classical natural law perspectives of e.g. 
Saint Thomas Aquinas, were subsumed by the voluntarism of European society during the clas-
sical legal positivist period, and yet have witnessed a resurgence of sorts in the post-war interna-
tional law developed through United Nations practice. Overlaps can be readily observed 
between the customary international human rights law of the year 2000 and the natural theology 
merging faith and reason in the 1200s. What is observed is an underlying inter-temporal tension 
between naturalism and voluntarism which lies inherent in international legal philosophy,1 and 
is perfectly reflective of the importance of empiricism in forming international law. It is here that 
the dichotomy between the absolute separation between ‘ought’ and ‘is’ in classical legal positiv-
ism recurs, as this rigorous appellation is buffeted by the Aquinan classical naturalism and the 
modern hybrid naturalism of an international law, reinforcing a global community of sovereign 
states. In this sense, once the system of written public laws became sufficiently developed 
throughout European states to have general acceptance, the age of positivism began in earnest. 
Thereafter, in domestic law the ‘ought’ had become the ‘is’, and in international law the ‘is’ was 
considerably less defined than can be observed in contemporary terms, given the lack at that 
time of a universal polity and the assertiveness attached to a state’s individual sovereignty, in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries. Even if the unscientific ‘ought’ must be completely separated 
from the scientific ‘is’, this is not to say that the separate, conceptual existence of an ‘ought’ is to be 
wholly negated. An ‘ought’ can remain an ‘ought’ without having a particular binding force of 
law. In various societies, specific principles, whether moral precepts, political processes, or 
unwritten social expectations, can indeed become actual, positivist, enforceable, written law, 
through the course of a state’s voluntary actions and law-making processes. Subject to the con-
straints of the law generally, there exists nothing to prevent a prior-day ‘ought’ from becoming a 
present-day ‘is’ through political action.2 
If this conceptual premise is able to be accepted, then, in the case of self-determination, 
the necessity for specific actions giving practical effect to the theoretical concepts becomes ap-
parent. Antonio Cassese, in his classic study on self-determination of peoples, terms this a “po-
litical postulate”.3 Through political actions, self-determination would progress, over time, 
from an ‘ought’ to an ‘is’. The assertion of the existence of the European nation-state, in the af-
termath of the Westphalian peace, was the first clear manifestation of this reality, and indeed, the 
actions taken by relatively unified, animate states, such as France and the American colonies, 
served to spawn the concept of self-determination. The 1776 American Declaration of 
Independence and the 1789 French Revolution (followed by the 1790 French Constituent 
Assembly with its ‘rights of man’ and ‘rights of peoples’) were political leaps of faith of a 
magnitude great enough to produce permanent legal consequences. Generally, these events are 
seen in a limited context, in that they were directed by ‘nationals’ against, in the case of the US,                                                                   
1 With, certainly, voluntarism continually profiting from a system based upon its perpetual reinforce-
ment. 
2 Cf. P. Soper, Some Natural Confusions About Natural Law, 90 Mich. L.Rev. 2423 (1998): “The natural 
law dilemma results from starting at the opposite end from the positivist in constructing a model of 
law—focusing on the reasons for accepting the rules rather than on the rules that have been accepted. But 
the dilemma leads to the same point reached in considering the paradox of positivism; natural lawyers 
must confront political theory to determine the limits on the state’s power to create obligations or justify 
punishment through (reasoned) fiat. Until they do so, they cannot rule out the possibility that social facts 
(in the positivist’s sense) play the dominant role in establishing the connection between law and morality 
that has always been the natural law legal theorist’s central concern.” 
3 A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal 11 (1995) [hereinafter Cassese]. 
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context, in that they were directed by ‘nationals’ against, in the case of the US, England, and in 
the case of France, the monarchy. They share the requirement of interaction and accountability 
between a government and its subjects in a territorially-defined state. 
By the 19th century, the concept of self-determination had evolved towards the formation 
of a system of globalised states emanating from the European tradition.4 Although it was only af-
ter the second world war that self-determination came into general acceptance,5 the establish-
ment of the Soviet Union and the rise of the United States as a world power earlier in the 20th 
century had galvanised world attention towards the topic and began substantively to develop its 
content. In hindsight, it seems clear that these two (eventual) superpowers would prove to be 
champions of self-determination rights, based upon the fact that their own separate creations 
represented relatively radical departures from the status quo of the times. However, given their 
competing political ideologies, it would similarly be unsurprising to observe that their interpre-
tations of self-determination were conceptually distinct and, in large measure, taken with one 
eye on the essence of the concept and the other on what ‘the other guy was doing’. Vladimir 
Lenin was the Soviet Union’s greatest promulgator of the concept, while Woodrow Wilson ar-
ticulated its American interpretation. 
The Soviet Union and Lenin’s Decree of Peace: Self-determination to the point of secession 
The Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, and Vladimir Lenin’s taking power from the initial 
moderate, provisional government, led to significant developments vis-à-vis self-
determination. The establishment of a large, centralised Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
witnessed Lenin espousing the right of self-determination chiefly for tactical reasons. Lenin’s 
views on self-determination were chiefly orientated towards the right to secede, as first de-
scribed by Stalin, who in 1913 wrote that 
[A] nation can arrange its life according to its own will. It has the right to arrange its life on 
the basis of autonomy. It has the right to enter into federal relations with other nations. It 
has the right to complete secession. Nations are sovereign and all nations are equal.6 
The underlying cause for this recognition of secession was a supposed guarantee of pro-
tection from oppression and prejudice by the centralised state. It was supposed to mean 
empowerment for the disenfranchised. As from 1916, Lenin advocated self-determination for 
all colonial countries, or ‘semi-colonial’ states—chiefly so that they would be persuaded to join 
the communist economic system.7 As such, Hurst Hannum’s statement must be borne in mind 
that “it should be underscored that self-determination in 1919 had little to do with the demands 
of the peoples concerned, unless those demands were consistent with the geopolitical and stra-
tegic interests of the Great Powers”.8 Lenin’s motivations notwithstanding, he did manage to in-
fuse great rhetorical power into the embryonic international debates on the role of self-
determination. In that sense, he identified a number of specific courses for the practical mani-
festation of self-determination. He was all the while hoping, of course, that such oppressed na-
                                                                  
4 Cf. I. Brownlie, Rights of Peoples in International Law, in J. Crawford (ed.) The Rights of Peoples 5 
(1988): “In the course of nineteenth-century European history the principle of nationality was influential 
and it was the alter ego of the principle of self-determination.” 
5 Id. 
6 J. Stalin, Marxism and the National Question, in J. Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Ques-
tion 19 (1942). 
7 See generally V.I. Lenin, Selected Works, at 159 et seq. (1969). 
8 H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting 
Rights 28 (1990) [hereinafter Hannum]. 
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tions would find solace in communism. Therefore, his formulation of self-determination re-
tained the possibility of secession as a necessary final guarantor of the existence of the right. 
Secession of one part of the Soviet Union was (theoretically, at least) a possibility guaranteed in 
the Soviet Constitution.9 Lenin wrote that 
 [w]e demand the freedom of self-determination, i.e., independence, i.e., the freedom of sepa-
ration of oppressed nations, not because we dream of economic particularization, or of the 
ideal of small states, but on the contrary, because we desire major states, and a rapproche-
ment, even a merging, of nations, but on a truly democratic, truly international basis, which is 
unthinkable without the freedom of secession.10  
Perhaps Lenin’s most significant perspective, vis-à-vis self-determination and secession, 
was his 1917 Decree of Peace. In this, he writes that,  
[i]f any nation whatsoever is retained within the boundaries of another state by coercion, and 
despite its expressed desire it is not granted the right by a free vote […] with the complete 
withdrawal of forces of the annexing or generally more powerful nation, to decide without 
the slightest coercion the question of the form of state existence of this nation, then it is an 
annexation [interpolation is unnecessary at the end of a quotation].11 
Lenin clearly aimed at self-determination as a concept forming a means to make radical 
changes to the international landscape. Cassese identifies three components of Soviet self-
determination: (a) something involving national or ethnic group invocation to decide their own 
destiny; (b) a principle to be applied during the aftermath of conflict between states; and (c) a 
measure for anti-colonialism.12 These components, which the Soviet Union advocates with 
unwavering dedication throughout the evolution of self-determination, from rough concept to 
collective right, will now be contrasted with the American interpretation of the concept, which 
was subjected to fierce internal dissension from the outset. 
The United States and Wilsonian idealism: Self-determination as self-government 
Woodrow Wilson is typically seen in American history as a highly idealistic individual, 
who is remembered more for his forward-looking visions than his administrative ability. His in-
clination was to transfer the Monroe Doctrine to global relevance. In his 1917 address on ‘A 
League for Peace’, President Wilson said that he was  
proposing [the League of Nations], as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt 
the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to 
extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to 
determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, 
the little along with the great and powerful”.13 
                                                                  
9 In 1990, the USSR Supreme Council adopted the “Law on the Resolution of Issues of Secession of Union 
Republics from the USSR” which, in the dissolution of the Soviet Union, gave practical effect to these pro-
visions. See Zakon o poryadke resheniya voprosov, svyazannikh s vykhodom soyuznoy respubliki iz SSSR, 
(Law on the resolution of issues of the secession of the Union Republics from the USSR). Records of Con-
gress of People’s Deputies of the USSR Supreme Council, No. 15, Moscow, 1990 (in Russian). 
10 R. Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism 1917-1923 45 (1964), 
quoting Lennin. 
11 Documenty Vneshnei politiki SSSR, vol. I, Moscow, Gospolitizdat 11 (1957), as quoted in R. Müllerson, 
International Law, Rights and Politics: Developments in Eastern Europe and the CIS 58 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter Müllerson]. 
12 Cassese, supra note 3, at 16. 
13 See citation in B. Vukas, States, Peoples and Minorities, 231 Rec. des Cours , at 364, 365-366 (1991) 
[hereinafter Vukas]. 
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Wilson was skilful in formulating a distinctly American perspective to serve as a direct 
counterbalance to the Soviet formulation of self-determination. He particularly favoured ideas 
similar to those of Lenin’s Decree of Peace—the substantial difference being as follows: that self-
determination meant true self-government, rather than pre-determined incorporation in a 
larger, centralised communist state. In his famous ‘Fourteen Points’ speech, he stated that “peo-
ples and provinces must not be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were 
chattels or pawns in a game”.14 He therefore asserts that the population of a territory should have 
some particular say in choosing their sovereign, although in a peaceful, non-violent manner 
only. And yet, the introverted idealism of Wilson’s perspective is revealed, as Wilson also re-
jected the idea of formal internal self-determination (particularly notions of minority protec-
tion) and, therefore, ‘peoples’ finding themselves in especially difficult circumstances with 
ineffective non-violent responses would tend to find only limited realisation of self-
determination. 
Cassese again provides a concise analysis of Wilsonian self-determination by moulding it 
into four elements:15 (a) there exists a right of people to determine forms of government; (b) the 
Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires should be divided; (c) territorial settlement at the end 
of the first world war was to be done with the interests of the populations affected in mind; and 
(d) self-determination had a relevance in settling colonial claims—in this case in conformity 
with the interests of the great (i.e., colonial) powers.  
President Wilson found himself facing both the wrath of his closest advisers and the 
American public for his perspectives. His Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, wrote in 1918 that 
 the more I think about the President’s declaration as to the right of ‘self-determination’, the 
more convinced I am of the danger of putting such ideas in the minds of certain races. It is 
bound to be the basis of impossible demands on the Peace Congress and create trouble in 
many lands […]. The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes which can 
never be realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives.16 
The concept of self-determination was also attacked in a well-publicised article in The 
Saturday Evening Post by Lansing,17 who resigned as Secretary of State over the implications of 
the concept. In the article, he writes that “the assumption that self-determination is a right inher-
ent to mankind is a menace to peace in the world, because it excites false hopes and produces 
political unrest that may develop into open resistance to established authority”.18 Further, Lans-
ing asserted that, at the Paris peace negotiations, President Wilson had “by his acts denied the ex-
istence of the right other than the expression of a moral precept, as something to be desired but 
generally unattainable in the lives of nations”.19 This served to persuade Lansing that “self-
determination is in truth ‘a mere phrase’, which as the declaration of a fundamental right of hu-
man society, as the declaration of ‘an imperative principle of action,’ should be discarded, be-
                                                                  
14 See W. Wilson, War and Peace, Presidential Messages, Addresses and Public Papers (1917-1924) Vol. 
I, eds. R.S. Baker and W.E. Dodd, at 182 (1927). 
15 See Cassese, supra note 3, at 20. 
16 R. Lansing, The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative 87 (1921). 
17 R. Lansing, Self-Determination: A Discussion of the Phrase, The Saturday Evening Post 3 (May 1921) 
[hereinafter Lansing, Self-determination]. Lansing’s criticisms of the concept were indeed striking, yet 
they were by no means reflective of all elements of American society. Cf. P.M. Brown, Editorial Com-
ment: Self-Determination in Central Europe, 14 AJIL 235-239 (1920), who advocated the peaceful con-
struction of a confederacy of peoples from the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, through self-determination 
of ‘common consent’. 
18 Lansing, Self-determination, supra note 17, at 8. 
19 Id. at 9. 
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cause it cannot be practically applied”.20 He launched into a litany of criticisms of Wilsonian 
idealism, the most reflective of which was that “the phrase, even if it could be considered to state 
a right possible of practical application, has never been limited as to the character of the territo-
rial or political unit which may demand that it be applied”.21 His conclusions in this article were 
that: (a) uniform application of the principle would necessitate constant border shifts as popula-
tions migrated for economic reasons, thereby causing instability; (b) the lack of qualifications 
for ‘successful’ self-determination may cause support for “a cause which [recognising states] 
otherwise would have hesitated to do, since it seemed contrary to the desire of the world for 
universal peace”,22; and (c) an inherent right to self-determination should be “denounced by all 
nations [and] forgotten. It has no place in the practical scheme of world affairs. It has already 
caused enough despair, enough suffering and enough anarchy”.23 
In the end, President Wilson became aware of the limitations of his own formulations of 
the concept. Quite simply, he promulgated a sense of self-determination propelled by an unre-
alistic expectation that societal liberalisation would develop in lands dominated by outsiders as 
something flowing inherently from within, guided by the now well-defined corpus of positivist 
international law. His comments in addressing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1919 
are illuminating: “You do not know and cannot appreciate the anxieties that I have experienced 
as a result of many millions of people having their hopes raised by what I have said.”24 
The pathway from ‘ought’ to ‘is’: The challenges to European power in law and morality 
The inconsistency between classical legal positivism and the more contemporary hybrid 
positivist/naturalist legal form should become more apparent in the sense that two absolute dis-
tinctions to be upheld in classical international law—positively defined legalities, i.e., the ‘is’ and 
the ‘law’—find inherent overlap in modern international law with that which was previously to 
be disregarded in classical international law, namely concepts of morality and ‘the law as it 
ought to be’. Such a watershed shift in underlying meaning and expectation of practical func-
tionality was not the result of some preordained and coordinated global policy development, as 
much as it was a reflection of the ascendancy of the bipolar political rivalry between Soviet Un-
ion and the United States. These emerging global powers themselves lacked the same fondness 
for overseas territorial possession as did the overtly imperial European powers and, as such, de-
veloped the concept so as to support their own underlying motivations.  
While not a primary focus of the present study, arguably one of the greatest challenges to 
unbridled European imperial power was the creation of the League of Nations and establish-
ment of its Mandate System, which was designed to uphold a ‘sacred trust of civilization’ to pre-
vent exploitation of colonised peoples and to promote their well-bring and development. As 
seen from Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties un-
dertake concrete and specific obligations with regard to formerly-colonised territories, and ap-
plied different standards of expected behaviours in geographic regions of comparatively 
different levels of ‘civilisation’. The article creates three classes of mandate, in decreasing level of 
perceived competence of self-administration: ‘A’ mandates, the highest level of autonomous 
administration, allocated to the UK and France over ex-Turkish Empire lands, from which in-
                                                                  
20 Id. at 11. 
21 Id. at 14. 
22 Id. at 15. 
23 Id. at 16. 
24 See H.M.V. Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, vol. IV, 429 (1969), as cited in 
Cassese, supra note 3, at 22, note 33. 
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dependence would be readily expected; ‘B’ mandates, of ex-German territories in Central Af-
rica, allocated to the UK, France and Belgium, and ‘C’ mandates, allocated to South Africa, in 
the case of South-West Africa and to Australia, New Zealand and Japan, over certain South Pa-
cific Islands, all of which were to be administered integrally within these states, yet prepared for 
eventual independence.25 Article 22 states: 
To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be 
under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited 
by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the mod-
ern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such 
peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust 
should be embodied in this Covenant. 
The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples 
should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience 
or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to 
accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the 
League. 
The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the 
people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar 
circumstances. 
Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of de-
velopment where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized sub-
ject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time 
as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consid-
eration in the selection of the Mandatory. 
Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory 
must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guar-
antee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order 
and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor 
traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases 
and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of terri-
tory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members 
of the League. 
There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, 
which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness 
from the centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Man-
datory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory 
as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the inter-
ests of the indigenous population. 
In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in ref-
erence to the territory committed to its charge. 
The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if 
not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case 
by the Council. 
A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of 
the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the 
mandates. 
                                                                  
25 See e.g. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa), notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), advisory opinion, 1971 ICJ Rep. 
16, at 32. 
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 It will be of interest to consider the final aspects of Article 22, given that Mandatories were 
required to report to the League on specific matters related to their territorial administration. 
Such requirements reflected the sense of duty-bound obligation inherent in the preservation of 
the ‘sacred trust of civilization’ and membership in the League of Nations itself. The establish-
ment of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), alongside the League, served to 
demonstrate the inclusion of the new element of multilateralism in the established, formalised 
positivist international law. Inherent within this multilateralism was the reality that the League 
was meant to “establish that the Mandate System was not a form of veiled colonialism and that it 
could effectively protect native peoples, promote their interests and guide them toward self-
government”.26 
In short, a major shift in world opinion, catalysed by the first world war, occurred be-
tween the Berlin Conference of 1885 and the apex of the League’s Mandate system in the 1920s, 
the effects of which would manifest themselves in defining statehood for a good fifty years fur-
ther. This shift would serve to move the previously quarantined ‘law’ and ‘morality’ closer to-
wards each other, creating a complicated legal landscape fuelled by the tentative 
intergovernmentalism of the League of Nations and the definitional bulk, which became associ-
ated with the concept of self-determination, as a specific legal construction.  
The meaning of self-determination: Access to government 
It is clear that the concept of self-determination was hardly free of controversy from its 
outset. The specific formulations of ‘self-determination of peoples’ flowing from the first world 
war was much more an ‘ought’ than an ‘is’ at this stage, legally speaking, although it was, never-
theless, an ‘ought’ with a certain inherent, dynamic potential to change the status quo. Through 
the prism of Lansing’s comments and Wilson’s backtracking from his original enthusiasm for the 
concept, the conceptual necessity of somehow ‘balancing’ self-determination with other con-
siderations also becomes clear, as the American and Soviet conceptions were quite undevel-
oped. For example, Lansing was unwilling to perpetuate self-determination claims by 
oppressed peoples in distant lands in spite of the fact that they, themselves, were born into a so-
ciety founded by those wanting to control their own destinies. Although such mentalities con-
formed to the dominant imperialist European cultures of the times, as European colonial 
empires began to crumble, it would prove much more difficult for such absolutist status quo 
mindsets to retain credibility.  
Furthermore, it seems similarly unlikely that giving credibility to each and every self-
determination claim would be a positive force for international peace and security. Yet this is 
what Lenin’s own formulation of the self-determination concept aimed to do, as a seceding en-
tity would naturally be expected to perform a subsequent embrace of a communist socio-
economic societal structure. In sum, self-determination was applied in a wholly haphazard 
manner following the first world war. However, recalling the discussion from the previous 
chapter, the principle did take on greater legal definition, through its invocation in the Åland Is-
lands case between Sweden and Finland in 1920, whereby Finland, having become independent 
from Russia, was seen by a commission of three jurists established by the League of Nations to 
retain sovereignty of the Swedish-speaking islands.27 It also was obliged to promote the islands 
                                                                  
26 A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law 140 (2004). 
27 Cf. Report of the International Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations 
with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of The Aaland Islands Question, Offi-
cial Journal of the League of Nations, Special Supplement No. 3, at 5 (October 1920): “Positive Interna-
tional Law does not recognize the right of national groups, as such, to separate themselves from the State 
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autonomy in accordance with already-enacted domestic legislation.28 However, as Cassese 
points out, as “in 1919-20 self-determination was not part of positive international law”,29 a 
Commission of Rapporteurs appointed to determine future action on the Åland Islands case 
was only conceptually willing to consider self-determination claims on a purely exceptional ba-
sis.30 
The point under examination in the present analysis remains: that sixty years later, self-
determination of peoples was indeed to be found at the heart, through voluntarist means, of the 
law of nations. By the end of the cold war, an ‘age of rights’ will have taken hold within positivist 
international law generally, and self-determination will have proven to be a cornerstone of this 
law. Or, as Russel Barsh proposed in 1988: 
 The most dynamic issue in international law today is the right to self-determination. All 
other human rights are considered to flow from this one, because the protection of human 
rights against government abuses depends entirely on who governs. It follows that you can 
assure the protection of human rights and individual freedoms if you have your own govern-
ment.31 
Much ground has been covered since the outset of this study. To recapitulate the discus-
sion heretofore, the following framework is offered: (a) in their purest form, many societies 
demonstrate inherent tendencies towards self-regulation; (b) external powers have greatly in-
fluenced many such societies through their sovereign acts; and (c) the internal tension therein 
has the capacity to be negated by modern territorial statehood, of which international human 
rights law forms a component part. 
Fusing the anti-colonial ‘ought’ and the juridical ‘is’: Decolonisation and the United Nations 
Returning to the time period of the United Nations’ formation, the haphazard develop-
ment of self-determination as a specific legal concept was met with a counterbalancing measure 
from the outset, in its unique codification. Whereas self-determination was originally seen as 
something akin to national self-determination, with a particular eye on the Central and Eastern 
European states emerging from empires, in the UN context, self-determination was equated 
with global decolonisation—a notion which was quite ambivalent towards the various nationali-
ties found within decolonising states. In Africa, this would have proven to have dramatic effects, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of which they form part by the simple expression of a wish […] [Taking such matters beyond the domes-
tic jurisdiction of the states involved] would amount to an infringement of the sovereign rights of a State 
and would involve the risk of creating difficulties and a lack of stability which would not only be contrary 
to the very idea embodied in the term ‘State’, but would also endanger the interests of the international 
community.” See also discussion supra chapter one of this study. 
28 See Official Journal of the League of Nations 701-702 (September 1921) for the terms of the Aaland Is-
land autonomy guarantees. 
29 Cassese, supra note 3, at 30. 
30 Cf. League of Nations, Report presented to the Council of the League by the Commission of Rapporteurs, 
Council Doc. B7/21/68/106, at 28 (16 April 1921), as quoted in Cassese, supra note 3, at note 58: “The 
separation of a minority from the State of which it forms a part and its incorporation in another State can 
only be considered as an altogether exceptional solution, a last resort when the State lacks either the will 
or the power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees.” 
31 R. Barsh, Indigenous Peoples and the Rights to Self-Determination in International Law, in B. Hocking 
(ed.), International Law and Aboriginal Human Rights 69 (1988). 
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as large swathes of the continent would be subjected to protracted armed conflict to which a 
constructivist source could be identified.32 
Crystallisation: The organisation’s establishment and the Belgian thesis 
Notions of self-determination were enhanced following the second world war, as the 
geopolitical system saw the entrenchment of the loose bipolar system between the US and the 
USSR. ‘The West’ had an interest in removing Soviet control from the so-called ‘buffer states’ of 
Eastern Europe, while ‘the East’ had an interest in encouraging decolonisation and eventual in-
corporation into the communist framework. The strong anti-colonial stance of the United States 
further hastened the process. Through the political manifestation of the Soviet notion of na-
tional liberation and decolonisation, as means to the formation of new socialist states and the 
wishes of the peoples of Afro-Asian colonies for an end to colonialism, a principle of self-
determination began to emerge in positivist international law, as guided by the United Nations, 
and Article 1 of its Charter.  
Following the League of Nations period, which included some provisions for minority 
rights protection, but little in the way of self-determination,33 the establishment of the United 
Nations perpetrated a renaissance of the concept of self-determination, albeit with an avoidance 
of the topic of minority rights. The pathway taken to arrive at this reality was circuitous. The ini-
tial Dumbarton Oaks proposals did not include a passage on self-determination; however, the 
Soviet Union persuaded the United States, the United Kingdom and France to consider the con-
cept, and Belgium came to propose a compromise agreement,34 which tried to clarify whether 
‘the peoples’ right of self-determination’ would refer to states or to national groups. No consen-
sus came from the Belgian proposal,35 and in the end the original Soviet proposal was included 
in the Charter. This established self-determination of peoples as one of the purposes of the or-
ganisation and included respect for the principle of self-determination as a grounding point in 
the field of economic and social cooperation. 
The UN Charter, which came into force in October 1945, refers to the principle of self-
determination explicitly only twice, and it can also be stated that there is no inherent right of self-
determination that can be seen to flow directly from the Charter. In Article 1, paragraph 2, self-
determination of peoples is identified as one of the purposes of the organisation. Given that, in 
the constitutive document of an international organisation, specific mention of a purpose of the 
organisation is given, it is hard to question the legally-binding nature of the principle of self-
determination in the Charter. This is not, however, to say that the content and scope of self-
determination is exclusively defined by Article 1, para 2. Herein lays a repetitive point in the pre-
sent study, that self-determination straddles the line of voluntarism and naturalism. To reinforce 
the point at hand, consider that self-determination is also mentioned explicitly as a principle to 
be upheld under the Charter, at Article 55. This article is more declaratory than constitutive in 
                                                                  
32 Cf. R.H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World 78 (1990) 
[hereinafter Jackson]: “Since most of the new states also do not provide minority rights and internal 
autonomies to compensate ethnonationalities and indeed often deliberately withhold them, they tend to 
provoke civil discord along ethnic lines as did the old multinational empires of Europe.” 
33 For discussion, see P. Thornberry, International Law and Minorities (1991) at 38 et seq. This is particu-
larly in evidence in Central and Eastern Europe following the first world war, as minority rights provi-
sions were included in peace treaties, specific declarations made by new League of Nations member-states 
upon entry into the organisation, special treaties concluded between the organisation and a number of in-
dividual states. 
34 For discussion, see UNCIO, Vol. VI, Committee I/1, Sixth mtg., at 296 (1945). 
35 See A. Cassese, International Law in a Divided World 113 (1986) [hereinafter Divided world].  
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nature, in that it seeks the “creation of conditions of stability and well-being”. Indeed, as a result, 
it may readily be prima facie assumed that the principle of self-determination must be subordi-
nate to Article 2(4) and Chapter VII of the Charter. This is to say that ‘states’ are ‘states’ when they 
are called ‘states’, and accepted as ‘states’ per se by other states. 
Were the Belgian amendment to have been accepted by the General Assembly, consid-
erable weight would have been allocated towards juridical arguments, lending credence to a 
‘self-determining’ people as forming something both geographically contiguous and conceptually 
inherent. Unsurprisingly, geography is the dominant variable between the two, in that it is gen-
erally assumed that a properly-defined ‘people’ must form a logical and obvious geographical 
perimeter—that is to say that a ‘people’ must neither be fabricated or gerrymandered—vis-à-vis 
an externality. Of course the Belgian amendment was not accepted, and the consequence was a 
continuation, in the lack of clarity of what was exactly meant by ‘self-determination’. While 
there is considerable weight leading towards the dominance of the uniform application of state-
hood per se across territories to which sovereignty was proclaimed or assigned by ‘states’, it 
would be both unfair and unrealistic to view positivist statehood as the monolithic, universally 
equivalent instrument for which its 19th and 20th century applications have shown extraordi-
nary appreciation, in certain quarters. 
Is sovereignty monolithic? Is statehood static? Can divergent populations be administra-
tively acknowledged under such universalisms? May the needs of such populations be met un-
der such circumstances? Were the international affairs of the late 1800s and early 1900s 
sufficiently coherent so as to coherently transfer actual capacity to govern through effective ad-
ministration throughout a territory? What about a portion thereof? Alas, the early promulgators 
of self-determination’s evolution into a tangible legality were intrinsically unconcerned with 
such irrelevancies. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, however, did offer ‘the only forthright 
statement’ on the phrase, as asserted by Thomas Musgrave, that “we must first of all see to it […] 
that dependent countries are enabled as soon as possible to take the path of national independ-
ence [by facilitating] the realization of the principles of equality and self-determination of na-
tions”.36 
Despite the inclusion of the Soviet perspective of self-determination in the Charter’s 
framework, modifications were made from Lenin’s original formulation, with secession as the 
ultimate guarantor of the concept. Automatically equating self-determination with secession 
has long been a challenging task, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the Sixth Committee at the San 
Francisco Conference in 1945 sought to limit the scope of self-determination. In its final report, 
the Committee stated that 
 [c]oncerning the principle of self-determination, it was strongly emphasized on the one side 
that this principle corresponds closely to the will and desires of peoples everywhere and 
should be clearly enunciated in the Charter; on the other side, it was stated that the principle 
conformed to the purposes of the Charter only insofar as it implied the right of self-
government of peoples and not the right of secession.37 
This focus, on self-determination as self-government, forms the core in determining the 
concept’s juridical meaning in the United Nations context. This was further developed in the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Although no specific mention per se of self-
determination is to be found, some aspects characteristics of the self-government aspect of self-
                                                                  
36 See T.D. Musgrave, Self-Determination and National Minorities (1997), at 64 [hereinafter Musgrave], 
quoting R.B. Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter 811 (1958). 
37 UNCIO, doc. 343, I/1/16, Vol. 6 296 (1945).  
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determination are to be found at Article 21.38 While it is generally accepted that the main sub-
stantive provisions of the Universal Declaration have now gained force as customary interna-
tional law, particularly prohibitions on genocide, slavery or slave trade, the murder or causing 
the disappearance of individuals, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, prolonged arbitrary detention, systematic racial discrimination or consistent pat-
terns of gross violations of internationally recognised human rights,39 ‘self-determination of 
peoples’ finds no certain place within even nascent customary international human rights law. 
However, a fundamental tension is also revealed in that the very notion of a juridical existence of 
a ‘customary international human rights law’ was fundamentally bolstered by the entry into 
force of the two main human rights covenants—and at their core sits the common article one 
pledging great support to self-determination.40 As such, the underlying role played by self-
determination, regardless of its more contradictory and tumultuous past, cannot go overlooked. 
Indeed, further foreshadowing of the future legal basis for self-determination can also be ob-
served from a phrase from the UDHR Preamble (‘Whereas it is essential to promote the devel-
opment of friendly relations between nations…’), in that, by the 1970s, ‘friendly relations’ per se 
was to become an explicitly-defined component of the United Nations’ work programme, and 
such a programme would have to be effectuated through its Member-States, which had volun-
tarily accepted the responsibility to uphold a newly-defined set of universal standards of ex-
pected behaviour, of which self-determination of peoples was the cornerstone. 
That said, none of this was likely to have been initially self-evident. If it were to be ac-
cepted that that which would separate a ‘people’ from a ‘minority’ was geography, in the sense 
that ‘peoples’ must be geographically conterminal, whereas ‘minorities’ need not necessarily 
be—but may nevertheless conceivably overlap with the definition of a ‘people’—the assumption 
that a ‘people’ must inherently correspond to the aggregate population of land inhabiting a 
state’s own territorial boundaries seems to bow rather graciously towards the dominance mani-
fested by the ‘scientific’ positivism of the late 1800s. In early UN practice, the ‘peoples’ mentioned 
in Articles 1(2) and 55 were seen in a fundamentally broader context than that which would 
have been likely to have been envisaged by positivists, should the concept ever have conceivably 
transpired. One commentator, in an authoritative study on UN practice on self-determination, 
prominently cited an internal UN Secretariat memorandum,41 and observed that 
 the Secretariat’s memorandum thus gave the word ‘peoples’ the widest meaning. It could 
cover states, nations and any groups of human beings that could be organised in a state, or 
form a nation or just be a group. Therefore self-determination applied to peoples as well as 
                                                                  
38 Article 21 of the UDHR states: “(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives; (2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public 
service in his country; (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this 
shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and 
shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures”. 
39 See US Restatement (Third) at § 702, and comments reflecting the customary scope of such rights since 
1987 “and whose scope and content are generally agreed”. See further at § 701, Reporters’ Note 6 that the 
list is neither necessarily completed, nor is it closed. 
40 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into 
force 3 January 1976, in accordance with Article 27; and see also International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolu-
tion 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with Article 49. 
41 The memorandum stated that “there appears to be no difficulty in the juxtaposition [of ‘friendly rela-
tions among nations’ and ‘self-determination of peoples’] since ‘nations’ is used in the sense of all political 
entities, states and non-states, whereas ‘peoples’ refers to groups of human beings who may, or may not, 
comprise states or nations”. UNCIO, doc. WD381, CO/156, Vol. 18 657-658. 
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nations and states.42 
It will be continually difficult to ignore the question of ‘what exactly is a people’ per se. In 
the following two chapters, the question will therefore be subjected to deeper critical examina-
tion. For the moment, however, it is hard to argue with Ian Brownlie’s ‘core of reasonable cer-
tainty’ in addressing the question, which is based largely on race or nationality.43 One would, of 
course, point out that even that formulation leaves much open to speculation. This reality must 
be simultaneously observed with the number of weaknesses, identified by Cassese, concerning 
the approach taken towards inclusion of self-determination in the UN Charter, namely: (a) the 
lack of a legally-binding obligation; (b) that self-determination was seen chiefly as ‘self-
governance’ and not independence; (c) that colonial empires were allowed to survive through 
the Trusteeship Council; (d) that it was implied that self-determination was to be set aside when 
it would give rise to tension and conflict; and (e) that the principle was to be upheld as long as it 
did not infringe upon the existing territorial integrity of states (i.e., there was no possibility of se-
cession to be drawn only from the Charter).44 
The Trusteeship System of the United Nations must be addressed at this point. This sys-
tem has its theoretical origins in the mandate system of the League of Nations, in that the en-
trusted powers had the duty to guide the peoples under colonial power to independence and 
thereby strengthen self-determination. In the Charter context, however, colonialism is explicitly 
legitimised,45 and Chapter XII of the Charter deals with mandated territories which were sepa-
rated from the so-called ‘enemy powers’ during the second world war. It can be seen that the 
Trusteeship Council is a response to a duty set forth upon the international community to fur-
ther the goal of decolonisation. 
While a full discussion of the Trusteeship System and the declaration on non-self govern-
ing territories other than trust territories in Chapter XI, XII and XIII of the Charter is beyond the 
scope of this study, reference is made to Articles 73 and 74 of the Charter, particularly at Article 
73(b), which required eventual self-government (taking ‘due account of the political aspirations 
of the peoples’) for non-self-governing territories administered by UN member states.46 It is 
highly ironic, however, to observe the overt references to self-determination in Articles 1 and 55 
of the Charter, and only implicit references when dealing with the Trusteeship System itself. In 
1950s General Assembly discussion on the matter, Belgium attempted to bridge the gaps be-
                                                                  
42 A. Rigo-Sureda, The Evolution of the Right to Self-Determination: A Study of United Nations Practice 
100 (1973). 
43 Cf. I. Brownlie, Rights of Peoples in International Law, in J. Crawford (ed.) The Rights of Peoples 5 
(1988): “This core consists in the right of a community which has a distinct character to have this charac-
ter reflected in the institutions of government in which it lives. The concept of distinct character depends 
on a number of criteria which may appear in combination. Race (or nationality) is one of the most impor-
tant of the relevant criteria, but the concept of race can only be expressed scientifically in terms of more 
specific features, in which matters of culture, language, religion and group psychology predominate. The 
physical indicia of race and nationality bay evidence the cultural distinctiveness of a group but they cer-
tainly do not inevitably condition it. Indeed, if the purely ethnic criteria are applied exclusively many 
long-existing national identities would be negated on academic grounds—such as, for example, the United 
States.” 
44 Divided world, supra note 35, at 133. 
45 See UN Charter at Article 76: generally to promote decolonisation “as may be appropriate to the par-
ticular circumstances of each territory and its peoples […] and as may be provided by the terms of each 
trusteeship agreement”. 
46 While the UN itself was not authorised by Chapter XI of the Charter to supervise this self-government 
process, such administering member states were required to report certain information to the Secretary-
General concerning the situations on the ground, in these territories. 
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tween Chapters XI, XII and XII of the Charter. In the General Assembly, its delegate stated that 
there existed 
[a] great deal of documentation to prove that a number of States were administering within 
their own borders territories which were not governed by the ordinary law; territories with 
well-defined limits, inhabited by homogeneous peoples differing from the rest of the popula-
tion in race, language and culture. Those populations were disenfranchised; they took no part 
in national life; they did not enjoy self-government in any sense of the word. Some of them 
were still unconquered. Entry into many of those territories was prohibited. He could not 
see how anyone could claim that the States administering such territories were not what the 
Charter called States “which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of terri-
tories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government”.47  
These concepts of what was to be known as the ‘Belgian thesis’48 found practical imple-
mentation in General Assembly resolution 637A (VII) of 16 December 1952, entitled ‘The right 
of peoples and nations to self-determination’. In this resolution, at operative paragraph 1, the 
Assembly recommended that “the States Members of the United Nations shall uphold the prin-
ciple of self-determination of all peoples and nations”—particularly “colonial peoples and na-
tions”. Further, at operative paragraph 2, the Assembly stated that peoples of non-self-governing 
and trust territories had the right to self-determination and invited member states to recognise 
and promote the realisation of that right. During this time, one simultaneously witnessed the 
growth in concern for human rights,49 and self-determination issues became integrated in this 
general framework, particularly following the General Assembly’s resolution 421D(V) of 4 De-
cember 1950, which, at operative paragraph 6, called upon the Economic and Social Council to 
request the Commission on Human Rights to “study ways and means which would ensure the 
right of peoples and nations to self-determination, and to prepare recommendations for con-
sideration by the General Assembly at its sixth session”. 
Implementation: The right of peoples to decolonise guaranteed by the UN General Assem-
bly 
In 1952, the General Assembly built upon the mandate given in resolution 421D(V), with 
resolution 545(VI) which “recognized the right of peoples and nations as a fundamental human 
right”. The issue of secession was hotly debated in that year’s Commission on Human Rights, 
and, in a 33-12-13 vote,50 the heretofore alluded-to article one common to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural rights was established. This article states the following: 
1. All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely de-
termine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural devel-
opment. 
                                                                  
47 GAOR 9th Sess. 4th Ctte. 419th Mtg. Para. 20 (1954). 
48 The document was originally published as Belgian Government Information Service (New York), The 
Sacred Mission of Civilisation: The Belgian Thesis (1953). See also M.M. Whiteman, 13 Digest of Inter-
national Law 697 
49 In General Assembly resolution 543(VI) of 5 February 1952, the notion of a single human rights cove-
nant was split along ideological lines such that one would deal with civil and political rights and the other 
would deal with economic, social and cultural rights. These ‘twin’ covenants were in some measure uni-
fied by the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, as the two ‘sets’ of rights were recognised as hav-
ing been artificially split when the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, proclaims all rights to 
be “universal, indivisible, and interdependent and interrelated”. Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action, UN document A/Conf.157/23 at Sec. I, para. 5 (1993) [hereinafter VDPA]. 
50 For discussion, see Musgrave, supra note 36, at 68. 
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2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources 
without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, 
based on the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people 
be deprived of its own means of subsistence.51 
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the 
administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realiza-
tion of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. 
The inclusion of these provisions in the main international human rights treaties is signifi-
cant, particularly in a post-decolonisation context, as the Covenants themselves were opened 
for signature on 19 December 1966, and entered into force at the time of the ratification or acces-
sion of the thirty-fifth UN member state. It must not go overlooked that this occurred on 23 
March 1976, at a time in which the decolonisation process was nearly complete. Nevertheless, 
the enshrinement of the principle as a cornerstone of promising international treaty law con-
cerning the status of the individual within the state (as opposed to treaty law concerning the ag-
gregated acts of states themselves) has served to establish the principle in international law. 
To reassess, during the late 1950s and early 1960s, the UN General Assembly played a 
highly significant role in bringing the notion of external self-determination to fruition. That such 
actions may have tangible applicability in modern territorial statehood would be manifested 
through Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which is commonly re-
ferred to as determining principal or subsidiary means of determining valid international law. It 
is indeed true that neither this reference, nor the UN Charter itself, confers power upon the 
General Assembly to ‘determine’ (except for internal UN matters) international law per se, but 
the General Assembly’s actions and activities towards the codification and development of a 
‘right of peoples to self-determination’ cannot be utterly without consequence. Alternatively, a 
resolution or decision of the General Assembly is a restatement of international law if it is in 
conformity with international law (and, indeed, usually ‘affirms’ a particular law and is adopted 
by consensus).52 The roles played by the General Assembly, in more technical conjunction with 
the relevant bodies of the Economic and Social Council, form tangible traveaux préparatoires to 
that which may even be accepted as a Gründnorm of modern territorial statehood. 
This insight is of primary importance in the (re-)consideration of the first substantive ba-
sis for self-determination of colonial peoples. From the period 1945-1966, at the very least, the 
right of self-determination applied to states and peoples of non-self-governing and trust territo-
ries. Two resolutions of the General Assembly in 1960 highlight this.53 In its resolution 
1514(XV), adopted by a vote of 89-0-9 on 14 December 1960, the General Assembly proclaimed 
a ‘Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples’. The follow-
ing day, the General Assembly also adopted its resolution 1541(XV) by a vote of 69-2-21.54 This 
                                                                  
51 The inclusion of this provision by Chile caused the United States to side with the United Kingdom and 
France and vote against the inclusion of this article into the twin covenants. 
52 Cf. (H.P.S.& S.) Int’l Law 3d. Ed. ACB-6 129 (1993) [hereinafter Int’l Law]: “These resolutions, declara-
tions may be considered by governments and by courts or arbitral tribunals as evidence of international 
custom or as expressing (and evidencing) a general principle of law […]. The fact that a law-declaring dec-
laration has been adopted without a negative vote or abstention is usually regarded as strong presumptive 
evidence that it contains a correct statement of law […]. The size and composition of the majority, the in-
tent and expectations of states, the political factors and other contextual elements are pertinent in judging 
the effect.” 
53 For a highly analytical, contextual analysis of these resolutions (rather different in focus than this sur-
vey exercise), see Vukas, supra note 13, at 384 et seq. 
54 Portugal and South Africa were the states which cast a negative vote. 
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resolution included an annex entitled ‘Principles which should guide Members in determining 
whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for in Article 73(e) of the 
Charter of the United Nations’. The interplay between these two resolutions is important, and 
both will now be analysed in turn.55 
The 1514 resolution “has become the definitive statement of the General Assembly with 
regard to colonial situations”.56 The Assembly, at its preambular paragraph 9, believes “that the 
process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible and that, in order to avoid serious crises, an 
end must be put to colonialism and all practices of segregation and discrimination associated 
therewith”. This is further met with a declaration in operative paragraph 1 that “the subjection of 
peoples to alien subjection, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental 
human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the pro-
motion of world peace and co-operation”, while paragraph 2 of the resolution which was a ver-
batim restatement of what was to become Article 1(1) of the twin human rights covenants.57 
Clearly independence was the goal of the resolution—so much so that it stated that “the inade-
quacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext 
for delaying independence”. In direct language, at operative paragraph 5, the Assembly further 
declares that  
[i]mmediate steps shall [emphasis added] be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territo-
ries or all other territories which have not yet attained independence [emphasis added], to transfer 
all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in ac-
cordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed 
or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom. 
Hurst Hannum’s commentary about operative paragraphs 6 and 7 of the resolution is es-
sential for a clear understanding of certain limits placed on self-determination in a colonial con-
text. He writes: 
Paragraph 6 of the declaration sets forth another fundamental principle, without which one 
almost never (at least in UN forums) finds a reference to self-determination: “Any attempt 
aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a 
country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Na-
tions”. The seventh and final paragraph reiterates “the sovereign rights of all peoples and 
their territorial integrity”.58 
James Crawford further points out that this final paragraph, establishing territorial integ-
rity for the colonial unit, was included to guarantee that the Declaration would be “on a par with 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Charter itself”.59 
This anti-colonial Declaration by the General Assembly certainly marked a shift from the 
previously accepted notion of self-determination, in that it gives a form of legal approval to the 
change in the intended beneficiaries of self-determination. Strictly speaking, it serves to shift the 
emphasis from the colonisers—which had implicit legal authority for their actions through the 
                                                                  
55 Considering the effect of these declarations and resolutions at the time they were adopted by the As-
sembly, and the small number of negative votes associated therewith, one would have to assume that the 
otherwise ‘soft law’ of the GA had found a rather stable terra firma vis-à-vis the necessity of decolonisa-
tion and the importance of incorporation of principles of ‘self-determination’ in this process. 
56 Musgrave, supra note 36, at 70. 
57 These provisions, however, were only to be seen in a colonial context, while the covenants must be seen 
in a context of continuity. 
58 Hannum, supra note 8, at 34. 
59 J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law 357 (1st ed., 1979). See also J. Crawford, The 
Creation of States in International Law 606-612 (2nd ed., 2006). 
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Trusteeship System—to the colonised, which found a legal foothold in the Declaration, albeit 
one which did not provide for piecemeal independence of colonised territories. 
The effect of the Declaration was considerably buffeted by a second resolution, 1541, 
adopted the following day, which by contrast upholds the provisions in the Charter which the 
1514 resolution sought to renounce in that by developing principles for reporting data to the 
Secretary-General on territories under control of the Trusteeship System, it continues to fully 
identify self-determination with decolonisation, but does not overturn the colonially-imposed 
political unit. In this resolution, a large number of ‘principles’ were enumerated to determine 
whether member states would be required to submit information called for under Article 73(e) 
of the Charter. It should be pointed out that Principle I specifies that territories—as opposed to 
peoples (and without any ethnic distinctions)—which “were then known to be of the colonial 
type” should be those for which information is required to be submitted. This territorial refer-
ence was maintained in Principle II, which observed that the obligation for member states to 
report under Article 73(e) of the Charter ends when “a territory and its peoples [emphasis added] 
attain a full measure of self-government”. Principle IV establishes the so-called ‘saltwater bar-
rier’, in that self-determination could only apply to territories separated from their metropolitan 
parent by oceans or high seas. It serves to ensure that a specific information transmission obliga-
tion would persevere between geographically separate regions administered by the same sover-
eignty. Such a ‘saltwater barrier’ presumed the existence of a “territory which is geographically 
separate and distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it”. Principle V 
further incorporates elements of, inter alia, “an administrative, political, juridical, economic or 
historical nature”. 
Principle VI is very important, as it lists ways in which self-determination can be effectu-
ated—essentially it identifies the practical measures necessary for the realisation of the right to 
external self-determination. This involves “a full measure of self-government” by: (a) emer-
gence as a sovereign independent State; (b) free association with an independent State—which 
must have a democratic measure, according to Principle VII; or (c) integration with an inde-
pendent State—which was subject to Principles VIII and IX, the bases of equality and the 
achievement of an advanced state of self-government. 
In sum, although there may well be contradictions between the underlying meanings of 
these two resolutions, their amalgamated practical effect serves to point in one direction: the 
eventual, universal sovereign independence of any remaining territorial possessions still con-
tinuing to be held by colonising entities, meaning the fundamental rejection of the legal validity 
of colonial rule.60 
 
 
                                                                  
60 Cf. Cassese, supra note 3, at 72-73: “This right only concerns external self-determination […]. The right 
belongs to the people as a whole: if the population of a colonial territory is divided up into various ethnic 
groups or nations, they are not at liberty to choose by themselves their external status. This is because the 
principle of territorial integrity should here play an overriding role […]. It is apparent […] that develop-
ing countries, with the full support of socialist States and without any opposition from Western coun-
tries, firmly believed that colonial boundaries should not be modified, lest this would trigger the 
disruption of many colonial countries, as well as serious disorder as a result of the carving up of old 
States into new. In short, the principle of uti possidetis was regarded as paramount. These geopolitical con-
siderations led States actually to deny the right of self-determination to individual ethnic groups within 
colonial territories.” 
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A monumental achievement, making European statehood permanent 
The British, Dutch and Spanish were the swiftest and arguably most successful in decolo-
nisation, while the Belgians, French and particularly Portuguese had serious difficulties in its 
implementation. To simplify matters considerably, self-determination came to be recognised as 
a pathway to which the independence of colonies might be achieved, with the inevitability of 
the concept continuing to linger persuasively regardless of circumstance. This incongruous re-
ality had the knock-on effect of drawing attention away from the development of any possible 
parallel right of secession as an inherent part of a peoples’ right to self-determination. Moreover, 
perhaps, rightly so, as decolonisation and its aftermath were not without acute moments of con-
fusion and discord, certainly the fluidity afforded to a piecemeal and organic dismantling of 
these European models of social order would have proven profoundly confounding for all par-
ties involved. So for the colonising states to allow their colonial subjects the possibility—and in-
deed a right—of self-determination, was one way for ‘the end of the empire’ to take place; that is, 
by the colonising states in a way which understandably was aimed at the promotion of inter-
societal stability, inasmuch as it preserved the status quo. This simultaneously led to the adop-
tion of an imprecise principle of self-determination into the Charter of the UN and of the organi-
sation’s subsequent practice. For example, when China and the Soviet Union made overland 
acquisitions of territory, these territorial gains were excluded from consideration in the estab-
lished legal framework of colonial acquisition and decolonisation. Self-determination, as mani-
fested in ‘saltwater barrier’ circumstances, permanently served to lock into place the territorial 
definition of a newly ex-colonial state into a form bearing profound similarities even to the earli-
est of imperial delineations and demarcations. The problem is that the actual populations are 
practically never as monolithic as the international legal structures which have, by now, begun 
to crystallise around such territories and populations (and, it would be argued, indeed, ‘peo-
ples’). Hence postcolonial states are not to be equated with nation-states. 
Yet if one were to consider Africa, a continent which the borders of its states, today, make 
sense only to the European colonialists that divided the continent, it can be observed that these 
borders held during African decolonisation, as in 1963, at the level of head of state and govern-
ment, the OAU pledged in the Cairo Declaration to “respect the frontiers existing on their 
achievement of independence”.61 The reason behind this was, again, to prevent land grabs and 
to prevent conflict, following the legal principle of uti possidetis juris, originally established in 
the Latin American decolonisation experience. Uti possidetis is a significant counterweight to 
self-determination of peoples. 
 While it was possible to state authoritatively that a right of self-determination had been 
established for colonised areas during this period, James Engers’ perspective summarises the 
period quite well: (External) “self-determination [was] not a universal doctrine but rather a spe-
cific concept relating to the international law of decolonisation”.62 
The ongoing ‘is’, after the fact: An observation on the modern law of self-determination 
As will be discussed, the biggest distinction between the right of self-determination in a 
colonial versus postcolonial context is the relevance of the concepts of internal versus external 
self-determination. Internal self-determination will be seen to retain the essential core of self-
government, which forms the core in determining the concept’s juridical meaning in the United 
Nations context. It will do so as a means to ensuring good governance within established territo-
                                                                  
61 See generally discussion infra chapter four. 
62 J.F. Engers, From Sacred Trust to Self-Determination, 24 Neth. Int’l L. Rev. 88 (1977). 
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rial states through measures of legitimacy and accountability. External self-determination in-
volves the sovereignty of a territory. In its most uncontroversial form, it is applied exclusively in 
a decolonisation context. As Cassese comments, “unlike external self-determination for colo-
nial peoples—which ceases to exist under customary international law once it is imple-
mented—the right to internal self-determination is neither destroyed nor diminished by its 
having already once been invoked and put into effect”.63 More controversial will be questions of 
external self-determination for non-colonial peoples, and the extent to which those claims are 
validated by international law, as possible remedies for violations of internal self-
determination.64 
The Friendly Relations Declaration as the conceptual basis for internal self-determination 
In 1960, the Assembly undertook its Decolonisation Declaration in the form of General 
Assembly Resolution 1514(XV). Ten years later, its Friendly Relations Declaration reinforced 
the anti-colonial message of ten years earlier, in a General Assembly Declaration designed to 
practically develop the future work plan for the Organization. This momentum was further buf-
feted by the adoption of the ICCPR and ICESCR in 1966. Although the covenants did not enter 
into force for another decade, they did serve to reinforce anti-colonialism, particularly given 
their common article 1 concerning self-determination. In particular, as the decolonisation 
process began in earnest and the practical effects of this process began to be recognised with the 
admission of newly independent states to the United Nations, the General Assembly allocated a 
portion of its own programme of work to evaluating the work of the organisation, which culmi-
nated in a significant declaration by the General Assembly, twenty-five years after the creation of 
the United Nations. In resolution 1815(XVIII) in 1962, the General Assembly authorised a study 
of the principles of the organisation and their duties imposed on member states. A committee 
was established the following year in resolution 1966(XVIII) to undertake this study, the result 
of which was the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations, which was adopted by consensus as 
General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV).65 
Although the Declaration has come to be closely identified with ideas of self-
determination, no overt reference to the 1514 resolution is to be found. The Declaration is writ-
ten in forward-looking language, the most salient parts of which, as identified by Hurst Han-
num, are quoted below: 
The use of force to deprive peoples of their national identity constitutes a violation of their 
inalienable rights and of the principle of non-intervention [...] 
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the 
Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without exter-
nal interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural devel-
opment, and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions 
of the Charter. 
Every State has the duty to promote [...] realization of the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples [...] in order: 
(a) To promote friendly relations and co-operation among States; and 
                                                                  
63 Cassese, supra note 3, at 101.  
64 Although the Soviet Union has ceased to exist and an unfettered right to secession was definitively 
blocked in United Nations practice, the intellectual underpinning of external self-determination, as a final 
guarantor of the manifestation of that right, cannot be overlooked. 
65 For discussion, see R. Rosenstock, The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations: A Survey 730 (1971). 
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(b) To bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due regard to the freely expressed will of 
the peoples concerned; and bearing in mind that subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, 
domination and exploitation constitutes a violation of the principle [of self-determination], as 
well as denial of fundamental human rights, and is contrary to the Charter [...] 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any ac-
tion which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political 
unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus pos-
sessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction 
as to race, creed or colour.66 
 Every State shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial or total disruption of the na-
tional unity and territorial integrity of any other State or country [...] 
 The territorial integrity and political independence of the State are inviolable.67 
From this, certain observations may be made. In the 1514 and 1541 resolutions, inde-
pendence from colonial situations was identified as one of the primary focuses of self-
determination. By 1970, the Declaration states that “independence [was] only one of several 
equally legitimate alternatives, declaring that the right of self-determination could be imple-
mented by the establishment of an independent state, association or integration with an inde-
pendent state, or ‘the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people’”.68 
The scope of ‘prohibition of discrimination’ within the Friendly Relations Declaration 
Cassese gives considerable attention to the concern expressed by Member States in the 
formulation of the Declaration that the principle of territorial integrity was “considered sa-
cred”,69 particularly as it followed the 1514 resolution, and as such he terms paragraph 7 as the 
Declaration’s saving clause, which served to reinforce directly the concept of external self-
determination as viewed through the decolonising framework, further implying that internal 
self-determination would be a notion only indirectly addressed by the Declaration. Cassese 
makes clear that any question of secession based upon paragraph 7 of the Declaration would be 
immediately suspect, owning to the weight in international law allocated to the principle of ter-
ritorial integrity.70  
The clause can be seen as giving rise to a form of legal recourse to post-decolonisation 
separatism, including the possibility of secession, or at least it can be said not to explicitly pro-
hibit it. While no right to secession can be found in the Declaration alone, secession can neither 
be seen specifically lawful nor unlawful per se. Cassese himself does not reject secession claims 
out of hand, but claims that “[o]ne thing is made very clear: any licence to secede must be inter-
preted very strictly”.71 This precariously balanced interpretation does very little to instil greater 
clarity on an already confounding legal topic. Although it is clear that the Declaration reaffirms 
                                                                  
66 This paragraph (emphasis added) is number 7 in the Declaration, and can be said to be the most impor-
tant continuing element from the Friendly Relations Declaration. This language was expanded in the Vi-
enna Declaration and Programme of Action as “without distinction of any kind”, drawing reference to 
Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See General Assembly Resolution 48/121, con-
firming the VDPA as originally published in UN document A/CONF.157/24 (Parts I and II). 
67 GA Res. 2625 (annex), UN Doc. A/5217 (1970) [hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration], as quoted 
in Hannum, supra note 8, at 35. 
68 Musgrave, supra note 36, at 76 (emphasis added). 
69 Cassese, supra note 3, at 112. 
70 See Id. at 112. 
71 Id. 
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the continual nature of self-determination, the contrasting identity to which a peoples’ self-
determination is directed has shifted from the colonising state to the postcolonial state. The col-
lectivité undertaking self-determination will be a portion of the postcolonial state, as opposed to 
the entire territory of the colony undergoing decolonisation.72 Therefore, identity-based con-
structions of a ‘people’ operate on a more complicated level in the postcolonial state than during 
colonial times,73 particularly when territorial delimitations, which were the product of the im-
position of the European state on Africa, could come under question. This could be most read-
ily observed if Lenin’s formulation of the necessity of recourse to external self-determination as a 
fundamental means of guarantee of self-determination were to retain its intellectual currency, 
albeit as an obscure juridical source. 
Cassese concludes that “secession is not ruled out but may be permitted only when very 
stringent requirements have been met”, as “the possibility of impairment of territorial integrity is 
not totally excluded, [and therefore] logically admitted”.74 However, his remarks are viewed 
through his desire to read the Declaration with a strong inclination toward upholding the prin-
ciple of territorial integrity. Such an inclination serves to negate the importance of ethnic, cul-
tural and linguistic criteria in the state’s formulation. Obviously, individuals meeting such 
criteria are rarely found in precisely defined geographies intrinsically conterminal with the terri-
torial boundaries of a state. Nevertheless, Cassese makes claims for considerable juridical 
weight to be allocated to the principle of territorial integrity, as a consequence of the advocacy, 
through his reading of the traveaux préparatoires of the Declaration, for a restrictive effect to have 
been caused by adding the phrase ‘race, creed of colour’ to paragraph 7.75 Thus, Cassese con-
cludes that the level of representation required to satisfactorily evaluate the level of access to 
government by a group would not necessarily be definitive.76 He argues that internal self-
                                                                  
72 Cf. R. Higgins, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession: Comments, in C.M. Brölmann et al 
(eds.), Peoples and Minorities in International Law 32 (1993). See also R. Higgins, V General Course on 
Public International Law, International Law and the Avoidance, Containment and Resolution of Disputes, 
230 Rec. des Cours, at 154 et seq. (1991). Higgins conceptually links territorial statehood with the overall 
concept of ‘government’ per se, thereby implying a deep presumption that the territory of a ‘people’ is in-
herently co-terminal with the territory of a state. Although it may be observed that such a perspective re-
inforces the absolutism of territorial integrity as a matter of primacy, one must recall how even Cassese 
allowed for the conceptual possibility of a diversion from such a primacy to be legitimately juridically 
construed. By implication, the equivocation of ‘peoplehood’ with that exclusively defined by ‘governmen-
talism’ must never go critically unevaluated. The pivot point of this equation will be formed by the inter-
actions between the theoretical concepts of ‘territorial integrity’, ‘governance’ and ‘effectiveness’, as 
contrasted with the more explicit provisions of historical treaties dictating the circumstances of territo-
rial transfer of title from colonised entities to such proponents. 
73 Cf. Cassese, supra note 3, at 114-115: “By limiting self-determination to racial and religious groups, the 
draftsmen made it clear that self-determination was not considered a right held by the entire people of an 
authoritarian State. The existence of a government which tramples upon its citizens’ basic rights and fun-
damental freedoms does not give rise to a right of internal self-determination. However, even those 
groups that are afforded rights under the Declaration are not as well off as one might expect, for it is equal 
access to government which they are entitled, not equal rights. The Declaration does not require States to 
grant racial and religious groups a menu of rights, nor does it prohibit the imposition of invidious meas-
ures. It simply demands that States allow racial and religious groups to have access to government insti-
tutions. The draftsmen undoubtedly assumed that once these groups were granted equal access to 
government, they would be in a position to ensure that all attempts to pass discriminatory legislation 
would be defeated—an assumption that is only partially correct.” 
74 Id. at 118-119. 
75 See Id. at 115-118. 
76 Cf. Id. at 117: “The insertion of the phrase ‘race, creed or colour’ was intended to qualify, that is, to re-
strict, the general thrust of [an] Italian compromise text. Indeed, without those words, the scope of the 
clause would have been very sweeping: any national, linguistic, ethnic, racial, or religious group not ‘rep-
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determination is conferred “only on racial or religious groups which are denied access to the po-
litical decision-making process; linguistic or national groups do not have a concomitant right”.77 
It could be assumed that the most extreme form of self-determination outside the colonial 
context—secession—produces a confounding set of problems for the systematic functioning of 
international law, particularly that the validity of such actions will largely be determined by the 
level of political recognition afforded by other states in the ‘international community’.78 
This may be why there exists such a fixation on the seemingly unchallenged presumption 
that the territorial integrity of all states is as uniform and as constant as the sovereign equality of 
all states. Without negating the reality that the territorial integrity does, indeed, form a funda-
mental basis for statehood, and thus the system of public international law, it must be also stated 
that the importance of the non-territorial aspects of a state’s composition can not go overlooked, 
for the primary test of self-determination itself is, of course, access to government. 
In this sense, David Raič has undertaken a critical evaluation of Cassese’s premise which 
is worth considering.79 Raič observes Cassese’s synonymous equation of the terms ‘race’ and 
‘colour’,80 and asserts that “the term ‘race’ should not be limited to the notion of ‘colour’”.81 This 
stands to reason, as e.g. Hispanics can be of any race and colour. Raič writes: 
[I]f Cassese’s argument is accepted, internal self-determination would, as far as subgroups are 
concerned, be confined to one specific, narrowly defined subgroup only. It is submitted, 
however, that this point of view cannot be maintained upon closer analysis and that the sub-
ject of internal self-determination includes ethnic groupings other than Cassese’s narrowly 
defined subgroups.82  
This leads him to conclude that the term ‘race’, as used in the Declaration, is formulated in 
such a way so as to preclude distinctions from being made amongst such groups. In recalling the 
text from paragraph 7 “without distinction as to race, creed or colour”, a “differentiation between 
groups, even on the basis of race, is not prohibited under international law, [and] the reference 
to the term ‘distinction’ must be interpreted as referring to the practice of arbitrary distinction, 
that is, discrimination”.83 Raič links this assessment to Article 1 of the 1966 Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which states that “the term ‘racial discrimi-
nation’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, 
descent, or national or ethnic origin […]”, and goes further to assert that the actual underlying 
motivation behind paragraph 7 aims towards the universal application of such provisions as 
opposed to mere commentary on specific situations. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
resented’ in the government would have had a right to self-determination. In addition, the populations of 
States with authoritarian and despotic governments would probably also have been entitled to claim the 
right.” For the proposed Italian text to the General Assembly preparatory committee, see UN Doc. 
A/AC.125/L.80, particularly that “states enjoying full sovereignty and independence, and possessed of a 
government representing the whole of their population shall be considered to be conducting themselves 
in conformity with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as regards that popula-
tion”. For a further critique of the notion that claims to the right of self-determination cannot be made by 
‘the populations of States with authoritarian and despotic governments’, see infra chapter four of this 
study. 
77 Cassese, supra note 3, at 114. 
78 For discussion, see J. Dugard and D. Raič, The role of recognition in the law and practice of secession, in 
M. Kohen (ed.) Secession: International Law Perspectives (2006), at 94 et seq. 
79 See D. Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (2002), at 250 et seq [hereinafter Raič]. 
80 See Cassese, supra note 3, at 112. 
81 Raič, supra note 79, at 251. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at text accompanying footnote 100. 
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Raič is thus led to conclude that internal self-determination must not only be limited to 
“‘racial’ groups (defined in terms of physical appearance) and religious groups”,84 and that “if, 
with respect to internal self-determination, racial groups would be considered to have a special 
position under international law in comparison to other subgroups it is at least remarkable that 
no other such special position is referred to in common Article 1 of the Human Rights Cove-
nants or any other instrument containing provisions on self-determination”.85 
Raič then finds himself in a position to take issue with Higgins’ assessment that a ‘people’ 
must mean either “the entire people of a State or […] all the persons comprising distinctive 
groupings on the basis of race, ethnicity and perhaps religion”,86 and asserts that ‘subdivisions’, 
or ‘subgroups’ within a state, are the true beneficiaries of internal self-determination, and such 
groups may be both racial and ethnic in composition.87 He writes that “the main objective or 
purpose of the concept of self-determination is the protection, preservation, strengthening and 
development of the identity or individuality of a ‘people’”,88 and thus “the applicability of self-
determination therefore presumes the distinctiveness of that ‘people’”.89 This leads Raič to begin 
to offer hypothetical criteria for ‘peoplehood’ under this more forward-looking formulation. He 
suggests objective criteria of: (a) a (historical) territorial connection, on which territory the 
group forms a majority; (b) a common history; (c) a common ethnic identity or origin; (d) a 
common language; (e) a common culture; and/or (f) a common religion or ideology,90 as well 
as a subjective criteria of “the belief of being a distinct people distinguishable from any other 
people inhabiting the globe, and the wish to be recognized as such, as well as the wish to main-
tain, strengthen and develop the group’s identity”, expressing the will for a common future.91  
The implications of Raič’s analysis are sweeping, in that they clearly demonstrate the shift 
in meaning of self-determination, from the decolonisation to the newly-independent state pe-
riod. As such his meticulous conclusion merits serious consideration: 
[I]f a specific subgroup within a State can be qualified as a people in an ethnic sense on the 
basis of the abovementioned criteria, that subgroup would be a holder of the collective ‘right’ 
of internal self-determination. This does not mean, however, that the composition of a 
State’s government must necessarily reflect all that State’s peoples qua peoples. A people 
may be of the opinion that its collective identity is sufficiently protected by the applicability 
of, and respect for, specific minority rights […]. Under these circumstances there is no im-
mediate further legal obligation on the side of the State to provide for specific and extra 
guarantees. […] It may also be envisaged that a subgroup as such does not exercise its right 
of internal self-determination on the central level of decision-making but that it does exercise 
this right freely through some form of autonomy. In such a case […] there is at least a pre-
sumption that the right of internal self-determination is respected.92  
Delimiting the extent of ‘prohibition of discrimination’: Approaching the secession question 
The requirements for the recognition of secession seem to be rooted in the developing 
human rights law. As already mentioned, the establishment of the ‘International Bill of Rights’, 
                                                                  
84 Id. at 255. 
85 Id. 
86 R. Higgins, International Law and the Avoidance, Containment and Resolution of Disputes, V HR 9, 170 
(1991). 
87 Raič, supra note 79, at 258. 
88 Id. at 261. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 262. 
91 Id. at 262-263. 
92 Id. at 264. 
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of the UDHR as well as the ICCPR and ICESCR, has witnessed the birth and growth of a true in-
ternational human rights régime. The twin covenants, with their common article 1 on self-
determination, entered into force in 1976, instilling another legal element. For viewing the ‘prin-
ciple’, in terms of ‘rights’ allowed, the ‘saving clause’ of the Friendly Relations Declaration may 
be viewed as a strictly construed implicit authorisation for secession. The requirements for this 
to happen have been outlined by Cassese, who contends that international human rights law 
and the Friendly Relations Declaration serve to link external self-determination with internal 
self-determination, in exceptional circumstances: 
When the central authorities of a sovereign State persistently refuse to grant participatory 
rights to a religious or racial group, grossly and systematically trample upon their fundamen-
tal rights, and deny the possibility of reaching a peaceful settlement within the framework of 
the State structure [...] In addition, there must be gross breaches of fundamental human 
rights, and, what is more, the exclusion of any likelihood for a possible peaceful solution 
within the existing State structure [...] A racial or religious group may secede—thus exercis-
ing the most radical form of external self-determination—once it is clear that all attempts to 
achieve internal self-determination have failed or are destined to fail.93 
Although this discussion has focused, in the main, on United Nations activities in the field 
of self-determination, it must also be mentioned that self-determination was a cornerstone of 
the 1975 Helsinki Final Act,94 which, as a ‘gentleman’s agreement’, has more political impact 
than would be found in proper treaty law. Nevertheless, the Act served to clarify principles es-
tablished in the Friendly Relations Declaration, particularly regarding the self-determination of 
peoples within a sovereign state beyond basic minority rights. In particular, its Principle VIII, 
which states broadly that all peoples determine their own internal and external political status, 
does not provide as coherent a delineation between the realms of internal and external self-
determination.95 
By the late 1970s, the world was witnessing the end of decolonisation, and with the conti-
nuity of the principle of self-determination being reaffirmed as a human right, the UN Commis-
sion on Human Rights instructed its Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities to undertake a comprehensive study on the right to self-
determination.96 Without going into unnecessary detail, Hector Gros Espiell, in his study, re-
traces self-determination from its origins in a UN context, and generally establishes that self-
determination, in its essence, means the free choice of peoples. Of particular importance are his 
observations on self-determination in a postcolonial context. He writes: 
                                                                  
93 Cassese, supra note 3, at 119-120. Cf. ICCPR at Article 27, providing “in those States in which […] mi-
norities exist” a measure of guarantee of basic minority rights. 
94 See I. Brownlie, Basic Documents on Human Rights (3d. ed.) 391-449 (1993). 
95 Cf. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Helsinki Final Act (1975) at Principle 
VIII, Equal rights and self-determination of peoples: “The participating States will respect the equal rights 
of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, includ-
ing those relating to territorial integrity of States. […] By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self- 
determination of peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as 
they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they 
wish their political, economic, social and cultural development. […] The participating States reaffirm the 
universal significance of respect for and effective exercise of equal rights and self- determination of peo-
ples for the development of friendly relations among themselves as among all States; they also recall the 
importance of the elimination of any form of violation of this principle.” 
96 H. Gros Espiell, Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Subcommission on the Prevention of Dis-
crimination and Protection of Minorities, in The Right of Self-Determination: Implementation of United 
Nations Resolutions, UN Sales Publication E.79.XIV.5 (1980) [hereinafter Gros Espiell]. 
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The right of self-determination, as it emerges from the United Nations system, exists for 
peoples under colonial and alien domination, that is to say, who are not living under the legal 
form of a State. The right to secession from an existing State Member of the United Nations 
does not exist as such in the instruments or in the practice followed by the Organization, 
since to seek to invoke it in order to disrupt the national unity and territorial integrity of a 
State would be a misapplication of the principle of self-determination contrary to the pur-
poses of the United Nations Charter.97 
This statement appears prima facie to be in conformity with one made by former UN Sec-
retary-General U Thant, who stated in 1970 that 
[a]s far as the question of secession of a particular Member State is concerned, the United 
Nations attitude is unequivocal. As an international organization, the United Nations had 
never accepted and does not accept and I do not believe it ever will accept a principle of se-
cession of a part of a Member State.98 
Still, Gros Espiell mitigates that assertion significantly, by continuing: 
[However,] if the national unity claimed and the territorial integrity invoked are merely legal 
fictions which cloak real colonial and alien domination, resulting from actual disregard of the 
principle of self-determination, the subject people or peoples are entitled to exercise, with all the 
consequences thereof their right to self-determination.99 
The problem, of course, is in finding objective proof that a people, in an independent 
state, actually do live in colonial or alien domination. This is a situation which shall be consid-
ered in greater detail in the following two chapters, particularly in light of subsequent jurispru-
dential development of the relationship between self-determination and secession, through the 
Canadian Supreme Court decision regarding Quebec’s secession. Returning momentarily to 
Gros Espiell’s study, however, it should be further mentioned that a 1978 resolution of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights stated that self-determination, in this traditional sense (i.e., ex-
ternal self-determination), is a peremptory norm of international law having the status of jus co-
gens.100 Gros Espiell himself concluded that self-determination does indeed have this status in 
his study as well.101 Other writers, such as Brownlie102 and Cassese,103 arrive at a similar conclu-
sion, while others, like Hannum, err on the side of caution and do not make an overt pro-
nouncement on self-determination’s status as a peremptory norm.104  
The rise of self-determination as a principle, and its establishment in soft law and treaty 
law as a right of peoples has earned it a certain place in the corpus of international law. Still, its 
invocation in case law has been less substantial. Although a number of decisions of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ) have made implicit or explicit reference to self-determination,105 it 
                                                                  
97 Id. at para. 90.  
98 2 United Nations Monthly Chronicle 36 (1970). By 2007, this perspective had become chiefly histori-
cal. Cf. Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status, UN Doc. 
S/2007/168, 26 March 2007, at para 5: “The time has come to resolve Kosovo’s status. Upon careful con-
sideration of Kosovo’s recent history, the realities of Kosovo today and taking into account the negotia-
tions with the parties, I have come to the conclusion that the only viable option for Kosovo is 
independence, to be supervised for an initial period by the international community.” 
99 Gros Espiell, supra note 96, at para. 90 (emphasis added). 
100 See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 62d session, supplement No. 4, UN Docu-
ment E/1978/32, at paras. 121-122 (1978). 
101 Gros Espiell, supra note 96, at para. 78. 
102 See I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (4th ed.), at 513 (1990). 
103 See Divided world, supra note 35, at 136. 
104 See Hannum, supra note 8, at 45.  
105 See Case Concerning the Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), 1960 ICJ Rep. 6 
and Case Concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), 1960 ICJ Rep. 53, im-
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was only in the 1975 ICJ Western Sahara advisory opinion106 that the Court confirmed that the 
right of peoples to self-determination was recognised in international law,107 although the Court 
further recognised the right of peoples to self-determination, in the 2004 Construction of a Wall 
advisory opinion.108 
As alluded to earlier, by 1993, the World Conference on Human Rights also made refer-
ence to self-determination in its Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, when it stressed 
the importance of the realisation of the right of peoples to self-determination, that the denial of 
self-determination was considered to be a violation of human rights (balanced by the now-
familiar territorial integrity guarantees, serving to generally suggest a presumption that external 
self-determination outside the colonial context is unacceptable).109 This restatement in the in-
tergovernmental arena came on the heels of the academic assertion—again by Franck—of an 
“emerging right to democratic governance”,110 which seems to provide a theoretical basis for the 
implementation of some type of self-determination in a contemporary context. Franck identifies 
four indicators for determining the legitimacy of rules: (a) pedigree, or the rule’s root in histori-
cal processes; (b) determinacy, or the rules ability to communicate content; (c) coherence, or 
the rule’s consistency with other rules; and (d) adherence, or the rule’s vertical connectedness to 
higher normative principles.111 
Finally, reference must be made to the 1995 East Timor case before the ICJ, which, inter 
alia, declared self-determination to have an erga omnes character emanating from the Charter 
and from state practice, and is “irreproachable [as] one of the essential principles of customary 
international law”.112 In 2004, the Court considerably reinforced this conceptualisation, in the 
Construction of a Wall advisory opinion, by noting the following: 
155. The Court would observe that the obligations violated by Israel include certain obli-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
plicitly discussing self-determination, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited Judge-
ment, 1970 ICJ Rep. 3, separate opinion of Judge Ammoun, affirming the law-making nature of, inter alia, 
GA resolution 1514, and Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Na-
mibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), advisory opinion, 
1971 ICJ Rep. 16, extending the “sacred trust” of the League of Nations mandate system and the UN Trus-
teeship System to “all territories whose peoples have not attained a full measure of self-government”. Id. 
at 31. 
106 1975 ICJ Rep. 12 [hereinafter Western Sahara case]. 
107 Cf. Musgrave, supra note 36, at 86: “The Court reiterated the position it had set out in the Namibia case 
in 1971, to the effect that self-determination was applicable to all non-self-governing territories. In this 
regard the Court linked the explicit references to self-determination contained in Articles 1 and 55 of the 
Charter to Chapter XI […]. After referring to certain key provisions of Resolutions 1514(XV), 1541(XV) 
and 2625(XXV), the Court concluded that it was necessary, in the process of self-determination, ‘to pay 
regard to the freely expressed will of the peoples’.”  
108 See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 2004 ICJ Rep. 136 [hereinafter Wall advisory opinion], particularly at para. 87 et seq. and para 
122, whereby the Court found that the route chosen by Israel in the construction of the wall served to im-
pede the Palestinian peoples’ right to self-determination. 
109 See VDPA, supra note 49, at para. 2. 
110 See T.M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AJIL 46 (1992) [hereinafter 
Franck]. 
111 See Id. at 65 et seq. 
112 Case concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 1995 ICJ Rep. 102. But consider that the Court 
went on to state that it “considers that the erga omnes character of a norm and the rule of consent to juris-
diction [of self-determination claims before the ICJ] are two different things. Whatever the nature of the 
obligations invoked, the Court could not rule on lawfulness of the conduct of a State when its judgement 
would imply an evaluation of the lawfulness of the conduct of another State which is not a party to the 
case. Where this is so, the Court cannot act, even if the right in question is erga omnes.” 
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gations erga omnes. As the Court indicated in the Barcelona Traction case, such obligations are 
by their very nature “the concern of all States” and, “In view of the importance of the rights 
involved, al1 States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection” (Barcelona Trac-
tion, Light and Power Company, Limited, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 32, para. 
33). The obligations erga omnes violated by Israel are the obligation to respect the right of 
the Palestinian people to self-determination, and certain of its obligations under international 
humanitarian law. 
156. As regards the first of these, the Court has already observed […] that in the East 
Timor case, it described as “irreproachable” the assertion that “the right of peoples to self-
determination, as it evolved from the Charter and from United Nations practice, has an erga 
omnes character” (I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 102, para. 29). The Court would also recall that un-
der the terms of General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) […], “Every State has the duty to 
promote, through joint and separate action, realization of the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, and to ren-
der assistance to the United Nations in carrying out the responsibilities entrusted to it by the 
Charter regarding the implementation of the principle…”113 
The specific case of Kosovo’s secession 
Following the settlement of overt hostilities in the Balkans, Kosovo, itself an autonomous 
province of Serbia, made a unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008. The law 
and politics of the former Yugoslavia reflects a complicated reality, the extent of which is be-
yond the scope of this study, but broadly speaking, given the facts that (a) the former Yugoslavia 
was a patchwork of different ethnicities and territorial governances; (b) international and re-
gional intergovernmental organisations have been allocated certain tasks related to the sover-
eignty of ex-Yugoslav territories following the cessation of overt hostilities in the region, 
particularly through UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), which laid a framework for 
the UN to administer Kosovo in anticipation of the eventual resolution of its final political and 
legal status; and (c) the effect of mediated negotiations between Serbia, Kosovo, the EU, Russia 
and the US was inconsequential,114  the Parliament of Kosovo pledged compliance with interna-
tional mediation efforts, and also declared that ‘Kosovo’ was to be “an independent and sover-
eign state”.115 
                                                                  
113 Wall advisory opinion, supra note 108, at paras. 155-156. 
114 See International Civilian Office, Report of the EU/US/Russia Troika on Kosovo, available on 
www.ico-kos.org, accessed May 2008. 
115 Cf. BBC News, Full text of Kosovo Declaration, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/ 
7249677.stm: 
Regretting that no mutually acceptable status outcome was possible, in spite of the good-faith en-
gagement of our leaders […]  Confirming that the recommendations of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahti-
saari provide Kosovo with a comprehensive framework for its future development and are in line with the 
highest European standards of human rights and good governance, 
 
We, the democratically elected leaders of our people, hereby declare Kosovo to be an independent and 
sovereign state. This declaration reflects the will of our people and it is in full accordance with the rec-
ommendations of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo 
Status Settlement. […] We declare Kosovo to be a democratic, secular and multiethnic republic, guided by 
the principles of non-discrimination and equal protection under the law. […] We shall adopt as soon as 
possible a Constitution that enshrines our commitment to respect the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of all our citizens, particularly as defined by the European Convention on Human Rights. […] 
We welcome the international community's continued support of our democratic development through 
international presences established in Kosovo on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 
(1999). […] With independence comes the duty of responsible membership in the international commu-
nity. We accept fully this duty and shall abide by the principles of the United Nations Charter, the Hel-
sinki Final Act, other acts of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the 
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Responses from the international community were, perhaps, able to be anticipated on 
political grounds, with the US and certain EU states quickly recognising an independent, sover-
eign Kosovo, and other states, Serbia and Russia in particular, asserting that Security Council 
resolution 1244, by reaffirming the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia”,116 was meant to imply that Kosovo was to remain territorially integrated into 
Serbia.  Despite the lack of stare decisis in international law generally, as well as the fact that de-
claratory and constitutive theories of new state recognition are of importance, but political con-
siderations do play significant roles in recognition decisions, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov 
made a statement which seemed to imply that if Kosovo were to be recognised as an independ-
ent state, the existing international order would begin to crumble in its wake. 117 FM Lavrov’s 
comments seemed to be based on his governments own concerns, saying on 12 February 2008 
that: 
We are speaking here about the subversion of all the foundations of international law, about 
the subversion of those principles which, at huge effort, and at the cost of Europe’s pain, sac-
rifice and bloodletting have been earned and laid down as a basis of its existence. We are 
speaking about a subversion of those principles to which the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe rests, those principles laid down in the fundamental documents of the 
UN.118 
Certainly the question to which FM Lavrov refers is to that of the circumstances whereby 
borders of established states (i.e., Serbia and Montenegro, holding Kosovo as integral therein) 
are to be accepted as being modified by the international community. Although it could be ar-
gued that  the changing of borders is only to be sanctioned by mutual agreement amongst nego-
tiating entities, such a position fails to consider the implications whereby the negotiation 
position between such entities is institutionally skewed. That is to say that in the face of massive 
human rights violations—which no right thinking analyst could ever deny transpired in 
Kosovo—such consensual “Czechoslovakian” dissolution may not be possible. Indeed, in the 
face of the most severe violations of individual human rights, warfare in particular, nothing in 
modern territorial statehood obliges an otherwise self-administering territory to remain part 
and parcel of the status quo when such an existence, formulated on the basis of recent practice, 
would only seem to lead to the repetition of repressive policies effectuated by the fulcrum of 
state power, to the detriment of its peripheries. Recognition of a new state will always be at the 
outset inherently political, and fused with passionate charges reflecting the impressions of those 
asserting an interest in the local situation.119  
It must also be observed that the recognition of other ex-Yugosav states as independent 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
international legal obligations and principles of international comity that mark the relations among 
states. Kosovo shall have its international borders as set forth in Annex VIII of the Ahtisaari Plan, and 
shall fully respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all our neighbours. […] We hereby under-
take the international obligations of Kosovo, including those concluded on our behalf by the United Na-
tions Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and treaty and other obligations of the 
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to which we are bound as a former constituent part, in-
cluding the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations. 
116 See UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), at preambular paragraph 1. 
117 See e.g. BBC News, Legal furore over Kosovo recognition, accessed from 
http://www.news.bc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7244538.htm. 
118 Russian FM Lavrov’s comments, as cited in BBC News reportage, Id. 
119 Cf. U.S. Recognizes Kosovo as Independent State, statement of Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, 
Washington DC (18 Feb 2008), via http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/02/100973.htm: “The un-
usual combination of factors found in the Kosovo situation—including the context of Yugoslavia’s 
breakup, and the extended period of UN administration—are not found elsewhere and therefore make 
Kosovo a special case. Kosovo cannot be seen as precedent for any other situation in the world today.”  
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entities under similarly violent circumstances (and, to be certain, Montenegro's admission as 
the 192nd UN member-state), as well as the willingness of the Security Council to consider the 
possibility of Yugoslav secessions during the 1990s, also contribute to the nebulous legal cir-
cumstance under which Kosovo declared its independence.  In critically evaluating the action 
taken by the Kosovar Assembly, it may be questioned whether the unlaterial declaration of in-
dependence decision is seen to be sufficiently representative of all aspects of the population, as 
well as whether the declaration of independence is in some way equivalent to a referendum on 
the topic. 
As of autumn 2008, these questions remain, as Serbia has refused to acknowledge the 
Kosovar declaration of independence. To this end, Serbia in August 2008 sought redress before 
the UN General Assembly to petition the ICJ for an advisory opinion on the legality of Kosovo’s 
independence.120 Other actions related to Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, in-
cluding admission to the United Nations, remain momentarily outstanding. 
Recapitulation of the development of self-determination 
Self-determination is a complicated, multifaceted topic with many different interpreta-
tions and implications. This traditional concept of self-determination has come to be known as 
‘external self-determination’, given its nature. In the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration, it is 
also mentioned that, bearing these considerations in mind, the most extreme form of external 
self-determination—that is, the creation of a new state entity—would not be acceptable in a state 
“possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction as to race, creed or colour”. This, by implication, leads to a more radical interpreta-
tion of the principle of self-determination, in that it “embraces a right to internal democracy for 
all peoples irrespective of the status of the territory […] it is a right of self-government for all 
peoples”.121 There is also an implication that there is no general right of secession per se (i.e., un-
der all circumstances) in international law, and that an excessive, unrestrained exercise of exter-
nal self-determination in a postcolonial context could threaten peace and security.122 And yet, as 
may be observed in Kosovo, the conceptual impossibility of postcolonial external self-
determination, that is to say, to ignore the possibility of remedial secession may similarly de-
grade peace and security in a particular geographic area.123 
In the main, states and peoples should seek to avoid such extreme measures by employ-
ing concepts of the so-called ‘internal self-determination’. Yet despite some elements of juridical 
reinforcement through state practice,124 it remains relatively uncontroversial to observe that in-
                                                                  
120 See Serbia Requests ICJ Opinion on Legality of Kosovo Independence, VOA News, available from 
http://voanews.com/english/2008-08-15-voa58.cfm. The General Assembly communicated this request 
to the ICJ in UN document A/63/L.2 (2008). 
121 Int’l Law, supra note 52, at 308. 
122 See e.g. B. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, UN Doc. S/24111, at para. 17 (1992) [hereinafter 
Agenda for Peace]. 
123 For discussion, see M. Kohen, Introduction, in M. Kohen (ed.) Secession: International Law Perspec-
tives (2006), at 19, noting “[…] in some cases, international law prevents secession, in other cases author-
ises it, and in yet others—the remaining situations only—it neither permits nor interdicts secession”. And 
cf. C. Tomuschat, Secession and self-determination, in Id., at 41: “Within a context where the individual 
citizen is no more regarded as a simple object, international law must allow the members of a community 
suffering structural discrimination—amounting to grave prejudice affecting their lives—to strive for se-
cession as a measure of last resort after all other methods employed to bring about change have failed.” 
124 See e.g. UN General Assembly Resolutions 45/150 (1991) and 46/137 (1991) stressing the importance 
of “periodic and genuine elections”. 
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ternal self-determination per se possesses comparatively less definition, in international legal 
terms, than does external self-determination. 
However, it certainly appears that Raič has shown considerable innovation in accentuat-
ing the juridical development of internal self-determination in the postcolonial sense, and his 
conclusions do serve to mitigate the restrictive approach found by Cassese’s interpretation of the 
Friendly Relations Declaration’s traveaux préparatoires. 
Overall, self-determination may be seen as a variable, ongoing right, dependant upon cir-
cumstances. It is balanced by the territorial integrity requirements in international law. Seces-
sion may be seen as the outer limit of possibilities of self-determination, but secession and self-
determination are not one and the same. That is to say, secession is not automatic but may be 
possible. Secession—at least on the theoretical plane—exists as a real option in selected circum-
stances. Determining the legitimacy of self-determination claims will be the challenge for the fu-
ture. A luminous guidepost is to be found in an Editorial Comment in the American Journal of 
International Law by Frederic Kirgis, who states that “one can discern degrees of self-
determination, with the legitimacy of each tied to the degree of representative government in the 
state”.125 Kirgis presents a graph demonstrating the degree to which a self-determination claim is 
destabilising and the degree to which government that is representative induces a negative pro-
pensity against legitimate self-determination. It is these types of considerations which will have 
to be considered in assessing the question of secession in contemporary international law. Be-
fore that can be done, however, due attention must be paid to the overall boundaries of states 
themselves, and for that, the discussion must return to the principle of uti possidetis. 
Self-determination held in check: The principle of uti possidetis juris 
Self-determination, as a variable positively defined with decolonisation, is neither univer-
sal nor arbitrary across a geographic region. It is simultaneously defined by the delimitation of 
the territorial frontiers of a state. If it were to be applied, it would have to be done in such a way 
as to serve its primary goal—obtaining the independence of colonised peoples—with as mini-
mal disruption of the international system as possible. In many respects, it would appear that 
this goal was achieved: with the independence of colonial peoples comes the natural increase in 
the number of sovereign states. Yet these sovereign states, for the most part, came into being 
within the colonial boundaries prescribed by Europeans. The self-determination of colonised 
peoples was allowed to take place, based on the transference of the legal principle of uti pos-
sidetis juris—the ‘as you possess, so may you possess’ principle—from a Roman law precept, 
based on individual property rights to a contemporary international legal principle, based, in 
turn, on the aggregated transfer of title from a colonising power to its subjects.  
To that end, then, the international system was indeed minimally disrupted: sovereignty 
over colonised lands was transferred to its subjects quite simply, as the stopgap principle of uti 
possidetis transferred internal administrative frontiers to external borders at the point of a ‘critical 
date’. Once accepted as a political reality by colonising powers, decolonisation was a relatively 
simple legal process. In the name of promoting stability, uti possidetis aimed at by preventing 
land grabs by those emerging from years of colonial rule as a sort of countervailing balance over 
local realities. This furthermore had the practical effect of ensuring self-determination was to be 
effectuated in European terms, inasmuch as self-determination was to be effectuated under the 
rubric of the sovereign state. Thus the juridical slurry which purports to define the sub-state 
                                                                  
125 F.L. Kirgis, Editorial Comment: The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era, 88 AJIL 
304 (1994) [hereinafter Kirgis]. 
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components formed by a collective right to self-determination as part of modern territorial 
statehood—namely, that which has been deferred to the presumptive dominance of the princi-
ple of territorial integrity—is in fact bolstered to some degree as a result of the definitional clarity 
provided to a specific situation as a result of its territorial circumstances. A ‘people’ actively 
demonstrating through the course of its collective manifestations a capacity for self-
administration across a specific geographic area may have the greatest claim for internal self-
determination in the postcolonial era. What is most significant is that the territorial form exam-
ined between that of a ‘state’ and of a smaller geographic group could easily have been affected 
or influenced by the location of a municipal boundary or international border as a result of his-
torical colonial activity. This also serves to imply a relevance to the effectiveness of such geo-
graphic regions within such states—this presumption, of course, being necessary for any 
semblance of real ‘territorial integrity’ to have credibility. 
The widespread employment of uti possidetis juris formed a tangible counterbalance to 
the self-determination principle as a general matter. That this also reinforced the sensibilities of 
the dominant positivist legal system also does not go overlooked. By maintaining that the integ-
rity of the territorial unit was not to be seriously questioned, uti possidetis thereby reinforced the 
notion that all states were not to interfere in the sovereign domains of other states. That is to say, 
the actions of European colonialists became a true fait accompli, and indeed while such a reality 
was more of a pragmatic response reflective of the fast-changing political realities of the time 
than of a specific logical plan to address the societal changes inflicted upon local populations by 
colonialist actions. Perhaps then it comes as little surprise that it is impossible to deny that the 
latter half of the twentieth century has witnessed swathes of Sub-Saharan Africa being plunged 
into previously unfathomable levels of chaos, as will be considered later in this study.  
However, before progressing to that level of analysis, uti possidetis juris will have to be 
considered in greater depth. The principle can be seen in two conceptual frameworks: that 
which concerns territory and the avoidance of terra nullius, and that which concerns the devel-
opment of the legal principle through its invocation in juridical forums. 
Practical assessment: The legal doctrine restated 
The colonial uti possidetis has its origins in Roman law, as found in the declaration by a 
praetor between two contending parties that “uti eas oedes de quibus agitur, nec vi, nec clam, nec 
precario, alter ab altero possidetis, quominus ita possideatis vim fieri veto”, which means roughly: 
“as you possess the [properties] referred to, without having obtained possession thereof, one 
from the other, by force, or clandestinely, or by sufferance, I forbid that you be hindered in con-
tinuing so possessed”. This Roman law provision is more commonly known as “uti possidetis, ita 
possideatis”, or “as you possess, so may you possess”.126 
As Ratner comments, uti possidetis, in its Roman origins, avoided taking up “the final dis-
position of the property; instead, it shifted the burden of proof during the proceedings to the 
party not holding the land. This represented an advantage for the possessor, who became the 
defendant in the case, even if he had wrongly removed the plaintiff from the land”.127 
It is thus clear that uti possidetis presumes from the outset the preservation of the posses-
sory status—the maintenance of the status quo, even if there is a measure of injustice therein. As 
                                                                  
126 See J.B. Moore, Costa Rica-Panama Arbitration: Memorandum on Uti Possidetis (1913), at 5-8. 
127 S.R. Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States, 90 AJIL 590, 593 
(1996) [hereinafter Ratner]. 
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Malcolm Shaw writes, “it is not unusual for legal concepts over time to alter their meaning or 
emphasis as new circumstances arise,128 and this has undoubtedly happened with regard to the 
doctrine of uti possidetis”.129 The current uti possidetis, indeed, has little in common with its Ro-
man law origins, yet saw itself generally transferred—and particularly vis-à-vis the preservation 
of the status quo of possession—to the Latin American experience, first in South America in 
1810, and in Central America in 1821. This was generally accepted, probably as much to pre-
clude the possibility of further European colonisation on the terra nullius basis, as the willing-
ness to adapt an ancient private law concerning individuals to a (then-)modern law concerning 
the emergence of new states in international law. Two practical effects of the redevelopment of 
this principle were as follows: 
Despite [the] general acceptance of the principle, the precise contours and effects of uti pos-
sidetis remained unclear. First, Latin states accepted the possibility that their final border 
might differ from the uti possidetis line, though they did not plan major revisions of the Span-
ish administrative borders. Second, and more important, the acceptance of uti possidetis in 
principle could not rectify confusions stemming from shifting territorial arrangements under 
the Crown, the absence of clearly demarcated boundaries due to ignorance of the local ge-
ography, or political tensions among the new Latin states. These factors led to warfare among 
them, as well as peaceful resolutions through boundary treaties or agreements to arbitrate.130 
So uti possidetis, while indeed a preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution measure, 
was not a panacea.131 The preference for continuity in the establishment of boundaries of states 
was confirmed by the arbitral decision of the Swiss Federal Council of 1922, which stated: 
Lorsque les Colonies espagnoles de l’Amérique centrale et méridionale se proclamèrent independents, 
dans une seconde moitié du dix-neuvième siècle, elles adoptèrent un principle de droit constitutionel 
et international auquel elles donnèrent le nom d’uti possidetis juris de 1810, à l’effet de constater 
que les limites des Républiques nouvellement constituées seraient les frontières des provinces espag-
noles auxquelles elles se substituaient.132 
In short, provided a sufficiently strong territorial claim could be made by a colonising en-
tity particularly through the demonstration of effective control on a territory, international law 
will broadly seek to reinforce the absence of terra nullius. In states emerging from colonialism, a 
colonising entity has widely been seen by the ICJ to be required to manifest its sovereign author-
ity on a colonial territory, so as to validate territorial title directly derived from uti possidetis. This 
was primarily employed to prevent states from laying claim to territory through occupation in 
the immediate postcolonial era. Although in the face of competing claims for territorial sover-
eignty between two states, the Court found that, despite the territorially impeded state’s “non-
assertion of its rights and by acquiescence in acts of sovereignty alleged to have been exercised” 
                                                                  
128 Cf. the evolution of self-determination in international law, for example. 
129 M.N. Shaw, Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries, 3 EJIL 478, 492 (1997) [hereinafter Shaw, Peoples]. 
130 Ratner, supra note 127, at 594. (emphasis added) 
131 It was, however, a logical first step to statehood. Cf. C.C. Hyde, International Law, Chiefly as Inter-
preted by the United States (2d. ed.) 499 (1947): “When the common sovereign power was withdrawn, it 
became indispensably necessary to agree on a principle of demarcation, since there was a universal desire 
to avoid resort to force, and the principle adopted was a colonial uti possidetis; that is, the principle in-
volving the preservation of the demarcations under the colonial regimes corresponding to each of the co-
lonial entities that was constituted as a State.” 
132 M.G. Kohen, Possession contestée et souveraineté territoriale 427 (1997) [hereinafter Kohen, Posses-
sion], quoting I R.S.A. 228 (1922). Author’s translation: “When the Spanish Colonies of Central and South 
America and proclaimed their independence in the second half of the nineteenth century, they adopted a 
principle of constitutional and international law to which they gave the name of uti possidetis juris in 
1810, for the purpose of noting that the limits of the newly formed Republics would be formed from the 
borders of the Spanish provinces to which they were substituted.” 
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by another state, such claims for territorial sovereignty were nonetheless insufficient to necessi-
tate territorial transfer away from the first state.133 This is significant because it demonstates how 
uti possidetis is not a monolith, but rather a specialised rule of law serving as a stopgap measure 
for a particular purpose. 
With the principle that the boundary of one territory is simply the end of that territory and 
the beginning of another, firmly established through the Latin American experience, the world 
witnessed the so-called African “habillement”134 of the principle in the next major decolonisa-
tion process: Africa in the mid-to-late 1900s. From the outset of the process, African and world 
leaders chose to maintain the precedent set in the Latin American experience. This decision was 
taken in spite of the wretched societal disruptions perpetrated by European imperialism against 
its southern neighbours, a theft of trade, land, greed, raw materials, labour and cultures. The 
achievement of independence for Africans was a dubious one at best: “the European powers 
who snatched 85 percent of Africa during the course of 20 years abandoned 80 percent of it in 
the 25 years from 1955 to 1980”.135 Many ethnic groups in West Africa, in particular, suffered the 
profound injustice of having their populations separated and cultures subsequently altered by 
direct colonial effect (viz. Gambia and Senegal, Ghana, Togo and Benin) or had differing popu-
lations grouped in such an arbitrary and artificial manner, so as to promulgate conflict from the 
outset of the nascent state (viz. Nigeria and Sudan). 
Still, one of the first collective African decisions in the post-colonisation period seemed to 
recognise that the regrouping of territorial boundaries on ‘proper’ ethnic or other lines would 
invariably lead to conflict greater than the maintenance of the status quo. The decision was taken 
to accept the “straight lines traced on the drawing board with little relevance to the physical cir-
cumstances on the ground”,136 as permanent frontiers. This serves to show that uti possidetis in 
the African context moves a step further from its Latin American origins. In Latin America, 
there was but one sole colonial power, Spain, to the exclusion of Brazil (Portugal).137 In Africa, 
there were seven colonial powers and but two independent states at arguably the height of over-
all colonialism on the continent in 1913; indeed, the picture seemed similarly dominated by 
European imperialism and the League of Nations mandate system until the late 1950s and early 
                                                                  
133 See Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (Belgium v. Netherlands), 1959 ICJ Rep. 209, 227. 
134 Id. at 428. 
135 D. Smith, The State of War and Peace Atlas, 107 (1997). 
136 See Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), 1994 ICJ Rep. 6. 
137 But Brazil accepted uti possidetis juris in principle and uti possidetis de facto nationally, so, in reality, it 
seems this distinction is a bit artificial. While this discussion will generally refer to the Latin term “uti 
possidetis” as all-encompassing in the interest of clarity, it should be mentioned that there exists a distinc-
tion between uti possidetis juris and uti possidetis de facto. As Marcelo Kohen points out, typically when 
parties refer to uti possidetis they are referring to the uti possidetis juris, the terminology of which has its 
explicit distinction as a legal precept in the arbitration between Guatemala and Honduras (1932), in con-
trast with the uti possidetis de facto which was Brazilian ‘interpretation’ of the principle. Kohen refers to a 
former Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs who in 1904 stated that Brazil considered the doctrine of uti 
possidetis juris to be applicable to the other Hispanic decolonising states, while uti possidetis de facto ap-
plied to Brazil. Brazil, however, also did not reject uti possidetis juris as such, but as the original treaties 
which delineated the Latin American frontiers did not involve Brazil, the principle of uti possidetis juris 
did not have direct application (and therefore the de facto indication). It should be mentioned that uti pos-
sidetis de facto has been invoked as indicative of practice in international tribunals, as well. It seems that 
invocations of this sort typically come when it is difficult or impossible to accurately determine the pre-
cise location of former colonial administrative borders, due to inadequate cartography or other develop-
ments. For further discussion, see M.G. Kohen, L’uti possidetis révisité : L’arrêt du 11 septembre 1992 
dans l’affaire El Salvador/Honduras, 4 Revue Générale de Droit Internationale Public, at 950-954 (1993) 
[hereinafter Kohen, L’uti possidetis révisité]. 
Nicholas Hansen 
Chapter Two: ‘Self-determination of peoples’ and the law of decolonisation 
 
Page 110 
1960s. Thirteen countries138 achieved their independence only through war. And yet, the legiti-
macy of the colonial borders was allowed to stand, particularly on the basis of colonial admini-
stration following an initial transfer of territory through e.g. territorial cession. 
The reasons for this are in large measure due to the sense of urgency associated with the 
departure of the colonisers. The basis for this is to be found in provisions of the 1514 and 1541 
resolutions of the General Assembly. By the time of the adoption of the Friendly Relations Dec-
laration in 1970, the decolonisation process was well on its way. Two important events ce-
mented the ‘habillement’ of uti possidetis in Africa: the establishment of the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU) in 1963, and the juridical confirmation of the principle by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice some twenty years later. 
The Cairo Declaration of the OAU was taken at the highest political level by OAU Mem-
ber-States, which committed themselves “to respect the frontiers existing on their achievement 
of independence”.139 The Declaration “stated that colonial frontiers existing at the moment of 
decolonisation constituted a tangible reality, which all member States pledged themselves to re-
spect”,140 but this affirmation should not be seen in absolutist terms.141 While this reality came 
much to the chagrin of Pan-Africanists and other dissenters,142 it seems clear that the pragmatic 
decision to accept the imposition of uti possidetis was a wise one, as several territorial conflicts 
along ethnic lines were already brewing. 
The appellation of uti possidetis as a rule of general scope was directed squarely at Africa; 
in Asia, the principle was similarly accepted, yet largely adapted from the African context. In the 
end, however, uti possidetis was seen as logically valid worldwide.143 This brings the discussion 
to the next event of juridical importance, the 1986 Frontier Dispute case. The Court, having be-
fore it a dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali, concluded in dictum that 
[t]he essence of the principle lies in its primary aim of securing respect for the territorial 
boundaries at the moment when independence is achieved. Such territorial boundaries may 
be no more than delimitations between different administrative divisions or colonies all sub-
ject to the same sovereign. In that case, the application of the principle of uti possidetis re-
sulted in administrative boundaries being transformed into international frontiers in the full 
sense of the term.144 
                                                                  
138 Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Eritrea, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Guinea-Bisseau, Kenya, Bu-
rundi, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique  
139 See OAU Resolution 16(1), OAU Doc. AHG/Res.16(1) (1964), as quoted in M. Shaw, Title to Territory 
in Africa: International Legal Issues 185-187 (1986). 
140 M.N. Shaw, The Heritage of States: The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris Today, 67 BYIL 103 (1996) 
[hereinafter Shaw, Heritage]. 
141 Brownlie, for example, believes that the resolution crystallised a generally-accepted view which led to 
a rule of regional customary international law, the implication being that the principle would be of less 
juridical weight in Africa than in Latin America. See I. Brownlie, African Boundaries – A Legal and Dip-
lomatic Encyclopaedia 11 (1979). 
142 See Ratner, supra note 127, at 595 and Kohen, Possession, supra note 132, at 429. 
143 Cf. Brownlie, General Course on Public International Law, 225 Rec. des Cours 70 (1995) [hereinafter 
Brownlie, Hague Academy Course]: “The principle of stability of boundaries was affirmed in the Temple 
case (Merits) and the essence of uti possidetis was recognized in the Award of the Tribunal in the Rann of 
Kutch Arbitration. Moreover, the Chamber in the case concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina 
Faso/Republic of Mali) stated that uti possidetis is ‘a principle of general kind which is logically connected 
with this form of decolonisation wherever it occurs’.” 
144 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali), 1986 ICJ Rep. 554, 589 [hereinafter Frontier Dis-
pute]. 
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In terms of practical effect, the Court stated that uti possidetis “freezes the territorial title; it 
stops the clock but does not put back the hands”.145 In terms of legal significance, the Court’s de-
cision greatly served to increase the opinio juris in favour of uti possidetis being employed as a 
customary norm; indeed, the Court itself pronounced that uti possidetis is a “general principle” 
as applies to decolonisation.146 The Court also found that the Cairo Declaration “deliberately 
defined and stressed the principle of uti possidetis juris [so the principle] must be seen not as a 
mere practice contributing to the gradual emergence of a principle of customary international 
law, limited in its impact to the African continent as it had previously been to Spanish America, 
but as the application in Africa of a rule of general scope”.147 The Court found this to be declara-
tory of existing principle rather than constitutive. Furthermore, although the parties to the case 
did not agree to the inclusion of the principle of ex aequo et bono (‘according to what is equitable 
and good’), the Court was, at times, forced to develop interpretative methods based on evidence 
of colonial activity as may correspond to the law in force. In practice, this implied the possibility 
of equitably dividing claims for territory between contesting parties in the event that insufficient 
territorial claim to title and subsequent manifestation of colonial effectivités were not both in evi-
dence. The Court reasoned that this principle of equity infra legem would be a sufficient solution 
to a circumstance whereby colonial effectivités were manifested without clear claim to territorial 
title. 148 
Further juridical insight into the uti possidetis principle is to be found in the 1992 El Salva-
dor/Honduras case before the ICJ, which builds upon its previous pronouncements in applying 
uti possidetis juris not only to situations of land boundaries, but also to the islands and waters of 
the Gulf of Fonseca.149 In terms of juridical significance, the Court first declared that its defini-
tion of uti possidetis from the Burkina Faso/Mali case constituted an authoritative statement and 
indicated that “uti possidetis juris is essentially a retrospective principle, investing as international 
boundaries administrative limits intended originally for quite other purposes”.150 The Court also 
asserted that “there can be no doubt about the importance of the uti possidetis juris principle as 
one which has, in general, resulted in certain and stable frontiers throughout most of Central 
and South America”.151 Such an acknowledgement may be seen as a strong endorsement of the 
usefulness of the principle, particularly considering the Court’s willingness to employ it in situa-
tions beyond land boundaries. However, it must simultaneously be recognised that uti possidetis 
found its place in law only as a response to situations of colonial activity.152As such, as the Court 
held, in dictum, that “a key aspect of the principle [of uti possidetis juris] is the denial of the pos-
sibility of terra nullius”,153 it demonstrated clearly how the principle is grounded in the necessity 
of evidence of demonstrable governmental activities, where original title to territory has been in 
some way obtained. 
In addition, it must also be observed how the exercise of postcolonial effective control by 
a state can be indicative of legitimate claims for territorial administration and sovereignty, as de-
                                                                  
145 Id. at 568. 
146 Id. at 565. 
147 Id. at 565-566. 
148 Id. at 567-68. 
149 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras: Nicaragua intervening) case, 
1992 ICJ Rep. 386 [hereinafter El Salvador/Honduras]. 
150 Id. at 388. 
151 Id. at 386. 
152 Cf. Id. at 558-559: “It should be recalled that when the principle of the uti possidetis juris is involved, 
the jus referred to is not international law but the constitutional or administrative law of the pre-
independence sovereign, in this case Spanish colonial law […].” 
153 Id. at 387. 
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cided by the Court. For example, as the Court was asked to delimit a disputed boundary that was 
inconsequentially referenced in the 1980 General Treaty of Peace between El Salvador and 
Honduras,154 it relied heavily upon postcolonial effectivités in circumstances whereby internal 
administrative frontiers were either undefined or unintelligible, and territorial title, while influ-
enced by uti possidetis, was also most readily validated, in circumstances whereby clear manifes-
tations of territorial sovereignty, despite such definitional ambiguities, was indeed a sufficient 
form of legal reasoning for the Court to award disputed territory to a claimant state.155 This is sig-
nificant for the broader purposes of this study, because it signifies on a conceptual level how the 
manifestation of effectivités is of fundamental juridical importance as a means to allocating dis-
puted territory between claimant states. From a perspective of transference, it may be observed 
how there exists a certain juridical value in the manifestation of effectivités in a territory per se 
without specific regard to original title to territory, particularly when, as observed in the Sover-
eignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v. Malaysia) case, such effectivités are of 
a particularly “legislative or regulatory character”.156 This may also be the case when particular 
claims for autonomy or secession are being made, by collective groupings, on the basis of fac-
tual circumstances—a notion which will be further developed in the course of this study. 
More recently, in one of the most complicated cases to pass before the ICJ,157 the Court al-
located sovereignty to the Bakasi Peninsula and a territorial region bordering Lake Chad to 
Cameroon from Nigeria, as it fixed certain boundaries on the basis of colonial treaties of ces-
sion. The Court readily upheld the legal validity of such treaties, including the 1929-1930 Thom-
son-Marchand Declaration (to which the UK and France had actively agreed),158 particularly as 
colonial effectivités were readily manifested at this time.159 Additionally, in the Territorial and 
Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Hon-
duras) judgement,160 in delimiting a maritime boundary, the Court found unanimously that 
Honduras held sovereignty over four disputed islands. In doing so, the Court clearly reaffirmed 
that evidence of original title was required for the invocation of uti possidetis;161 however, even in 
circumstances where evidence of original title can be shown,162 colonial effectivités must also be 
clearly manifested in order to fully demonstrate sovereignty.163 As a result of the inability for the 
                                                                  
154 See Id. at 357. 
155 See Id. at 565. 
156 See Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v. Malaysia), 2002 ICJ Rep. 625, 683. 
157 See Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria, Equatorial 
Guinea Intervening), 2002 ICJ Rep. 303 [hereinafter Cameroon/Nigeria]. 
158 See Id. at para. 34 et seq. 
159 See also discussion infra chapter five, at part C. 
160 See Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicara-
gua v. Honduras) [hereinafter Nicaragua/Honduras], available from http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/ 
120/14075.pdf, accessed 8 October 2007. 
161 Cf. Id. at para 158: “The Court observes that the mere invocation of the principle of uti possidetis juris 
does not of itself provide a clear answer to sovereignty over the disputed islands. […] The Court recalls 
that uti possidetis juris presupposes the existence of a delimitation of territory between the colonial prov-
inces concerned having been effected by the central colonial authorities. Thus in order to apply the princi-
ple of uti possidetis juris to the islands in dispute it must be shown that the Spanish Crown had allocated 
them to one or the other of its colonial provinces.” 
162 In this context, see Gámez-Bonilla Treaty of 7 October 1894, affirmed by Award of the King of Spain of 
1906. See also Arbitral Award of the King of Spain (Nicaragua v. Honduras), 1960 ICJ Rep. 205. 
163 Cf. Nicaragua/Honduras, supra note 160, at para 165: “[The] test of ‘colonial effectivités’ has been de-
fined as ‘the conduct of the administrative authorities as proof of the effective exercise of territorial juris-
diction in the region during the colonial period’,” referring to Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of 
Mali), Judgment, 1986 ICJ Rep. 586, para. 63, and Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger), Judgment, 2005 ICJ 
Rep. 120, para. 47. 
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Court to render judgement in this case on the basis of uti possidetis juris without subsequent ter-
ritorial effectivités evidenced by colonial administration,164 the Court looked for evidence of 
post-colonial effectivités in the disputed territories to decide the case. This approach may be seen 
as differing from that employed in deciding the Nigeria/Cameroon case a few years earlier, 
whereby the Court, citing the Fisheries Case (UK v. Norway),165 accepted that the notion of ‘his-
torical consolidation’ was of conceptual acceptance.166 ‘Historical consolidation’, as a particular 
notion, essentially comprises the amalgam of demonstrated effectivités not particularly attributed 
to a colonial (i.e., ‘civilised’) or postcolonial entity. However, in this case, the Court rejected its 
application due to the controversiality of the precept,167 and, indeed, the case itself is more read-
ily known for its tendency to uphold original title as a primary means of determining disputed 
sovereignty. Although the concept of ‘historical consolidation’ will be further considered in de-
tail at the conclusion of this study,168 the Cameroon/Nigeria case was illuminating, in that de-
monstrative territorial transfer from colonised to colonising entities was readily established as 
the principal means of determining statehood in the postcolonial state. In particular, as was 
noted: 
Nothing in the Court's case law suggests that historical consolidation allows land occupation 
to set aside an established conventional territorial title. Regarding the legal relationship be-
tween effectivités and titles, the Court recalled its earlier findings that preference should be 
given to the holder of the title over another state administering a disputed territory. Al-
though policing, the administration of justice, and the organization of health and education fa-
cilities could typically be considered as actes à titre de souverain, or manifestations of 
sovereignty, the pertinent legal test was whether Cameroon had acquiesced in the passing of 
its preexisting title from itself to Nigeria. In the Court's view, the evidence showed that 
Cameroon had not so acquiesced: in addition to its modest administrative activity (including 
tax collection) and exercise of control, Cameroon had firmly protested Nigeria's diplomatic 
note of April 14,1994, in which Nigeria first claimed sovereignty over Darak.169  
Self-determination and uti possidetis: Conflict at the junction of ‘freedom’ and ‘stability’? 
Uti possidetis certainly has had its place confirmed in law. But the question remains as to 
how it interacts with self-determination, which the Court, itself, noted could be a priori in con-
flict with uti possidetis.170 Self-determination had evolved to be a ‘right of peoples’ while uti pos-
sidetis has constituted a general principle invoked to preserve the balancing norm identified by 
Shaw. The Court, in the Frontier Dispute case, took a pragmatic approach in comparing the two 
legal principles, in that the virtue of uti possidetis, as a balancing norm, allowed it to prevail over 
self-determination in the event of conflict between the two principles. The Court stated that “this 
                                                                  
164 Cf. Id. at para 167: “[…] the Court concludes that the principle of uti possidetis affords inadequate assis-
tance in determining sovereignty over these islands because nothing clearly indicates whether the islands 
were attributed to the colonial provinces of Nicaragua or of Honduras prior to or upon independence. 
Neither can such attribution be discerned in the King of Spain’s Arbitral Award of 1906. Equally, the 
Court has been presented with no evidence as to colonial effectivités in respect of these islands. Thus it has 
not been established that either Honduras or Nicaragua had title to these islands by virtue of uti pos-
sidetis.” 
165 See 1951 ICJ Rep. 116. 
166 Cf. Id. at 130. Cf. Id. at 137, whereby the Court acknowledged particular maritime delimitations which 
were broadly uncontroversial. To this end, it specified the existence of “a well-defined and uniform sys-
tem […] which would reap the benefit of general toleration, the basis of an historical consolidation which 
would make it enforceable as against all States”. 
167 See Cameroon/Nigeria, supra note 157, at para. 65. 
168 See Id. at § 7.3. See also discussion infra chapter five, at part C. 
169 P.H.F. Bekker, International Decisions: Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria 
(Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening), 97 AJIL 389 (2003). 
170 Frontier Dispute, supra note 144, at 554. 
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essential requirement of stability in order to survive, to develop and gradually to consolidate 
their independence in all fields [led Africa] judiciously to consent to the respecting of colonial 
borders, and to take account of it in the interpretation of the principle of self-determination of 
peoples”.171 The final practical result was that the ‘incorrect’ territorial boundaries that were to 
be found in Africa were ex post facto seen as valid, and allowed to possess the authority of legiti-
macy in conformity with international law.172 
What remains, however, is the reality that uti possidetis concerns itself primarily with the 
drawing of lines. The practical effects are huge, and have direct effect on the ongoing territorial 
integrity of the new state. “A simple line determines which state, subject to international law, can 
prescribe and apply laws and policies relating to the full range of attributes of persons and prop-
erty, whether citizenship, taxation or educational opportunities”, as Ratner writes. Jurisdic-
tional separation, immigration standards, customs duties, export and import quotas and 
controls on circulation of people, goods and intangibles are other considerations.173 Bearing 
this in mind, as well as the ICJ’s perspective in the Burkina Faso/Mali case, that uti possidetis 
concerns itself primarily with securing respect for borders at the moment of independence, in 
considering the connection between uti possidetis and other rules concerning territorial integ-
rity, one must consider, as Kohen proposes, “the critical date”174 in which the internal adminis-
trative frontiers will be held as fixed, in order to evolve into international frontiers. Ratner 
comments: “If, as the World Court said in the Frontier Dispute case, uti possidetis turns on a ‘pho-
tograph of the territorial situation,’ then those analyzing the image and ‘plugging it into’ the uti 
possidetis equation must know two core things—what the photograph shows and when it was 
taken”.175 
Kohen’s perspective on the ‘critical date’, as it applies to the two ICJ cases raised in this 
discussion is worth examination. He writes: 
Pour l’arrêt de 1986 [Burkina Faso/Mali], “l’uti possidetis gèle le titre territorial”, il consiste à 
établir le “legs colonial, c’est-à-dire de ‘l’instante territorial’ à la date critique”. En 1992 [El Salva-
dor/Honduras], la Chambre parle de la date critique, se réfère partout à 1821 comme l’année 
pour la determination de l’uti possidetis juris et argumente également sur la possibilité de plusieurs 
dates critiques dans un seul et même différend.176 
                                                                  
171 Id. at 567. 
172 Cf. Shaw, Peoples, supra note 129, at 495: “It is important to recognize uti possidetis for what it is, and 
not to overemphasize it. It is a transitional mechanism and process which concerns the transmission of 
sovereignty from a previous sovereign authority to the new state. It is, therefore, part of the larger princi-
ple relating to the stability of territorial relationships. It provides the territorial delineation for the proc-
ess of establishment of a new state by positing, absent special factors, the continuation of the pre-existing 
line, whatever provenance that line previously claimed. It is limited both temporally and conceptually to 
this situation. Once the new state is established, the principle of uti possidetis will give way to the princi-
ple of territorial integrity, which provides for the international protection of the new state so created. 
While it ‘freezes’ the territorial situation during the movement to independence, uti possidetis does not 
prescribe a territorial boundary which can never be changed. It is not intangible in this sense.” 
173 Ratner, supra note 127, at 602. 
174 Kohen, L’uti possidetis révisité, supra note 137, at 961. 
175 Ratner, supra note 127, at 607. 
176 Kohen, L’uti possidetis révisité, supra note 137, at 961. Author’s translation: “For the judgment in 1986 
[between Burkina Faso and Mali], ‘uti posstidetis sets the territorial title’ consisting of the establishment of 
the ‘colonial legacy, that is, the exact moment of the “critical date”.’ In 1992, the Chamber spoke of the 
critical date, referring broadly to 1821 as the year for the determination of the uti possidetis juris and also 
argues for the possibility of several critical dates under similar circumstances.” 
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This perspective is important to bear in mind, as the future state will be ‘built’ from this 
moment.177 Further, GA resolution 1514 (XV), at paragraph 6, prohibits the unilateral secession 
of a component part of a territorial entity, through its insistence of the overall territorial integrity 
of the colonial unit. Here a great truth of uti possidetis is revealed, particularly as the classical 
doctrine of uti possidetis juris is considered primarily in a context of decolonisation: as self-
determination is “generally defined in terms of territorial criteria”,178 and this territorial criteria is 
presumed to be a territorially whole unit to be accepted in aggregate, it can be said that uti possidetis is 
a legal precept which guides the preservation of the territorial integrity of an ‘self-determining’ 
entity through the entire process.179 That is to say that the colonial entity sees its sovereignty shift 
from being held by the overseas power, to being held by the new state. Uti possidetis further pro-
vides guidance, with particular effect, from the point of determination of the ‘critical date’ from 
which the ‘photograph of the territorial situation’ is taken (i.e., the final determination of what 
the boundaries of the new sovereign entity will be over which it will preserve its sovereignty and 
territorial integrity). This is to imply, furthermore, that uti possidetis and territorial integrity are 
mutually reinforcing. Therefore, uti possidetis unleashes its juridical power at the time of inde-
pendence, in defining boundaries and reaffirming that the territorial integrity of the self-
determining entity. 
The effectiveness of the determination of the uti possidetis line thus revolves around the 
critical date determination—if this can be effectively determined at all, that is.180 One is thus 
minded to recall Shaw’s earlier suggestion to avoid overemphasis of uti possidetis, thus implying 
that consent, international recognition, acquiescence, decisions by international courts or the 
interests of peace and security can subsequently modify the uti possidetis line.181 
Cassese’s assessment of uti possidetis covers the most salient parts of this discussion. He 
writes: 
It is plain that [uti possidetis], in that it is designed to “freeze the territorial title” and to “stop 
the clock” at the time of a colonial country becoming independent or at the same time of the 
secession of a region from a unitary State (or a member State from a federated State), is in 
sharp contrast with that of self-determination. This is because the population living on or 
around the borders of the newly independent State may wish to choose a different sovereign 
or even opt for independent status or some sort of autonomy. We are here confronted with 
an area in which historical and political considerations were regarded by States as of such 
paramount importance as to make it necessary to set aside the right of peoples to self-
                                                                  
177 This concept seems rather generally accepted in international law. Viz. the transition process from na-
tional European currencies to the Euro as part of the European Monetary Union process—at the ‘critical 
date’ of a country joining Euroland, its national currency is permanently ‘fixed’ at a rate of exchange vis-à-
vis the Euro in preparation for its eventual incorporation into the supranational currency. 
178 Musgrave, supra note 36, at 181. 
179 Given that the lines between uti possidetis juris and uti possidetis de facto have become blurred and that 
the overall notion of uti possidetis has been so repeatedly confirmed in international law, uti possidetis 
would be generally recognised and assumed as the proper prima facie assumption for determination of 
new borders. 
180 Cf. Shaw, Heritage, supra note 140, at 130: “The critical date as a legal concept posits that there is a cer-
tain moment at which the rights of the parties crystallize, so that acts after that date cannot alter the legal 
position. It is a moment which is more decisive than any other for the purpose off the formulation of the 
rights of the parties in question. In some cases, there is self-evidently a “critical date” in this sense […] in 
many cases [however] there will be no such self-evident “critical date”, and one should be wary of search-
ing for one in all cases and in all situations.” 
181 See Id. at 141-150.  
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determination. In this area, the principle of self-determination, instead of influencing the con-
tent of international legal rules, has been “trumped” by other, overriding requirements.182 
Cassese goes further to state that self-determination also enters into the equation in the 
event of post-colonial or secessionist modification of borders by legal means, such that the local 
populations should have recourse to plebiscite or referendum to determine the free will of those 
affected.183 Particularly after the East Timor independence process (and, separately, those in 
Bosnia and Kosovo), it seems difficult to imagine how any future such actions would be legiti-
mised without a referendum, or other sort of grass-roots polling instrument to demonstrate ef-
fective will on the part of a nascent self-governing political community.184 
Uti possidetis and self-determination, in their most extreme forms, can be seen as opposite 
poles along a sliding scale of the state-creation paradigm. This is not, however, to say that uti 
possidetis is a completely separate notion from self-determination, as it seems perfectly clear to 
imagine natural overlaps between the two principles (that is to say that the uti possidetis ‘photo-
graph’ may conceivably correspond perfectly to the self-determination desires of the peoples on 
the ground). Conflict between the principles, then, can be seen to exist when there is no such 
common ground; that is to say, when the ‘powers that be’ in the international community 
(which will largely determine the specifics of uti possidetis to be employed in the new state crea-
tion) determine the territorial boundaries, without due regard for the genuine wishes for the 
majority of the population affected, or, indeed, when the resulting new state entity would be ef-
fectively precluded from exercising its own territorial integrity due to the nature of the composi-
tion of the state.185 Clearly, then, the line between law and politics becomes greatly blurred, as 
the political interests of states may subjugate a pure legal perspective.186  
Interpreting the role played by uti possidetis in maintaining territorial integrity and avoiding 
terra nullius 
Territory is the most tangible aspect of statehood; it is what one sovereign state possesses 
to the exclusion of another sovereign state. It is also one of the fundamental criteria for deter-
                                                                  
182 Cassese, supra note 3, at 192-193. 
183 Id. at 193. 
184 This is particularly significant in view of the growing importance of the democratic governance con-
cept in international affairs generally. Cf. B. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law 250 
(1999): “For a political community to be self-governing, it must, at minimum, be governed in the name of 
the whole.”  
185 Here the discussion returns to the definition of a state from the Montevideo Convention. Therein lies 
the requirement for the “defined territory” and “permanent population” to be under the control of its own 
government. Yet some states—termed ‘failed states’ by scholars and practitioners—continue to exist (ei-
ther de facto or de jure) in spite of their ‘failed’ status. These are states for which their government does 
not exercise effective control (e.g. the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo, or perhaps, as is 
the case of Somalia, there is no government at all). See e.g. G.P.H. Kreijen, Somalia and Withdrawal of 
Recognition, in Kreijen (ed.), State, Sovereignty and International Governance 45 (2002). The operative 
point that remains is that, in new state creation, the insistence of the employment of the uti possidetis stan-
dard, in situations which would tend to preclude the effective control of the territory of the state by the 
government, and therefore preclude the territorial integrity of the state, would be an impediment to the 
oft-mentioned presumption in favour of the continuity of the state.  
186 Certainly, however, diplomatic practitioners and international lawyers will have differing opinions 
(even if they are not expressed per se) as to the desirability of using political processes versus juridical 
doctrine, in taking decisions of recognition of new states. 
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mining statehood, and the sovereignty associated with the state, in international law.187 Further, 
it has been indicated that the ‘question of statehood’ arises particularly in the following situa-
tions: 
(a) Break-up of an existing state into a number of states; (b) secession or attempted seces-
sion by part of a territory of an existing state; (c) cases in which foreign control is exercised 
over the affairs of a state, whether by treaty, unilateral imposition or delegation of authority; 
(d) cases in which states have merged or formed a union; (e) claims by constituent units of a 
union or federation to the attributes of statehood; (f) territorial or non-territorial communi-
ties which have a special international status by virtue of treaty or customary law and which 
claim statehood for certain purposes.188 
Therefore, it can be observed that the limit of the sovereignty of a state corresponds to the 
sovereignty the state possesses over its territory, and so it follows that the territorial integrity of 
the state is the chief guarantor of the sovereignty of a state. Given that the chief function of states 
is to guarantee their own preservation, it seems clear that territories should be explicitly com-
posed and particularly defined, so as to raise and determine “issues ranging from the nationality 
of inhabitants to the application of particular legal norms. [Territorial delineation] is the essen-
tial framework within which the vital interests of expressed and with regard to which they inter-
act and collide”.189 Yet territories are formed in cubic units, while boundaries are merely linear 
entities. As Marcelo Kohen writes, “Une frontière n’est que la fin d’un territoire soumis à une sou-
veraineté et le commencement d’un autre soumis à une autre souveraineté”.190 
Still, despite disputes by states over territories and their boundaries, the overall reality is 
that both ‘states’ (as a concept of societal organisation) and their ‘borders’191 (the boundaries 
within which the territories of states are to be found), have been accepted as reality, particularly 
in a contemporary context. As Hill comments, 
The need for defined borders really only arose as States developed in the post-Westphalian 
world and populations expanded into border areas and cross-boundary communication 
thereby increased significantly. Exact boundaries, however, could only really develop when 
map-making and geographic techniques were sufficiently advanced to facilitate such delimita-
tion and demarcation.192 
It may therefore be generally presumed that uti possidetis-defined borders have provided 
a contextual framework, albeit one with definitional imprecision, for the emergence of new ter-
ritories as sovereign states. Shaw demonstrates that a certain measure of overall territorial stabil-
ity has emerged through the development of this system. He asserts that “once created in 
accordance with international law, a boundary is protected and assumes finality and perma-
nence. What is established on the bases of the consent of the States concerned can only be un-
                                                                  
187 Cf. Int’l law, supra note 52, at 309: “There is obviously no question as to which states have acquired 
sovereignty over the great bulk of the earth’s habitable territory, and some of the issues presented in con-
nection with acquisition of sovereignty of territory are of more historical than contemporary signifi-
cance. Nonetheless scores of controversies as to sovereignty over territory remain, including issues as to 
what state should be regarded as exercising sovereignty over certain islands, land areas subject to bound-
ary disputes, and polar regions.” 
188 Id. at 243. 
189 Shaw, Heritage, supra note 140, at 75. 
190 Kohen, Possession, supra note 132, at 427. Author’s translation: “A border is only the end of a territory 
subjected to a sovereignty and the beginning of another subjected to another sovereignty.” 
191 In the context of this discussion, the terms ‘boundary’, ‘border’ and ‘frontier’ can be assumed to have the 
same generalised meaning. 
192 H. Hill, Claims to Territory in International Law and Relations 23 (1945). 
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done or modified by the exercise of such consent”.193 Borders constructed in this manner will, 
according to Shaw, incorporate the principles of: (a) consent of the affected parties to create 
binding obligations on the parties; (b) the ‘objectivisation’ of boundary treaties creating objec-
tive realities over time which will survive the demise of the treaties themselves; (c) the presump-
tive interpretation of boundary treaties in favour of the principle of stability; (d) the equation of 
equity with stability; and (e) the principle of stability as a balancing norm.194 It is this last point to 
which attention is drawn in the course of this discussion. 
The role of terra nullius in modern international law 
Broadly speaking, given the colonisation and decolonisation of the planet, the question of 
terra nullius is largely moot, although it may be presumed that international law generally would 
discourage any situation that could conceivably lead to the existence of terrae nullius, given the 
dominance of the state in formulating legal personality and the presumption that all territories, 
except the sui generis continent of Antarctica, are to be attributed to a sovereignty. However, the 
question of terra nullius remains of potential interest in a more specialised legal context, such as 
when considering the situation in Australia, for example. A particular set of historical and geo-
political circumstances, not the least of which is the fact that it is simultaneously a state and a 
continent, coexist with a rise in importance of law of particular concern to aboriginal peoples.  
Terra nullius, itself, is not in any sense conceptually suspended above the realm of chal-
lenging or shifting circumstances. This can be briefly observed from the Mabo Decision of the 
Australian High Court,195 which inserted the legal doctrine of native title into Australian law. 
The 1992 judgement invalidated British colonial claims that Australian territory was terra nullius 
and recognised a specific form of native title. The Court, in its judgement, recognised both the 
traditional rights of the Meriam people in the eastern Torres Straight, and held that a native title 
existed for inhabitants of Australia prior to the establishment of New South Wales in 1788. It fur-
thermore held that native title continues to exist in any territory that has not seen a legal rejection 
of such title. 
Thus while the avoidance of circumstances of terra nullius have seemed to be favoured, 
for the purported stability it affords to the territorial situation, the fundamental reformulation of 
the underlying basis of Australian land law which resulted from the Mabo decision is certainly 
not without controversy, and indeed the consequent practical jurisprudence continues to build. 
More recently, in 2006, the Federal Court ruled in favour of the existence of native title by the 
Noongar in Western Australia, particularly in and around the wider Perth metropolitan area 
and the City of Perth, including settled communities on the banks of the Swan River.196 Although 
Justice Wilcox found the existence of a single community, on the basis of laws and customs 
shared amongst the populations of the area, and evidence of disruption to the community as a 
result of settlement by populations of European extraction, the case is not largely seen as estab-
lishing terrae nullius in Western Australia. As of late 2007, the case remains on appeal. 
As has been previously mentioned, the notion of stability as a balancing norm is a funda-
mental predicate of the incorporation of the uti possidetis principle in the decolonisation exer-
                                                                  
193 Shaw, Heritage, supra note 140, at 82. 
194 See Id. at 84-97. 
195 See Mabo & Others v. State of Queensland (No 2), 175 CLR (1992). And see also Native Title Act 1993 
(Cth), s 24AA, s 24MD, in which the Australian Parliament sought to clarify determinations of native ti-
tle on Australian territory following the Mabo decision. 
196 See Bennell v. State of Western Australia, (2006) FCA 1243. 
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cise. As Shaw writes, balancing norms “may be regarded as a hierarchically superior proposi-
tion. This has become particularly apparent with regard to the possibilities of conflict between 
the norms of self-determination and territorial integrity (as expressing and protecting the 
boundary established in accordance with the principle of uti possidetis juris)”.197 This perspec-
tive will be important to bear in mind, as the balancing function of uti possidetis has been em-
ployed primarily with a view to preventing land grabs or other conflicts in the decolonisation 
process. In legal terms, uti possidetis was employed to recognise the frontiers of sovereign states. 
As such recognitions increased with each decolonising state, uti possidetis also came to serve a 
secondary purpose, namely to prevent situations of terra nullius. 
Terra nullius, as opposed to the res communis (e.g. the high seas or outer space), is land 
which is not territorially sovereign per se but could conceivably be subjected to a unique sover-
eignty. From the outset of the colonial period in the 1800s, it has only been European states 
which were considered to be ‘states’ as such. From this perspective, the non-European ‘state’—
that is to say, the colony—was lacking in sovereignty and therefore lacked independent legal 
personality. From that, to recall the framework established by Antony Anghie, the international 
law of this period, ‘defined, identified and categorised the uncivilised’.198 Jurists of the time have 
used positivism to create a cultural gap between civilised and uncivilised European and non-
European worlds—a gap which they then tried to bridge by ‘civilising the uncivilised’.  
The Western Sahara advisory opinion by the ICJ was the result of a 1974 request from the 
General Assembly to determine if Western Sahara was terra nullius at the time of colonisation 
by Spain, and if so, what legal ties existed between the territory, Morocco and Mauritania. 
Broadly speaking, the Court disaffirmed the widespread view at the time that non-European en-
tities were generally terra nullius. The Court’s reasoning revolved around a particular logic: 
[T]he expression ‘terra nullius’ was a legal term of art employed with ‘occupation’ as one of 
the accepted legal methods of acquiring sovereignty over territory. ‘Occupation’ being legally 
an original means of peaceably acquiring sovereignty over territory otherwise than cession or 
succession, it was a cardinal condition of valid ‘occupation’ that the territory should be terra 
nullius—a territory belonging to no-one—at the time of the act to constitute the ‘occupation’ 
[…] In the view of the Court, therefore, a determination that Western Sahara was a terra 
nullius at the time of decolonisation by Spain would be possible only if it were established that 
at the time the territory belonged to no-one in the sense that it was open to acquisition 
through the legal process of ‘occupation’ […] the state practice of the relevant period indi-
cates that territories inhabited by tribes or peoples having a social and political organisation 
were not regarded as terra nullius.199 
The Western Sahara advisory opinion, among its many pronouncements, does serve to 
demonstrate that there is no terra nullius in the modern world.200 Therefore, occupation of terra 
nullius, while an outdated notion in contemporary international law, was historically consid-
ered as one of the means by which territory and title to territory may be acquired,201 particularly 
in the initial decolonisation period. The doctrine of uti possidetis juris is thus a fundamental cor-
relative to the concept of terra nullius. 
                                                                  
197 Id. at 93.  
198 See discussion supra chapter one, at text accompanying note 116. 
199 Western Sahara Case, supra note 106, at paras. 79-80. The Court went on to determine that Spain did 
not colonise the territory on the basis of terra nullius, but on the basis of agreements that had been entered 
into with the chiefs of local tribes. 
200 Cf. Ratner, supra note 127, at 615: “Terra nullius […] has no place in contemporary international law. In 
the most literal sense, it is anachronistic because nearly the entire global landmass is already under the ac-
cepted sovereignty of one state or another […]. Except for some oceanic rocks, a few disputed territories 
and Antarctica, today no land lies outside the territorial sovereignty of some state.” 
201 The other means being prescription, conquest, accretion and cession. 
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The Badinter Commission, the referendum question and the continued relevance of a post-
decolonisation uti possidetis juris 
In 1991, the Arbitration Commission of the European Community’s Conference for 
Peace in Yugoslavia (hereinafter the ‘Badinter Commission’, named after Robert Badinter, the 
Commission’s chairman) was established pursuant to the EC Declaration of 27 August 1991 and 
EC Ministerial Joint Statement of 3 September 1991 to promote peace between the various 
Yugoslav peoples.202 The Commission’s decisions, which were not binding in nature, aimed “to 
resolve discrete issues through the application of legal principles”.203 Considering the implica-
tions of the first few opinions will serve to demonstrate the post-colonial nexus amongst self-
determination, sovereignty, territorial integrity and uti possidetis. In the first opinion, the Com-
mission (at paragraph 3) concluded that the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia “was in 
the process of dissolution”,204 and subsequently established a Declaration on the Guidelines of 
New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union,205 which established respect for the “rule 
of law, democracy and human rights” as prerequisites for recognition (thereby instilling the ba-
sic requirement of internal self-determination as a requirement for recognition). While in its 
second opinion the Commission stated that self-determination cannot alter existing frontiers 
unless all parties agree, and, in its third opinion, the Commission stated that former boundaries 
become frontiers in international law, due to the acceptance of uti possidetis as a rule of general 
scope in the Frontier Dispute case,206 while uti possidetis considerations seem to be largely ab-
stract principles, what is most striking is the level of consultation with the population on the 
ground resulting from the Commission’s fourth principle.207 In assessing the situation in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the Commission concluded, at paragraph 4, that “the will of the peoples of Bos-
nia-Hercegovina to constitute the [Republic] as a sovereign and independent state cannot be 
held to have been fully established”. Nevertheless, the Commission went further to state that this 
conclusion “could be reviewed if appropriate guarantees were provided by the Republic apply-
ing for recognition, possibly by means of a referendum of all citizens of the [Republic] without 
distinction, carried out under international supervision”.208 This is important, because, as Marc 
Weller writes, the Commission’s opinion “can be understood as reflecting an additional crite-
rion for recognition of statehood in cases of secession, based on the principle of self-
                                                                  
202 For discussion, see e.g. P. Radan, The Break-up of Yugoslavia and International Law (2002) [hereinafter 
Radan], Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions Arising from the Dis-
solution of Yugoslavia, 31 ILM 1488 (1992); M.C.R. Craven, The European Community Arbitration 
Commission on Yugoslavia, 1995 BYIL 333 and A. Pellet, The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Com-
mission: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples, 3 EJIL 178 (1995). 
203 D.F. Orentlicher, Separation Anxiety: International Responses to Ethno-Separatist Claims, 23 Yale J. 
Int’l L. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Separation Anxiety]. 
204 Cf. Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (1978) which provides that 
treaties establishing boundaries are an exception to the general rule that successor states start with a clean 
slate in respect of treaties entered into by their predecessors. 
205 See 31 ILM 1486 (1992). 
206 See M. Pomerance, The Badinter Commission: The Use and Misuse of the International Court of Jus-
tice’s Jurisprudence, 20 Mich. J. Int’l L. 31 (1998) [hereinafter Pomerance] at 51 et seq. for a sharp critique 
of the Commission, namely that it “extended the principle in ways that are neither legally warranted nor 
necessarily politically desirable”. 
207 See Opinion No. 4 on International Recognition of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by 
the European Community and its Member-States, 11 January 1992, 31 ILM 1501 (1992). 
208 For detail greater than that which can be presented here, see discussion in Radan, supra note 202, at 
183-190. 
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determination and on considerations of general international law, including human rights 
law”.209  
This revelation does seem to fly directly in the face of Brownlie’s assertion210 that a refer-
endum would not be a requirement in new state creation. Nevertheless, this referendum re-
quirement can be seen in the spirit of Franck’s ‘democratic entitlement’ and lends credibility to 
perspectives which grant greater weight to self-determination claims in post-colonial situations. 
And yet, the uti possidetis side of the equation still remains valid. Shaw, for example, interprets 
the Badinter Commission’s pronouncements on uti possidetis to be valid (and it must be men-
tioned that his opinion is but one in a spectrum of divergent perspectives). He writes, in referring 
to the Commission’s handling of the Frontier Dispute case as follows: 
 [T]he Chamber was seeking to underline that behind the application of uti possidetis to all 
decolonization situations lay a more general principle which relates to all independence 
processes. This is perhaps reinforced by looking at paragraph 20 of the judgement, where the 
Chamber emphasizes that the principle of uti possidetis “is a general principle […]”. It is 
therefore felt that the Yugoslav Arbitration Commission, in so relying upon the Burkina 
Faso/Mali decision was not acting in error. It is not unreasonable to argue that the Commis-
sion, faced with the implosion of Yugoslavia and the need to apply appropriate legal princi-
ples, relied upon a legitimate interpretation of the Chamber’s statement to conclude that uti 
possidetis was an abstract principle applicable to all independence situations. It is, indeed, 
quite a normal judicial process to move step by step from examining a set of facts, to infer-
ring from them a legal principle expressed in generalizable form, to applying that principle to 
a set of facts deemed analogous to, but not identical with, the original scenario.211 
This assessment, however, can be contrasted with that of Steven Ratner, who takes a dif-
ferent view—one which is wholly credible, based on the fact that the original ‘habillement’ of uti 
possidetis was deemed desirable to govern a swift transition from colony to nascent independent 
state, with as little disruption to the international system as possible. In that context, the ‘people’ 
was the (theoretically, at least) unified political construction within the colonial territorial unit 
wishing for self-governance as a whole. In the Yugoslav situation, however, the ‘peoples’ were 
much harder to define, as they were much more deeply based on ethnicity and religion—
traditional nation-state characteristics—yet they, for the most part (Slovenia being the clearest 
exception), were dispersed over areas inconsistent with the ‘lines’ derived from the employment 
of uti possidetis (the Krajina and Republika Srpska being the clearest examples). This is then, in-
deed, a more pragmatic logical approach than that of Shaw in the sense that it upholds the un-
derlying essence of the principle’s original raison d’être more than the emphasis on procedural 
matters seemingly espoused by Shaw. Ratner writes: 
The Commission, however, erred in its comprehension of the nature and purpose of uti pos-
sidetis. Uti possidetis is not simply an abstract legal formula to be pulled out and applied auto-
matically every time an entity seeks statehood. Rather, whatever normative force uti 
possidetis has enjoyed depended on two core considerations: the universally agreed policy 
goal it was serving—orderly decolonization—and the lack of any competing norms of internal 
self-determination. With decolonization now historically complete (more or less) and the law 
                                                                  
209 M. Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
86 AJIL 569, 593 (1992). Antonio Cassese lends support to such a view. Cf. Cassese, supra note 3, at 272: 
“It is apparent from the above that the Arbitration Commission regarded the holding of an internationally 
monitored referendum involving the whole population as an indispensable element for the granting of in-
ternational recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent State. The Committee thus elevated the 
referendum to the status of a basic requirement for the legitimation of secession.” 
210 Cf. Brownlie, Hague Academy Course, supra note 143, at 72, stating that “few writers express the opin-
ion that a condition of the validity of a transfer of territory is the provision of opportunity for the expres-
sion of opinion concerning the transfer by the inhabitants”. 
211 Shaw, Peoples, supra note 129, at 498-499. 
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now cognizant of notions of internal self-determination and political participation, the founda-
tions for uti possidetis are weak and the validity of the principle for noncolonial breakups sus-
pect.212 
As regards the Badinter Commission itself, then, some perspectives established in inter-
national law seem very broadly reinforced: that there be no changes to existing frontiers without 
consent; that the right of recognition of identities is along ethnic, religious or linguistic commu-
nities; that there exists a right of individuals to choose communities, and that the rights of mi-
norities shall be preserved under all circumstances. And yet, it appears that great discrepancies 
exist in interpretation of the principles in light of each other, due to the variable nature of the 
concepts, and the challenges of expressing political pragmatism in juridical dogma, often lead-
ing to the inevitable questions of interpretation. 
That said, the main point regarding uti possidetis emerges: in its practical application, the 
employment of uti possidetis juris will, by definition, be a counterweight to the consent princi-
ple, as to use Brad Roth’s terminology,213 consent is something derived through democratic 
practice by a ‘self-governing political community’—that is, a community being ‘governed in the 
name of the whole’. If uti possidetis, as a static precept, coincides with such a principle of consent 
at all, it does so only by mere coincidence. The realities of the Berlin Conference strongly cast 
doubt on the existence of such a coincidence in the African situation, for example. From here, 
the roots of the incongruity between state and society on the African continent are exposed. 
While decolonisation likely benefited from the ambivalence of uti possidetis towards national 
groups, minorities, peoples, ethnicities, races, religions, linguistic groups and all other assorted 
subdivisions of the human race, the inevitable post decolonisation reality, that such subdivi-
sions actually are in existence and now separated into sovereign states demarcated by the uti pos-
sidetis—i.e., colonial—line, was difficult to face. In particular, going from ‘indirect rule’ to a ‘self-
governing political community’ on the basis of an inherited colonial legal system, as might be 
expected, led to serious questions about possibilities of access to government for those holding a 
non-privileged position within these post-colonial societies. It is thus hardly surprising that such 
realities may result in a less animate form of statehood (i.e., a less naturally-configured form of 
statehood) than would otherwise tend to be found without the employment of uti possidetis.  
Or, from one African perspective a bit further removed from the ‘newness’ of African de-
colonisation, new states were formed through a process of coercive homogenisation, as a result 
of European colonialist actions, which has led to a crisis in governance, an ongoing series of in-
ternecine armed conflicts throughout the African continent and, indeed, a crisis not only of le-
gitimate governance, but legitimate statehood.214 
Recapitulation of the development of uti possidetis 
In assessing a legal significance for uti possidetis, Ratner makes a number of observations 
which bear repeating: (a) barring exceptional circumstances, the presumption existed for the 
transference of the colonial border into an international frontier; (b) the emergence of borders 
different from those of colonial rule is not prevented in the decolonisation process; (c) post-
independence changes to borders by mutual consent are allowed, as uti possidetis is not a per-
emptory norm having the character of jus cogens in international law; (d) according to the Vi-
                                                                  
212 Ratner, supra note 127, at 613-614. 
213 See supra note 184. 
214 See generally O.C. Okafor, Re-Defining Legitimate Statehood: International Law and State Fragmenta-
tion in Africa (2000), and discussion infra in this study. 
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enna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969)215 and the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (1978), borders different from those of colonial administrative units are not automati-
cally overridden by the uti possidetis standard.216 
It cannot be stated, then, that in determining responses to future boundary issues and ter-
ritorial disputes, uti possidetis is a rigid principle that is to be inflexibly applied, but it does seem 
clear that the uti possidetis is the prima facie determinant for territorial boundaries and questions 
related therein. Overall, it does seem that, as Ian Brownlie writes, “there is a complementarity 
between uti possidetis and the principle of self-determination. It is uti possidetis which creates the 
ambit of the putative unit of self-determination, and which in that sense has a logical priority”.217 
But nevertheless, self-determination is more than just a ‘principle’. It has evolved into an 
ongoing a right of peoples that, at least in its classical form, may have the character of jus cogens. 
As this discussion continues toward its conclusion, further analysis must be directed on these 
interactions, particularly those in which the scope of the unit of self-determination would seem 
to have logical priority over the uti possidetis standard. As the 1514, 1541 and 2625 resolutions do 
(rightly and importantly) balance references to self-determination with the importance of na-
tional unity and territorial integrity, it would appear that areas with a dearth of national unity 
and territorial integrity in reality would be those in which the junctions of self-determination 
and uti possidetis would find their greatest levels of turbulence, greatest levels of ingrained con-
flict, and indeed their greatest levels of separatism. As Higgins writes: 
Again, the desire for secession from a State by certain groups—whether to form their own 
independent State or to join with another group or unit elsewhere—will be at its most in-
tense when their human rights are being suppressed. Just as the desire of individuals to exer-
cise their right to leave the country is strongest when their rights have been violated, so the 
desire of ethnic groups to break away is most noticeable when they are oppressed […]. Even 
if, contrary to contemporary political assumptions, self-determination is not an authorization 
of secession by minorities, there is nothing in international law that prohibits secession or the 
formation of new States. The principle of uti possidetis provides that States accept their inher-
ited colonial boundaries. It places no obligation upon minority groups to stay a part of a unit 
that maltreats them or in which they feel unrepresented […]. Where no principle of ex in-
juria jus non oritur applies, international law will recognize new realities. And where secession 
has in fact occurred, and a new State has emerged with its own Government, not dependent 
on another, and functioning effectively over the territory concerned, then recognition will 
follow.218 
Observations from chapter two 
After having introduced the conceptual elements underpinning modern territorial state-
hood in the previous chapter, the analysis has now progressed to the procedural stage. The dy-
namic between self-determination of peoples and uti possidetis juris has proven simultaneously 
complicated and necessary, in that uti possidetis made claims for stability by seeking to preserve 
the existing status quo throughout the decolonisation process. This is not to presume automati-
cally a prima facie bias that self-determination of peoples must necessarily be in conflict with uti 
possidetis juris. Indeed, it is entirely conceivable that a colonised entity could undergo decoloni-
sation and assume the external frontiers inherited as a result of this exercise without excessive 
difficulty. The problem, however, is that it is similarly conceivable that the opposite could be 
true as well. 
                                                                  
215 See at Article 62. 
216 Ratner, supra note 127, at 598-600. 
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218 R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It 169-171 (1994). 
Nicholas Hansen 
Chapter Two: ‘Self-determination of peoples’ and the law of decolonisation 
 
Page 124 
That there has been a tangible deference to the principle of territorial integrity in equating 
these two variables is not wholly surprising, owing to the dominant positivism of the era. What 
can be similarly observed is a definitional shift in meaning as self-determination’s perpetual 
scope outgrows the constraints of its early intent. Before decolonisation, a ‘people’ was basically 
seen as the population of a colonial possession achieving sovereign independence, generally 
formed by inheriting colonial boundaries and borders. After decolonisation, a ‘people’ must 
necessarily comprise something less than the entire population of a territory, because that terri-
tory would already have experienced an act of self-determination as a whole. This serves to 
demonstrate a substantive legal framework for which self-identifying groups, formed particu-
larly but not necessarily exclusively on the basis of race, creed or colour, could make claims for 
greater access to government through internal self-determination. The question which remains 
is the extent to which uti possidetis would continue to play a role in a circumstance of internal 
self-determination. It has been asserted, particularly after the curious application of uti possidetis 
by the Badinter Commission, that its role would be chiefly historical in such circumstances. 
Thus, the discussion is now sufficiently developed to attempt a detailed analysis of the 
means of effectuating internal self-determination and considering international law’s responses 
to circumstances whereby internal self-determination becomes an incredible proposition. A 
theoretical discussion on the legal status of collective groupings, including ‘peoples’ and ‘mi-
norities’ in universal and regional contexts, presents particular focus on sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
 CHAPTER THREE 
Territory, recognition and collective groupings 
The concept of ‘collective groupings’ derives its specific legal validity from a body of state 
practice evidenced between the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly sub-
sequent to the creation of the United Nations Organization. International law is indeed the 
law of states, but when considered in view of the International Bill of Rights and the Friendly 
Relations Declaration, protections for individuals and levels of expected behaviours by states 
have also become established in law. The law of collective groupings was further reinforced 
by the General Assembly, which in its follow up to the Millennium Declaration, affirmed that 
all states have the responsibility to protect populations from egregious human rights viola-
tions. As it has become easier to observe that self-determination of peoples is not limited to 
instances of decolonisation, and territorial boundaries may be modified through the consent 
of the parties affected, the question of new state recognition may rise concurrently. Despite 
the reality that the international community of states unsurprisingly tends towards a restric-
tive view of postcolonial new state creation, the eventual question of territorial secession re-
sulting from a lack of internal self-determination is not automatically disallowed in 
international law. This has been most recently observed by the reference question put to the 
Supreme Court of Canada regarding Quebec’s unilateral secession. Furthermore, as ob-
served in Bangladesh, when there are circumstances of widespread and systemic human 
rights violations targeted against a segment of the population, the process of effectuating self-
determination can be seen to be rapidly catalysed in the direction of external self-
determination. Collective groupings—‘peoples’, ‘minorities’, ‘indigenous peoples’ and other 
territorial collectivités with comparatively less legal definition—will almost invariably have 
some overlap in form and circumstance, but only will be likely to find adequate recognition of 
their claims by constructing them according to the various legal rules applicable to a particu-
lar set of circumstances, and being recognised as such by both national and international legal 
authorities. 
Collective groupings as a product of the international legal system 
As a result of activities undertaken primarily in the United Nations framework, ‘collective 
groupings’, seen as the amalgam of ‘peoples’, ‘minorities’ and ‘indigenous peoples’, have ac-
quired a particular legal status. The implications for this are considerable, particularly as they 
are the product of the international human rights movement and a matter of practical concern 
in all states. This chapter seeks to demonstrate that attention should be given to the identification 
and acceptance of such collective groupings, as component parts of the international legal sys-
tem. This is most readily observed by considering the pathway to legality as the product of a 
chronological, evolutionary process. This can be observed from a cursory survey of activities 
dating throughout the 20th century and into the 21st, which demonstrate an invariable and sus-
tained erosion of the suprema potestas principle in the law of statehood. From the early estab-
lishment of international humanitarian law in the Hague and Geneva processes, to the creation 
of the United Nations Organization following the second world war and the adoption of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the international covenants on human rights, a 
core legal framework has been established to categorise collective groupings and the protec-
tions afforded to them. A large measure of substantive legal development has occurred with the 
Friendly Relations Declaration and the entry into force of the principal international human 
rights covenants, which has led to the notion of ‘third-generation’ rights reinforcing ‘rights’ with 
‘responsibilities’ of states and, indeed, the responsibility for states to protect populations on their 
territories. 
The core matter in considering ‘collective groupings’ is that which is formed by ‘third gen-
eration rights’—that the existence of the phenomenon is circumstantial, and that when such 
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circumstances exist, the state in question must uphold obligations simultaneously to the interna-
tional community and to the affected parties within the state; oftentimes, this is the ‘people’ in 
question by a ‘peoples’ right to self-determination, although it could also be classified as an indi-
vidual who is a member of a minority population. In any event, international law now recog-
nises both the existence of states as primary subjects of international law, and entities which 
prima facie may be deemed as having a status of a ‘collective grouping’: a ‘people’, a minority, or 
an ‘indigenous people’, most obviously. The most evident circumstances of ‘state’ and ‘collec-
tive’ interactions will not necessarily reflect circumstances whereby overt conflict between the 
entities is manifest, as juridical agreement between the legal recognition of a state and a ‘collec-
tive grouping’ can surely occur, both on a mutually consensual and peaceable basis, as well as a 
negotiated settlement following a potentially protracted armed conflict. In assessing any such 
circumstances, an impartial assessment of factual evidence is paramount. 
The contextual examination of ‘collective groupings’: On identifying and implementing collective 
rights under varying factual circumstances 
To recapitulate somewhat, the rubric of ‘collective groupings’ examined in this chapter is 
comprised of four main legal forms, namely the ‘right of peoples’ to internal and external self-
determination, as well as ‘minority rights’ and ‘indigenous peoples’ rights’. Of these various 
forms, in the first instance, the territorial nature of a peoples’ right to self-determination will ap-
pear most significant, due to the potential for the modification of existing state boundaries, 
which themselves were recognised and established through processes of new state recognition, 
delineation and demarcation. 
‘Self-determination of peoples’, in and of itself, has undergone three main definitional 
evolutions, and the territorial element, that most closely associated with statehood, has re-
mained constant throughout. The first main period of self-determination (i.e., pre-1955 era) is 
largely formed from Wilsonian idealism, yet is also mitigated by the reality that self-
determination also reflected Lenin’s own form of idealism and was the product of Soviet law. As 
extrapolated to colonial forms, this also largely reflects the emerging discrediting of colonial 
possession-holding, particularly following the second world war. The second period (i.e., circa 
1980) is formed from the reality of self-determination of peoples being a right to decolonisation 
having the character of jus cogens, as indeed was affirmed by the UN Commission on Human 
Rights.1 The third period is formed by the emergence of internal self-determination as a reflec-
tion of the fact that self-determination is an ongoing legal right, with a scope outlasting colonial-
ism. By the end of the 1970s, it followed that the overseas territories of European colonising 
states were to be granted independence, if only by virtue of the fact that there were few such re-
maining possessions. But it may also be observed that from the 1980s and beyond, as self-
determination meshed with concrete expectations, themselves primarily expressed in the Eco-
nomic and Social Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations, certain concepts of 
economic, social and political development, democracy and the importance of effective self-
administration became defined, as ‘soft law’ at the very least.2 
                                                                  
1 See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 62d session, supplement No. 4, UN Document 
E/1978/32, at paras 121-122. 
2 Cf. C. Tomuschnat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism 48-49 (2003), drawing reference to 
the principal legal documents generally related to the concept of ‘third-generation rights’ or ‘solidarity 
rights’, specifically a right to development (see Declaration on the Right to Development, GA Res. 41/128, 
4 December 1986), a right to peace (see Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace, GA Res. 39/11, 12 
November 1984) and a right to a clean environment (see Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
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Although the concept of internal self-determination developed a conceptual legal basis in 
the period following decolonisation, in practical terms, it is uncontroversial to assume that 
postcolonial states would be neither particularly capable of, nor generally minded towards, the 
provision of even limited measures of self-administration for portions of territory within a newly 
decolonised state. This leads immediately to the question of whether postcolonial self-
determination must be exclusively internal in character, in that its external nature was in some 
way intrinsically linked to the necessity of anti-colonialism, and nothing more. Realistically, as 
has been suggested throughout the previous chapters, this cannot be so, as to do so is to presume 
the perfection of statehood as both a legality and a factual circumstance for social ordering. To 
do so is to imply that postcolonial states must fundamentally afford protection and benefit to 
their citizens. Surely this has not been the case in all postcolonial states, however, which logi-
cally suggests that subsequent acts of external self-determination may not be precluded, as in-
ternal self-determination may prove inadequate or impossible, even when a state actively 
negotiates in good faith on self-determination claims. As demonstrated by Dietrich Murswiek in 
1993, “without a right to secession, there is no people’s right of self-determination”, and “if the 
right of self-determination included automatically the possibility of secession, there could not 
be any right of self-determination”.3 
Thus the discussion reveals the reality whereby the territorial unit implied by self-
determination of peoples must be smaller than the entire territory of a state, and, further, that in 
the event of prolonged non-response to factual claims made by territorially and culturally con-
tiguous administrative entities, the limits to (external) self-determination must be continually 
justified and observed. In this sense, external self-determination removed from the colonial 
context is limited in scope.4 However, the overall conceptual framework may be examined by 
discussing general points of state practice with particular application to public international law, 
in contrasting factual circumstances. For example, the high-intensity inter-societal conflict 
which created the independent state of Bangladesh, will be contrasted with a low-intensity in-
ter-societal conflict in Quebec, where an established and respected judiciary was able to make a 
certain judgement on a reference question put to it, regarding the legality of a postcolonial seces-
sion of part of the population of Canadian territory. 
Self-determination can now be seen to take on differing roles in the postcolonial context, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
ment, 14 June 1992, in 31 ILM 876 (1992)). 
3 D. Murswiek, The Issue of a Right of Secession – Reconsidered, in C. Tomuschat (ed.) Modern Law of 
Self-Determination 21 (1993). Cf. Id. at 37: “The subject of the offensive right of self-determination is 
every people that first can clearly be distinguished from other peoples by objective ethnic criteria, par-
ticularly by culture, language, birth or history. Secondly, a people must settle in on a coherent territory, 
on which it forms at least a clear majority. Mere minorities are not subjects of the right of self-
determination. […] But it is important to recognize that the terms ‘minority’ and ‘people’ do not totally 
exclude each other; rather they partly overlap: one group that is a minority in relation to the whole popu-
lation of a State can, on the one hand be a national minority in the meaning of the law relating to minori-
ties. But on the other hand, it can be a people in the meaning of the right to self-determination at the same 
time. This is the case if the group is the only population or if it forms a clear majority on a territory that is 
suitable for State-building and where the group has traditionally settled.” 
4 Cf. J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2d ed., 2006) 391 [hereinafter Crawford, 
2nd ed.], listing the cases of secession outside the colonial context as: Senegal; Singapore; Bangladesh; Lat-
via, Lithuania and Estonia; Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Moldova, Ta-
jikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan; Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, FR 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); Czech Republic, Slovenia; and Eritrea. Montenegro became an inde-
pendent state following a referendum on independence on 21 May 2006, in which 55.5 percent of the 
population, thus greater than the 55 percent threshold to validate the results, as set by the European Un-
ion, voted for independence. 
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because the question of territorial modification is now implied throughout, even though the an-
swer to this question will be restrictive in all but the most extreme of circumstances. Under the 
uti possidetis-defined decolonisation, however, territorial modification was not something seri-
ously considered. The general attitude taken by states towards recognition of new statehood has 
unsurprisingly become restrictive following the period of decolonisation. Returning to the 
chronological definitions suggested at the outset of this study, self-determination can legiti-
mately be seen as, in its first evolution, the official banning by the international community of 
the otherwise widespread practice of colonialism. In its middle form, it reaffirmed the ongoing 
illegality of colonialism, particularly as would be manifested by former colonial powers. More 
recently, the concept of internal self-determination has gained both intellectual and juridical 
weight, broadly known to mean that access to government is available to all individuals within 
demarcated administrative frontiers, and is correlated with a separate legal regime of minority 
rights drawn primarily from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.5 
In considering the interplay between the two practical examples under examination in 
this chapter, it will be recalled that internal self-determination itself is a concept difficult to 
quantify and extrapolate. This is primarily so because of the difficulty in determining at what 
point a judiciary is deemed competent to make pronouncements on the validity of internal ad-
ministrative matters or a legislature to recognise collective groupings per se. It is also difficult to 
determine because the most general law of collective groupings will pay particularly close atten-
tion to the self-determination of peoples due in particular to its territorialism. It will also prove 
indifferent to instances of recognised postcolonial self-determination, provided that access to 
government, i.e., internal self-determination, has proven demonstrably futile. In this sense, in 
the evaluation of any situation involving circumstances of internal self-determination, an infor-
mal evaluation of the ability of the state will always be of analytical usefulness, if only to realisti-
cally assess the capacity for a collective grouping to be formed and recognised per se by the state 
and implement certain territorially-based measures for self-administration. To this end, the 
contribution by the Canadian Supreme Court to the jurisprudence on peoples’ rights has be-
come justly famous and provides guidance for the recognition of claims by new collective 
groupings, and, conceivably, the possibility of new postcolonial states. 
The Canadian Supreme Court, the Canadian Parliament and Quebec’s National Assembly: ‘Clar-
ity’ towards situations incorporative of judicial redress? 
The largest Canadian province in area, and second largest in population, Quebec has had 
an uneasy relationship within the larger context of the Canadian Federal Government. This has 
led to sporadic aspirations for independence. Although in the 1960s the question of amending 
the Canadian Constitution to recognise Quebec as a founding nation arose, the ongoing legal 
consequences of such actions were limited, at least until the Parti Québecois came to power in 
1976 and held a referendum on independent sovereignty in 1980, which some 40% of the popu-
lation supported. When the Parti regained power in 1994, it quickly set out to hold another ref-
erendum on independence. It did so in 1995, with independence from Canada receiving a 
49.42% favourable vote. 
As the Québécois are foremost a territorially-defined administrative entity, rather than a 
collectivité formed around a particular ethnicity,6 all Canadian citizens resident in Quebec are 
                                                                  
5 On the interplay between self-determination and minority rights in a practical context, see infra chapter 
four of this study. 
6 It should be recalled, from the Introduction of this study, that collectivités are a self-identifying group of 
individuals, which need not take on any particular attributes beyond territorialism. 
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given this provincial appellation,7 in the same way that residents of e.g. Toronto and Windsor 
are Ontarian and residents of e.g. Vancouver and Victoria are British Columbian. Certainly, 
then, there are considerable English-language minority communities, as well as groups of in-
digenous peoples, located throughout the province. By 1996, these circumstances had given 
way to a complicated reality approaching the level of a Constitutional crisis. This led the Gover-
nor in Council to send to the Supreme Court three questions related to the legality of a possible 
secession of Quebec from the Canadian state.8 Thus, although external self-determination 
would be the practical result of such activities, the circumstance should be immediately con-
trasted with that of Bangladesh, in that Canada is known to afford basic human rights and fun-
damental freedoms to all of its citizens, and the level of targeted violence, repression or other 
major human rights violations against the Québécois, particularly when viewed in contrast to 
that directed by Pakistan against East Pakistan, is nil. It seems then, prima facie, that there would 
be ample room for the accommodation of internal self-determination concerns, given the fed-
eral structure and practical effectiveness of the state overall. 
The reference questions put to, and the answer of, the Canadian Supreme Court 
The three questions put to the Court were as follows:  
Question 1: Under the Constitution of Canada, can the National Assembly, legislature or 
government of Quebec effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? 
Question 2: Does international law give the National Assembly, legislature or government 
of Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec of Canada unilaterally? In this regard, 
is there a right to self-determination under international law that would give the National As-
sembly, legislature or government of Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec 
from Canada unilaterally? 
Question 3: In the event of a conflict between domestic and international law on the right 
of the National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec to effect the secession of 
Quebec from Canada unilaterally, which would take precedence in Canada? 
The Court answered the first two questions in the negative and found no issue between 
international and domestic law to be addressed in the third question. It decided: 
We have also considered whether a positive legal entitlement to secession exists under in-
ternational law in the factual circumstances contemplated by Question 1, i.e., a clear democ-
ratic expression of support on a clear question for Quebec secession. Some of those who 
supported an affirmative answer to this question did so on the basis of the recognized right 
to self-determination that belongs to all “peoples”. Although much of the Quebec population 
certainly shares many of the characteristics of a people, it is not necessary to decide the 
“people” issue because, whatever may be the correct determination of this issue in the con-
text of Quebec, a right to secession only arises under the principle of self-determination of 
peoples at international law where “a people” is governed as part of a colonial empire; where 
“a people” is subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation; and possibly where “a 
people” is denied any meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination within the state of 
which it forms a part. In other circumstances, peoples are expected to achieve self-
determination within the framework of their existing state. A state whose government repre-
                                                                  
7 Or, indeed, the Anglophone equivalent of ‘Quebecker’. 
8 An impetus for the questions comes directly from the Bertrand Case in the Superior Court of Québec, 
whereby a citizen of Quebec made legal challenges, both before and after the referendum itself, concerning 
the 1995 referendum on sovereignty. See Action for Declaratory Judgement and Permanent Injunction, 
and Motion for Interlocutory Measures, Bertrand v. Bégin, 10 August 1995, Quebec 200-05-002177-995 
(Sup. Ct.), and Bertrand v. Québec (A.G.), [1995] 127 DLR (4th) 408. In the judgement on preliminary ex-
ceptions of Judge Pidgeon, 30 August 1996, Bertrand v. Bégin, [1996] RJQ 2393, a number of constitu-
tional issues similar to the three questions in the reference question were also considered.  
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sents the whole of the people or peoples resident within its territory, on a basis of equality and with-
out discrimination, and respects the principles of self-determination in its internal arrangements, is 
entitled to maintain its territorial integrity under international law and to have that territorial integrity 
recognized by other states. Quebec does not meet the threshold of a colonial people or an op-
pressed people, nor can it be suggested that Quebecers have been denied meaningful access 
to government to pursue their political, economic, cultural and social development. In the 
circumstances, the National Assembly, the legislature or the government of Quebec do not 
enjoy a right at international law to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally. 
Although there is no right, under the Constitution or at international law, to unilateral seces-
sion, that is secession without negotiation on the basis just discussed, this does not rule out 
the possibility of an unconstitutional declaration of secession leading to a de facto secession. 
The ultimate success of such a secession would be dependent on recognition by the interna-
tional community, which is likely to consider the legality and legitimacy of secession having 
regard to, amongst other facts, the conduct of Quebec and Canada, in determining whether 
to grant or withhold recognition. Such recognition, even if granted, would not, however, 
provide any retroactive justification for the act of secession, either under the Constitution of 
Canada or at international law.9 
The underlying legal questions involved concern the attitude of international law towards 
the phenomenon of secession generally. Although the Canadian Constitution does not specifi-
cally mention secession, the Court stated that a secession attempted in a manner inconsistent 
with existing constitutional arrangements would be illegal, and therefore, the Canadian Consti-
tution would have to be amended in order for secession to be effectuated.10 The Court also sig-
nalled that a “clear expression of a clear majority” would have to demonstrate the unambiguous 
willingness of the Québécois to secede from Canada, in effect recalling the democratic nature of 
the country itself.11 By implication, this means that a decision would have to be taken by refer-
endum, although the Court held that “in itself and without more, [the holding of a referendum] 
has no direct legal effect, and could not in itself bring about unilateral secession”.12 According to 
the Court, one way that manifestations of secessionist activity can find enhanced credibility is 
when other relevant governmental entities within a state refuse to negotiate with entities compe-
tent to make such claims, including e.g. referendum holders with affirmative results. The Court 
observed: 
To the extent that a breach of the constitutional duty to negotiate in accordance with the 
principles described above undermines the legitimacy of a party's actions, it may have impor-
tant ramifications at the international level. Thus, a failure of the duty to undertake negotiations 
and pursue them according to constitutional principles may undermine that government's claim to le-
gitimacy which is generally a precondition for recognition by the international community. Con-
versely, violations of those principles by the federal or other provincial governments 
responding to the request for secession may undermine their legitimacy. Thus, a Quebec that 
had negotiated in conformity with constitutional principles and values in the face of unrea-
sonable intransigence on the part of other participants at the federal or provincial level 
would be more likely to be recognized than a Quebec which did not itself act according to 
constitutional principles in the negotiation process. Both the legality of the acts of the parties 
to the negotiation process under Canadian law, and the perceived legitimacy of such action, 
would be important considerations in the recognition process. In this way, the adherence of 
the parties to the obligation to negotiate would be evaluated in an indirect manner on the in-
                                                                  
9 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, paras 154 and 155. (emphasis added) [hereinafter 
Québec decision] 
10 Id. at para 84. 
11 See generally Id. at paras 92-100. 
12 Id. at para 87. This seems to be reinforced in practice by the general non-recognition by the interna-
tional community of the results of a referendum on secession by the South Ossetia region of Georgia, in 
November 2006. See OSCE: EU Statement on the so-called ‘referendum’ and so-called ‘presidential elec-
tions’ in South Ossetia on 12 November 2006, Finnish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 9 
November 2006. 
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ternational plane.13  
On the question of secession, the Court stated that, although no specific authorisation or 
prohibition on secession exists in international law, the status of secession under international 
law is to be kept conceptually separate from “a prediction that the law will respond after the fact 
to a then existing political reality”.14 As such, the Court, in its examination of the concept of 
‘peoples’, reiterated the imperfection in determining an exact definition of a ‘people’, although it 
did state “it is clear that ‘a people’ may include only a portion of the population of an existing 
state”.15 However, the Court also stated that it was unnecessary to determine whether the Qué-
bécois were a ‘people’ per se, even though the Quebec population includes characteristics in-
dicative of a people, such as territoriality, culture and language.16 
In the decision, particular attention was focused by the Court on the various roles played 
by self-determination, as applicable to colonial and oppressed peoples. The Court separated 
the right of self-determination into its anti-colonial and postcolonial forms,17 based upon the 
Friendly Relations Declaration, and concluded that “when a people is blocked from the mean-
ingful exercise of its right to self-determination internally, it is entitled, as a last resort, to exercise 
it by secession”.18 That said, referring to the amicus filings and expert opinions submitted to the 
Court, it furthermore concluded that: 
[t]he population of Quebec cannot plausibly be said to be denied access to government. 
Quebecers occupy prominent positions within the government of Canada. Residents of the 
province freely make political choices and pursue economic, social and cultural development 
within Quebec, across Canada and throughout the world. The population of Quebec is equi-
tably represented in legislative, executive and judicial institutions. In short, to reflect the 
phraseology of the international documents that address the right to self-determination of 
peoples, Canada is a “sovereign and independent state conducting itself in compliance with 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of a gov-
ernment representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction”.19  
In light of the above, the Court also concluded that: 
 [t]he international right to self-determination only generates, at best, a right to external self-
determination in situations of former colonies; where a people is oppressed, as for example 
under foreign military occupation; or where a definable group is denied meaningful access to 
government to pursue their political, economic, social and cultural development. In all three 
situations, the people in question are entitled to a right to external self-determination because their 
                                                                  
13 Id. at para 103 (emphasis added). Cf. Id. at para 88: “In Canada, the initiative for constitutional amend-
ment is the responsibility of democratically elected representatives of the participants in Confederation. 
Those representatives may, of course, take their cue from a referendum, but in legal terms, constitution-
making in Canada, as in many countries, is undertaken by the democratically elected representatives of the 
people. The corollary of a legitimate attempt by one participant in Confederation to seek an amendment to 
the Constitution is an obligation on all parties to come to the negotiating table. The clear repudiation by 
the people of Quebec of the existing constitutional order would confer legitimacy on demands for secession, 
and place an obligation on the other provinces and the federal government to acknowledge and respect that 
expression of democratic will by entering into negotiations and conducting them in accordance with the 
underlying constitutional principles already discussed.” (emphasis added) 
14 Id. at para 110. 
15 Id. at para 124. 
16 Id. Probably this is why the notion of a comparatively less-defined territorial collectivité as a juridical 
concept holds appeal, as the overall notion allows for the reality that entities may hold a particular juridi-
cal appellation yet may not be adequately defined by such existing forms. 
17 Id. at para 132. 
18 Id. at para 134. 
19 Id. at para 136. 
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have been denied the ability to exert internally their right to self-determination.20  
The ‘effectivity’ principle: Considering the law’s capacity to adapt to changing political re-
ality 
An amicus curiae was appointed to present the case of Quebec, as its government refused 
to play any role in the proceedings.21 The Court’s answer was made as a result of the expert opin-
ions submitted to it by scholars of international law, with particular competence within the 
realm of ‘collective groupings’.22 Particularly germane to the present study is the expert opinion 
of Georges Abi-Saab. In his opinion, he claims that, although the law has no direct bearing on 
the process of new state creation, it is, however, “acting on probabilities and effectivity”.23 State-
hood, Abi-Saab argues, is a factual circumstance as opposed to a legal action, and it is the reality, 
or effectivity, of the state that is being recognised. Although prior to an act of secession, the state 
concerned is squarely operating within the domestic realm of its own administration, Abi-Saab 
also alluded to implications for international law given situations of attempted secession. In his 
opinion, he wrote that 
[t]he primary fact, as captured and rationalized in the abstract model of the state by interna-
tional law, is the triptych of population, territory and sovereignty […]. And it is the effectivity 
of these elements, and above all their integration into an operative whole, which constitutes the 
“primary fact” and determines its being taken into consideration by international law or, in 
other words, compels its acknowledgement as a state by international law regardless of the 
process that led to this result.24  
Abi-Saab, in writing about the integration of the numerous variables of statehood into an 
operative whole, demonstrates that the process of ‘integration’ by definition is intertemporal, 
thus necessitating an adaptive legal framework. What is of particular interest is that although le-
gal questions related to the possible secession of a part of a territory are internal in character until 
such time as the effectuation manifests itself, Abi-Saab’s discussion of the elements of statehood 
as being ‘integrated into an operative whole’ conceptually allows for the modification of legal 
rules as this integration procedure is carried out. Implied in this procedure is the necessity for a 
means to approximate the points of differentiation between the laws of statehood reflective of 
fixed, established law and that in the process of development. 
The Court addressed these circumstances in its judgement, primarily in the context of the 
possibility of a de facto secession by Quebec on the basis of effectivity, and, presumably, subse-
quent peer recognition by the international community of states. The Court reinforced its nega-
tive answer to question one by disavowing the principle of effectivity as a specific legality. It did 
so by separating the factual circumstances surrounding a possible secession from the law affect-
ing the process, observing that “a distinction must be drawn between the right of a people to act, 
                                                                  
20 Id. at para 138 (emphasis added). 
21 An English-language compendium of the reference question’s documentation is to be found in A.F. 
Bayefsky, Self-Determination in International Law: Quebec and Lessons Learned (2000) [hereinafter 
Bayefsky], which presents a useful English-language compendium of documents related to the reference 
question, but, it should also be observed, little guidance as to what any obvious lessons actually would be. 
22 Indeed a number of reports by e.g. J. Crawford, G. Abi-Saab, T.M. Franck, A. Pellet, M.N. Shaw were 
submitted to the Court as expert opinions to accompany the Factums of the Attorney General of Canada 
and the Amicus Curiae acting on Quebec’s behalf. See Bayefsky, supra note 21, at 29-304. 
23 Report by Georges Abi-Saab: “The Effectivity Required of an Entity that Declares its Independence in 
Order for it to be Considered a State in International Law”, in Bayefsky, supra note 21, at 69. 
24 Id (emphasis added). 
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and their power to do so”,25 and that “a power may be exercised even in the absence of a right to 
do so, but if it is, then it is exercised without legal foundation”.26 It furthermore found that “the 
alleged principle of effectivity has no constitutional or legal status, in the sense that it does not 
provide an ex ante explanation of justification for an act”.27 
However, the Court revisited the topic later in its decision and considered the relation-
ship between factual circumstances and legality, in a more practical sense. Under this more op-
erative framework, the Court stated that “it is true that international law may well, depending on 
the circumstances, adapt to recognize a political and/or factual reality, regardless of the legality 
of the steps leading to its creation”.28 It observed furthermore that 
[n]o one doubts that legal consequences may flow from political facts, and that "sovereignty 
is a political fact for which no purely legal authority can be constituted . . .". Secession of a 
province from Canada, if successful in the streets, might well lead to the creation of a new 
state. Although recognition by other states is not, at least as a matter of theory, necessary to 
achieve statehood, the viability of a would-be state in the international community depends, 
as a practical matter, upon recognition by other states. That process of recognition is guided 
by legal norms. However, international recognition is not alone constitutive of statehood 
and, critically, does not relate back to the date of secession to serve retroactively as a source 
of a "legal" right to secede in the first place. Recognition occurs only after a territorial unit 
has been successful, as a political fact, in achieving secession.29 
The Court then went on to directly reject the notion that the legality of secessionist activ-
ity, were it to emerge from factual, rather than legal, circumstances, automatically must be the 
ultimate result of such activity, particularly by observing “that subsequent recognition of a state 
of affairs brought about by a unilateral declaration of independence could be taken to mean that 
secession was achieved under colour of a legal right”.30 The Court attempted to strike a delicate 
balance in its ultimate consideration of ‘effectivity’, holding that ex post facto recognition of an 
originally illegal act may lead to the acquisition of legal status on the basis of that recognition,31 
but only when the legitimacy of these actions are based upon a change in factual circum-
stances.32 However, little further guidance is given on the effectivity principle, leading to the 
conclusion that such a change in factual circumstances will be largely reflective of the level of 
recognition successfully obtained by a territorially-defined collectivité.  
The advisory opinion, in withholding an overt pronouncement on the status of the Qué-
                                                                  
25 Québec decision, supra para 9, at para 106. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at para 107. It continued, Id. at paras 107-108: “In essence, acceptance of a principle of effectivity 
would be tantamount to accepting that the National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec may 
act without regard to the law, simply because it asserts the power to do so. So viewed, the suggestion is 
that the National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec could purport to secede the province 
unilaterally from Canada in disregard of Canadian and international law. It is further suggested that if the 
secession bid was successful, a new legal order would be created in that province, which would then be 
considered an independent state. Such a proposition is an assertion of fact, not a statement of law. It may or 
may not be true; in any event it is irrelevant to the questions of law before us. If, on the other hand, it is put 
forward as an assertion of law, then it simply amounts to the contention that the law may be broken as 
long as it can be broken successfully. Such a notion is contrary to the rule of law, and must be rejected.” 
28 Id. at para 141. 
29 Id. at para 142, quoting H.W.R. Wade, The Basis of Legal Sovereignty, 172 Camb. L.J. 196 (1955). 
30 Id. at para 144. 
31 Id. at para 146. 
32 Id. The Court continued: “It is, however, quite another matter to suggest that a subsequent condonation 
of an initially illegal act retroactively creates a legal right to engage in the act in the first place. The 
broader contention is not supported by the international principle of effectivity or otherwise and must be 
rejected.” 
Nicholas Hansen 
Chapter Three: Territory, recognition and collective groupings 
Page 134 
bécois as a ‘people’ as defined by international law, does not codify a uniform and global black-
letter rule of law on self-determination as it particularly applies to territorially-defined entities. 
But it certainly does make a significant contribution towards such legal definition, particularly in 
the sense that e.g. GA Resolution 1541 (XV), Principle IV and the Friendly Relations Declara-
tion are reinforced by the juridical recognition that, in the eyes of the Canadian Supreme Court, 
a state “is entitled to maintain its territory under international law and to have that territorial integ-
rity recognized by other states”.33 That the question of maintenance of a state’s territorial integ-
rity, in the time of the positivist international law of the late 1800s and early 1900s, could ever 
fundamentally conceivably come into question is starkly contrasted by the Canadian Supreme 
Court’s statement of entitlement to preserve the status quo to states, in that the notion that a Court 
should ever find it necessary to make such pronouncements is anathema to classical legal posi-
tivist thought. On the basis of the Court’s overall reasoning, Quebec’s ability to appeal to the in-
ternational community for external recognition was unhindered by the Court, provided the 
federal government was in some way negligent in its negotiations with Quebec, e.g. by not nego-
tiating ‘in good faith’.  
Subsequent developments in light of the Supreme Court’s advisory opinion 
By maintaining both the notion that distinction is to be made with regard to secession be-
tween factional circumstances of law and “a prediction that the law will respond after the fact to 
a then existing political reality”,34 as well as the notion that law may also respond to an instance 
of ‘secession in the streets’, the Court attempted, and it would appear largely succeeded, to 
maintain a delicate balance between the responsibilities of a state to maintain ongoing good-
faith negotiations on matters of self-determination with bona fide collectivités and the reaffirma-
tion of the general understanding that there exists no unfettered right to unilateral secession in 
international law, but that factual circumstances may eventually lead to the occurrence of seces-
sion. 
The notion of statehood in Canada is undoubtedly complicated, and the practical effects 
of the Court’s answer to the reference question did not go unnoticed in Parliament. To recapitu-
late, as applies to the theoretical law of self-determination of peoples, the core principles of law 
as envisioned by the Court, are defined by the notion that  
[…] a right to secession only arises under the principle of self-determination of peoples at in-
ternational law where "a people" is governed as part of a colonial empire; where "a people" is 
subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation; and possibly where "a people" is de-
nied any meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination within the state of which it 
forms a part. In other circumstances, peoples are expected to achieve self-determination 
within the framework of their existing state. 35 
In an attempt to lay the Quebec question to rest, following the Supreme Court’s decision, 
Parliament sought to ensure that circumstances would not appear whereby Quebec would be 
seen to be denied self-determination, particularly through a tangible demonstration of the fed-
eral government’s willingness to negotiate in good faith with Quebec. In 2000, it enacted what 
has colloquially become known as the Clarity Act.36 Its main function is to respond to the per-
ceived ambiguity in the wording of the question of the 1995 referendum and to ensure that any 
                                                                  
33 Id. at para 154. (emphasis added) 
34 Id. at para 110. 
35 Id. 
36 See Act to give effect to the requirement for clarity as set out in the opinion of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference, Statutes of Canada 2000, c.26 
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future referenda do not undertake such perceived ambiguities.37 In particular, the House of 
Commons granted itself the power to determine whether the size of a majority voting for seces-
sion was sufficiently large, whether voter participation was of a sufficiently high proportion, 
and, ‘other matters’ deemed worthy of consideration by the House.38 Some commentators, such 
as Daniel Turp, have been deeply critical of the initiative, particularly with regard to the ability 
of the House of Commons to determine, itself, the technical aspects that would indicate whether 
a future referendum is to be successful or unsuccessful in reflecting a popular manifestation of 
independent sovereignty.39 Unsurprisingly, the Clarity Act is unpopular with Québécois politi-
cal parties, and an opposing response came swiftly—indeed two days after the bill proposing the 
Clarity Act was first presented in the House of Commons—from the Quebec National Assembly 
in the form of the Fundamental Rights Act,40 which itself reasserted that a simple majority would 
be sufficient to demonstrate the will of the Québécois,41 and asserts that Quebec, itself, holds an 
exclusive right to determine its political and legal form.42 
Quebec’s place within Canada continues to develop, as was observed in late 2006 when, 
in anticipation of a motion to be undertaken by the Bloc Québécois to ‘define the Quebec nation’, 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper surprisingly gave a one-line statement to the House of Com-
mons, stating simply “that this House recognize that the Québécois form a nation within a 
united Canada”,43 although later clarification was provided that the use of the term ‘nation’ was 
used in a ‘cultural-sociological’, rather than in a legal sense.44 Nevertheless, the House accepted 
                                                                  
37 Id. at s 1(1) 
38 Cf. Id. at s 2(2) and s 2(3): “In considering whether there has been a clear expression of a will by a clear 
majority of the population of a province that the province cease to be part of Canada, the House of Com-
mons shall take into account (a) the size of the majority of valid votes cast in favour of the secessionist op-
tion; (b) the percentage of eligible voters voting in the referendum; and (c) any other matters or 
circumstances it considers to be relevant. […] In considering whether there has been a clear expression of 
a will by a clear majority of the population of a province that the province cease to be part of Canada, the 
House of Commons shall take into account the views of all political parties represented in the legislative 
assembly of the province whose government proposed the referendum on secession, any formal state-
ments or resolutions by the government or legislative assembly of any province or territory of Canada, 
any formal statements or resolutions by the Senate, any formal statements or resolutions by the represen-
tatives of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, especially those in the province whose government proposed 
the referendum on secession, and any other views it considers to be relevant.” 
39 Cf. D. Turp, Québec’s Right to Secessionist Self-determination: The Colliding Paths of Canada’s Clarity 
Act and Québec’s Fundamental Rights Act, in J. Dahlitz (ed.) Secession and International Law: Conflict 
Avoidance – Regional Appraisals 173 (2003): “The idea that a referendum is won with a majority of 50 
per cent plus one of the valid votes cast seemed also to have prevailed in all referendums organized with 
respect to the political and constitutional future in Quebec and Canada. Here too, ideas are in collision, 
since the intent of the Clarity Act is to give the House of Commons the power to decide that a majority of 
50 per cent plus one of valid votes cast is not enough to compel the federal government to assume its con-
stitutional and mandatory goal to negotiate. […] All [past] referendums in Canada have been held on the 
basis of majority rule. […] To cast doubt on the rule of 50 percent plus one is also to contravene the fun-
damental principle of the equality of voters. […] The Clarity Act breaks the democratic tradition in Can-
ada that, up to now, had taken into account Québec’s desire to freely decide its future.” 
40 See An Act respecting the exercise of the fundamental rights and prerogatives of the Québec people and 
the Québec State, R.S.Q., c. E-20.2 
41 Id. at 2000, c. 46, s. 4. 
42 Cf. Id. at 2000, c. 46, s. 3: “The Québec people, acting through its own political institutions, shall deter-
mine alone the mode of exercise of its right to choose the political regime and legal status of Québec. No 
condition or mode of exercise of that right, in particular the consultation of the Québec people by way of a 
referendum, shall have effect unless determined in accordance with the first paragraph.” 
43 See Statement by the Prime Minister to the House of Commons, 27 November 2006, available at 
http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1412 
44 See CBC News, House passes motion recognizing Québécois as nation, 27 November 2006, available at 
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the notion by a 266-16 vote, although given the timing of the motion and the perceived motiva-
tion of Harper’s statement, it may also be observed that the Canadian Federal Government con-
tinues to want to demonstrate that it is actively seeking to negotiate with Quebec, in good faith 
with regard to self-determination concerns, but simultaneously reiterate its position that the way 
for Quebec to manifest such self-determination is within the federal structure of the existing 
Canadian state. In short, what seems most ‘clear’ in the ongoing aftermath of the Quebec 
situation is that the low-level tensions within the federal state seem likely to persist, as political 
manifestations continue to play out in the face of what is, otherwise, a clear, balanced advisory 
opinion delivered by one of the world’s most competent and respected Supreme Courts. 
Whether this necessarily leads to the ‘inevitable collision course’ suggested by Turp will only be 
able to be observed with certainty as the next chapters of Canada’s history are written. 
The law of new state recognition and its implications for collective groupings 
Following the specificity of the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision concerning the legal-
ity of Quebec’s secession, the discussion concerning collective groupings now progresses to a 
more general level. It will be broadly asserted that some intellectual overlaps exist between 
claims for sub-state rights (particularly self-determination) and claims for new state creation. 
Self-determination is somewhat analogous to independent statehood, in that decisions taken 
will have to balance the will of ‘people’, as a collectivité, with the legitimate power ascribed to a 
the territory to which it will form a legitimate, administrative authority. The overlap between the 
concepts is rooted in the reality that both emerging states seek external recognition, and, to ‘peo-
ples’ or ‘minorities’, although the possibility of eventual external recognition is not precluded, 
the recognition they seek in the first instance is fundamentally internal in basis. Therefore the 
potential for confrontation will always run high; however, it must also be recalled that such cir-
cumstances are not entirely dissimilar to those of decolonisation and the subsequent new state 
creation of recent times.  
Whereas uti possidetis juris preserved definitional forms through the process of decoloni-
sation, it should be recalled from the ongoing discussion that the role of uti possidetis is now 
largely historical, and cannot credibility be seen as eternally binding a territory to a population, 
as democratic actions taken by a collectivité within a state may lead, under certain occasions, to 
create new states. Under such circumstances, adherence to Montevideo criteria would be ex-
pected. Thus, if only by implication, these criteria lie as an omnipresent reality, and attention 
must be particularly applied to circumstances whereby Montevideo criteria could be modified 
as a result of state practice, as the general pattern of state practice in the period following the sec-
ond world war, was generally contradictory.  
Thus, an examination of the established doctrine on new state recognition is presented in 
the context of so-called ‘modern territorial statehood’, with ‘modern’ meaning ‘post-colonial’, 
‘territorial’ a synonym for ‘boundaries and borders’, and ‘statehood’ incorporating the compo-
nents of public international law corresponding to the individual and collective rights and re-
sponsibilities of citizens and their governments, and the protections and mutual expectations 
associated therewith. The interaction of ‘modern territorial statehood’ and the established theo-
ries of new state recognition thus primarily revolve around the ability to deliver a persuasive ar-
gument relevant to the situation on the ground. New state creation is certainly not a postcolonial 
necessity for collectivités, but it certainly is a definitional factor under all circumstances and may 
well prove to be reflective of a perceived best course of action in the most extreme of factual 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2006/11/27/nation-vote.html 
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situations, i.e., those of ‘internal colonisation’ or ‘postcolonial colonisation’.  
Examining the constitutive and declaratory theories of new state recognition 
Recognition in international law is a complicated subject normally split into declaratory 
and constitutive theoretical premises. The decision to recognise a state per se is a decision taken 
by other states and, in so doing, such decisions are very much based upon their own political 
considerations and calculations. The discussion is introduced from a mainstream text: 
The question of whether an entity is a state and should be so treated has given rise to two 
opposing theories. One theory is that the act of recognition by other states confers interna-
tional personality on an entity purporting to be a state. In effect, the other states by their 
recognition “constitute” or create the new state. On this “constitutive” theory an observer 
or a court need only look at the acts of recognition (or lack thereof) to decide whether an 
entity is a state. 
The opposing position is that the existence of a state depends on the facts and whether 
those facts meet the criteria of statehood laid down in international law. Accordingly, a state 
may exist without being recognized. Recognition is merely declaratory. The primary function 
of recognition is to acknowledge the fact of the state’s political existence and to declare the 
recognizing state’s willingness to treat the entity as an international person, with the rights 
and obligations of a state.45 
 It may well be the case that the theoretical underpinnings provide, if not little usefulness 
to the present discussion, then, certainly, somewhat less usefulness than when Sir Hersch Lau-
terpacht contended that the act of recognition by other states to an emerging state entity were 
what would serve to instil a state with legal personality. Lauterpacht himself took the constitutive 
path,46 albeit one mitigated with his conclusion that states have a duty to recognise other entities 
meeting the qualifications of statehood.47 This approach stands in further contrast with another 
constitutive theory advocate, Hans Kelsen,48 who, while perhaps not anticipating the certain cir-
cumstances faced in an exploration of postcolonial self-determination, separated the process of 
recognition into separate political and legal acts, with the legal act having a specifically constitu-
tive character that is not found in the separate political act.49 Kelsen, furthermore, disagrees with 
Lauterpacht’s assertion that there is an obligation to recognise entities fulfilling the requirements 
of statehood, viewing recognition as an empowerment, and not an obligation. He writes: 
Refusal to recognize the existence of a new state is no violation of general international law 
and thus constitutes no violation of the right of any other community. However, recognition 
of a community as a state, even though it does not fulfill the conditions laid down by interna-
tional law, is a violation thereof. If, for instance, part of an existing state tries to separate it-
self by revolution, and another state recognizes this part of the state as a state before the 
conditions prescribed by international law are fulfilled, the recognizing state infringes upon 
                                                                  
45 Damrosch et al, International Law: Cases and Materials 252 (4th ed., 2001) [hereinafter Int’l Law] 252. 
46 Cf. P.K. Menon, Some Aspects of the Law of Recognition, 66 Revue de droit international et de droit 
comparé 161, 163 (1989) [hereinafter Menon]: “Prominent among the exponents of this view are 
Anzilotti, Bluntschli, Kelsen, Lauterpacht, Lawrence, Le Normand, Liszl, Oppenheim, Redslop and 
Triepel.” 
47 See H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (1947), at 6 et seq. 
48 Cf. H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law 270 (1952): “[A] state violates international law and thus 
infringes upon the rights of other states if it recognizes as a state a community which does not fulfill the 
requirements of international law.” 
49 Cf. H. Kelsen, Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations, 35 AJIL 605 (1941): “Politi-
cal recognition may be conditional or unconditional. However, these questions are unimportant from a 
legal point of view, since the declaration of willingness to enter into political and other relations with a 
state or government does not constitute any concrete legal obligation.” 
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the right of that state against which the revolutionary attempt at secession is directed.50 
Although Kelsen’s observations are of interest, it appears clearly that even greater juridical 
weight is on the side of the declaratory theorists.51 What seems undeniably clear is that state 
practice does not in any way accept that the mere proclamation of the existence of a state from a 
part of a particular population instils within it international legal personality, and therefore 
makes it a subject of international law. What is primarily at issue is the capacity to uphold the 
rights and duties of statehood concurrent with the expectation that a territorial entity seeking 
self-administration has the capacity to invoke, successfully, international legal personality. 
Surely the most tangible manifestation of such capacity is through peer recognition by the inter-
national community of states as a state per se, although recognition, itself, is an ex post facto activ-
ity, as applicable to the determination of the start of a specific moment of legality. As J.L. Brierly 
writes: 
The better view is that the granting of recognition to a new State is not a ‘constitutive’ but a 
‘declaratory’ act; it does not bring into legal existence a State which did not exist before. A 
state may exist without being recognized, and it does exist in fact, then, whether or not it has been 
formally recognized by other States, it has a right to be treated by them as a State. The primary 
function of recognition is to acknowledge as a fact something which has hitherto been uncer-
tain, namely the independence of the body claiming to be a State, and to declare the recog-
nizing State’s readiness to accept the normal consequences of that fact, namely the usual 
courtesies of international intercourse.52 
Recognition in the practical context: Framing the theories in a context relevant to modern state-
hood 
The overarching concept to be borne in mind when considering the practical aspects of 
statehood is that it is a binary proposition, in that an entity either will or will not be instilled with 
international legal personality, from where it will take on all of the associated rights and respon-
sibilities commensurate with the doctrine of sovereign equality of states. The problem with the 
declaratory theory is its relative imprecision vis-à-vis the constitutive theory, in that the legal act 
of recognition by other states is an innately more precise instrument than is the identification of 
the particular moment whereby an emerging state becomes a state per se.53  
Even within the declaratory theory framework, Kelsen’s identification of separate legal 
and political acts is worthwhile, as if statehood were a mere legality, and yet not sufficiently tan-
gible to manifest sovereign equality per se without specific legal recognition,54 the role played by 
                                                                  
50 Id. at 610. 
51 Cf. Menon, supra note 46, at 163.: “Adherents to the view include Baty, Brierly, Cobbett, Erich, Goebel, 
Halleck, Jaffe, Lorimer, Moore, Nys, Phillimore, Scelle, Vattel, Westlake and Williams.” See also Int’l 
Law, supra note 45, at 252, citing the following in further support of the declaratory theory: 2 Annuiare de 
l’Institut de Droit Int’l 300 (1936); Inter-American Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Art. 3 
(1933); Charter of the Organization of American States, renumbered Art. 13 (1948, amended by Protocols 
of 1967-1993); and the ad hoc Arbitration Commission established by the EC Conference on Yugoslavia, 
Opinion No. 1, 31 ILM 1494 (1992). See also Québec decision, supra note 9, at para 142. 
52 J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations (6th ed., Waldock, 1963) 139, as cited in Menon, supra note 46, at 171. 
53 Cf. T.C. Chen, The International Law of Recognition 16 (1951) [hereinafter Chen]: “The most important 
part of departure between the constitutive and the declaratory theories lies in the question whether the le-
gal personality of a State exists prior to recognition, that, is to say, whether the unrecognized State can be a 
subject of international law, having capacity for rights and duties. On this point, there is no doubt that 
these writers [Rivier, Fauchille, and De Louter—that is, those chiefly critiqued by Lauterpacht in his 
analysis] are in support of the declaratory theory.” 
54 See Id. at 63.  
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recognition under the declaratory theory is largely “an assurance given to a new State that it will 
be permitted to hold its place and rank, in the character of an independent political organism, in 
the society of nations”.55 It furthermore serves “as an estoppel against any subsequent denial of 
the existence of the State”.56 Thus under the declaratory theory, it is possible that an entity taking 
the form of statehood, and therefore possessed with international legal personality, may go un-
recognised, for it is dubious whether Lauterpacht’s assertion under the constitutive theory 
framework that states have a duty to recognise entities which satisfy the criteria of statehood is, in 
fact, valid under a declaratory system, and this would be largely a political act on the part of non-
recognising states, in that the withholding of legal recognition of the new state has occurred. 
Indeed what seems the most likely arbiter of the constitutive/declaratory dichotomy in 
the modern age is a state’s admission to an intergovernmental organisation, the United Nations 
in particular.57 Although it could be argued that using membership in an intergovernmental or-
ganisation is little more than a repackaging of the constitutive theory, in that recognition is col-
lectivised into the multilateral form of membership in an intergovernmental organisation, to do 
so is to overlook the point that, under the declaratory theory, it is possible that a state can exist, 
and thus have international legal personality, without achieving full recognition across the in-
ternational community of states.58 Thus the obvious reality of the deliberate non-recognition of 
states is presented. What is most at issue here is not necessarily to further delineate between the 
two theories of recognition, but rather to observe the roles played by recognition in an era of a 
rapid increase in states concurrent with the decolonisation process, fuelled by the United Na-
tions itself. However, such is the level of controversy associated with recognition that the Inter-
national Law Commission—founded by the United Nations in 1947 to promote the progressive 
development of international law and its codification—has little to say on the topic. As James 
Crawford, a former ILC member himself, states: 
The Commission has spent much of its time on international transactions and obligations (the 
law of treaties, State responsibility, liability for injurious consequences, the law of interna-
tional watercourses, etc.) and very little time on questions of sovereignty. Of the 14 topics 
on its first work program, “recognition of States and Governments” is the only one which 
the Commission has never tackled and I doubt will ever tackle. The only work it has directly 
done on sovereignty issues was its work on state succession. That was an offshoot of the law 
of treaties: state succession is an area of intersection between the fields of sovereignty and 
obligation. In the end one might say that the implications so far as sovereignty were con-
cerned proved overwhelming, and the work on succession is regarded as only moderately 
successful.59 
                                                                  
55 Id. at 77, citing Hyde, Moore and Rivier. 
56 Id. 
57 Articles 3 and 4 of the UN Charter establish that membership is only open to States, and indeed UN 
membership has been instrumental in validating the independent statehood of postcolonial states in par-
ticular. See generally J. Dugard, Recognition and the United Nations (1987) [hereinafter Dugard], but cf. D. 
Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (2002), at 39-47 [hereinafter Raič]. 
58 Cf. Chen, supra note 53, at 17: “There is another group of writers, described by Professor Cavaré as mi-
constitutive, mi-declarative. These writers, in an effort to reconcile positive rules of law and social neces-
sity, advance the argument that recognition is declaratory as regards certain minimum rights of existence, 
but constitutive as regards more specific rights. Such a view is in reality a rejection of the constitutive 
view, in so far as it regards States as capable, even in the absence of recognition, of enjoying rights, how-
ever limited, under international law.” 
59 J. Crawford, Responsibility to the International Community as a Whole, 4th Snyder Lecture, delivered 5 
April 2000, available from lcil.law.cam.ac.uk (footnotes omitted), citing Report of the International Law 
Commission on the work of its 48th Session, 6 May-26 July 1996, UN Doc. A/51/10, at para. 162 & An-
nex II. But cf. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Interna-
tionally Wrongful Acts, at Articles 40 and 41, in Report of the International Law Commission, 53d 
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The question of ‘illegality’ and the (collective) non-recognition of states 
The remaining issue is that of the non-recognition of states in international law. John 
Dugard has directed considerable focus in this direction to the question of entities which have 
achieved the requirements of statehood as set forth in the Montevideo Convention, but where 
“it is absurd to contend that any of these entities [e.g. Rhodesia, Transeki, Bophuthatswana, 
Venda, Ciskei and, perhaps the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus] has achieved interna-
tional legal personality or acquired the status of ‘State’”.60 While not specifically concerned with 
the examples put forth in Dugard’s own analysis, the underlying premise of entities having the 
trappings of statehood but lacking recognition per se is to be considered. Indeed it may be the 
case that would-be ‘peoples’, claiming self-determination to the extent of recognition as external 
entities by other states, will have to justify their alteration of the status quo to the international 
community on the basis of the tangible contributions such actions would make towards the 
preservation of human life and dignity. It is therefore instantaneously debatable whether the ex-
amples put forth at the outset of Dugard’s analysis are those which inherently pursue such objec-
tives: Rhodesia clearly did not, while Bangladesh should be seen as having done so. 
What is at issue is the standard of government that would be assumed by the new state. 
Even before the entry into force of the international human rights covenants, scholars such as 
J.E.S. Fawcett were asserting what Dugard terms as a ‘new’ criterion of government,61 not par-
ticularly dissimilar from the additional recognition criteria established more clearly in the 
European context, resulting from the Declaration on the Guidelines of New States in Eastern 
Europe and in the Soviet Union, by the Arbitration Commission of the European Community’s 
Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia.62 Drawing upon this, what is at issue is the right to societal 
existence, equality amongst different groups within a state, and a willingness to allow recourse 
to postcolonial external self-determination in circumstances whereby internal self-
determination has proven insufficient, and is likely to remain so. This reflects the fact that the 
question of contested secession remains omnipresent in dealing with self-determination cases; 
however, the desirability or the achievability of such actions remains more in doubt. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Session, GAOR 50th Session, Supplement No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10: Article 40 states, “this chapter ap-
plies to the international responsibility which is entailed by a serious breach by a State of an obligation 
arising under a peremptory norm of general international law. A breach of such an obligation is serious if 
it involves a gross or systematic failure by the responsible State to fulfil the obligation.” Article 41 states, 
“States shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach within the meaning of 
article 40. No State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the meaning of 
article 40, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation. This article is without prejudice to 
the other consequences referred to in this Part and to such further consequences that a breach to which this 
chapter applies may entail under international law.” 
60 Dugard, supra note 57, at 123. 
61 Cf. J.E.S. Fawcett, The Law of Nations 38-39, as cited in Dugard, supra note 57, at 127: “The criterion of 
organized government is that there must be a central government having effective control over the na-
tional territory, for the purpose of making and executing all those decisions that good government entails. 
Here we may bring in the idea of self-determination. If there is a systemic denial to a substantial minority, 
and still more to a majority of people, of a place and say in the government, the criterion of organized 
government is not met.” Rhodesia’s denial of its citizens’ right to political participation, and the “virtually 
unanimous condemnation of the unilateral declaration of independence by the world community” further 
reinforce the distinction between what could be easily termed as discriminatory claims for statehood, and 
thus frivolous claims for statehood, as opposed to those formulated as antithetic to such claims; that is, 
those claims which genuinely reflect both the core of customary international human rights law and the 
notion of horizontal societal preservation, in the face of excessive vertical state consolidation. See also 
further discussion infra chapter five. 
62 See 31 ILM 1486 (1992) and discussion supra chapter two. 
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Before explaining this premise further, it would be helpful to clarify matters somewhat by 
returning momentarily return to Dugard’s analysis, for he draws reference to the principle of ex 
factis jus oritur, or a function designed to bring the law into line with a factual situation, which is 
a counterbalance to the principle of ex injuria jus non oritur, wherein no legal title can be de-
rived from an illegal act.63 Dugard states that prior to the codification of the principle of jus co-
gens in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, doctrine greatly favoured a policy of 
non-recognition of new states, and, indeed, the type of states under question being denied rec-
ognition were those exemplified by Rhodesia, the apartheid-era homeland states of South Africa 
and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.64 Were other states to subsequently recognise the 
states under examination being denied recognition, the principle of ex factis jus oritur would 
take precedence, and the legality of such states would go uncontested. What the principle of ex 
injuria jus non oritur does is to allow for a sort of vetting process against such initiatives, which 
hardly could be seen as accurately reflecting the genuine intent of the notion of internal self-
determination as derived from modern international law. But Dugard views the non-
recognition of such apparently illegitimate states as a sanction against their claims for independ-
ence put forth to the international community. In recalling his initial assertion that while these 
entities may satisfy the Montevideo Convention guidelines for statehood, they could not be seen 
as having international legal personality, he is able to conclude that “the principle of ex factis jus 
oritur has ceased to be seen as a necessary corollary to non-recognition”.65 He then begins a de-
tailed analysis of the roles played by peremptory norms and recognition, first concluding that 
states have a customary duty of non-recognition of new states when there has been a violation of 
a jus cogens norm.66 He furthermore states that the ex factis jus oritur principle retains validity as a 
general principle (or as a hybrid general principle/customary rule) for the basis of non-
recognition of circumstances “where the illegality has been confirmed by the political organs of 
the United Nations”,67 casting an eye to the 1971 Namibia Opinion before the ICJ.68 Finally, 
Dugard refers to actions of the Security Council, and, in particular, Article 25 of the Charter, 
obliging member States to carry out the Council’s resolutions and decisions, again formulating 
his argument primarily in the context of Namibia.69 
One substantive observation that should not go overlooked is that the type of state being 
addressed by Dugard in the course of his analysis, and that which is under present examination 
is completely different. This discussion is leading toward the assertion that persistently and con-
tinually threatened groups have a right to societal existence, either as collective groupings or as a 
new independent state. As such, there must be a specific measure of equality amongst citizens 
and citizen-groups within the state. Perhaps most significantly, the effectuation of this right is not 
expressly delineated by the make-up of existing state boundaries. Dugard’s analysis focuses 
mainly on questions whereby the international community of states is proscribed, or at least in-
hibited, from recognising the governmental actions claiming sovereignty over territorial entities 
as independent states, due to their dubious and, perhaps, illegal, policies and actions which 
bring about the question of statehood. More recently, Dugard and David Raič have reprised the 
question of collective non-recognition in a more modern formulation, as they succinctly state 
the following: 
                                                                  
63 Cf. [Recapitulation of the development of uti possidetis] section, supra chapter two. 
64 See Dugard, supra note 57, at 130-132. 
65 Id. at 135. 
66 Id. at 135-136. 
67 Id. at 136. 
68 See 1971 ICJ Rep. 16. 
69 Dugard, supra note 57, at 137.  
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Today, it is accepted that there are certain basic norms upon which the international order is 
founded and that these are peremptory and may not be derogated from under any circum-
stances. The modern law of non-recognition takes cognisance of this development. An act in 
violation of a norm having the character of jus cogens is illegal and is therefore null and void. 
This applies to the creation of States and to the acquisition of territory. States are under a 
duty not to recognise such acts under customary international law and in accordance with 
the general principles of law. […] In accordance with this doctrine, the United Nations has 
directed States not to recognise claimant States crated on the basis of aggression (e.g. the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus), systematic racial discrimination and the denial of hu-
man rights (e.g. South Africa’s Bantustan States) and the denial of self-determination (e.g. Ka-
tanga and Rhodesia).70 
Furthermore, the ILC has addressed the non-recognition of states in its 2001 Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,71 at Articles 40 and 41:72 
Article 40 – Application of this chapter 
1. This chapter applies to the international responsibility which is entailed by a serious breach 
by a State of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law. 
2. A breach of such an obligation is serious if it involves a gross or systematic failure by the 
responsible State to fulfil the obligation. 
Article 41 – Particular consequences of a serious breach of an obligation under this chapter 
1. States shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach within 
the meaning of article 40. 
2. No State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the mean-
ing of article 40, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation. 
3. This article is without prejudice to the other consequences referred to in this part and to 
such further consequences that a breach to which this chapter applies may entail under in-
ternational law 
What is at issue here are circumstances whereby claims are sent out to the international 
community for political independence and territorial sovereignty on the basis of dubious, and 
usually coercive illegal, actions taken by the central government of an existing state against a 
segment of its population, usually in its Hinterland.73 To that end, even if one were to declare 
self-determination of peoples as a peremptory norm, an appropriate rejoinder would follow: 
what kind of self-determination? When Héctor Gros Espiell, in the late 1970s, proclaimed self-
determination to ‘necessarily’ have the character of jus cogens,74 he was using his seminal study to 
refer to self-determination as having the form of decolonisation, for that was initial legal form 
taken by self-determination of peoples in the United Nations context. Most likely, such a formu-
lation served to negate the possibility of ex-colonialists to change their minds and re-colonise 
newly independent states. But it is much less certain that self-determination of peoples, in all its 
modern forms and permutations, holds up as splendidly now as it did to the jus cogens test. A 
similar ambivalence is reflected in the present analysis with regard to self-determination being 
an obligation erga omnes, as reference must be made to the 1995 East Timor case before the ICJ, 
                                                                  
70 J. Dugard and D. Raič, The role of recognition in the law and practice of secession, in M.G. Kohen (ed.) 
Secession: International Law Perspectives 101 (2006). 
71 See J. Crawford, J. Peel and S. Olleson, The ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts: Completion of the Second Reading, 12 EJIL 963 (2001). 
72 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (UN Doc. 
A/56/10) 
73 The question of peremptory norms is much clearer in the first example than in the latter, and therefore 
the present thesis is concerned with peremptory norms only in an ancillary sense. 
74 See H.G. Espiell, The Right of Self-Determination: Implementation of United Nations Resolutions, UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.1 (1980), at para 74. 
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in which the Court inter alia declared self-determination to have an erga omnes character ema-
nating from the Charter and from state practice and termed it as “irreproachable [as] one of the 
essential principles of customary international law”.75 
Indeed, the aim at present is certainly not to refute attempts to give self-determination, in-
cluding the eventual possibility of postcolonial external self-determination, the status of a 
peremptory norm. Rather, it is to say that the nature of the analytical form—that is, the would-be 
independent state—is completely different than that put forth by Dugard, in his book on Recog-
nition and the United Nations, in that such a form of external self-determination would be effec-
tuated to promote, rather than hinder, the promotion and protection of human rights. To that 
end, the principle of ex factis jus oritur may be of use, for when the underlying factual circum-
stances involve primarily the existence of massive and systemic human rights violations targeted 
against a specific segment of the overall population of a state, such circumstances may contrib-
ute to the recognition of a new entity. So, while it is now relatively uncontroversial, post-
Rhodesia, to state that “it appears then that a new rule has come into existence, prohibiting enti-
ties from claiming statehood if their creation is in violation of an applicable right to self-
determination”,76 it is still controversial to advocate independent statehood for entities claiming 
statehood, on the basis of violations of an applicable right to (internal) self-determination. Nev-
ertheless, these are precisely the types of situations most apparent under circumstances of post-
colonial self-determination.  
One way to recapitulate the ideas presented herewith is through the analysis provided by 
Stefan Talmon in his interesting thesis on recognition of governments (as opposed to recogni-
tion of new states). Given that states and governments are virtually indistinguishable at the outset 
of the process of new state creation—which, in the African context, is a phenomenon that is of-
ten self-perpetuating well beyond the initial period of new state creation—some of his com-
ments with regard to secession, decolonisation or partition of states may prove illustrative. 
Talmon uncontroversially assigns a juridical weight to the legal act of recognition.77 More con-
troversially, however, there may well be territorial entities with indigenous political structures 
which reflect genuine governmental control. This is to say that such governmental control 
serves to negate coercion as a matter of practice. Thus, it may also appear that ‘effective’ govern-
ance need not necessarily emanate from a political capital and capitol, nor be necessarily dis-
persed, in a Weberian sense, throughout the land, and as such, to all corners of a state conceived 
as much of arbitrariness as of societal harmoniousness. ‘Effective’ governance can, indeed, be 
formed in much more localised territorial elements, and as such, as exceptional measures, it 
may well be the case that there are functional governments, and judiciaries, and legislatures, 
which go unrecognised by other sovereign states, in as much as those states are unwilling to 
make the political determination of new state creation, as well as the fact that the principle of uti 
possidetis juris may trap otherwise self-governing entities into administrative, political and judi-
cial structures which actually contribute to their repression, rather than their development. 
                                                                  
75 Case concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 1995 ICJ Rep. 102. But consider that the Court 
went on to state that it “considers that the erga omnes character of a norm and the rule of consent to juris-
diction [of self-determination claims before the ICJ] are two different things. Whatever the nature of the 
obligations invoked, the Court could not rule on lawfulness of the conduct of a State when its judgement 
would imply an evaluation of the lawfulness of the conduct of another State which is not a party to the 
case. Where this is so, the Court cannot act, even if the right in question is erga omnes.” 
76 J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law 106 (1st ed, 1979). 
77 Cf. S. Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular Reference to Gov-
ernments in Exile 95 (1998) [hereinafter Talmon]: “As long as the sovereignty and independence of a 
(new) State have not been recognized its government cannot be regarded as a sovereign authority and 
therefore cannot be recognized de jure.” 
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But in mitigation, in a world whereby universal standards of human rights is the norm, ex 
factis jus oritur is not without its possible employment in circumstances whereby a paucity of 
human rights can be readily observed. It may even be the case that, in postcolonial circum-
stances, factual circumstances can make contributions to the reality of governance in a particu-
lar territory, even if such activities are not products of recognised governmental authority per 
se.78 To accept the notion at hand is to accept that e.g. certain effectivités, rooted in international 
human rights preservation, can be territorially manifested regardless of whether such manifesta-
tions come directly from the state, or whether they emerge from agents acting under the colour 
of state authority, or indeed, whether they are reflective of actions taken by state, or non-state, 
agents operating in peripheral geographic areas. Although such activities may be effectuated by 
individuals or groups not formally instilled with governmental authority per se, local popula-
tions may derive benefit from such activities in a way that compliments such governmental 
authority, or indeed supplements deficiencies in governmental administration. Such a reality 
further serves to demonstrate how the administration of modern territorial statehood is any-
thing but monolithic. 
The non-recognition of a self-administering territorial entity: The uniqueness of the So-
maliland example 
Although the British were active in colonising the Horn of Africa and the northern terri-
tory of Somaliland, after occupying Egypt, Somalia’s previous colonising power, the integration 
of Somaliland into the state of Somalia is something of an anomaly. The southern part of the cur-
rent state of Somalia itself was an Italian colony, and indeed, following the second world war, in 
which Italian Somaliland was briefly conquered from the British, the two territories became in-
dependent within days of each other, and in 1960 were thereafter merged into the present terri-
torial form, the state of Somalia. The state had a decentralised, weak governmental form from 
the outset, and by 1969, a coup d’état by the army commander Siad Barre was followed by a brief 
period of social development, particularly in the reaffirmation of the Somali ethnicity, but in-
herent deficiencies in the state led to long periods of brutal military dictatorship, armed conflict 
with neighbouring Ethiopia, and eventual civil war. By the 1990s, a circumstance of perpetual 
conflict, without obvious reason or solution, had become the status quo, and Somalia became 
widely viewed as the sine qua non of a ‘failed’ state due to its anarchy in the complete absence of a 
government. Despite intervention by the international community through the United Nations 
in particular,79 the anarchical situation prevailed under the difficult circumstances on the 
ground. Although a transitional regime has been officially enacted since 2002, the effectiveness 
of the government is highly questionable, and clan-based violence continues to be perpetuated 
as a matter of course on Somali territory. As one commentator writes: 
At the beginning of 2003, Somalia, after more than a decade, remains—and this is despite the 
last round of peace talks in Eldoret, Kenya, in October 2002 (where the [transitional gov-
ernment] had the doubtful honour of being considered as merely one of many Somali fac-
tions)—the “only country in the world totally devoid of a functioning central government and 
no less than twenty unsuccessful national-level peace initiatives since 1991” on its record. It 
appears that in the near future Somalia will remain a ‘black hole’ where ‘regional authorities’, 
armed factions, and warlords continue to create chaos and instability, as a result of their con-
test for power.80 
                                                                  
78 See discussion infra chapter five in this study. 
79 See Security Council resolution 751 (1992), creating a United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNO-
SOM), and Security Council resolution 814 (1993), which expanded the mission’s mandate. 
80 G. Kreijen, State Failure, Sovereignty and Effectiveness 71 (2004), quoting research by the International 
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This has led another commentator to note that: 
[N]o entity—except for an entity within ‘Somalia’, namely Somaliland in the north—has 
claimed any Somali territories, and thereby effectively challenged its ‘undiminished’ statehood 
on the international plane. Somalia’s statehood has rather been presumed in accordance with 
international law doctrine, particularly since efforts for the reinstitution of effective (central) 
governance have not yet been abandoned and there remains some hope that central author-
ity will eventually be re-established.81 
Nevertheless, as Schoiswohl suggests, the territory corresponding to the former British 
Somaliland has manifested certain effectivités despite the chronic ineffectiveness of the Somali 
state and has set a clear pathway advocating its own existence as an independent state. This is 
clear when considering Somaliland has drafted, implemented and revised a National Charter,82 
which was overwhelmingly approved by a referendum held on 31 May 2001,83 and whereby ar-
ticle one of which proclaims the existence of a “sovereign and independent country known as 
‘The Republic of Somaliland’. Furthermore, although Somaliland is not an ethnic monolith, it 
has been largely spared the warlord violence so prevalent throughout the rest of Somalia. In-
deed, Somaliland appears to present most of the criteria for statehood as per the Montevideo 
Convention, including the ‘more fluid’ aspects of statehood related to governance. According to 
Schoiswohl, this includes a two-house parliament, political parties, periodic elections, central, 
regional and local government, a functioning judiciary, as well as both a police force and na-
tional armed forces.84 However, Somaliland undoubtedly finds itself firmly located within the 
larger Somali state, following the post-independence merger of the former British and Italian 
colonies. 
To remedy this circumstance through, conceivably, an act of postcolonial external self-
determination would essentially imply a reversal of this merger. Schoiswohl initially posits that 
this would imply recognition of the very brief time—five days—in which Somaliland was an in-
dependent state prior to the formation of the current state, a retroactive rejection of the merger, 
particularly in light of the absence of government elsewhere in the state and the invocation of the 
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, in that the expectations of the merged states in terms of effective 
administration had not nearly been met and so constituted a fundamental change in circum-
stances from what was expected at the time of merger.85 However, Schoiswohl goes on to ob-
serve that any rebus sic stantibus argument is flawed, as the fundamental change of circumstances 
would be the remedy of 1969 coup d’état, which led to the tyranny of Said Barre being waged in 
both Italian and British Somaliland. By the time Barre went into exile, and subsequently died in 
1991, “Somaliland’s alleged right to restoration thus could, if at all, only be asserted against the 
suppressive regime itself, but not against the south as such. Once Barre’s regime had finally been 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Crisis Group. 
81 M. Schoiswohl, Status and (Human Rights) Obligations of Non-Recognized De Facto Regimes in Inter-
national Law: The Case of ‘Somaliland’ 132 (2004) [hereinafter Schoiswohl]. 
82 Document available on www.somalilandgov.com, accessed May 2005. 
83 See Schoiswohl, supra note 81, at 133, citing the Initiative and Referendum Institute, Final Report of the 
Initiative and Referendum Institute’s Election Monitoring Team, 27 July 2002, available on 
www.iandrinstitute.org/international/FinalSomalilandReport7-24-01combined.pdf, accessed August 
2004. 
84 See Id. at 134-38. 
85 See Id. at 152-54. He continues, Id. at 155, footnotes omitted: “[…] the Somali Republic, though lacking 
unambiguous legal foundation, proceeded on the basis of a ‘de facto union’. [A historical] observation is 
most crucial in evaluating the assertion that the act of unification was invalid and that Somaliland would 
thus have a (historic) title to restoration: despite any legal uncertainties and initial opposition manifested 
in the turnout and results of the referendum, no corresponding claim to independence had been advanced 
[…].” 
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ousted in 1991, Somaliland lost its ‘oppressor’ and, with him, the only possible addressee of any 
doubtful right to restoration”.86 The remaining legal options for effectuating Somaliland’s claims 
for sovereignty would be principally through the self-determination pathway, as Somalia ac-
ceded to the ICCPR on 24 January 1990. Although this may indeed lead to increased levels of 
autonomy within the Somali state, Somaliland’s referendum on its National Charter is purpose-
ful and unambiguous and raises the question of Somaliland’s secession from the existing Somali 
state. The problem with collective groupings claiming postcolonial external self-determination 
is that the claimants most likely to achieve this ambitious goal are those that have demonstrably 
presented evidence showing they are, in fact, being harmed by the preservation of the status quo, 
generally due to being the recipient of targeted attacks by the state itself. The Somali situation, as 
it is relatively uncontroversial to observe that the Somali state is a ‘failed state’, presents a para-
dox, because in view of the dominant declaratory theory of recognition, Somaliland does ap-
pear to fulfil all relevant criteria of statehood, except for the most overarching of all: actual acts of 
recognition by peer states as an independent state per se. What this serves to demonstrate most 
clearly is that regardless of doctrinal theory, in practical terms new state recognition is driven 
primarily by the political motivations of states, and the non-recognition of a territorial entity, 
which would ‘otherwise’ effectively manifest sovereignty and uphold territorial integrity, is 
largely inconsequential as a compulsory matter. 
The evolution of territorially-defined collective rights in light of the Montevideo 
criteria 
 Although minority rights are of a tremendous significance, whereby individual citizens 
are made to achieve parity with other individual citizens of a state, the territorial definitional na-
ture of ‘peoples’ per se may lend itself to a somewhat different interpretive significance, which 
will feature more prominently in the present analysis.87 As well as comprising a dominant vari-
able in the equation of statehood, territorialism is also a predominant feature of a ‘people’ that 
collectively seeks to assert, define, advocate and implement collective self-government within 
the established framework of an existing sovereign state, at least in the first instance. Such proce-
dures are likely to prove contentious, and difficulties in their implementation may be widely 
evidenced. Particularly in the newer, postcolonial states, where human and financial capital 
may be limited and infrastructures are likely to be considerably underdeveloped, the achieve-
ment of full measures of ‘self-determination’ is a particularly challenging, perpetual task. 
It must be stated, however, that although statehood is a most specific legality, both univer-
sal in scope and widely accepting of definitional criteria rooted in, the Montevideo Convention, 
in particular, the phenomenon of universal statehood certainly evidences the capacity for it to 
prove discordant with local realities. Governance, government, hegemony, acquiescence and 
effectiveness are all socio-juridical terms with particular meanings and practical implications. 
Although many, perhaps even most, states arising from colonial situations in the period follow-
ing the two world wars have emerged into nominally effective and tangibly functional, if not 
underdeveloped, territorial state entities, the sustainability of these circumstances may be lim-
ited. To this end, it may be recalled that the postcolonial entities under consideration surely 
could not be considered ‘nation-states’ per se in the same manner as colonising states could lay 
greater claim to such composition. 
                                                                  
86 Id. at 157. 
87 In the following chapter, the ‘minorities’ concept is more fully integrated into the overall legal analysis, 
in that the evaluation of the ‘collective groupings’ to be found in certain geographic regions, such as sub-
Saharan Africa, may also be found within established postcolonial state borders. 
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There is an expectation in international law that states will uphold the requirements of 
sovereign equality associated with statehood, in particular the concepts of independence, terri-
torial integrity, effectiveness, pacta sunt servanda and, increasingly, an expectation of some 
measure of accountability in terms of a state’s administrative procedures. By this measure, again 
largely shaped through an understanding that Montevideo Convention criteria, are the most 
readily established criteria of statehood, a large percentage of ex-colonial territories have 
emerged into independent states and will be able to demonstrate continually the fulfilment of 
these criteria, and, as such, the question of statehood will not arise. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, a state recognised by other states and fulfilling the general legal criteria for statehood is, 
quite simply, a state. 
The question, however, of collective groupings is complicated by a certain amalgam of 
circumstances, whereby a geographically-contiguous ‘people’ has a right to internal (and poten-
tially external) self-determination, a ‘minority’, not typically being subject to internal territorial 
definition or demarcation has a right to parity with the majority, and an ‘indigenous people’ has 
direct access to a particular set of rights and privileges systemically designed to preserve particu-
lar traditions and patterns of behaviour. In those circumstances where the tension between the 
‘state’ and its component parts becomes extreme, particularly in those circumstances whereby 
the postcolonial context produces a reality fraught with a complicating set of social, economic 
and geopolitical pressures, coercive governmental behaviour may be directed against potions of 
its citizenry, as matters of policy, or of evidenced practice.88 
Under such circumstances, the ‘collective groupings’ being examined in this chapter find 
their most obvious definition through the commonality of an inherent desire to rectify these 
situations and to achieve, in the main, a measure of self-administration (i.e., self-determination 
of peoples, to which the internal and postcolonial external forms share a common juridical 
pedigree), parity with other citizens (i.e., minority rights), or recognition as an established, dif-
ferentiated group with distinct linguistic, cultural and social characteristics (i.e., indigenous 
peoples’ rights). 
The ability to invoke successfully collective rights by collective groupings is practically 
limited by the capacity of the collective grouping to define persuasively and advocate its claims. 
In short, the collective grouping must be recognised, primarily within the state in question, and, 
with ancillary measure, by the international community of states. This study has focused in the 
main on sub-Saharan Africa as its practical reference point because, as will be elaborated in 
chapter four, sub-Saharan Africa is a widely diverse and dynamic region for the consideration 
of collective groupings generally. What can be said with certainly is that, in the sub-Saharan Af-
rican context, the legacy of colonialism is shared by the likes of the administrative structures 
formed in e.g. Accra, Ghana and Dakar, Senegal as well as those in e.g. Khartoum, Sudan and 
Kinshasa, DR Congo. Although such situations would reflect profoundly different sets of cir-
cumstances in terms of economic development, social stability and effective territorial admini-
                                                                  
88 As a reference point, it should not go overlooked that this study is written from a perspective generally 
seeking to incorporate the effects of postcolonial circumstances into an analytical legal framework. As ob-
served by one commentator: “As with the end of slavery, the end of colonial rule seemed a hopeless ven-
ture at the start and an inevitable outcome by the end. The precipitous end of colonial rule resulted partly 
from the devastating civil wars among the European colonial powers from 1914 to 1945, which literally 
bled the colonial powers, exhausted from economically, and discredited them morally. Still, the triumph 
was one of mass political action and the awakening of vast publics around the world to the ideals of self-
rule. Without glossing over the tragic violence, cynicism, political failure, and despotism that often re-
placed imperialism, we can marvel at the phenomenal and positive spread of the Enlightenment ideal of 
government by consent.” Cf. J.D. Sachs, The End of Poverty 362-363 (2005). 
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stration, the underlying point is that the universalism of statehood is projected not only into in-
ter-temporal European and post-colonial circumstances, but also develops with a similar dy-
namism, as colonialism becomes more of a historical relic and postcolonial statehood is 
increasingly forced to address substantive claims of collective rights. Thus, while fundamentally 
rejecting racism and négritude outright, it cannot go overlooked that the smaller and more inte-
grated, rather prosperous capitals of Accra and Dakar are faced with considerably less compli-
cated factual circumstances, in terms of territorial administration, than in Khartoum and 
Kinshasa. It seems likely that geography plays a formative role in this comparison, in that one 
pan-African commonality, however, is a definitional form largely shaped by a tendency to-
wards profound economic underdevelopment, sprawling geographic reach and certain evi-
dence of discordance in municipal affairs,89 but the scope and extent of such malfeasance is 
considerably more tangible, and therefore more juridically significant in the latter of such cir-
cumstances. 
There are, therefore, obvious, workaday circumstances of administrative deficiency, 
coupled with the quintessence of systemic dysfunction which may well lend credibility to 
claims of collective rights under the aforementioned three main forms of ‘collective groupings’ 
(under which ‘self-determination’ is loosely grouped with ‘minority rights’ and ‘indigenous 
peoples’ rights’). Self-determination is particularly relevant in postcolonial states, in particular, 
those having long since been the subject of speculation on the forms functional incorporation 
into the global state system.90 Although this formulation lends credence to the notion that col-
lective groupings may be judicially formed in both complicated and uncomplicated factual cir-
cumstances alike, care should be taken when formulating an overall conceptual picture to avoid 
assuming factual circumstances in situations on the ground, which are, in fact, worse than they 
may otherwise appear at first glance. As one commentator has stated: 
[T]here remains the possibility that a particular people may be treated systematically by the 
central government in such a way as to become, in effect, non-self-governing with respect to 
the rest of the state. By analogy with GA Resolution 1514 (XV), Principle IV, if they are arbi-
trarily placed in a position of subordination, the question of external self-determination is 
surely raised. Measures grossly discriminating against the people of a territory on grounds of 
ethnic origin or cultural distinctiveness may effectively single out and thereby define the terri-
tory concern as non-self-governing according to existing criteria, reinforcing or even consti-
tuting the case for external self-determination by the people of that territory. 
But situations of internal colonization are very much the exception. In the normal case it is clear 
that ethnic or cultural distinctiveness of groups within the state, whether or not it qualifies 
those groups as ‘peoples’ for the purpose of the principle of self-determination in interna-
tional law, does not entitle them to secede from the state of which they are part. Despite 
this, there is a growing acceptance that, for real equality to be achieved for such groups 
within the state, measures of a collective kind may be necessary. These can include measures 
of local autonomy, provisions for separate representation in legislative and executive bodies 
at central or regional levels, land rights (especially in the case of indigenous groups with his-
torical links to areas of land) and so on.91 
                                                                  
89 Indeed while the Ghanan and Senegalese circumstances are comparatively preferable, the fragility of this 
reality is unquestionable, as Côte d’Ivoire certainly would have otherwise been viewed as a paragon of 
stability in the decades immediately following its independence from France. 
90 Cf. W.V. O’Brien and U.H. Goebel, United States Recognition Policy Toward the New Nations, in W.V. 
O’Brien (ed.), The New Nations in International Law and Diplomacy 98 (1965) [hereinafter O’Brien and 
Goebel]: “… [t]he emergence of so many states, virtually all in Asia and Africa, has naturally caused 
speculation on the effect of all of these non-Western states on international law and diplomacy. One side 
of this subject, and possibly the most important in the long run, concerns the behavior of the new nations 
themselves. It is still rather early, however, to develop this side in depth.” 
91 J. Crawford, The Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its Development and Future, in P. 
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Thus, although neo-colonialism is unlikely to be widespread, the possibility for the phe-
nomenon to exist, or for evidence to exist that factual circumstances have been driven by that 
phenomenon, cannot necessarily be excluded. Surely such circumstances would be of greater 
practical and administrative dysfunction than would be otherwise observed in postcolonial 
states lacking sustainable economic and social development, but otherwise exhibiting a level of 
social cohesion sufficient so as to continue to reinforce the validity and legitimacy of the state it-
self. The juridical examination of modern territorial statehood undergoes a perpetual state of 
critical evolution, as law is both defined by, and dependent upon, human behaviour, particu-
larly in circumstances whereby collectivités submit credible claims for recognition to the states of 
which they are citizens. Such claims need not necessarily be minded to have been invoked in re-
sponse to circumstances of neo-colonialism per se, although they may well serve to document 
substantial and fundamental violations of individual and collective human rights.  
It may be the case that neo-colonial circumstances, or situations of ‘internal colonisation’ 
would correspond most closely with situations likely to be found on the outermost cultural and 
geographic extremes of postcolonial states, e.g. South Sudan and Darfur, the eastern part of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, easternmost Chad, and in many of the northernmost regions of 
the West African states.92 The sub-state entity may be faced with a power structure concentrated 
around the apparatus of a central government in a distant capital. The collective grouping will in 
theory be making claims to this government, from which, again theoretically, a response will be 
forthcoming. In practice, however, the capacity for such inter-societial administrative function-
ality will be limited. Indeed in the case of Darfur or the eastern part of the DR Congo, such for-
malities are purely fictional. To complicate matters further, the international law governing 
collective groupings is particularly definitional in character, with an implication of subsequent 
vagueness revolving around the notion of sub-state collective rights as human rights, while hu-
man rights litigation is the subject of municipal law in the first instance, before emerging onto 
the international plane, following the exhaustion of local remedies. 
When collective rights are unlikely to be recognised as such by the encompassing state in 
question, and the international community as a whole and by extension, the concept of ‘internal 
self-determination’ fails the test of sustainability. This is a different phenomenon than that of a 
regional or national government, e.g. Quebec, asserting that the central government has failed to 
negotiate in good faith on its claims for (external) self-determination. Rather, it is more akin to 
the circumstance whereby particular measures of internal self-determination prove insufficient 
to achieve an effective level of self-administration. In the most extreme of circumstances on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Alston (ed.), Peoples’ Rights 64-65 (2001), emphasis added. 
92 The situation in Darfur is particularly challenging as it may eventually be proven to have a genocidal 
character; however, the Security Council, following an International Commission on Inquiry, concluded 
that genocidal intent could not be definitively linked to the central government. See Report of the Interna-
tional Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, 25 January 2005, not 
issued as a UN document, available from http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf, at para 
640. But cf. Sudan ‘backs’ Janjaweed fighters, BBC News, 18 October 2006, available from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6060976.stm: “A man identified only as ‘Ali’ told the BBC's 
Newsnight programme that Sudanese ministers gave express orders for the activities of his unit, which 
included rape and killing children. ‘The Janjaweed don't make decisions. The orders always come from the 
government,’ he said. ‘They gave us orders, and they say that after we are trained they will give us guns 
and ammunition.’ ‘Ali’ - who is now seeking asylum in Britain - said the men who had trained them were 
wearing the uniforms of the Sudanese military, adding that Interior Minister Abdul Rahim Muhammad 
Hussein was a ‘regular visitor’.” See also Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democ-
ratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium 2002 ICJ Rep. 3. 
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ground, a tangible measure of ‘internal self-determination’ could even be measured by a cease-
fire or other cessation of hostilities, particularly involving activities directed against civilian 
populations. As such, the positive definition of a ‘collective grouping’ is largely dependent upon 
the argument underlying a collective grouping’s self-identification, and the general political 
climate governing the interactions between governmental capital and political Hinterland. It 
seems to be unlikely that in the most extreme factual situations (i.e., those most akin to ‘internal 
colonisation’), the achievement of group rights by collective groupings will come to fruition 
without a fundamental change in factual circumstances on the ground. Internal self-
determination, then, could well be a difficult proposition to imagine. Indeed, it may be an ut-
terly incredible proposition, as should be seen from Darfur. Yet, in addition, the notion that ex-
ternal self-determination would act as a panacea when the attainment of internal self-
determination appeared unlikely or problematic, seems similarly difficult to comprehend. As 
Christian Tomuschat writes: 
It is abundantly clear, therefore, that international practice from Africa, the continent where 
the greatest number of incongruities between ethnic lines and State boundary lines can be 
observed, strongly speaks against acknowledging a right of secession being enjoyed by ethnic 
groups. In fact, in countries like Nigeria, where roughly 250 linguistic and ethnic groups exist, 
and Cameroon, where the number of indigenous languages rises to more than 120, the appli-
cation of that legal proposition would lead to nonsensical results through infinite fragmenta-
tion which could hardly be stopped at any given point if no additional criteria were 
introduced, such as the viability of a potential State entity. Yet, the available texts do not 
mention such additional requirements—quite obviously because it was never thought that 
the assertion of self-determination could end up in such a chaotic state of affairs. This, again, 
confirms that the presumed premise—the existence of an unlimited right of secession for 
every ethnic group—must be wrong.93 
A situation develops whereby, in the most extreme postcolonial circumstances, the 
achievement of any measure of internal self-determination seems farcical, yet the threshold to 
external self-determination is held restrictively high. The point remains that collectivités will con-
tinue to bring an onus on the state, supported if need be, through actions by the international 
community,94 determining that these circumstances do exist and that a remedy is required. The 
greatest problem with this formulation is that the potential for the most extreme factual situa-
tions on the ground to retain that status is considerable.  
However, an emerging point worthy of greater consideration is the reality that notions of 
sovereignty have considerably and tangibly evolved since the historical period of absolute sov-
ereignty associated with classical legal positivism. Indeed, as can be easily observed, one of the 
most significant developments, at the outset of the 21st century, has been action by the United 
Nations to reinforce the linkages between rights and responsibilities, both between states and 
individuals. 
 
 
                                                                  
93 C. Tomuschat, Secession and self-determination, in M.G. Kohen (ed.), Secession: International Law Per-
spectives 29 (2006). 
94 U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 9 Sep-
tember 2004 that genocide was occurring in Darfur, although whether this action has served the Darfur 
people well is perfectly questionable, in that it has proven to be of little practical effect in the years follow-
ing its pronouncement. This action further follows that taken in the House of Representatives in 
H.Con.Res. 467 (21 July 2004), resolving that Congress “declares that the atrocities unfolding in Darfur, 
Sudan are genocide”. 
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The responsibility to protect populations and the methods of accommodating collective group-
ings 
The effectuation of postcolonial, and indeed post-cold war,95 self-determination never 
occurs in a vacuum. Particularly for collectivités hoping to achieve the status of a ‘people’ and the 
level of self-administration associated therewith, questions of potential territorial modifications 
and the associated questions of administration may also arise. The foremost initial challenge for 
a newly independent state, a self-determining ‘people’ or a minority group is to evaluate the 
merit of an entity’s particular claims. Many states will devote considerable effort toward denying 
the factual existence of a substantive claim by collective groupings. Indeed, as well, many col-
lective groupings will lack sufficient resources to be able to advocate their claims sufficiently. Al-
ternatively, states may strongly respond that no established procedure exists to attempt 
rectification of the situation. However, (viz. Greenland’s autonomy from Denmark and the 
devolution of powers in the British Isles) internal self-determination may also be achieved on 
the basis of mutual consent, as allocation of certain powers away from a central governmental 
establishment need not be necessarily contested.  
It is never straightforward to ascribe a particular legal status to postcolonial collective 
groupings beyond the usual categorisation into the established forms of ‘self-determination of 
peoples’, ‘minority rights’ and ‘indigenous peoples’ rights’. Accordingly, the underlying ques-
tion, and thus the primary focus of this chapter, is how collective groupings become ‘recognised’ 
by both municipal and international legal frameworks and once ‘recognised’ per se, how those 
entities are able to function, not as independent states, but as, primarily, self-administering terri-
torial regions within established states. 
As the frameworks both for ‘peoples’ rights’ and ‘minority rights’ are defined primarily in 
the context of international law and international human rights law in particular, this is a cir-
cumstance whereby international law itself has a direct and relevant role to play in the territorial 
administration of an entity, in that it defines the form and function of a ‘people’ or ‘minority’. 
Such a process, from the perspective of public international law, involves evaluating specific 
circumstances allocating established legal principles according to their connection to particular 
facts and implementing decisions taken on this basis.96 The fundamental juridical problem is 
that the set of circumstances between the official recognition of claims by collective groupings 
and the official recognition of claims by ‘new-state entities’, as it were, share both similar cir-
cumstances and different legal definitions. The ‘similar circumstances’ are that an emerging en-
tity seeks acknowledgement from more established entities. The ‘different legal definitions’ 
reflect that fact that, concerning newly emerging states, their definitional form is exclusively 
based on external, Montevideo criteria, whereas for collective groupings, definitional criteria, 
while being not wholly dissimilar, are also significantly more relativist and therefore dependent 
upon individual circumstance, given the conceptual overlap between the separate regimes of 
‘self-determination’ and ‘minority rights’. 
This dilemma reflects a problem common to entities seeking a specific legal recognition, 
either as independent entities or as component parts of a municipal, recognised ‘state’. Although 
the concept of ‘recognition’ as a legal concept per se is certainly set in the context of peer-state 
recognition, many of the same underlying processes are also transferable to sub-state situations. 
                                                                  
95 Viz. the unification of Germany, the separation of Czechoslovakia and the dissolution of Yugoslavia. 
96 Cf. Crawford, 2nd ed., supra note 4, at 117: “It will be seen that in each of these cases the problem of 
identification [of the units of self-determination] has been solved in practice by processes of agreement or 
at least acquiescence.” 
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Whenever collective groupings present, through established legal channels, coherent argu-
ments for the legal recognition of specific claims made within the frameworks of ‘peoples’ 
and/or ‘minority’ rights, states will be called upon to provide a similarly coherent procedural 
framework for the evaluation and eventual effectuation of such claims, both within their own 
territories as well as for the recognition of such claims, on the international plane.  
This line of argumentation has been afforded significant structural enhancement by the 
United Nations’ 2000 Millennium Declaration, which makes clear that states have a concrete ob-
ligation to respect claims for collective self-administration and individual equality by their citi-
zens.97 These obligations were given considerable further definition in the 2005 World Summit, 
in UN Doc. A/RES/60/1 (24 October 2005), which reaffirmed the 2000 Declaration five years af-
ter its proclamation. This is most evident with regard to paragraphs concerning human rights 
and conflict prevention, but what is particularly notable is the groundbreaking ‘responsibility to 
protect populations’, now colloquially referred to as ‘R2P’, mentioned in paragraphs 138 and 
139 of the GA resolution (with emphasis added): 
Human rights. 121. We reaffirm that all human rights are universal, indivisible, interre-
lated, interdependent and mutually reinforcing and that all human rights must be treated in a 
fair and equal manner, on the same footing and with the same emphasis. While the signifi-
cance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious 
backgrounds must be borne in mind, all States, regardless of their political, economic and cul-
tural systems, have the duty to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental free-
doms. 
122. We emphasize the responsibilities of all States, in conformity with the Charter, to re-
spect human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction of any kind as to 
race, colour, sex, language or religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status. […] 
127. We reaffirm our commitment to continue making progress in the advancement of the 
human rights of the world’s indigenous peoples at the local, national, regional and interna-
tional levels, including through consultation and collaboration with them, and to present for 
                                                                  
97 Cf. United Nations Millennium Declaration, UN Doc. A/RES/55/2 (18 September 2000), para 6: “We 
consider certain fundamental values to be essential to international relations in the twenty-first century. 
These include: 
Freedom. Men and women have the right to live their lives and raise their children in dignity, free 
from hunger and from the fear of violence, oppression or injustice. Democratic and participatory govern-
ance based on the will of the people best assures these rights. 
Equality. No individual and no nation must be denied the opportunity to benefit from develop-
ment. The equal rights and opportunities of women and men must be assured.  
Solidarity. Global challenges must be managed in a way that distributes the costs and burdens 
fairly in accordance with basic principles of equity and social justice. Those who suffer or who benefit 
least deserve help from those who benefit most.  
Tolerance. Human beings must respect one other, in all their diversity of belief, culture and lan-
guage. Differences within and between societies should be neither feared nor repressed, but cherished as a 
precious asset of humanity. A culture of peace and dialogue among all civilizations should be actively 
promoted. 
Respect for nature. Prudence must be shown in the management of all living species and natural 
resources, in accordance with the precepts of sustainable development. Only in this way can the immeas-
urable riches provided to us by nature be preserved and passed on to our descendants. The current unsus-
tainable patterns of production and consumption must be changed in the interest of our future welfare and 
that of our descendants. 
Shared responsibility. Responsibility for managing worldwide economic and social development, 
as well as threats to international peace and security, must be shared among the nations of the world and 
should be exercised multilaterally. As the most universal and most representative organization in the 
world, the United Nations must play the central role.” 
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adoption a final draft United Nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples as soon 
as possible. […] 
130. We note that the promotion and protection of the rights of persons belonging to national or 
ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities contribute to political and social stability and peace and 
enrich the cultural diversity and heritage of society. […] 
Democracy. 135. We reaffirm that democracy is a universal value based on the freely ex-
pressed will of people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems 
and their full participation in all aspects of their lives. We also reaffirm that while democra-
cies share common features, there is no single model of democracy, that it does not belong 
to any country or region, and reaffirm the necessity of due respect for sovereignty and the 
right of self-determination. We stress that democracy, development and respect for all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. 
136. We renew our commitment to support democracy by strengthening countries’ capacity 
to implement the principles and practices of democracy and resolve to strengthen the capac-
ity of the United Nations to assist Member States upon their request. […] 
Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. 138. Each individual State has the responsibil-
ity to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against human-
ity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through 
appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. 
The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise 
this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability. 
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to 
use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with 
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take 
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with 
the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional 
organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are 
manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of 
the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and 
international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to 
helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before 
crises and conflicts break out.98 
The willingness manifested by the General Assembly to assume responsibility to protect 
their populations, of which collective groupings may form a part, from genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing (itself a term with a less-developed juridical pedi-
gree than the other three), is of critical importance in how the international community views 
the seriousness of implementing international human rights law, particularly in the most chal-
lenging of regional situations. When the level of urgency with which collective groupings make 
specific legal claims per se is so high that genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity are considerable possibilities, it can readily be assumed that the state involved 
has an obligation to respond expeditiously to such claims, with an established procedural 
framework capable of providing an effective result. As such, arguments are not necessarily 
formed—as submissions to courts of high standing, in a framework whereby international law is 
sufficiently developed—so as to assert, clearly, the universal equality of citizens, within a state, as 
well as the right of such citizens to have access to universal standards of individual and collective 
                                                                  
98 See also Security Council Resolution 1674 (2006), 28 April 2006, which reaffirmed these provisions. 
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human rights.99 
Therefore, by affording particular and specific rights to collective groupings under the 
substantive and procedural rubric framed by indigenous peoples’ rights, a people’s right to self-
determination and minority rights enacted by the territorially administering state, states have 
explicitly recognised the conceptual validity of collective groupings with specific rights formed 
from international law. ‘Recognition’ as considered in the present context, is greatly dominated 
by the established practice of states recognising entities professing ‘statehood’, under the estab-
lished criteria for such a status. But, in the more extreme of factual circumstances, such as those 
observed when attempting to view statehood through its more ‘modern’, i.e., postcolonial real-
ity, established practice may be lacking, and the underlying evaluative criteria may be highly 
subjective. 
The ‘responsibility to protect’ is quite a new development in the international legal 
framework, and it remains to be seen how it will manifest itself in practice.  Some indications on 
the future course of this legal development may be obtained from an article written by the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, prior to the expiry of her mandate.100  In 
it, she observes that responses by the international community to severe violations of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, such as genocide, are now widely viewed as reasonable ex-
pectations by influential sectors of world opinion, which serves to intrude into “the fortress of 
State sovereignty”.101 This sense, she writes 
[i]s not, as some have suggested, a leap into wishful thinking. Rather, it is anchored in existing 
law, in institutions and in lessons learned from practice. Its vitality flows from its inherent 
soundness and justice, as well as the concept’s comparative advantages over formulations of 
humanitarian intervention. […] Rooted in human rights and international humanitarian law, 
the norm squarely embraces the victims’ point of view and interests, rather than question-
able State-centred motivations. It does so by configuring a permanent duty to protect indi-
viduals against abusive behaviour. Such duty is a function of  sovereignty and should be 
                                                                  
99 See also Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law, UN GA Resolution 60/147 (16 December 2005), whereby the Assembly states in the operative para-
graphs one and two of the resolution that “The obligation to respect, ensure respect for and implement in-
ternational human rights law and international humanitarian law as provided for under the respective 
bodies of law emanates from (a) Treaties to which a State is a party; (b) Customary international law; (c) 
The domestic law of each State,” and that “If they have not already done so, States shall, as required under 
international law, ensure that their domestic law is consistent with their international legal obligations by 
(a) Incorporating norms of international human rights law and international humanitarian law into their 
domestic law, or otherwise implementing them in their domestic legal system; (b) Adopting appropriate 
and effective legislative and administrative procedures and other appropriate measures that provide fair, 
effective and prompt access to justice; (c) Making available adequate, effective, prompt and appropriate 
remedies, including reparation, as defined below; (d) Ensuring that their domestic law provides at least 
the same level of protection for victims as that required by their international obligations.” 
Furthermore, the Assembly lists the scope of the obligation as including “the obligation to re-
spect, ensure respect for and implement international human rights law and international humanitarian 
law as provided for under the respective bodies of law, includes, inter alia, the duty to (a) Take appropriate 
legislative and administrative and other appropriate measures to prevent violations; (b) Investigate viola-
tions effectively, promptly, thoroughly and impartially and, where appropriate, take action against those 
allegedly responsible in accordance with domestic and international law; (c) Provide those who claim to 
be victims of a human rights or humanitarian law violation with equal and effective access to justice, as 
described below, irrespective of who may ultimately be the bearer of responsibility for the violation; and 
(d) Provide effective remedies to victims, including reparation, as described below.” 
100 See L. Arbour, The responsibility to protect as a duty of care in international law and practice, 34 Rev. 
Int’l Studies 445 (2008). 
101 Id. at 446. 
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fulfilled primarily by the State concerned. Absent that State’s ability or willingness to dis-
charge such obligations, the onus of protection falls by default upon the broader international 
community, which is then called upon to step in and help, or compel and—through appropri-
ate authorisation and in accordance with international law—even coerce States to put in 
place the requisite web of protection. At its core, the norm asserts a broad international 
public interest predicated on universal human rights, while appealing to the practical wisdom 
of confronting threats and ongoing abuses before a crisis unravels and unfolds with unfore-
seeable consequences.102 
More specifically, although the responsibility to protect is formulated in a manner afford-
ing protection to individuals, particularly when given the serious nature of the types of crimes 
deserving of protection, there is nothing per se logically inconsistent about viewing a group of 
individuals otherwise fulfilling the characteristics of a ‘people’ (or other collective grouping) as 
being worthy of protection. Indeed R2P’s existence may lead to increased credibility in the re-
gional acknowledgement of the claims of a collective grouping.103 When viewed against e.g. the 
situation in Darfur—a situation to which Arbour herself draws reference—104 the theoretical in-
terplay between collective groupings and R2P must be acknowledged. 
Conceptually speaking, however, as defined by this study, ‘collective groupings’, as a gen-
eral legal concept, may be viewed in the context of an increasingly developed body of interna-
tional law with direct applicability to domestic legal systems. In particular, collective groupings 
seeking ‘recognition’ per se will likely find the greatest measures of success when formulating 
their arguments along the lines of established legal principles. For example, a ‘people’ hoping 
for self-determination (i.e., territorial self-administration) would be likely to gain credibility in 
its lines of argumentation by employing principles derived directly from international law, such 
as Montevideo criteria and a demonstrated commitment to upholding the international human 
rights core. Given the explicit responsibility by states to protect populations within the ambit of 
their territorial administration, from the most extreme governmental and non-governmental 
actions targeted against specific populations, as decided by the 2005 World Summit, the inter-
connectivity between the international and domestic planes is further reinforced. The question 
remaining will be the extent to which, by definition, a geographically-congruent ‘people’ can be 
formed as a result of collective decision-making, in opposition to the status quo. Indeed, it will 
be increasingly asserted that a ‘people’ can take specific form from such an inherently negative 
composition. This analysis will then be concluded, with a view to anticipating relevant aspects 
under examination in the following chapter, where specific provisions of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights are examined in light of factual circumstances readily observed on 
the ground. 
Translating international law to municipal application: Interactions between the law of 
collective groupings and the juridical phenomenon of statehood 
As was the case with decolonisation, the effect desired by collective groupings will tend to 
revolve around the advocacy of a case that a specific factual circumstance exists, in that it coin-
cides with one or more rules of self-determination or minority rights, and that such rules will af-
ford a mutually-agreed negotiated solution between otherwise separate entities under common 
                                                                  
102 Id. at 448. 
103 Cf. Id. at 454: “[…] the opinion [in Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Gen-
eral List, no. 91, 26 February 2007] appears to put an additional onus on those States that are nearer to the 
theatre of a crisis and that, due also to their capacity to wield influence and their possession of informa-
tion, are better positioned to prevent genocide.” 
104 See Id. at 458. 
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administration. 
To this end, much as colonial independence could be contested, and indeed resisted by 
administrators on the ground, the obtaining of a particular juridical ‘status’ through practice, 
and the implementation of procedures most appropriate to the situation at hand, will show 
similar potential for complication, in that between e.g. the period 1950-1980, anti-colonialism 
became a political force of such intensity that universally-recognised legal consequences were 
readily derived. The remaining question, to be addressed, therefore, in e.g. the period 1980-
2010, is the extent to which new states created by anti-colonialism are able to implement the 
fundamental building blocks of modern society, particularly with regard to the expectations of 
modern territorial statehood, incorporating territoriality, as well as the complicated nexus of 
political participation, sustainable development and individual security formed by the core pre-
cepts of international human rights law. 
Surely the legal recognition of new state entities has a long and developed juridical pedi-
gree, whereas the recognition of collective groupings as a legal concept per se would stem pri-
marily from the development of international human rights law itself, dating in particular from 
the late 20th century. Postcolonial new state recognition emerges thereafter from the practices 
established from the saltwater barrier-defined decolonisation process of the earlier era. How-
ever, the definitive step of recognising the decolonising entity as an independent sovereign state 
is always a specific legal action handled through established and particular diplomatic and min-
isterial channels.  
‘Recognition’ of new statehood in the postcolonial era remains an essentially extraordi-
nary activity, in the sense that an act is undertaken by states for specific, and indeed, even reme-
dial, reasons. In a postcolonial era, it is conceivable that newly independent states could emerge 
further onto the world stage, and it seems likely that such emergence would be caused by spe-
cific circumstances, particularly within the realm of international human rights law and directed 
squarely towards the remedying of specific circumstances within a state. But whether the par-
ticular legal act consummating the ‘recognition’ of collective groupings within a municipal state 
finds itself subject to the same conceptual, or procedural, restrictions as those defining new state 
recognition is questionable, in that new states will have to earn peer recognition from nearly 200 
such entities, whereas sub-state recognition will be primarily fixated on its recognition per se by 
precisely one state within the framework of its own legal system. Clearly, a deeper level of analy-
sis between the state and collective groupings would be useful to determine how the roles they 
play may overlap, under the rules of so-called ‘modern’ statehood—i.e., that which merges clas-
sical Montevideo and postcolonial criteria under a common legal framework. 
That said, it is difficult to argue that claims for recognition of specific authority follow 
wholly dissimilar intellectual lines of conceptual argumentation, as entities presenting claims to 
the international community for recognition as independent states, and as entities presenting 
claims as established collective groupings to an established government, draw from a common 
pool of circumstances and similar procedure –, namely that a specific case for the modification 
of the territorial status quo is developed, from ‘identification’ to ‘evaluation’ to ‘implementation’. 
The implementation mechanism is most obvious in practical circumstances, whereby human 
rights concerns are not so profoundly acute so as to invoke violation of the right to life. Scotland, 
for example, has achieved tangible measures of internal self-determination, due the UK’s devo-
lution of powers from London to the regions at the end of the 20th century. That Scotland has 
achieved such measures under the established framework of the territorial United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland demonstrates that the criteria for devolutionary recognition 
within the specific UK context has now become more richly defined than in the past, and there-
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fore may not be viewed as existing within a conceptual vacuum.105 Thus in the Scottish circum-
stance, the bridge between ‘independent state’ and ‘sub-state’ is quite clearly demarcated, in that 
Scotland would have to demonstrate, most obviously, tangibly, that systemic human rights vio-
lations have the most certain claims of independent statehood, yet to have achieved. In addition, 
many of the same objectives of independence, by common consent between London and Ed-
inburgh. This is because 21st century society is no longer subjected to the phenomenon of colo-
nialism and its juridical realities, and the onus of identifying the breaking point between 
imperial administration and local governance has been squarely formed to protect the self-
identifying, particular administrations within a state. 
This reality demonstrates a credible affront to the established doctrine of a foregone era, 
whereby the expectation of uniform standards of human behaviour—e.g. the product of mod-
ern international human rights law—was not yet intellectually conceived. Statehood, in the ear-
liest period of decolonisation, was a tangible reality, in a world otherwise largely defined by 
latent imperialism. The dominant, yet fading, European positivism of the time, and its obvious 
actions, inherent in a civilising mission meant that to hold administrative actions together in a 
coherent form, reveals this burgeoning dichotomy of purpose between classical and modern 
forms. Indeed, as international human rights law has now become part and parcel of modern 
international law, ‘statehood’, as a legal subject per se, is confounded by a duality of circum-
stances in that statehood in its original form is arbitrary and rigid, and in its more modern form 
must pay close attention to its internal administration, in particular. This parallel reality has 
caused a puncture in the monolith form of sovereign equality. Indeed, now, the laws of state-
hood may also serve to play a tangible, and perhaps indisputable, role in determining whether 
one state will go so far as to recognise the independence and emergence of a new state entity, 
particularly as a remedial measure. 
To that end, although circumstances of neo-colonialism or ‘internal colonisation’ are 
relatively rare, as the level of coercive subordination to which a population would be subjected 
would be practically intolerable, with widespread, protracted and systemic violence purpose-
fully targeted against a population, they are not inconceivable. Again, with geographic and 
temporal sights locked on sub-Saharan Africa at the outset of the 21st century, the circumstances 
found in the eastern DR Congo and Darfur, Sudan are paradigmatic, in that they are found 
within exceptionally large states, with large, territorially-defined populations being subjected to 
extremely coercive behaviour, directed from far-away seats of power. Under these most ex-
treme circumstances, it would appear that the primary rule for the evaluation of collective 
groupings’ claims would be based upon the need to obtain evidence of the factual situation on 
the ground by all sources most appropriately placed to provide such information (i.e., from in-
tergovernmental, governmental and non-governmental sources alike). It may also be entirely 
conceivable that the most credible claims of a collective grouping would be those seeking to 
mitigate the most acerbic and troubling aspects of a collective existence, most readily, but not 
necessarily, to be observed in the developing world.106 
The question again returns to that of recognition, in that a nuanced formulation of recog-
nition of new state entities by the international community of states, particularly through the 
                                                                  
105 Regional devolution of powers is not wholly without prejudice to the potential external independence 
from a state per se, whether the practical circumstance is the eventual independence of e.g. Scotland, Cata-
lonia or indeed Somaliland. The point being made, however, is that the cause of definitional clarity may be 
well-served by the effectuation of a decentralised territorial administration. 
106 See e.g. D. Kurban et al, Zorunlu Göç ile Yüzleşmek: Türkiye'de Yerinden Edilme Sonrası Vatandaşlığın 
İnşası (Confronting Forced Migration: The Construction of Citizenship in the Aftermath of Internal Dis-
placement in Turkey) (2006).  
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United Nations, is likely to retain its peculiar hybrid restrictive and permissive character. In light 
of the present discussion, it is clear that e.g. Montenegro became the 192nd UN member state in 
2006, whereas in 1945, the UN had only 51 member states. Thus, there is no static cap fixing the 
number of independent states that may be recognized by the international community. How-
ever, in practical circumstance, new state creation is a relatively rare phenomenon and is likely 
to remain an exceptional action, due to the permanence of the entity created. Although great 
care needs to be taken when implementing lasting decisions undertaken largely on the basis of 
geography, the point being made thereto is that, despite inherent restrictions, postcolonial new 
state creation is not a matter for automatic or out-of-hand preclusion or rejection. A similarly 
restrictive approach should be seen prima facie in place when considering the roles played by 
collective groupings for achieving recognition as such. These entities will have to demonstrate 
factual circumstances not dissimilar to those of a decolonising entity, showing particular regard 
to the levels of political participation, social cohesion and economic stability observed across a 
territorial region. Claims for recognition of new states on the international plane, as well as 
claims for collective rights domestically, are not meant to be treated with insouciance by either 
the international community of states, or a specific state faced with particular claims by a collec-
tive grouping on its territory. 
‘Claims’ and their refutations: The ability to encapsulate the situation ‘on the ground’ un-
der the established legal frameworks 
As a general matter, the existence of a claim from a collective grouping is a genuine cause 
for concern by a state’s government, due to its implications for territorial administration, a cer-
tain amount of attention must be paid to the evaluation of claims put by collectivités to 
encompassing states directly, and the international community of states by extension. As the 
practice of international law generally depends upon, and exerts pressure towards, the 
maintenance of the status quo, a similar tone is set to consider, conceptually, the recognition of 
postcolonial states formed by acts of secession in a similar light to the recognition of claims for 
collective rights. The chief distinction that should be made between these concepts, however, is 
that the theoretical capacity of the international legal system to incorporate and accommodate a 
relatively limitless number of states seems practically vast, whereas the overall capacity of a state 
to accommodate the various collective groupings within its boundaries will always be 
comparatively more constrained. The existence of recognised micro-states in international law 
and the expansion of intergovernmental organisations, viz. the UN and the EU, in particular 
terms of state practice, conceptualises how the global system is able to adapt to evolving 
circumstances. However, the domestic capacity of a state to absorb, theoretically, and to 
incorporate conceptually, accommodate practically and legally recognise the particularities of 
an internal situation, is defined by a more immediate sense of practical urgency, particularly in 
least-developed countries, than could the case when on the larger international plane. 
By combining the variables of effectiveness, parity amongst citizens, independence, self-
administration and territoriality, claims may be made to achieve legitimacy, through specific 
municipal legal recognition. The arguments put forth by collective groupings effectuated from 
the established courses of action (e.g. territorial self-administration, minority parity with the 
majority), the ability to associate freely with others, as much as the ability to be left alone and, 
perhaps most importantly, the ability to achieve legitimacy as a result of specific acts of territorial 
administration will become increasingly reinforced so long as the argument continues to be 
made in similar fashion, over time. It would be expected that, as the strength of the argument is 
reinforced over time, a progressively greater expectation of (re-)evaluating the situation by the 
government of the municipal state would be seen to occur, and that the question of potential 
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remedies would grow increasingly larger, based upon the factual situations on the ground. 
Should the question go so far as to escalate to the point of remedial, postcolonial seces-
sion, and the question of statehood would be placed before the international community of 
states, it would appear that entities fulfilling the Montevideo criteria would be most likely to win 
approval for actions deemed appropriate by the international community as a whole. As there is 
no blanket prohibition on secession in international law, it is generally the case that once a tan-
gible, critical mass forms around entities endowed with a capacity to govern, and indeed such 
entities pledge themselves to upholding the basic core of international human rights law, new 
states per se may be admitted into the existing postcolonial community of states, particularly in 
circumstances whereby the act of new state creation would not be likely to cause further destabi-
lisation in regional peace and security.107 Likewise, revolving particularly around the factual 
variables of situational necessity and administrative capacity, new collective groupings may also 
be municipally recognised by a state, under analogous factual and intellectual circumstances to 
those of new state creation. Although sovereign state status and the independence of govern-
ment associated therewith, would appear to be an object of nearly universal attraction, particu-
larly in the most polarised situations, it may also be the case that a collective grouping can 
achieve its administrative objectives while remaining a component part of an existing state. The 
guiding principle in evaluating claims for internal and external self-determination, minority 
rights and ‘peoples’ rights, as well as for devolutionary regimes, federations and confederations 
and other, less clearly-defined administrative programmes, should be that which reinforces the 
effective capacity of local territorial administration to meet international standards. 
In sum, this serves by association to reinforce the generally accepted notion that defini-
tional overlaps can exist between citizens of states. ‘Peoples’, self-identifying primarily on the ba-
sis of race or religion, will have more obvious claims to geographically-contiguous territorial 
administration, and ‘minorities’ will be self-identifying as individuals with a common claim to 
parity with the majority, although their claims cannot always be definitively separated, as both 
collective groupings are also citizens of a state, and thus, also broadly protected by the core of 
international human rights and humanitarian law. The point being presently considered is lim-
ited to the means for affording a recognised status to a collective grouping. Although this is pri-
marily a question for the municipal legislative and legal systems of the state in question, it may 
also be observed from an international legal perspective that claims from those seeking such 
status, particularly in the case of ‘peoples’ rights’, and corresponding as closely as possible with 
existing Montevideo criteria, will have the greatest legal credibility. This is noticeably because 
clearly-defined territorial and population limits, coupled with an independent government, are 
indisputably important in reinforcing effectiveness, whether within or outside an existing state. 
If there exists a conceptual similarity between the recognition of new states by the international 
community and the recognition of specific claims by collective groupings, collective groupings 
will have the responsibility to delineate the limits of transference of the separate, but overlap-
ping, principles. Thus, postcolonial states faced with the prospect of major claims for self-
determination, or, similarly, dynamic minority rights claims, will have to ascertain the threshold 
for the acknowledgement and official response to such claims. 
To this end, the practical examples of Bangladesh and Quebec under discussion in this 
chapter should be seen as being definitional in character, as they demonstrate contrasting situa-
tions whereby postcolonial states have coped with such complicated circumstances and have 
responded to questions of self-determination, both external (in Bangladesh) and internal (in 
                                                                  
107 See F.L. Kirgis, Editorial Comment: The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era, 88 
AJIL 304 (1994). 
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Quebec) in character. These examples are chosen particularly because of their contrasting na-
tures, in that Bangladesh was an acute situation, which quickly evolved into a case of external 
self-determination, whereas the circumstances in Quebec are considerably more organic and 
long-standing. What will be most significant in the Bangladeshi circumstance is the influence of 
effectiveness, or, at the very least, the perception of effectiveness, in determining the validity of a 
‘post-’postcolonial state.  
Bangladesh’s secession from Pakistan: Massive human rights violations and the implications for 
the continuity of the state 
Bangladesh earned its independence not from a centralised government in London, but 
rather from one in Islamabad, itself established there after having moved in 1958 from Pakistan’s 
first postcolonial capital, Karachi. Thus, although the United Kingdom granted independence 
to its South Asian colonies in 1947, East Pakistan declared its independence from West Pakistan 
on 26 March 1971 following a chaotic and deadly period, with massive human rights violations 
as the norm. By 16 December 1971, the independent state of Bangladesh was officially created, 
when the Pakistani Army retreated from what the then-East Pakistan. Although it may be ob-
served that the state faltered greatly in its own self-administration in the years following inde-
pendence, Bangladesh’s secession from Pakistan was a clear case of postcolonial external self-
determination. This is most evident particularly because the only real commonality between 
East and West Pakistan was religion. The kind of governance observed in the Bangladeshi ex-
ample makes a definite contribution towards the realisation that a state is not unlimited in its ac-
tions vis-à-vis its own diverse populations. Given the presumption in favour of the continuity of 
the state generally in international law, postcolonial external self-determination remains very 
much the exception rather than the rule. However, similarly there is nothing in international law 
that compels a territory to remain intrinsically fixed to its prescribed administrative delimitation. 
Bangladesh in the early 1970s defines this reality. 
Surrounded on all sides by India, with the exception of a small border with Burma 
(Myanmar), Bangladesh is something of an anomaly in that following its independence from 
Britain, the then-East Pakistan was administered in a form not dissimilar to some of the worst 
imaginable excesses of colonial rule. While not strictu sensu falling under the usual understand-
ing of colonialist administration, chiefly because there was no European power dominating the 
relationship, factual parallels to such a predatory system of administration were abundantly evi-
denced. Furthermore, the state of India acted as a barrier not of saltwater but of land, separating 
West and East Pakistan. In East Pakistan itself, the majority Bengali population was routinely ex-
ploited by the non-Bengali rulers. This led to a palpable quest for independence beginning in 
1971, following a relatively democratic election in East Pakistan which was rejected by Pakistani 
president Yahiya Kahn. By March 1971, the Pakistani army had turned itself against the Bengali 
populations of East Pakistan, which led to a declaration of independence by the Bangladeshi 
military leader Major Ziaur Rahman.108 India, sandwiched as it was between the two separate 
                                                                  
108 Cf. statement published in Shadeen Bangla Betar and The Statesman of Delhi, 27 March 1971: “Major 
Zia, Provisional Commander in Chief of the Bangladesh Liberation Army, hereby proclaims, on behalf of 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the independence of Bangladesh. […] I also declare, we have already framed a 
sovereign, legal Government under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, which pledges to function as per law and the 
constitution. The new democratic Government is committed to a policy of non alignment in international 
relations. It will seek friendship with all nations and strive for international peace. I appeal to all Govern-
ment to oblige public opinion in their respective countries against the brutal genocide in Bangladesh. The 
Government under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is sovereign legal Government of Bangladesh and is entitled 
to recognition from all democratic nations of the world.” 
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territories, did not remain neutral and provided military and humanitarian assistance to the 
Bangladeshi population. The Pakistani army became little more than an occupation force, and 
by 16 December 1971 it quit the newly-independent country.109 
Furthermore, although the form of self-determination effectuated by Bangladesh quickly 
passed from internal to external forms, recognition of a newly independent Bangladeshi state 
was not readily forthcoming.110 The United Kingdom actively withheld recognition on 28 June 
1971, plainly stating “there is no State of Bangla Desh which fulfils our normal criteria for recog-
nition”.111 As has been indicated, however, that reality would prove fluid, and the situation will 
have significantly evolved in the following year. Although the UN Security Council was unable 
to adopt a resolution at the height of the conflict,112 acting under the ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolu-
tion, on 8 December 1971, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2793, which called for an 
immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of all foreign troops. This resolution was subsequently 
endorsed by the Security Council,113 which was likely to have contributed to the progressive 
recognition of Bangladesh as an independent state, having seceded from West Pakistan, in an 
act of postcolonial external self-determination. As David Raič writes, “[a]lthough India’s assis-
tance did thus not play a significant role in the decision to secede, it proved essential for the sub-
sequent success of the secession of Bangladesh. Between January and May 1972, Bangladesh 
was recognized by some 70 States”.114  
The creation of the state: Effectiveness and the transition from East Pakistan into Bangla-
desh 
Of deeper interest are issues related to measures for autonomous government for the 
then-East Pakistan, leading to the questions of territorial integrity, with regard to Bangladesh’s 
secession from Pakistan. Thereafter, the factual circumstances will be better placed to be viewed 
through the form of territorial administration expected in modern statehood, specifically 
whereby measures of equality, justice and reason are expected as matters of practice. 
Prior to Bangladesh’s actual secession, in December 1970, general elections took place in 
Pakistan which validated claims for autonomy put forth by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of the 
Awami League, with which Ziaur Rahman was associated. The League, which was founded in 
1949 on the basis of a 42-point programme for provincial autonomy, demanded recognition of 
Bangla as a state language of Pakistan, equal voting rights and constitutional democracy through 
                                                                  
109 A comprehensive discussion of the factual circumstances involved, with ample references to journalis-
tic reporting at the time, is to be found in V.P. Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law: The 
Tragic Tale of Two Cities—Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan), 66 AJIL 321 (1972) 
[hereinafter Nanda]. 
110 Cf. Talmon, supra note 77, at 307: “India, which maintained de facto relations with the Provisional 
Government, did not think it fit formally to recognise a Provisional Government of Bangla Desh in exile. 
Neither did any other State.” However, India was subsequently to become the first state to recognise an 
independent Bangladeshi state, on 6 December 1971, as the Bangladeshi power structure began to estab-
lish itself with the decline of Pakistani martial law. 
111 820 HC Debs., WA, col. 26, 28 June 1971, as cited in Talmon, Id.  
112 See UN Doc. S/RES/303 of 6 December 1971. 
113 See UN Doc. S/RES/307 of 21 December 1971. 
114 Cf. Raič, supra note 57, at 339. He continues, Id., referring to Bangladesh’s first application, of 20 
August 1972, to become a UN Member State. In it, with support from Pakistan claimed that Bangladesh 
had failed to demonstrate it was peace-loving, and its ally, China, which vetoed the resolution introducing 
the application, asserted that Bangladesh did not comply with past Security Council resolutions. See 26 
UN Ybk. 215-220 (1972). Bangladesh eventually achieved membership to the United Nations through 
General Assembly resolution 3203 (XXIX), on 17 September 1974.  
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a parliamentary system of government. By the 1970 election, the Awami League was able to 
form a nearly 100% majority in East Pakistan Provincial Assembly, and a 53% majority in the 
Pakistani National Assembly, holding 167 seats out of 313.115 The League agreed to participate 
fully in the Assembly, not by trying to impose its own East Pakistani will on the West, but, rather, 
to develop a means to guarantee political autonomy for the East vis-à-vis the West. To that end, 
it made four proposals to further the political process: (a) the withdrawal of martial law; (b) the 
return of troops to barracks; (c) an enquiry into killings which had taken place; and (d) transfer 
of power to the elected representatives of the people.116 Shiek Mujibur Rahman was then ar-
rested by military police, followed by the postponement of the Constitutional Assembly be-
cause a draft constitution formed on the basis of such a unified showing of political power in 
East Pakistan was seen as a grave threat to the dominance held by those in the West. Subse-
quently, the Awami League formed a government-in-exile in April 1971, guerrilla attacks began 
against the Pakistani army and the internecine conflict escalated in gravity and then subsided 
somewhat. When the conflict escalated to such a point that it threatened to include India, the in-
ternational community urged Pakistan to exercise restraint. However, a month-long interna-
tional armed conflict between Pakistan and India broke out in December 1971, which 
coincided with the official creation of the state of Bangladesh and the withdrawal of Pakistani 
military forces. 
The question then turns towards the veracity of the government-in-exile’s claims to be the 
legitimate political leadership of, as they were to be called, Bangladesh. When the Awami 
League went into exile, ostensibly at the time to India, despite its undeniable status as a legiti-
mate political entity, it could hardly have had the ability to become an established entity per se, as 
it lacked any semblance of actual effectiveness. Or, in the vernacular asserted at the outset of the 
present thesis, the ‘relatively fluid’ provisions of statehood were profoundly established such 
that, a not-entirely-farcical analogy to a delta land was comprised of rivers flowing freely from 
the Himalayas. The synonymous meaning of ‘capacity to enter into international relations’ with 
‘independence’ in the formulation of statehood is observed anew, for it was with great speed that 
the excessive fluidity of the self-declared independent Bangladeshi state was able to be solidified 
with the progressive departure of the West Pakistani military and the transference of East Paki-
stani militias into what would become the Bangladeshi armed forces. It would therefore appear 
that competence to undertake governing actions—acts of state—were allowed to begin slowly 
and to increase in constitutionality and effectiveness, in anticipation of East Pakistan’s eventual 
official recognition as the sovereign state of Bangladesh in early 1972.117 
Furthermore, the Bangladeshi example reinforces concepts put forth by William O’Brien 
and Ulf Goebel in 1965 in analysing United States policy towards recognition of decolonising 
countries. A restatement of their argument is worthwhile: 
The traditional question is, “Does a state exist?” (In the case of recognition of a new gov-
ernment, the question is, “Does it have effective control of the population and territory of 
the state?”) To [Sir Hersch] Lauterpacht, these conditions were substantially “definite and 
exhaustive.” However, as subjective criteria gained importance, the question became increas-
                                                                  
115 See particularly A. Naqvi, West Pakistan’s Struggle for Power, 4 South Asian Rev. 213 (April 1971), at 
224 et seq.  
116 See Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1-8 May 1971, at 24566, as cited in C.N. Okeke, Controversial 
Subjects of Contemporary International Law: An Examination of the New Entities of International Law 
and their Treaty-Making Capacity 132 (1972) [hereinafter Okeke]. 
117 Cf. Id. at 139: “The conclusion might therefore be that neither constitutional origin, nor functioning in 
conformity with a particular constitution are necessarily required in order that a body that claims to be a 
government in exile should be competent in international law to act on behalf of a state. […] [T]his is an 
area in which the law is still in process of formation in a situation of some fluidity.” 
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ingly, “Should this state, which seems to enjoy a real existence in the material sense, exist as 
an international person?” The “should” could be couched in the context of the political, legal, 
or even moral norms. Thus the U.S. refused recognition for sixteen years to the [govern-
ment of the] Soviet Union, despite its clear establishment as an independent entity by, at the 
latest, the early 1920’s.118 
 At issue here is a circumstance formed in the inverse of the Soviet Union example. The 
nascent Bangladeshi government had nothing close to effective control of the population and 
territory of the state; indeed, the ‘state’ per se existed only in the minds of those declaring it as 
such, which, at the time, were seen as little more than treasonous East Pakistani citizens by the 
government in the West. Yet over the span of roughly nine months, the League went on to suc-
ceed in its quest to form a new state, demonstrating the innate subjectivity in determining factual 
situations under such circumstances. Returning to O’Brien and Goebel for the moment, how-
ever, they then go on to discuss the American policy of ‘anticipatory recognition’—essentially a 
measured disbursement of pragmatism, in view of a rapidly evolving factual situation on the 
ground.119 The United States, aware of the fact that it had advocated independence for European 
colonies, in the face of, particularly, Anglo-French resistance, had taken the decision to be real-
istic in terms of its established recognition policy to newly-emerging states, particularly in Af-
rica. Thus, the shift from ‘does’ to ‘should’ takes effect, which demonstrates that a ‘legality’ has 
been formulated, in permutation ad infinitum, in response to evolving inter-societal realities. 
To that end, O’Brien and Goebel continue their argument to track the evolution of judi-
cial criteria for state recognition in the postcolonial context: 
The U.S. has justified [the aforementioned] policies by adding to the traditional criteria for 
recognition the requirement that the entity’s government be able and willing to abide by in-
ternational law. The very positing of this criterion, of course, makes possible at least a three-
fold breakdown of international entities: 
1. Full international persons, entities possessing the elements of a sovereign state and evi-
dencing an ability and willingness to comply with international law. 
2. Occupants of a legal limbo, entities possessing the elements of a sovereign state, but failing 
to evidence an ability and willingness to accept the obligations of international law. 
3. Less than full international persons, entities not possessing the traditional prerequisites for 
statehood.120 
Implications for recognition: Does the state exist, or should the state exist? 
What is most important here are the implications for the distinction between ‘does’ and 
‘should’; indeed, in the case of Bangladesh, the answer was indisputably that the state should ex-
ist. The question then turns to why this should be so, and to that end, what seems most likely is 
that a massive, systemic violence directed against civilians was sufficient to cast sufficient doubt 
against the side of perpetuity of the postcolonial Pakistani state. To that end, then, Nanda has 
                                                                  
118 O’Brien and Goebel, supra note 90, at 106. 
119 See generally Id. at 114-223. 
120 Id. at 106. They continue, Id.: “It is true that, thus far, the weight of authoritative opinion and the prac-
tice of states seem to deny the validity of ‘willingness’ to accept international obligations as a criterion for 
international personality and that insistence upon it has been almost entirely confined to the practice of 
the United States. Moreover, Lauterpacht is probably right in suggesting that the ‘ability’ to meet interna-
tional-law obligations is properly a part of the ‘effective control’ that is the necessary characteristic of the 
independent government of a sovereign state. But this criterion remains embedded in the practice of the 
most powerful state in the West. Thus far it has been applied mainly to the question of recognition of new 
governments than to the recognition of new states. But there is no reason to believe that its application 
might not preclude recognition of a new state that otherwise clearly met the standards of statehood.” 
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identified six special features of the East Pakistani conflict, reproduced herewith: 
(a) physical separation of the two regions and the political domination by West Pakistan over 
East Pakistan; (b) the nature of the linguistic, cultural and ethnic differences between the two 
geographic areas of Pakistan; (c) the problem of regional disparity in economic growth which 
is heavily weighted in favor West Pakistan; (d) The December 1970 elections in Pakistan 
which gave the Awami League an overwhelming mandate for the autonomy of East Pakistan; 
(e) The brutal suppression by the West Pakistani Army of the League opposition in East Paki-
stan and the reported murders of political leaders and intelligentsia in East Pakistan, giving 
rise to accusations of “genocide” and “selective genocide”; and (f) the impact of an independ-
ent East Pakistan on Pakistan and the rest of the world community.121 
A number of his observations can be overlooked as superfluous in regard to the present 
discussion. For example, the geographic distance between East and West Pakistan, while pro-
foundly incongruous, does not inherently draw the state into question. In the same manner that 
nobody would seriously suggest that the separation between Kalingrad and metropolitan Russia 
would inherently necessitate secession between the two territorial entities, due to Lithuania and 
Poland’s accession into the European Union—itself a form of internal and external self-
determination—there is no inherent encumbrance to upon maintaining West and East Paki-
stan.122 Furthermore, its linguistic, cultural and ethnic differences do not themselves present the 
question of statehood, for multi-ethnic states are commonplace; indeed, this is why the dis-
missal of the term ‘nation-state’ has been advocated in the course of this discussion.123 The po-
litical domination of West Pakistan and the comparative problem of economic 
underdevelopment in East Pakistan, however, while increasingly problematic, are still hardly 
factors, intrinsically, to calling the state into question—not because economic, social and cul-
tural rights are aspirational, but, rather, immediate in character. 
Thus, while admittedly awkward, and undoubtedly structurally lopsided without sub-
stantial inter-temporal governance reform, the territorial integrity of the state was not by defini-
tion called into question until such time as the outcome of the Pakistani national elections were 
met with such a harsh response by the West Pakistan Army. What is particularly significant, 
then, is the fact that agents of the state were acting in a manner contrary to the effective solidifica-
tion of the nascent postcolonial state of West/East Pakistan. The combination of postcolonial 
political control and extraordinary high population density must then be seen as an irresistibly 
volatile combination for systemic repression and, indeed, coercive hegemony. What is more 
questionable, however, is the extent to which the autonomising actions proposed by the pro-
vincial assembly that instigated the armed conflict between East and West Pakistan. The election 
of the Awami League to the National Assembly and the negative effects afforded by the central 
government are, in themselves, not dissimilar to e.g. actions taken by central governments in 
Angola and Algeria following the outcome of national, majoritarian electoral processes. Nanda 
encapsulates the autonomy provisions advocated by the Awami League to include the follow-
ing criteria: (a) a federal constitution, parliamentary form of government and ‘autonomous and 
sovereign’ constituent units; (b) federal governmental competence only provided externally, 
i.e., for defence and foreign affairs; (c) separate currencies between East and West Pakistan, or 
alternatively, measures to prevent capital flows from East to West; (d) local autonomy in forms 
                                                                  
121 Nanda, supra note 109, at 328. 
122 Cf. Raič, supra note 57, at 335: “In the case of Pakistan, this geographical feature was, against the back-
ground of the other features involved, not as such a source of conflict but more a factor which complicated 
rather than helped the political and economic cooperation and integration of the communities in the East 
and the West.” 
123 Cf. Nanda, supra note 109. at 329: “Islam and hatred of India were perhaps the only unifying factors be-
tween East and West Pakistan […] Consequently, Pakistan has never been a cohesive national entity.” 
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of fiscal policy, taxation and revenue collection; (e) separate trade linkages and foreign ex-
change between East and West Pakistan; and (f) separate militia or paramilitary forces.124  
Such actions should be viewed as attempts to exhaust the local remedies for a people ef-
fectuating a form of internal self-determination. In this case, these measures were cast aside by 
the West Pakistani power apparatus, and a serious denial of internal self-determination led to 
the widespread recognition of Bangladesh as an independent state on the part of other states, 
themselves. Clearly, internal self-determination, in this form, was too much to ask of such a frag-
ile postcolonial state and must serve to negate somewhat the previous assertion herein, that the 
incongruous nature of the Pakistani state’s construction did not inherently foretell its own de-
mise. For, although the concept did not find juridical existence per se, at the time, acquiescence, 
even to an initially limited degree, on the part of the West Pakistani authorities, to East Pakistani 
rule, would have reflected a profound measure of internal self-determination to the East Paki-
stani population. Indeed, given the clear territorial delimitation and demarcation, as well as 
unified political structure, on ethnic or religious grounds (i.e., not merely linguistic), this is the 
East Pakistani people: the Bangladeshi people, a people which solidified itself politically, and as a 
result came to know what it was in negative definition against the dominant state. Thus when the 
level of targeted violence became too great to overlook,125 the question of an independent East 
Pakistan, thereafter Bangladesh, can be seen to have appeared, once the level of such human 
rights violations crossed a critical threshold.  
In sum, the secession of East Pakistan from West Pakistan was effectuated primarily on the 
basis of equality, justice and reason—concepts which should guide any evaluative analysis of 
the interactions between collective groupings and the modern international law of territorial 
statehood. These criteria for evaluation will be useful to recall in the assessment of other credi-
ble claims for postcolonial internal and external self-determination. Equality came about by vir-
tue of the Pakistani National Assembly choosing to support the Awami League’s political 
platform. Justice was synonymous with reason, in that in the face of such obviously systemic 
human rights violations, they were given a practical form of redress: the expulsion of the West 
Pakistan Army, and its replacement with an indigenous military force. Such actions, of course, 
led to a severance of the dominance of the West Pakistani political apparatus over the East Paki-
stani territory and population. Beyond a certain point, it can be logically concluded that there 
was no other rational recourse to a complicated postcolonial problem than for its constituent 
elements to govern themselves in their own fashion (and, as it is now undoubtedly established, 
to universal standards). Viewed in hindsight, the separation of India and Pakistan, both East and 
West, was inevitable upon decolonisation from Britain. Moreover, as it can be observed, the se-
cession of Bangladesh from Pakistan, while not as necessarily inevitable, was manifested as a di-
rect result to the political forces, in West Pakistan, repressing legitimate expressions of 
autonomy on the part of genuine societal leadership in the East. That leads to the baseline con-
clusion, for the moment at least, that a territorial people, faced not only with a denial of self-
administration, but also observed with focused, tangible governmental activities directed 
                                                                  
124 See Nanda, supra note 109, at 331. 
125 Cf. Id. at 332, citing journalist réportage in Indian and Foreign Rev., 1 Jul. 1971 23, and press release of 
International Commission of Jurists, 16 Aug 1971 4-5: “What I saw and heard with unbelieving eyes and 
ears during my 10 days in East Bengal in late April made it terribly clear that the killings are not the iso-
lated acts of military commanders in the field. ‘We are determined to cleanse East Pakistan once and for 
all of the threat of secession, even if it means killing off two million people and ruling the province as a 
colony for 30 years,’ I was repeatedly told by senior military officials in Dacca and Comilla. The West 
Pakistan army in East Bengal is doing exactly that with a terrifyingly thoroughness. I saw Hindus, hunted 
from village to village and door to door, shot off-hand after a cursory ‘short-arm inspection’ showed they 
were uncircumcised.”  
Nicholas Hansen 
Chapter Three: Territory, recognition and collective groupings 
Page 166 
against it, may indeed be existing within the type of neo-colonial, or ‘internally colonial’ circum-
stances seen, at the outset of this chapter, to be conceivable, if not extraordinary. 
Observations from chapter three 
The outset of the 21st Century has witnessed a dramatic evolution in the concept of state 
sovereignty, whereby the core principles of international human rights law have been solidified 
and reiterated by the international community. The globalised system of public international 
law has observed considerable progression from the positivist form of statehood. From the con-
ceptual rejection of colonialism by the international community of states, to the consideration 
of practical circumstances whereby the secession question—that which lies dormant under 
practically all situations of self-determination—can be addressed, these inter-temporal 
evolutions, within the concept of state sovereignty, are profound. It is obviously consequential 
that, in addition to human rights promotion, in general, each individual state now has the re-
sponsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity, in particular the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appro-
priate and necessary means. 
What has been observed in this chapter is that the question of recognition, both within 
the municipal framework of a state, and on the international plane, that of collective groupings 
such as ‘peoples’ is, in large measure, dependent upon factual circumstances. Bangladesh is an 
oft-considered example, not only because it is the most readily-referenced evidence of state 
practice, whereby a secession has transpired following the independence of a former colony. It 
is also significant because the level of targeted violence against a specific population within a 
state became so critically high that the maintenance of the postcolonial status quo became prac-
tically unthinkable, as the conditions on the ground eclipsed the worst abuses of colonial rule. 
Quebec, on the other hand, has borne no evidence to the level of targeted human rights viola-
tions— in particular, the right to life –, as observed in Bangladesh. It is, however, a good con-
trasting example to demonstrate how the natural political processes in democracies may 
complicate the long-term resolution of questions of self-administration.  
Surely, within that general framework, there is a considerable balance to be achieved in 
assessing claims for territory by collective groupings. Given the duty not to recognise illegal acts, 
including attempts for new state creation, states will take a basically restrictive view as well as a 
disapproving view toward the most furtive attempts to frame new state creation, inappropri-
ately. But the challenges of getting recognised as having collective rights is probably one of the 
greatest challenges in international law overall. The concept must be a practical possibility, for 
otherwise it would not exist as law, but it must be buffeted against the parallel reality that there 
must be a compelling need for such actions to occur. In this sense, the next chapter will focus 
primarily on the African continent, a region where post-colonialism and complicated, and vio-
lent, inter-societal engagement tend to coincide. Greater definition to the ‘peoples’ concept may 
thus be found when viewed, with relation to the separate legal regime of minority rights and ac-
tions that may be undertaken, when a state acts with negligence in the protection of its constitu-
ent populations. 
 
 
 CHAPTER FOUR 
Interpreting ‘government’ and ‘equality’ in a practical context 
Following the establishment and entry into force of the ICCPR and the ICESCR, the rights of 
‘collective groupings’ had become juridically tangible, as the near-universal ratification of 
these covenants is based upon voluntary actions taken by states. In practice, all ‘peoples’ hav-
ing an integrally territorial component will be expected, in the first instance, to seek collec-
tive redress for claims related to their status as a ‘people’ per se, through the governmental 
and administrative machinery of their state. Simultaneously, however, ‘minorities’ seeking 
parity with the majority, are viewed individually, without specific regard to collectiveness and 
territoriality, as formulated by international human rights law. When considering practical 
situations involving the collective groupings of ‘minorities’ and ‘peoples’, in postcolonial 
statehood, attention can be most obviously drawn both to Asia and Africa. However, Africa 
holds an obvious advantage over Asia, regarding the depth of legal analysis, given the exis-
tence of its regional intergovernmental organisation, the African Union. The African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights has affirmed that all peoples have a ‘right to existence’, which 
demonstrates how regional insight can aid in understanding of the concept of collective 
groupings, as the conceptually separate legal regimes governing the rights of ‘minorities’ and 
those of ‘peoples’ may have the potential to overlap. In the African context, as the concept 
of ‘peoples’ has additional, regionalised meanings, it may be unclear whether a collective 
grouping should be defined as a ‘people’ or ‘minority’. Surely, circumstances of armed or civil 
conflict are likely to exist within the localised regions in question. In the most extreme situa-
tions, it could very well be that a ‘people’ may be observed to have formed in opposition to 
the most extreme actions of a state, particularly when such actions are repeatedly and con-
sciously targeted against a specific segment of its own citizenry. It appears that greater insight 
into the postcolonial state could be derived from further deconstructing the tensions be-
tween state and society on a conceptual level. 
Introducing the delineations formed between ‘peoples’ and ‘minorities’ by inter-
national human rights law  
Traditional international law has been, and in large part continues to be, the law of states: 
that which is created by states to serve states’ interests. Undoubtedly, however, the actions of 
states also contribute to lawmaking, as state practice is indicative of custom in international law. 
The horrors of the second world war gave rise to the notion of an ‘enlightened self-interest’ and 
the conception that a state’s actions towards individuals—nationals and aliens alike—within 
those states was not unlimited. International law underwent a substantial evolution with the 
emergence of a nascent international human rights law followed by the incorporation of such 
law into the broader general public international law, particularly from 1976, when the ICCPR 
and ICESCR entered into force. International human rights law, particularly when viewed as a 
subset of a larger ‘international law’ set, is traditionally concerned with addressing the rights of 
individuals within states. That the individual is even a matter of legal concern in modern inter-
national law reflects a great deal of progressive development, primarily through codification, 
since the era of the great positivists. States continue to retain their powerful force as the greatest 
repositories of international legal personality, however, and a state’s sovereign acts are conse-
quential. States manifest their sovereignty primarily through administrative actions on their own 
territory. But all the while, supranational authority has also been continually reinforced, par-
ticularly through international human rights law, so as to shift the scope of sovereignty by a state 
from a practical carte blanche to a circumstance whereby all states have, through their voluntary 
actions, agreed that the protection of individuals, within a state, is of critical importance. Fur-
thermore, when global international law is further developed by regional or localised enforce-
ment measures, the depth of its application can only be increased.  
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As was introduced in the previous chapter, during the early stages of the development of 
international human rights law, this reality was of comparatively less significance, as the empha-
sis was more on standard-setting than enforcement of human rights norms. But with the entry 
into force in 1976 of the twin human rights covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, de-
spite the contrasting motivations for their advocacy and indeed owing to political realities fol-
lowing the second world war showing favour to reconstructive activity, the unavoidable reality 
emerged that a particular set of human rights are evolved from post-war statehood and are suffi-
ciently developed, so as to fuse the protections afforded by the state (through e.g. international 
human rights law generally) and the protections afforded to entities, such as peoples or minori-
ties (i.e., collective groupings) throughout a state. It is therefore apparent that international law, 
itself, is concerned with protecting something greater than the rights of individuals, alone. 
Group rights may exist, but they are to be protected in the first instance through the provisions of 
international law most readily associated with individual rights. 
This phenomenon may be observed by following the chronological pathway of the UN’s 
own establishment as a law-making process, since the initial identification of ‘human rights’ as a 
topic of concern was conceptually followed by a particular codification process fuelled by the 
loose bipolar structure which defined international relations following second world war. The 
delineations formed between so-called ‘competing’ groups of rights—‘civil and political’ and 
‘economic, social and cultural’—developed concurrently in the early-to-mid 1970s, with the 
formulation of a ‘peoples’ right of ‘access to government’ (i.e., as the Friendly Relations Declara-
tion has been interpreted to mean), and the emergence of a particular set of ‘minority rights’, 
with the entry into force of the ICCPR and ICESCR (i.e., the International Bill of Rights, within 
which ‘peoples’ find definition in Article 1 ICCPR and ‘minorities’ find definition in Article 27 
ICCPR).1 
By way of background, it is further recalled that civil and political rights are so-called 
‘first-generation’ rights, economic, social and cultural rights are so-called ‘second-generation’ 
rights, and ‘third-generation human rights’ are collective rights, or rights of solidarity. This latter 
set of rights has inherent differences in terms of standard setting and enforcement as compared 
to the human rights of individuals.2 However, when viewed in a manner cognisant of the con-
straints the postcolonial statehood framework, for which sub-Saharan Africa, seen as a whole, is 
exemplary, it is here where the ‘peoples’ and ‘minorities’ concepts may be seen to overlap. 
‘Collective rights’, as defined by individuals, geographically-defined groups and the totality of a 
state’s inhabitants 
Certain analytical parameters should be established to guide the interpretation of state 
practice concerning collective groupings. Most importantly, it should be observed that the 
                                                                  
1 The conceptual independence of these phenomena should be noted as at the time the UN human rights 
programme was squarely within the realm of the more ‘functional’ Economic and Social Council, 
whereby the Friendly Relations Declaration emanated from the more ‘quasi-parliamentarian’ General As-
sembly. 
2 The term ‘third-generation rights’ emanates from the intellectual synergies formed between the Interna-
tional Institute of Human Rights in Strasbourg and UNESCO in Paris as the two main human rights 
covenants entered into force. The term was first used by Karel Vasak in Human Rights: A Thirty-Year 
Struggle: the Sustained Efforts to give Force of law to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
UNESCO Courier 30:11 (November 1977). For a complementary analysis from this period, see also S.P. 
Marks, Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980s?, 33 Rutgers L.R. 435 (1981), and K. 
Vasak and P. Alston (eds.) The International Dimensions of Human Rights (2 vols., 1982). 
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question of meaning permeates practically all discussion about third-generation rights. Indeed, 
questions of definition have been a factor since the outset of this study. In terms of definitional 
hierarchy, ‘collective’ or ‘third-generation’ rights may be sought by collectivités, which itself is a 
catch-all phrase serving to include all potential beneficiaries of third-generation rights, which 
could mean ‘the entire population of a state’, as in uti possidetis-defined formulations of the first 
postcolonial external self-determination acts, or beneficiaries of more modern collective rights, 
such as the Right to Development. Additionally, ‘peoples’ and ‘indigenous peoples’, which are 
genuine collective rights, given principal definition on the basis of territoriality, may be grouped 
with ‘minority rights’, which are individual rights with similar goals as those sought by organised 
collectivités, under the chapeau of ‘collective groupings’.  
Group rights, when taken at a more basic level, do not necessarily find a specific corollary 
with the rights pursued by ‘collective groupings’ per se. In the context of this study, the notion of 
‘collective groupings’ has heretofore been seen as an untidy amalgam of the legal concepts of 
‘peoples’, ‘minorities’ and ‘indigenous peoples’. It will also be observed, however, that the ‘right 
to development’ is exemplary of a collective right, which assumes the definitional form of the 
entire population of a state, as the seeker of a ‘right to development’ is not, strictly speaking, seek-
ing particular access to government, parity with a majority or cultural autonomy based on tradi-
tion. Thus although it is uncontroversial in international law to observe that ‘peoples’ are to be 
afforded access to government, ‘minorities’ are to be afforded parity with a definitional majority, 
and ‘indigenous peoples’ are to be afforded a mechanism for their societal preservation, within 
the context of a modern territorial state, on the basis of subsequent law concerning collective 
groupings, it may also be observed that ‘collective rights’ need not be limited to peoples, minori-
ties and indigenous peoples to find validity in law. 
For example, the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development is widely known to be a 
legal instrument with a scope greater than on the individual level alone;3 however, it appears 
that the collective element, inherent in this right, is disbursed across all populations on a terri-
tory.4 It therefore is evident that the Declaration makes particular claims in a collective form, but 
it is also the case that the Declaration does not necessarily do so on the basis of the heretofore es-
tablished juridical conceptualisations of collective groupings—that is, something based on, 
                                                                  
3 See Declaration on the Right to Development, General Assembly resolution 41/128 (4 December 1986). 
As applies to the analysis at hand, it must clearly be observed that the Declaration formulates the majority 
of its provisions in such a way as to make the state the primary subject of the Declaration, but does so in a 
way which addresses particular attention to the rights of a state’s citizens and residents.  
4 Cf. Id. Article 1 states that “[t]he right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which 
every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, so-
cial, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully 
realized”, and “[t]he human right to development also implies the full realization of the right of peoples to 
self-determination, which includes, subject to the relevant provisions of both International Covenants on 
Human Rights, the exercise of their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and 
resources”. (emphasis added) 
Article 2 continues by stating that “[t]he human person is the central subject of development and 
should be the active participant and beneficiary of the right to development”, and “[a]ll human beings have 
a responsibility for development, individually and collectively, taking into account the need for full re-
spect for their human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as their duties to the community, which 
alone can ensure the free and complete fulfilment of the human being, and they should therefore promote 
and protect an appropriate political, social and economic order for development”. Furthermore, Article 2 
states that “[s]tates have the right and the duty to formulate appropriate national development policies that 
aim at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals, on the 
basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of the 
benefits resulting therefrom”. 
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primarily, the ‘peoples’ and ‘minorities’ criteria, which, themselves, are developed from separate 
legal pedigrees, yet find considerable overlap due to a circumstance whereby a factual situation 
may either be interpreted as ‘minority’ or ‘peoples’ rights. To be certain, however, differences ex-
ist, in form (e.g. minority rights seek equality with a majority, whereas peoples rights seek self-
government), geographical composition (e.g. a minority may be scattered throughout a terri-
tory, whereas a people should be largely geographically contiguous) and functional definition 
(e.g. minorities may be defined on the basis of language, whereas peoples are not). 
That said, the principal legal examination considered heretofore has been relatively 
straightforward, concerning itself with the assertion that a truly globalised system of territorially-
defined statehood has emerged through the imposition of a European model. As has been 
demonstrated, the monolith of juridical statehood is in practice a highly variable entity, when 
examined by the standard criteria of self-determination’s ‘access to government’ provisions and 
the ‘civic equality’ sought through minority rights regimes. But by the 1970s, through particularly 
the Friendly Relations Declaration and the ICCPR, international human rights law began to de-
velop sufficient capacity so as to be, some thirty years later, broadly in force in practically all 
states worldwide. 
Again, once the Right to Development emerged as a matter of legal consideration as a 
Declaration by the General Assembly in the 1980s; it did so without particular concern for the 
language of self-determination and ‘minority rights’ per se. Nevertheless, the collective nature of 
the declaration is obvious, as the social and economic development of individuals does not oc-
cur in a vacuum. It is logical to observe that every citizen, and to a certain extent foreign nation-
als legally resident within a state, are the intended beneficiaries of such a right, if only due to the 
fact that large-scale variations on the validity of this right may run contrary to other rights-based 
expectations, particularly with regard to equality before the law (e.g. inter alia ICCPR Articles 
14, 25 and 26 and ICESCR Articles 3, 5, 6, 9, 11 and 15).  
It is important to make these distinctions explicit for the purpose of this study, which has 
tended to favour the phrase ‘collective groupings’ in its intellectual framework to incorporate all 
groups that seek to employ the provisions of international law corresponding to ‘peoples’, ‘mi-
norities’ or ‘indigenous peoples’ and appear, prima facie, to be able to make such claims success-
fully, under at least one of these legal forms. However, once the notion of a global ‘right to 
development’ had emerged in the intergovernmental law-making bodies of the United Nations, 
it became clear that there were no absolute delimitations with regard to the extent of interna-
tional law’s definitional capacity for collectivités. Although ‘peoples’ and ‘minorities’ had 
emerged as legal subjects as a result of separate formative regimes, there is no preclusion to using 
a collectivist banner over both of the two main forms of juridical ‘collective groupings’,5 nor is 
there the expectation that collective rights, in international human rights law, must be formed 
explicitly by one and only one of the terms ‘peoples’, ‘minorities’ or ‘indigenous peoples’. And 
thus, it does appear that, when considering the topic of ‘third-generation rights’ generally, the 
question of definitional overlap is inescapable.  
                                                                  
5 Questions regarding the rights of indigenous peoples are complicated in their formulation, undoubtedly 
because the goals of indigenous peoples’ rights are conceptually opposed to notions of ‘civilisation’ in the 
positivist legal sense. The juridical rights of sovereignty emerging from such ‘civilising’ actions may be, 
in the face of overwhelming evidence of the right of an ‘indigenous people’ to claim such rights, juridi-
cally mitigated by the recognition of ‘indigenous peoples’ rights’, on the territory of an otherwise sover-
eign state. That such circumstances, in terms of practical example, are most likely to be observed in 
postcolonial states, should not go overlooked. 
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An observation on the topics of ‘consent’ and ‘consensus’ as applied to the postcolonial 
state 
A second conceptual observation should be made to set the tone for the rest of the chap-
ter. Leaving aside the question of peremptory norms in international law, it should also briefly 
be recalled that the vast majority of the corpus of international law has been formed by the con-
sent or acquiescence of states to be bound to a particular legal concept, and by subsequent state 
practice. Therein lies the implication of consent: by virtue of active membership within a group, 
its members give, at minimum, tacit consent to allow the aggregation of one’s individual actions 
to a collective, or group level, in order to promote that associated aggregated, collective or 
group interest.6 When considering the concepts of ‘government’ and ‘equality’ in a postcolonial 
context, the levels of ‘consent’, in evidence, may be of uncertain composition, as the municipal 
legal systems in force will, largely, have been inherited through colonialism, and the govern-
ment may not be formed through democratic processes. Thus, as postcolonial states operate the 
machinery of statehood through their governments, their diplomatic positions, taken at inter-
governmental forums such as the United Nations, may be influenced by a lack of access to gov-
ernment or civic equality. The notion, then, of modern international law being formed by 
specific processes such as multilateral treaty-making and operating on the basis of consensus, 
becomes viewed through an additional layer of complexity. 
‘Consent’ for a structured system of societal operations at a more global level, such as 
through an international community of states, surely predates the United Nations and its multi-
lateral treaty-based system of global governance.  
As Georg Schwarzenberger states, two conditions are required for the formulation of in-
ternational law: a reciprocated equality of status and a level of contact which necessitates regula-
tion of conduct;7 this is, presumably, followed by voluntary actions by parties involved to 
manifest their agreed wills. It can subsequently be observed how a functional system of state-
hood has emerged on the international arena. The integrity of this system is derived from the 
sovereignty of each of its members and the lack of a higher authority to which the individual 
states might be bound. This implies that it is the structures within the individual states them-
selves which perpetuate this system; moreover, that it is the acceptance of statehood per se by 
those within individual states, which makes statehood a desirable societal condition. Kalevi 
Holsti provides a theoretical construction of this in contemporary statehood by proposing that a 
state’s legitimacy is based on something akin to consensus.8 
                                                                  
6 Viz. Thucydides et al, History of the Peloponnesian War, Book One, The Dispute over Corcyra 433 
(Penguin, 1986) at 54: (as representatives of Corcyra spoke to Athenians) “Athenians, in a situation like 
this […] we have come to ask you for help, but cannot claim that this help is due to us because of any great 
services we have done to you in the past or on the basis of any existing alliance. We must therefore con-
vince you first that by giving us this help you will be acting in your own interests; and then we must show 
you that our gratitude can be depended upon. If on all these points you find our arguments unconvincing, 
we must not be surprised if our mission ends in failure.”  
7 See G. Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law, Book 1, (4th ed., 1960), at 3. 
8 Cf. K.J. Holsti, The State, War and the State of War (1996) 98: In a diagram, he purports that a contempo-
rary state’s legitimacy is based upon: “an implicit social contract, consensus on political ‘rules of the 
game’, equal access to decisions and allocations, clear distinction between private gain and public service, 
effective sovereignty, ideological consensus/pragmatic politics, civilian control of military and interna-
tional consensus on territorial limits and state legitimacy”. 
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Consensus is something more than consent.9 Whereas consent, as such, is something that 
seems more focused on an individual and his or her embrace or acquiescence to something, 
consensus implies a dose of collective measure towards a more active participation in the affairs 
of the state. Consensus, as a procedural consideration, is at the heart of many UN policy-making 
bodies, particularly its General Assembly and Economic and Social Council. This is particularly 
the case in the area of standard-setting with regard to international human rights law, as op-
posed to special procedures and fact-finding, as well as intergovernmental enforcement.10 
 To illustrate this phenomenon in a wider context, it may be recalled from earlier in this 
study how European states began to form more or less organically, following the Peace of West-
phalia. As the Hinterlands of European states came under fuller control of the capitals—often 
whether one liked it or not in the first instance—the consensus principle contributed to the terri-
torial definition of European statehood.11 This is not automatically to equate consensus with 
modern notions of democratic governance; indeed, quite often the opposite was true. But this 
did signify a growth in importance of incorporating the totality of a population into the affairs of 
the state. It was a deliberate and active process of cultural integration, undoubtedly witnessed 
more in places like France and less in the lands of the former Holy Roman Empire. Neverthe-
less, an important formula transpired, as European statehood simply did not ‘happen’. It was the 
natural outpouring and growth of its own complicated processes of societal evolution and de-
velopment. 
As concerns the implementation of ‘third-generation rights’ generally, it stands to reason, 
that actions encouraging the development of a consensus-based municipal state are to be con-
ceptually welcomed, particularly in view of the eventual discord between state in society within 
the postcolonial state. Such formulations reaffirm that the notion of collective rights may apply 
to the entire population of a state, individuals within a state and groups of self-associating indi-
viduals. For example, the right to political participation is universally expected, in a state-party 
to the ICCPR, and this may be effectuated both on an purely individual level, through e.g. vot-
ing, in addition to actions taken through official interactions with local government institutions. 
However, what is more appropriate for a study—predicated on the idea that the superim-
position, of the European state onto colonised lands, has had, in some cases, a destabilising ef-
fect on certain postcolonial populations— is to acknowledge the conceptual overlap between 
the concepts of ‘peoples’ and ‘minorities’ on the one hand, and to attempt to identify conceptual 
delineations, between the separate legal concepts, on the other. Furthermore, as the topic of 
self-determination of peoples has been extensively discussed on a general level in previous 
                                                                  
9 Cf. Concise Oxford English Dictionary (10th ed., 1999): Consent is a noun meaning ‘permission’ or a 
verb meaning ‘give permission’ or ‘agree to do something’. It dates from Middle English and can be traced 
back to Old French and Latin. Consensus, however, is a noun meaning ‘general agreement’ dating only 
back to the 17th Century from Latin antecedents.  
10 Cf. D. Kennedy, A New Stream of International Law Scholarship, 7 Wisc. Int.L.J. 39: “By 1975, the fash-
ionable international institution made up its mind by consensus. By exactly translating political reality 
into institutional action, consensus keeps the institution in step with all states. The minority feels attended 
to, respected: neither the big powers nor the blocs are able to control the majority any more. Consensus is 
the perfect form of international deference. Moreover, consensus permits the institution to make powerful 
decisions and ensures compliance with such decisions as are taken. The very experience of coming to con-
sensus builds community. Finally, as we might expect, by 1980, the blooms was beginning to be off con-
sensus—and the results were familiar. The institution was hostage to one hold out autonomous state—and 
the individual sovereign felt bullied into agreement by a powerful consensus building plenary practice.” 
11 Cf. Frontier of Walfisch (Walvis) Bay between Germany and Great Britain, XI Recueil des Sentences 
Arbitrales 306 (1911) for the Hinterland doctrine: “[…] it requires for its application the existence or 
assertion of political influence over certain territory, or a treaty in which it is concretely formulated.” 
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chapters, it will be useful to develop the ‘peoples’ concept into a more specialised, regional con-
text—in this case employing the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights—to attempt to emphasise aspects of the postcolonial state which would benefit from the 
greater effectiveness which is to be assumed with increased juridical provisions for ‘collective 
groupings’.  
Identifying minority protection and peoples’ rights through the ICCPR and the 
practice of the Human Rights Committee 
Minority protection was a subject of public international law even before the entry into 
force of the ICCPR in 1976. Despite the absence of its specific mention in the Covenant of the 
League of Nations, the protection of minorities was a central feature of the League, itself, due in 
large part to the realities of multiple ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities being distrib-
uted—often quite arbitrarily—across new state boundaries following the first world war.12 The 
League developed a system formed on the basis of special treaties between the League and a 
number of member-states,13 whereby minorities alleging violations of their rights could petition 
the Council of the League, and have potential recourse to the Permanent Court of International 
Justice for advisory opinions on specific legal questions related to such petitions.14 It would be, 
however, appropriate to observe that the United Nations has shown more concern for avoid-
ance of the concept of minority protection than its incorporation into the nascent organisation’s 
programme of activities.  
Given the loose bipolar period between the Soviet Union and the United States, many po-
tential minority concerns were subsumed into the ideological contest between the superpow-
ers. With the end of the Cold War, however, and the lack of such a confining global politique, it 
has proven increasingly difficult to ignore such concerns, particularly as they often manifest 
themselves in the form of a ‘new nationalism’, involving the sorts of postcolonial internal armed 
conflicts most obvious in sub-Saharan Africa at the outset of the 21st century. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides the best example of the 
interplay between the concepts of ‘people’ and ‘minority’, as it is the only treaty-based interna-
tional human rights instrument, which makes overt references to both of the concepts, although 
it does not go so far as to link them directly. Specific reference is made to the distinctions be-
tween these conceptualisations in Article 1 of the Covenant,15 which grants ‘all peoples’ the right 
to self-determination. In contrast, Article 27 of the Covenant affords certain basic protections to 
minorities within their own states; indeed, it is the only explicit reference to the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities in treaty-based international human rights law. It states: 
In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to 
such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their 
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their 
own language. 
                                                                  
12 See H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination (1990), at 51 et seq. 
13 For a representative example, see Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Po-
land, signed at Versailles (29 June 1919), whereby Poland granted special rights to ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities and agreed (at Article 12) that these rights constituted international obligations to be 
guaranteed by the League of Nations. 
14 For discussion, see e.g. J. Robinson, From Protection of Minorities to Promotion of Human Rights, 
1948 Jewish Yb.Int’l.L. 115. 
15 See citation supra chapter two, at text accompanying note 40. 
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The language used in the article is restrictive, as it affords the possibility for states to claim 
they are not one in which minorities do exist; furthermore, it must also be observed that minor-
ity rights protection is not an element deeply rooted in the UN Charter framework.16 An addi-
tional complication is the fact that a precise definition of what actually constitutes a minority is 
not apparent.17 Indeed, the most that can be inferred from Article 27 is, in the words of Zelim 
Skurbaty, an action “to avoid conferring an international legal personality on groups (or collectiv-
itiés)”.18 However, the restrictions of Article 27 must also be read in conjunction with the most 
significant attempt by the United Nations General Assembly to build upon the terms of its provi-
sions, the 1992 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities,19 which affords more positively-formulated protections to minorities, 
or, more accurately, to persons belonging to such minorities. Nevertheless, the declaration simi-
larly leaves the definition of minorities substantively undefined.20 
Attempts to define a ‘minority’ by the United Nations have only met with limited success, 
despite the appointment in 1971 of Francesco Caportorti as Special Rapporteur, mandated to 
study the issue and the development of the concept generally, and indeed more specifically 
through the 1992 Declaration by the General Assembly. This is, in large part, because the mi-
nority concept, itself, is “complex, vague and imprecise”.21 Whether this is the cause or effect of 
the general unwillingness of states to fully consider the concept is similarly obscure. Neverthe-
less, the inherent definitional imprecision does not negate the existence of minorities.22 The 
same can be said of the ‘peoples’ concept. This reality leads to an inherent bias toward ‘circum-
stantialism’ in both definition and interpretation, a situation acknowledged by one of the most 
authoritative sources on minority issues, the former OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities, Max van der Stoel.23 One should also observe that, although there has been more 
                                                                  
16 For discussion, see M.N. Shaw, The Definition of Minorities in International Law 20 IYHR 13 (1991). 
17 Cf. F. Caportori (Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities), Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384 95 (1979) [hereinafter Caportori 
study]: “When it comes to determining what groups constitute minorities, all kinds of difficulties arise. 
We have seen that, religious minorities apart, relatively few States expressly recognize the existence in 
their populations of groups described as ‘ethnic or linguistic minorities’ and that, while a considerable 
number of States have introduced measures granting special rights to various ethnic and linguistic 
groups, the majority prefer not to apply the term ‘minority’ to them.” 
18 Z. Skurbaty, As If Peoples Mattered 295 (2000) [hereinafter Skurbaty]. (Emphasis supplied.)  
19 See Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Mi-
norities, UN General Assembly Resolution 47/135 (18 December 1992) [hereinafter Minorities Declara-
tion]. For discussion, see A. Phillips and A. Rosas (eds.) The UN Minority Rights Declaration (1993).  
20 Cf. Report of the Working Group on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Religious and Lin-
guistic Minorities, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1991/53 (1991), at para. 9: “Delegates expressed the view that the 
present declaration did not necessarily have to contain a definition of the term ‘minority’, as such a defini-
tion was absent in other human rights instruments […]. It was also stated that the declaration could func-
tion perfectly well without precisely defining the term as it was clear from its classical meaning to which 
groups the term referred in concrete cases.” 
21 O. Andryesk, Report on the Definition of Minorities 8 SIM Special, as cited in J. Packer, On the Defini-
tion of Minorities in J. Packer and K. Myntti (eds.) The Protection of Ethnic and Linguistic Minorities in 
Europe 13 (1993). 
22 Viz. Caportori study, supra note 17, at 95: “The problem of defining the term ‘minority’ has never been 
an obstacle to the drawing-up of the numerous international instruments containing provisions on the 
rights of certain groups of the population to preserve their culture and use their own language. The termi-
nology used to refer to such groups varies from one instrument to another.” 
23 Cf. M. v.d. Stoel, Keynote Address to the Human Dimensions Seminar, Case Studies on National Minori-
ties Issues, Warsaw, 24-28 May 1993, as reprinted in 1 CSCE ODHR Bulletin 22 (1993): “What is a mi-
nority? I do not pretend to improve upon the work of many experts who over the years have not been able 
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definitional development on the concept of minorities in a regional European setting, the extent 
to which this development can be extrapolated to a universal level is limited.24 
Some attempt must be made to offer delineation, however fluid, between the concepts of 
‘people’ and ‘minority’. Article 27 actually provides little in the way of nuanced understanding 
between the separate legal concepts, as the article is negatively-formulated (‘[…] minorities 
shall not be denied the right […]’), thereby leaving positive state obligations open to consider-
able interpretation. The negative formulation of Article 27 has been altered by subsequent UN 
practice, in that the 1992 Minorities Declaration for the first time frames the protections afforded 
to minorities in terms of positive obligations to UN member-states, particularly at Articles 1, 2 
and 4.25 
In Article 1, the General Assembly declares that states “shall protect the existence and the 
national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective 
territories and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity” and “shall adopt 
appropriate legislative and other measures to achieve those ends”. 
Article 2 affords a positive right to minorities “to enjoy their own culture, to profess and 
practise their own religion, and to use their own language, in private and in public, freely and 
without interference or any form of discrimination”. Furthermore, “the right to participate effec-
tively in cultural, religious, social, economic and public life", and "the right to participate effec-
tively in decisions on the national and, where appropriate, regional level concerning the 
minority to which they belong or the regions in which they live, in a manner not incompatible 
with national legislation”, as well as “the right to establish and maintain their own associations” 
are established. This article concludes by granting “persons belonging to minorities […] the 
right to establish and maintain, without any discrimination, free and peaceful contacts with 
other members of their group and with persons belonging to other minorities, as well as con-
tacts across frontiers with citizens of other States to whom they are related by national or ethnic, 
religious or linguistic ties”. 
Article 4 provides that “States shall take measures where required to ensure that persons 
belonging to minorities may exercise fully and effectively all their human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms without any discrimination and in full equality before the law” and that “States shall 
take measures to create favourable conditions to enable persons belonging to minorities to ex-
press their characteristics and to develop their culture, language, religion, traditions and cus-
toms, except where specific practices are in violation of national law and contrary to 
international standards”. 
It should, therefore, not go overlooked that these articles must also be read in the context 
of Article 8 of the Declaration, which most significantly includes a usual reaffirmation of the 
principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of states, to 
which minorities, as citizens of states, are also subject. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
to agree on a definition, so I won’t offer you one of my own. I would note, however, that the existence of a 
minority is a question of fact and not of definition […]. I would dare to say that I know a minority when I 
see one.” 
24 For an interesting discussion from the European perspective greater than that allowed by the confines of 
this study, see K. Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: Individual Human 
Rights, Minority Rights and the Right to Self-Determination (2000), at 17-30 [hereinafter Henrard]. She 
concludes, Id. at 30, that “there is no general agreement on a definition of ‘minority’, either at the interna-
tional or at the European level”.  
25 See Minorities Declaration, supra note 19. 
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The nature of the concepts reflects a peculiar dynamic, in that it involves, on the one 
hand, rights possessed by individuals but, on the other hand, these individual rights can only be 
effectuated in concert with other such individuals (as does a ‘people’).26 In spite of this peculiar-
ity, states themselves are generally quite comfortable to work within this ambiguity. Thus the 
present discussion is left with a definition, which is viewed by many observers as acceptable in-
tellectually, if not having specific legal force: 
A “minority” is a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-
dominant position, whose members being nationals of the State, possess ethnic, religious or 
linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only 
implicitly, a sense of solidarity directed towards protecting their culture, traditions, religion 
or language.27 
This definition is supplemented by that provided in 1985 by Jules Deschênes, a member 
of the Commission on Human Rights’ (then-) sub-Commission. Although this definition was 
not accepted in the intergovernmental forum of the Commission on Human Rights, the 
Deschênes definition, read in conjunction with that of Caportori, does not make substantive re-
visions to its meaning, although Deschêne’s definition goes a bit further than that of Caportori.28 
Deschênes defines a minority as: 
A group of citizens of a State, constituting a numerical minority and in a non-dominant posi-
tion in that State, endowed with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ 
from those of the majority of the population, having a sense of solidarity with one another, 
motivated, if only implicitly, by a collective will to survive and whose aim is to achieve equal-
ity with the majority in fact and in law.29 
In the European context, this ‘working definition’ is further developed by principles iden-
tified with the final report of the Steering Committee on Human Rights to the EC Council of 
Ministers in September 1993, which was mandated to propose legal standards related to the pro-
tection of national minorities.30 These concepts, as extracted by Karen Henrard, include the fol-
lowing: 
The group should be less numerous than the rest of the population of the state, the mem-
bers of the group should reside in the state and have either the nationality of or close and 
long lasting ties with that state, they should have ethnic, religious or linguistic features differ-
ing from the rest of the population and finally, they should have expressed the wish to be 
recognized as a minority in the sense that the members of the group should have the will to 
                                                                  
26 Cf. Caportori study, supra note 17, at 35: “Although the expression ‘rights of minorities’ is used in 
common parlance, it is persons belonging to minorities, in community with the other members of their 
group, who are regarded in article 27 as having the right to enjoy their own culture, to practise their own 
religion and to use their own language.” See also Minorities Declaration, supra note 19, at Article 3, which 
states that "persons belonging to minorities may exercise their rights, including those set forth in the pre-
sent Declaration, individually as well as in community with other members of their group, without any 
discrimination", and that "no disadvantage shall result for any person belonging to a minority as the con-
sequence of the exercise or non-exercise of the rights set forth in the present Declaration". 
27 Caportori study, supra note 17, at para. 568. But cf. A. Eide, New Approaches to Minority Protection 5 
(1993, rev. ed. 1995) [hereinafter Eide], stating that as regards the numerical component in defining mi-
norities, it may be the numerical majority which is in a non-dominant position vis-à-vis the population 
of the rest of the state. This certainly could be seen as being the case in Rwanda, as the Tutsi ethnic group 
constitutes a minority of the population as a whole, yet has historically exhibited a dominant position 
over the more numerous Hutu ethnic group (as well as the comparatively minuscule Twa group). 
28 For discussion, see also G. Gilbert, The Legal Protection Accorded to Minority Groups in Europe, 1992 
Neth. YB Int’l L. 71. 
29 J. Deschênes, Proposal concerning a Definition of the term “Minority”, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/31, para. 181. 
30 CDDH (93) 22, Strasbourg, 8 September 1993, feddh 93.22, as cited in Henrard, supra note 24, at 27. 
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preserve collectively their distinctive collective identity.31 
Still deeper insight into the concept is given through the perspectives of Asbjørn Eide. In 
his report to the sub-Commission, in his capacity as Special Rapporteur on the Protection of 
Minorities,32 and in a subsequent edited sales publication,33 he states generally that whether a 
‘minority’ exists or not depends largely on whether it is recognised as such by both a government 
and a specific group.34 Questions regarding the rights of minorities, within a larger state struc-
ture, become problematic only when some groups within that state directly endanger other 
groups within the same state. This is because if basic rights are fully respected amongst all mem-
bers of a population, a minority would have very few specific wants or needs within that popu-
lation (such as the protection of its specific religion, culture or language, etc.). Eide additionally 
points to the existence of a constitution within a state as a demonstrative entitlement of specific 
rights into a legally invocatory framework.35 Nevertheless, persons belonging to minorities, 
within the framework of a specific state, must have all normal rights attributed to all persons 
within that state, as well as some additional rights specific to that minority. This is because, as 
James Crawford writes, “by definition, a ‘minority’ implies the existence of a ‘majority’ (not nec-
essarily a coherent one, since it could be made up by a collection of other minorities)”.36 This 
reasoning is best expressed by the Permanent Court of International Justice in its Minority 
Schools in Albania advisory opinion, dating from 1935: 
The idea underlying the treaties for the protection of minorities is to secure for certain ele-
ments incorporated in a State, the population of which differs from them in race, language or 
religion, the possibility of living peaceably alongside that population and co-operating amicably 
with it, while at the same time preserving the characteristics which distinguish them from the 
majority, and satisfying the ensuing special needs.37 
A further unique feature of collective rights is the expectation of a tangible measure of ex-
clusivity and compulsiveness. It is difficult to say that, universally, an individual must be either a 
member of a specific minority or not a member of that minority, or, for that matter, a specific 
people, for this overt dogmatism hardly reflects the realities of the intermingled, complex mo-
saic of individuals worldwide. It is fair to say that, once accepted as a member of a specific 
group, the individual is compelled to identify with that specific group, although the question of 
whether there can be a ‘minority’ within a ‘minority’, or a ‘people’ within a ‘people’ is to be left 
conceptually open, on the theoretical plane, as such pronouncements would be most clearly 
made in response to certain factual questions put to a court or other recognised source of law.  
With a general framework in place, accepting of the notion that, particularly in postcolo-
nial states, factual circumstances may be simultaneously and satisfactorily expressed in the sepa-
rate legal frameworks of ‘peoples rights’ and ‘minority rights’, it now becomes necessary to 
differentiate between a ‘people’ and a ‘minority’, so as to provide definition to what are, indeed, 
separate legal concepts. Remaining aware of the definitional variability of the concepts, as well 
                                                                  
31 Id. 
32 See Possible ways and means of facilitating the peaceful and constructive solution of problems involv-
ing minorities, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34 and Addenda. 
33 See Eide, supra note 27. Deeper definitional insight is provided in A. Eide, Minoritetsvernet, stebarn i 
det internasjonale menneskerettighetsvern? (1983), which includes an English-language summary.  
34 It should be recalled that the importance of collective groupings seeking ‘recognition’ per se was dis-
cussed in detail, in the previous chapter. 
35 Id. For discussion, from the US perspective, see also L. Henkin, The Age of Rights (1990), at 118-124 
and 127-140. 
36 J. Crawford, The Rights of Peoples: ‘Peoples’ or ‘Governments’, in J. Crawford (ed.) The Rights of Peoples 
60-61 (1988) [hereinafter Crawford]. 
37 Minority Schools in Albania, Ser. A/B. No 64 Advisory Opinion 17 (1935). 
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as their lack of generally-accepted definitions, the discussion will examine a number of relevant 
individual communications to the Human Rights Committee, the treaty-monitoring body of the 
ICCPR, to which states are required to submit periodic reports discussing the progress made 
towards implementation of the provisions of Covenant, into their domestic legislation.  
Delineations between ‘people’ and ‘minority’ from ICCPR communications 
As Patrick Thornberry writes, “self-determination and the rights of minorities are two 
sides of the same coin”.38 Although distinct, the specific appellations of ‘people’ and ‘minority’ 
are not to be seen in a vacuum. It is true that there is a fundamental difference between the con-
cepts, in their practical application, in that minority rights are afforded to individuals, and peo-
ples’ rights are afforded to collective entities. Beyond this specific distinction, however, it can be 
observed that the concepts are not completely independent of each other. As they both involve 
some measure of collectiveness, it follows that, in some form, the mere membership of an indi-
vidual within that group will automatically constrict some of that individual’s own personal 
choices to those defined by the overall group; in both cases, there are essential elements of 
group membership. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that such a formulation, in some way, 
goes beyond what was intended in the initial substantive development of the concepts in the 
United Nations.39 As was reported in 1955 by the General Assembly’s Third Committee to the 
Plenary: 
Much of the discussion on Article 1 had related to the question of self-determination to the 
colonial issue, but that was only because the peoples of non-self-governing and Trust Terri-
tories had not yet attained independence. The right would be proclaimed in the Covenants as 
a universal right and for all time. The danger of misreading the article had been exaggerated. 
It was true that the right could be and had been misused, but that did not invalidate it. It was 
said that the article was not concerned with minorities or the right to secession, and the 
term ‘peoples’ and ‘nations’ were not intended to cover such questions.40 
However, such a strict separation is increasingly difficult to sustain. The simple reality 
which exists in the 21st century is that it is possible, if not uncontroversial, that a ‘people’ may 
have characteristics similar to those of a ‘minority’, and it is similarly possible that a ‘minority’ 
                                                                  
38 P. Thornberry, Self-Determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of International Instruments, 
38 ICLQ 867 (1989) [hereinafter Thornberry]. 
39 Debate from the General Assembly’s Third Committee demonstrates that Western countries were ada-
mant that self-determination was to be executed, as a universal principle, but other states were afraid of 
the possibility of universal self-determination leading to fragmentation. Cf. Draft Resolution of the Third 
Committee in UN Doc. A/C.3/L.299 (25 November 1952) with Draft Resolution of the Third Committee 
in UN Doc. A/C.3/L.294. The first document is a United Kingdom amendment on state obligations re-
garding self-determination of peoples to a draft resolution presented by the Economic and Social Council 
itself to the Third Committee which broadly states that self-determination should be recognised “in a 
manner appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory or nation and the interests of the 
peoples concerned”. The second document is a United States proposal calling for self-determination of 
“all peoples and nations”. However, at the insistence of some Asian, Latin American and Middle Eastern 
states, the concept was condensed to ‘all peoples’, the ‘and nations’ formulation having been dropped out of 
the concern that minorities might wish to formulate themselves as a nation, and therefore have recourse to 
the emerging right to self-determination. See Draft Resolution of the Third Committee in UN Doc. 
A/C.3/L.304 (28 November 1952), and as amended by India in UN Doc. A/C.3/L.297/Rev.1 to clarify that 
while self-determination was to have a universal scope, no fragmentation was to occur in determining ‘the 
people’. Thus broad consensus emerged that minority groups were to be kept separate from formulations 
of ‘peoples’, and that the ‘peoples’ concept incorporates “peoples in all countries and territories, whether 
independent, trust or non-self-governing”. See UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.253. 
40 UN Doc. A/3077, para. 39 (1955). 
Nicholas Hansen 
Chapter Four: Interpreting ‘government’ and ‘equality’ in a practical context 
Page 179 
may choose to identify itself as a ‘people’. Although such overlaps may be possible, they are, by 
no means, necessary. Given this reality, as Thornberry suggests, a considerable level of confu-
sion has developed as “minorities appropriate the vocabulary of self-determination whether 
governments or scholars approve or not”,41 a phenomenon conceivably mirrored by indige-
nous peoples, as well. 
Article 27 of the ICCPR has been invoked in a number of cases demonstrating the inter-
play between indigenous peoples’ rights and the rights of minorities, in e.g. Canada and Swe-
den. The first communication of importance received by the Human Rights Committee was that 
of Sandra Lovelace, a Canadian First Nation woman who married a non-indigenous man. In 
1983,42 the Committee received as admissible a communication from her, under the first op-
tional protocol of the ICCPR, claiming that, due to her marriage, she was unable to continue re-
siding on an Indian reservation, pursuant to section 12(1) of the Canadian Indian Act.43 The 
Committee’s response was that this provision was not in conformity with Article 27 of the Cove-
nant, and Canada changed the Indian Act to reflect this fact. What is significant is that the com-
munication’s admissibility was only to be found under Article 27 and not under Article 1 of the 
Covenant: Lovelace was a member of a minority and not a member of a self-determining peo-
ple. This has been made clear, when examined with a later General Comment made by the 
Human Rights Committee in 1994 regarding the scope of Article 1, and particularly regarding 
the admissibility of individual communications under that article.44 In this comment, the Com-
mittee stated that self-determination, being a right of peoples, prevents an individual from 
presenting an admissible communication to the Committee, because the Optional Protocol al-
lows only claims of violations of human rights from individuals to be received. It should also be 
noted that a prior General Comment on Article 1 of the Covenant, from 1984,45 indicated an 
unwillingness on the part of the Committee to consider cases of self-determination beyond the 
decolonisation context.46 
In 1990, a communication was accepted by the Committee from a group of Cree Indians, 
known as the Lubicon Lake Band.47 While clearly comprising the definitional form of an in-
digenous people, the group claimed a violation of Article 1 of the Covenant, because the Cana-
dian Government’s exploration for oil and gas on their traditional lands would prevent them 
from continuing their aboriginal lifestyle. The Committee chose to classify the communication 
not under self-determination of peoples, but, rather, as a protection of minorities question un-
der Article 27 of the covenant.48 This formulation perhaps reflects the wish of the Committee to 
                                                                  
41 Thornberry, supra note 38, at 868. 
42 See UN Doc. CCPR/C/DR[XII]R6/24 (31 July 1983). 
43 Revised Statutes of Canada c.I-6 (1970). 
44 See General Comment No. 23(50) of the Human Rights Committee, Regarding Article 27, GAOR, 49th 
Sess., Supp. 40, UN Doc. A/49/40 (1994), Vol. I 107. Viz. Id. at para. 3.1: “The Covenant draws a distinc-
tion between the right to self-determination and the rights protected under article 27. The former is ex-
pressed to be a right belonging to peoples and is dealt with in a separate part (Part I) of the Covenant. Self-
determination is not a right cognizable under the Optional Protocol. Article 27, on the other hand, relates 
to rights conferred on individuals as such and is included, like the articles relating to other personal 
rights conferred on individuals, in Part III of the Covenant and is cognizable under the Optional Proto-
col.” 
45 General Comment No. 12(21) of the Human Rights Committee, Regarding Article 1, GAOR, 39th Sess., 
Supp. 40, UN Doc. A/39/40 (1984) 142. 
46 For discussion, see M. Scheinin, The Right to Self-Determination under the Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights, in P. Aikio and M. Scheinin (eds.), Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2000), at 187 et seq. 
47 See UN Doc. A/45/40, Vol. II, App. A (1990) [hereinafter Lubicon Communication]. 
48 For discussion greater than that which can be provided here, see D. McGoldrick, Canadian Indians, Cul-
tural Rights and the Human Rights Committee, 40 ICLQ 658 (1991). 
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avoid making overt pronouncements on contentious political situations, because the Chief of 
the indigenous group, Bernard Ominayak, did not have the authority to speak for his entire 
people and therefore did not have the authority to bring a ‘people’-based communication to the 
Committee. This was the approach taken by the Government of Canada, which was accepted 
by the Committee.49 A similar situation may be observed in a 1985 individual communication to 
the Committee, submitted by a Swedish Saami, Ivon Kitok, in which he claimed violations of 
both Articles 1 and 27 of the Covenant. Sweden maintained that the Saami were not an indige-
nous people under the meaning of Article 1. The Committee’s reasoning focuses upon the diffi-
culties in categorising ‘third-generation’ rights, particularly when allegations of violations of 
such rights are brought by individuals. In its findings: 
[T]he Committee observed that the author, as an individual, could not claim to be the victim 
of a violation of the right of self-determination enshrined in Article 3 of the Covenant. 
Whereas the Optional Protocol provides a recourse procedure for individuals claiming that 
their rights have been violated, Article 1 of the Covenant deals with rights conferred upon 
peoples, as such.50 
In the above-mentioned cases, the Committee found that members of indigenous peo-
ples were individually enforcing their rights. In Lovelace’s case, for example, by virtue of the 
change in her status, due to the nature of her marriage, she went from ‘minority’ to ‘majority’ as 
per the terms of the Canadian Indian Act. Nevertheless, her individual concern was primary: to 
maintain membership in a minority group. This, however, is contrasted with the ongoing expe-
riences of a ‘people’ as a whole. Thus, an essential distinction must be made between the con-
cepts of ‘minority’ and ‘people’, because the collective outweighs the individual, due to the 
circumstances that constructed the ‘people’.  
Furthermore, the concept of ‘peoples’ is more substantially developed than that of the 
concept of ‘minority’, at least in terms of identifying generally-accepted law, if only because the 
‘peoples’ concept of ‘access to government’ is formed on the basis of a the Friendly Relations 
Declaration of the UN General Assembly, which, itself, is a manifestation by the international 
community providing definition to public international law, by virtue of having been adopted at 
a higher political level than a General Assembly Resolution, whereas the ‘minority rights’ con-
cept is formed primarily through Article 27 of the ICCPR which has nearly, but not completely, 
universal accession through voluntary actions by states.  
The underlying reality is that, in a sense, an opposing pole has been presented, through 
the negative formulation of what constitutes a ‘minority’. A minority in a state is not an aggregate 
grouping, as such; it is the collective entity to which an individual belongs in order to differenti-
ate itself from the majority population as a whole. From there, a ‘person belonging to’ a minority 
can make specific claims based upon the specific rights afforded to him or her through whatever 
minority rights regime is in operation in a state (indeed, assuming one exists at all). This then 
begs the question of what happens when enough such individuals present similar or overlap-
ping claims to the governing minority rights regime within a state: where does the individual 
element end and the collective element begin? 
A dichotomy between the concept of ‘people’ and ‘indigenous people’ will have appeared 
                                                                  
49 Cf. Lubicon Communication, supra note 47, at para. 23.1: The Canadian Government asserted to the 
Committee that “working through a single individual who is said to retain some ties with the Band but 
who has not lived in the community for 40 years, these agents are said to try to induce other native indi-
viduals to strike their own private deals with the federal Government. Most of the individuals identified 
by the agents do not appear to be affiliated with any recognized aboriginal society”. 
50 See UN Doc. CCPR/C/DR/R6/197 (Communication No. 197/1985), 27 July 1988. 
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by this stage of the analysis. Although it may conceptually appear that indigenous peoples 
would find some overlap with ‘peoples’ (because the operative noun is repeated in both terms), 
such assertions are unlikely to be seen as juridically valid. Indeed, following the United Nations 
Decade of the World’s Indigenous People,51 and given the ongoing efforts by the previous 
Commission on Human Rights to adopt a Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples,52 on the basis of a text produced by its sub-Commission’s Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations,53 and the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People,54 it can reasonably be stated that indigenous 
peoples—the term ‘peoples’ being provisionally accepted, by virtue of its acceptance in the Draft 
Declaration (although not necessarily in other ECOSOC resolutions, viz. resolution 2001/57, es-
tablishing the Special Rapporteur)— have been subject to an emerging legal status independent 
of that of both ‘minorities’ and ‘peoples’. 
This is most evident when one considers the final outcome of the General Assembly’s 22-
year deliberation on the topic of indigenous peoples.55 In it, the General Assembly proclaimed 
inter alia that indigenous peoples have the right to all human rights and fundamental freedoms,56 
that “indigenous peoples and individuals are free and equal to all other peoples and individu-
als”,57 that indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination,58 autonomy or self-
government,59 and, specifically, “have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct politi-
cal, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate 
fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State”.60 Signifi-
cantly, the Declaration proclaims that: 
1. Indigenous individuals have the rights to life, physical and mental integrity, liberty and secu-
rity of person. 
2. Indigenous peoples have the collective right to live in freedom, peace and security as dis-
tinct peoples and shall not be subjected to any act of genocide or any other act of violence, 
including forcibly removing children of the group to another group.61 
Practically speaking, this implies that indigenous peoples are not to be subjected to forced 
assimilation, and states shall provide redress for any actions which deprives the distinct nature of 
indigenous peoples,62 or their cultural, spiritual and religious traditions.63 Thus, although this 
may not have been the case per se prior to the adoption of the Declaration, it may be observed 
                                                                  
51 As proclaimed by the General Assembly in Resolution 48/163 (21 December 1993), and launched on 9 
December 1994. It should be noted that the title refers to ‘people’ and not ‘peoples’. 
52 Cf. an earlier draft text as formulated in UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/33 at operative paragraph 1, stat-
ing: “Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination, in accordance with international law by vir-
tue of which they may freely determine their political status and institutions and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development. An integral part of this is the right to autonomy and self-
government”, with the eventual text, which was sent to the Commission on Human Rights for approval. 
53 Again, note the use in terminology of ‘populations’ instead of ‘people’ or ‘peoples’. 
54 See Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/57. 
55 See United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. A/61/L.67 (7 September 
2007), adopted by a vote of 143-4-11. 
56 Id. at operative para 1. 
57 Id. at operative para 2 (emphasis added). 
58 Id. at operative para 3, echoing language found in common article 1 of the ICCPR/ICESCR. 
59 Id. at operative para 4. 
60 Id. at operative para 5. 
61 Id. at operative para 7. 
62 Id. at operative para 8. 
63 Id. at operative paras 11 and 12. 
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how certain overlaps may be now be observed between ‘indigenous peoples’ and ‘peoples’.64 
Therefore, although there exists in this study the formulation of ‘collective groupings’ as a sort of 
definitional catch-all, in which ‘peoples’ and ‘indigenous peoples’ might be conceptually 
grouped, it should be recalled that such terms are formed by separate legal regimes, both collec-
tive in scope, but separate in objective, yet having the conceptual potential to overlap with ‘mi-
norities’, which are inherently singular in definition, yet potentially desirable as a potential 
remedy obtained in response to specific local circumstances.65 It may be the case that a ‘people’ 
and a ‘minority’ (indeed, based more on relatively undefined factual circumstances than on ju-
ridical pedigree, ‘an indigenous people’) may conceptually overlap, in terms of definition, based 
on established international law.66 The point remains that, broadly speaking, ‘peoples’ seek ac-
cess to government, ‘minorities’ seek parity with a majority and ‘indigenous peoples’ seek to 
maintain their traditions, within a state. 
Having broadly identified delineations amongst the holders of rights allocated to ‘collec-
tive groupings’, and having reset the term ‘minorities’ to a framework more receptive to the no-
tion of overlap with self-determination of peoples, the ‘right of peoples to self-determination’ as 
a specific unified concept should also be reconsidered as a legal principle operating on a sliding 
scale of meanings. This is to say that the ‘self’ and the ‘peoples’ components are synonymous, 
since they constitute the specific element of the collective ‘group’ phenomenon. 
What is not at issue here, specifically, is the existence of this element per se, but rather the 
ways in which it can be construed as having a legitimate appellation of this particular status. For 
example, how can a ‘people’ be a ‘people’? Although the established UN framework must be 
seen as a broadly representative of the substantive positivist pronouncements on defining a 
‘people’, it will also be of interest to consider simultaneously how the very essence of the concept 
has changed over time through these same political processes. What should be considered is 
how the international community forms its responses to the most obvious flaws in the system of 
international governance, itself largely formed on the basis of consent by sovereign states.  
In large swathes of sub-Saharan Africa, the separate juridical pedigree of the variables of 
‘government’ and ‘equality’ have been proven to be inconsequential, as systems of governmental 
malfeasance dominate the administrative landscape of certain postcolonial states. 
Thus while in the main, there exists a problem of definition, based upon the divergent 
definitional form of ‘people’ and ‘minority’ in public international law, there also exists a simul-
taneous circumstance whereby, on the one hand, international law is asserting a necessary role 
in ensuring the right to political participation throughout the population of a state, and on the 
other hand, is charged with the responsibility of responding to circumstances, whereby ‘the 
                                                                  
64 Cf. T.D. Musgrave, Self-Determination and National Minorities 177 (1997) [hereinafter Musgrave]. If 
indigenous peoples rights are not governed by common Article 1 of the two main human rights covenants 
and General Assembly Resolutions 1514 and 2625, then, as he concludes, the emerging texts on indige-
nous peoples “purport to recognize indigenous populations as ‘peoples’, while refusing to allow them to 
determine their own political status.” 
65 This could be so if for example a small territorially-formed ‘people’ in a postcolonial state attempted to 
assert its rights under international law, but only so far as to achieve parity with the majority and not spe-
cifically to seek access to government as a particular collectivité. 
66 This is so because of the distinction in international law whereby the ‘access to government’ provisions 
of self-determination law may factually co-exist with the ‘parity with majority’ provisions of minority 
law, but neither legal formulations are prima facie likely to co-exist with ‘indigenous peoples’ rights’ as 
generally observed under international law, given that the rights of indigenous peoples are generally for-
mulated so as to preserve the unique societal roles of autochoneous populations, without disturbing the 
established, recognised states, conceptually formed to the positivist, ‘civilised’ standard. 
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state’ per se is simply dysfunctional, and structurally underdeveloped from the standpoint of de-
monstrative capacity.  
What remains is the question of administrative malfeasance being implicitly sanctioned 
by the inefficiencies of the horizontal-enforcement system of international law, and the form 
under which many postcolonial states came to find legitimate juridical recognition of their 
claims for and manifestations of sovereignty. As applied to the principal regional territorial en-
tity of this study, the African Continent, primarily south of the Saharan Desert, the gap between 
theory and practice seems readily apparent, when one considers the potentially discordant 
forms of international law, which may be applicable in a postcolonial state. 
Interpreting the law’s applicability towards the modern reality of postcolonial 
statehood 
There is little doubt today that Africa’s survival is seriously threatened by corrupt and inept 
political elites, unbridled militaries, ethnic rivalries and economic misery […]. The problems 
of the post-colonial state indicate that the juridical statehood attained with the decoloniza-
tion of the colonial state has in the past four decades proven inadequate. It is becoming in-
creasingly apparent that sovereignty and statehood are concepts that may have trapped 
Africa in a detrimental time capsule; they now seem to be straightjackets with time bombs 
ready to explode.67 
The paramount variables of territorialism and effectiveness 
The international community is often faced with the troubling situation, whereby an in-
ternationally-recognised state entity with legal personality lacks the actual capacity in practice to 
continue as a functioning state. The international law to which this community is bound, how-
ever, tends to view situations such as these with considerable indifference, as the conditions of 
statehood as defined by the Montevideo Convention and subsequent restatements of the law are 
focused considerably more on the creation rather than the dissolution of states. Nevertheless, 
the position of positivist international law on the topic is relatively clear: the failure of a state, due 
to external or internal factors, does not automatically imply its juridical demise. For example, 
occupation of one state by another does not imply the juridical demise of the former.68 The 
United States, for one, never recognised the USSR’s annexation of the Baltic States, and the ac-
tions taken by the international community, through the United Nations to repel the annexation 
of Kuwait from Iraq’s occupation provide further evidence in this regard. Subsequently, both 
Cambodia and Somalia are relatively recent examples of states that have seen their existence 
perpetuated even in the absence of functioning governments.69 
Thus, international law reflects a sense of deference to the principle of effectiveness on an 
individual state level and, therefore, the oft-repeated principles of sovereign equality and territo-
rial integrity of states on a collective global level.70 Effectiveness is independent of legitimacy as 
                                                                  
67 M. wa Mutua, Conflicting Conceptions of Human Rights: Rethinking the Post-Colonial State, 89 ASIL 
Proc. 487 (1995). 
68 See e.g. US Restatement (Third) at § 201, comment b. 
69 Cf. Henkin, Pugh, Schachter & Smit, Int’l Law: Cases and Materials (3d. ed, 1993), at 247: “A state does 
not cease to exist when a previously functioning government becomes ineffective or defunct.” 
70 Cf. Permanent Court of Arbitration, Island of Palmas case (Netherlands v. United States), 2 RIAA 829 
(sole arbitrator: Huber) (1928), at 845-46: “International law in the 19th century, having regard to the fact 
that most parts of the globe were under the sovereignty of States members of the community of nations, 
and the territories without a master had become relatively few, took account of a tendency already existing 
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such, and therefore is more of an ‘insurance policy’ guaranteeing sovereignty throughout states 
in the international community than is it to individuals within that particular state. As Okafor 
writes, “in the past, traditional international law was little more than a self-serving crystallisation 
of state practice which was based on the notion that when once an act had been effectively done, 
it was ipso facto legitimate”.71 States came about through effective occupation of territory, and 
once they did so, they were relatively unrestrained in their choice of actions. In a more contem-
porary context however—that is to say, through the prism of the UN Charter—territorial integ-
rity is the product of this ‘insurance policy’, dictating the sovereign equality and non-
interference in the internal affairs of all sovereign states.72 Thus, the Montevideo criteria for de-
termining statehood and the general presumption, in favour of the continuity of the state, do 
seem to reject the possibility of terra nullius in a contemporary context (as the basis for territorial 
incorporation into European states during colonial times was not generally based on terra nul-
lius, in the first instance, according to the legal doctrine),73 which therefore frowns heavily upon 
notions of the de-recognition of existing states, in spite of the actualities of the situation on the 
ground, including the lack of a functioning government.74 Ergo, the phenomenon of failed states 
emerges in a form appropriate for juridical analysis. 
The question which presents itself at present is one occurring when the state, itself, fails, 
due to lack of an actual (local) government, to be able to manifest its sovereignty adequately, 
particularly in a manner which seeks to preserve the core of international human rights law, yet 
which continues to be propped up by the effectiveness principle. As Gerard Kreijen writes: 
The normative elements of these States stand out. Their whole precarious existence depends 
on externally acknowledged sovereignty—a formal and negatively asserted independence 
premised on the right to self-determination—and territory, the latter being neatly appor-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and especially developed since the middle of the 18th century, and laid down the principle that occupation, 
to constitute a claim to territorial sovereignty, must be effective, that is, offer certain guarantees to other 
States and their nationals. It seems therefore incompatible with this rule of positive law that there should 
be regions which are neither under the effective sovereignty of a State, nor without a master […].” For dis-
cussion, see J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law 3-4 (1st. ed, 1979). 
71 O.C. Okafor, Re-Defining Legitimate Statehood: International Law and State Fragmentation in Africa 65 
(2000), citing T.J. Christian, Introduction, in L.C. Green and O. Dickanson (eds.) The Law of Nations and 
the New World x (1989). 
72 Of course, a truer picture (conveniently forsaken by some states in certain contexts) is that these provi-
sions are considerably mitigated in a contemporary context by the emergence of systems of international 
human rights law and the laws applicable to armed conflict. Cf. L. Henkin, International Law: Politics and 
Values 12 (1995), emphasis supplied: “Modern states are treated as impermeable and monolithic by 
international law. Its relations to its citizens was regarded as beyond the reach of other states. For 
centuries, what transpired between a state and its inhabitants, as once between a prince and subject, was no 
other state’s business. While this is still a general characteristic of statehood, it is no longer absolute.” Cf. O. 
Schachter, The Decline of the Nation-State and its Implications for International Law, 36 Colum. J. Trans-
nat’l L. 7 (1997): “No state, not even the most powerful, is wholly autonomous, free of constraints and in-
fluences from outside its borders.” 
73 Cf. S. Ratner, supra chapter two, at note [104/p.26]. 
74 Cf. Western Sahara Case (Advisory Opinion), 1975 ICJ Rep. 12, at para 80: “Whatever difference of 
opinion there may have been among jurists, the state practice of the relevant period indicates that territo-
ries inhibited by tribes or peoples having a social and political organization were not regarded as terra 
nullius. It shows that in the case of such territories the acquisition of sovereignty was not generally con-
sidered as effected unilaterally through ‘occupation’ of terra nullius by original title but through agree-
ments concluded with local rulers.” But cf. D. Smith, Sovereignty over Unoccupied Territories—The 
Western Sahara Decision, 9 Case W.Res.J.Int’l L. 135, 140 (1977): “[…] the Court would be hard-pressed 
to name the party displaying [sovereignty] in Western Sahara […]. The Court’s conclusion that Western 
Sahara was not terra nullius in 1884 is not consistent with the fact that there was no country or group of 
individuals in a position to occupy the territory at that time.” 
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tioned on the basis of uti possidetis juris. The sociological elements are laid on very thinly. In-
ternally, effective government is more a phrase than anything substantial because of the brev-
ity of colonialism and the precipitous process of decolonization that followed, while the 
normally necessary stable political community shares a similar doubtful status, if only for the 
distorting effects of uti possidetis juris. The sociological roots of these States, their ‘is’, are dry, 
which accounts for their lack of positive sovereignty, capacity, or, simply, power. Hence their 
general inability to enforce what the State as a normative order, the ‘ought’, usually pre-
scribes. Some of them may never flower. They are formal-legal constructs that resemble cars 
without engines.75 
It is asserted that, when such circumstances occur, an analytical deconstruction must be-
gin to occur, so as to consider the roles played by sub-state groups within the failed state. This 
must be so, for if this sort of analysis is precluded from occurring, for what other purpose does 
the state retain its potency? That is to say, the discussion should once, briefly, return to the inter-
play between self-determination and uti possidetis, as self-determination is a right of peoples. 
The difference is that, this second time around, the nature of the topic at hand deals in the first 
instance with the concept of internal self-determination, as proposed initially by the Friendly 
Relations Declaration, and elaborated upon, by subsequent developments in the field of global 
governance and democratic accountability.  
Uti possidetis juris and territorial integrity as applied to postcolonial statehood 
Thomas Franck, in a thought-provoking 1993 article,76 coined the phrase ‘postmodern 
tribalism’ to refer to “the direct and indirect use of force” of a new political context for “conflict-
ing justice-based claims to land, water, air and resources”.77 It will be of little surprise to see that 
the claims revolve around the self-determination/uti possidetis nexus. He writes: 
Postmodern tribalism seeks to promote both a political and a legal environment conductive 
to the breakup of existing sovereign states. It promotes the transfer of defined parts of the 
populations and territories of existing multinational or multicultural states in order to consti-
tute new uninational and unicultural—that is, postmodern tribal—states. It asserts a political, 
moral, historically-determinist and legal claim to support this agenda. The legal claim it es-
pouses is framed in terms of a well-established existing right, perhaps even a peremptory 
norm: that of self-determination.78 
The reasons for this are clear, as concisely proposed by Philip Allott, who states that “end-
less international and internal conflicts, costing the lives of countless human beings, have cen-
tred on the desire of this or that state-society to control this or that area of the earth’s surface to 
the exclusion of this or that state-society”. 79 With this in mind, Franck, in drawing reference to 
the Frontier Dispute case,80 equates territorial integrity with uti possidetis and suggests that “two 
entitlements [self-determination and uti possidetis] emerged from quite different times and 
places, developing separately without apparent conflict between them”.81 Immediately follow-
ing the second world war, United Nations practice was to synthesise the principles. It tended to 
defer to uti possidetis, in the event of conflict between them, such that self-determination was ex-
                                                                  
75 G. Kreijen, State Failure, Sovereignty and Effectiveness 226 (2004). 
76 T.M. Franck, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, in C. Brölmann et al. (eds.), Peoples and 
Minorities in International Law 3 (1993) [hereinafter Postmodern tribalism]. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 4. 
79 P. Allott, New Order for a New World 330 (1990). 
80 Case concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali), Judgement, 1986 ICJ Rep. 544 
[hereinafter Frontier Dispute case]. For discussion of the case and its probative recognition of uti pos-
sidetis as a ‘rule of general scope’, see discussion supra chapter two. 
81 Postmodern tribalism, supra note 76, at 6. 
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pected to occur “within the colonial boundaries, which would remain sacrosanct, unless the 
people—as a whole—within those boundaries freely elected to change them by integrating with 
another state”.82 Although none of this stands in apparent contradiction with the historical dis-
cussion of self-determination formed from chapter two, the resulting ambiguity from this situa-
tion is demonstrated by Franck in more concrete practical terms: 
Fortunately for world peace, but unfortunately for legal clarity, most of the challenges of 
postmodern tribal secession have arisen in circumstances in which the potential conflict be-
tween a state and seceding “peoples” is being managed by a process of conflict resolution 
without recourse to the language and procedures of international law.83 
Therefore, while asserting, as is now uncontroversial in law, that secession is neither en-
dorsed nor prohibited per se in international law—that secession is a factual situation to which 
international law responds but does not anticipate— Franck’s conclusion is that: 
[t]he probable redefinition of self-determination [in a post-Cold War/post-decolonisation 
context] does recognize an international legal right, but it is not to secession but to democ-
racy. In the transition from colonial to post-colonial contexts, the right is reinterpreted in 
the practice of states to take on new vigor as the instrument for regional and global en-
forcement of minimal standards of governmental legitimacy. This is rooted both in developing 
human rights law and in the evolution of the international community’s thinking about the 
causes of war.84 
The perspectives put forth so distinctly by Franck in 1993 came in the midst of a flurry of 
academic discussion on the topic, particularly in courses given at the Hague Academy of Inter-
national Law.85 The most significant criticism of Franck’s argument at the time came from 
Rosalyn Higgins,86 who considers that a bridge has been built “from self-determination as the 
process of decolonizing to self-determination as a human right—a right of peoples”.87 Rather 
broadly, she groups the colonial concept of self-determination under the heading of “external 
self-determination” and Franck’s democratic entitlement under the heading of “internal self-
determination”.88 Perhaps most significant is her critique of Franck’s equation of territorial in-
tegrity and uti possidetis. Her distinction is as follows: 
Uti possidetis is uti possidetis and territorial integrity is territorial integrity. Uti possidetis is the 
principle […] whereby states become independent within their colonial boundaries, forfeiting 
any historical claims they might aspire to regarding territories now held within the old colo-
nial boundaries of others. Territorial integrity, quite simply, is what is required by Article 2(4) 
of the Charter—that no force be used against the territory of an independent state, whether 
by bombardment, incursion or occupation. Uti possidetis is to do with parallel moments of 
                                                                  
82 Id. at 9. 
83 Id. at 15. This perspective, however, presumes that international law plays no specific role in the process 
of international conflict resolution, an assertion which can not simply be accepted without further intro-
spection. See discussion infra chapter four of this study. 
84 Id. at 21. Cf. T.M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AJIL 46 (1992). 
85 See e.g. R. Higgins, General Course on Public International Law, 230 Rec. des Cours, at 154 et seq. 
(1991) [hereinafter Higgins], B. Vukas, States, Peoples and Minorities, 231 Rec. des Cours , at 364 et seq. 
(1991) [hereinafter Vukas], T.M. Franck, General Course on Public International Law, 420 Rec. des Cours 
(1993), I. Brownlie, General Course on Public International Law, 225 Rec. des Cours, at 51 et seq. (1995) 
[hereinafter Brownlie, Hague Academy Course]. See also L.I.S. Rodriguez, L’uti possidetis et les effectivi-
tés, 263 Rec. des Cours (1997), at 161 et seq. for a highly comprehensive Hague Academy course on uti 
possidetis. 
86 R. Higgins, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession: Comments by R. Higgins, in C. Brölmann 
et al. (eds.), Peoples and Minorities in International Law 29 (1993). 
87 Id. at 31. 
88 Id. at 31-32. 
Nicholas Hansen 
Chapter Four: Interpreting ‘government’ and ‘equality’ in a practical context 
Page 187 
decolonisation; territorial integrity is a basic Charter principle applicable to all states.89 
Nevertheless it is recalled that uti possidetis is a concept of primarily historical importance 
and not necessarily one equated with territorial equality, again by drawing reference to the Is-
land of Palmas framework. The point on which the discussion at hand would like to focus is that 
if uti possidetis is not necessarily equivalent to that of territorial integrity, then it follows logically 
that the inverse could be true—namely, that territorial integrity could be something different 
than uti possidetis. This is to say that a post-colonial external self-determination by a people 
within a sovereign state is not inherently damaging to the much-revered principle of territorial 
integrity of states. For as the act of external self-determination were to take place—that is to say, 
as, not inconceivably, a potential act of secession were to take place at the moment of independ-
ence from the existing state (e.g. a seceding entity forms a new state, through recognition by 
other states, following e.g. a declaration of independence and the acknowledgment of the inter-
national character of its own borders, as observed at a ‘critical date’), the new, smaller seceding 
governing entity would undertake to uphold the integrity of its territory. 
The notion being considered at present is the possibility that such entity may well be bet-
ter placed to do so, in that it may prima facie exhibit a greater propensity to project its power 
across distance and do so with greater levels of legitimacy than that of their predecessors. This 
may be particularly the case, as applied to post-colonial African statehood, for every state, even 
the poorest, has some sort of economic base from which the state can extract resources to per-
petuate itself, irrespective of the ethnography formed by the superimposition of the modern ter-
ritorial state, in European form, following colonialism and decolonisation. 
Nevertheless, there remains the reality that although governmental standards are broadly 
applied through the general forms of collective groupings to make claims for either access to 
government or parity in a state’s administration, when the state itself is demonstrably, funda-
mentally unable to sustain such claims, the participants in such legal exercises are left to carry on 
as best they may under the circumstances. This will likely be an undesirable situation, as the le-
gal forms of ‘access to government’ and ‘minority rights’ are principally formed by the reality that 
postcolonial states often have inherited ‘civilised’ European forms of judicial administration.  
Certainly by the 1970s, when colonial possessions became independent on a large scale, 
and the notion of individual and group protections, within heretofore unrestrained, sovereign 
states began to matriculate, the rubric of statehood had become irrevocably changed. The prob-
lem that remained, however, was one of a lack of definitional clarity and situational duplicity 
between actions by the General Assembly (the Friendly Relations Declaration) and the 
ECOSOC (the ICCPR and ICESCR). This sense of definitional incompletion would serve to 
complicate matters in postcolonial states particularly, as the question of administrative capacity 
became tangible, in observing how states manifest their own sovereignty. 
 
                                                                  
89 Id. at 34. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states: “All Members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, 
or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations”. Article 10 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations also enshrined the principle of territorial integrity. The interpretative meaning of Arti-
cle 2(4), as proposed by Schachter, is that disputes between states are to be settled by peaceful means, and 
that “as long as the act of force [a coercive incursion of armed troops into a foreign State without its con-
sent] involves a non-consensual use of a State’s territory or compels a State to take a decision it would not 
otherwise take, Article 2(4) has been violated”. See O. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice 
113 (1995). 
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The influence of territorialism on effectiveness-building activities by collective groupings  
Nearly forty years ago, a Professor of Political Science, who was also President of the United 
States, President Wilson, enunciated a doctrine which was ridiculous, but which was widely 
accepted as a sensible proposition, the doctrine of self-determination. On the surface it 
seemed reasonable: let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous, because the people cannot 
decide until someone decides who are the people.90 
It seems clear that the specific intent of the international community, in the United Na-
tions context, was to keep the concept of ‘people’ separate from that of ‘minority’. The ‘minority’ 
concept was seen to be a potential cause of state fragmentation and, therefore, as a threat to an 
institution seeking above all to perpetuate its own existence, the ‘state’. It took a manifestation of 
the political wills of states, within the post-second world war international community, to 
abandon the concepts of genuinely ‘national’ self-determination, in favour of a form of self-
determination more likely to keep ethnic criteria out of the overall equation. So, decolonisation 
took place as defined by the uti possidetis standard. The question which remains, however, is 
now that the decolonisation process is, for all practical purposes, complete, and assuming self-
determination is an ongoing ‘right of peoples’, what role, if any, does the ethnic concept—the 
idea of ‘nation’ as identified by the first proponents of self-determination as a principle—play in 
a contemporary definition of that which constitutes the collective, group element to which the 
right is granted? What role does the national element play within a ‘people’ actively choosing to 
seek ‘self-determination’? 
Going full circle?: The waxing, waning and waxing of the national element 
The definitional imprecision which was so apparent in previous attempts to define a ‘mi-
nority’ replicates itself in attempts to define a ‘people’. In the case of a minority, this is in large 
part because the international community is unwilling or unable to assign a specific definition to 
the term. In spite of this reality, as long as the van der Stoel standard of ‘knowing a minority when 
one sees one’ is adhered to, the definitional imprecision is not fundamentally problematic. Hav-
ing said that, it is simply not possible to draw direct parallels between well-defined, or distinct, 
experiences of ‘minorities’ and those of ‘peoples’. ‘Minority’ is a static, self-explanatory concept, 
as the concept of a minority is substantively grounded to being in opposition to the majority. 
Thus the principal reason emerges why direct definitional parallels between the minority 
and people concepts cannot be drawn. In the first instance, the concept of people has taken on 
so many different, and often simultaneously contradictory, meanings. Each, by definition, takes 
on a territorial element, if not for the inherent linkages with statehood. In the second instance, as 
was discussed earlier in this study,91 early United Nations practice mandated a substantive 
change in the nature and scope of the concept of ‘people’. As the holder of the right to self-
determination tangibly evolved from all the inhabitants of a decolonising territory to self-
identifying territorially-based groupings within a state, self-determination became revitalised as 
a legal concept. The problem, however, remains one of definition, as although the present dis-
cussion has become more comfortable in dealing with the language and function of collective 
groupings, the truth remains that neither ‘minority’ nor ‘peoples’ has any universally-accepted, 
uncontested definition in contemporary international law. 
                                                                  
90 I. Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government 55 (1956). 
91 At The ‘Ought’ becomes an ‘is’: “Whereas self-determination was originally theorised as something akin 
to national self-determination, with a particular eye on the Central and Eastern European states emerging 
from empires, in the UN context, self-determination was equated with global decolonisation—a notion 
which was quite ambivalent towards the various nationalities found within decolonising states.” 
Nicholas Hansen 
Chapter Four: Interpreting ‘government’ and ‘equality’ in a practical context 
Page 189 
However, given the relative lack of definition of the ‘peoples’ concept vis-à-vis that of ‘mi-
norities’, the conceptual fusion, which permits the consideration of ‘collective groupings’ as an 
amalgam of, principally, ‘peoples’ and ‘minorities’ leads to its own set of special problems. As 
was noted in a 1993 report to the UN sub-Commission: 
The controversy over the understanding of ‘peoples’ as beneficiaries of the right to ‘self-
determination’ had, prior to the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, become 
heightened. It had been further complicated by the increasingly numerous understandings 
sought to be given to the content of self-determination. Some of the most vehement parties 
to the present violence in Bosnia and elsewhere seek to justify it by exaggerated and miscon-
ceived interpretation of the right to self-determination. Bosnia-Herzegovina was and should 
still be seen as a sovereign State whose territorial integrity and political unity should be re-
spected; the acts of aggression in encouragement of group claims to self-determination have 
demonstrated the dangers inherent in vague and elusive interpretations of the right to self-
determination.92 
Why is this so? In moving beyond the general discussion on the ‘peoples’ concept pre-
sented heretofore, it appears that, in a contemporary setting, certain groups find the ‘peoples’ 
concept attractive because of the perception, correct or not, that such a designation will provide 
the greatest possible benefit to the group. Moreover, given the possibility of autonomy ar-
rangements, devolved powers and other consociational tools being granted to such groups 
through ‘internal self-determination’, such a formulation provides to the group a level of benefit 
similar to the most egalitarian definitions of a ‘minority’. From the perspective of the disenfran-
chised group seeking some form of self-determination, the idea of direct control of one’s own 
political affairs has considerably more appeal than the receipt of some special rights from the 
majority to protect both the minority within the majority, and, inherently, to perpetuate the mi-
nority-majority relationship. 
Thus, although the overt ‘national’ element to self-determination was de-emphasised in 
favour of a more state-centred focus in early United Nations practice, it is impossible to say that 
this ‘national’ element disappeared completely. Although the formulation originating from 
Hans Kelsen equates ‘the people’ squarely with ‘the state’,93 any singular entity comprising e.g. 
colonial Belgium and the Belgian Congo and consisting of only one people extracted from the 
ethnic origins of Alur, Azande, Flemish, German, Kongo, Luba, Lugbara, Mangbetu, Mongo, 
Ndembu, Pende, Songye and Suku and Wallonian is a paradigmatic example of a legal fiction.94 
Obviously this formulation overlooks any ethnic criteria whatsoever in determining ‘people-
hood’, for all of the above ethnicities were, legally speaking, amalgamated into the same colonial 
state, whether in Northwest Europe or in Central Africa. 
The reason why such a non-monolithic approach to defining a people must be seen as 
valid in a contemporary setting is due to the substantive development of the concept in the 
United Nations debates on decolonisation. Simply put, the eventuality of decolonisation has 
demonstrated how incorporation of ethnic criteria into the ‘peoples’ concept is unavoidable. 
Here, a ‘people’ has evolved into something defined less by the demarcated territory, which the 
group inhabits, and more by the particular unifying characteristics of the inhabitants of that ter-
ritory. Thus the door is opened through the ‘saving clause’ of the Friendly Relations Declaration, 
to the possibility of a people constituting something other than ‘the state’. Thus the separation is 
made—in large part via the ‘salt-water barrier’—between the territorial ‘people’ in the European 
                                                                  
92 Possible Ways and Means of Facilitating the Peaceful and Constructive Solution of Problems Involving 
Minorities, Report of the Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34 (10 August 1993), para 79. 
93 See H. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations 52 (1951). Kelsen notes that as Article 1(2) refers only to 
equal rights amongst states, this determines the meaning of the reference to ‘peoples’ in the same clause. 
94 See The Diagram Group, Encyclodedia of African Peoples 309 (2000). 
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colonial state and the territorial ‘people’ in the African colonised state (again ignoring ethnicity 
due to the employment of uti possidetis juris).95 Thus the salt-water barrier, inadvertently or spe-
cifically, addresses the fundamental reality that there are indeed differences in ethnicities be-
tween coloniser and colonised. 
Furthermore, it may be observed that the ‘particular unifying characteristics’ of those in-
habiting a piece of territory are, broadly speaking, what constitute ethnicity.96 In that sense, self-
determination has not yet come full circle back to the notion of purely national self-
determination, advocated by the dualism of Wilson and Lenin, but it has taken decisive steps in 
that direction. As colonial administrative boundaries translated into external borders, through 
the hastily-constructed political process of uti possidetis-defined decolonisation, no further con-
sideration to other (ethnic) criteria was granted. As far as the international law of the time was 
concerned, the colonial entity was simply granted independence from its coloniser. 
The reality is that as decolonised entities began performing the functions of statehood 
with inherited colonial infrastructure, questions of access to government and equality amongst 
citizens often became of acute importance. Richard Falk’s 1988 encapsulation of this reality re-
tains its validity today: 
It is obvious that many governmental actors with the authority to represent States can gov-
ern only by reliance on coercion and intimidation. That is, the apparatus of the State has 
quite often been captured by small élites, even individual tyrants, who rule on behalf of only a 
fragment of the population within the boundaries of the State. Thus, to assume a correspon-
dence between State and society would be grossly distorting in many cases, even if distinct 
classes, races, ethnic groupings and regional orientations did not exist.97 
 Thus the stage is set for even further development of the ‘ethnic’ component of a ‘peo-
ple’. This is so because, in the post-colonial setting, a ‘people’ must either be limited to the de-
colonisation context (thereby relegating the concept in the main to the annals of history), or it 
must be allowed to have some form of ongoing scope. Clearly the latter option is the correct 
formulation, particularly as it is now theoretically impossible to do so, when one considers the 
presence of common Article 1 to the human rights covenants,98 as well as the representative 
                                                                  
95 Cf. A. Eide, Territorial Integrity of States, Minority Protection and Guarantees for Autonomy Ar-
rangements: Approaches and Roles of the United Nations, in European Commission for Democracy 
Through Law of the Council of Europe, Local Self-Government, Territorial Integrity and Protection of 
Minorities, International Colloquium (Lausanne, 25-27 April 1996) 82: “From the standpoint of interna-
tional law, the ‘permanent population’ is identical to the nation. ‘Nationality’ refers to the country in which 
a person is a citizen. From an international law perspective, the nationality of a citizen of Belgium is sim-
ply Belgian, not Flemish [or] Wallonian […].”  
96 For discussion, see B. Vukas, States, Peoples and Minorities, VI HR 267, 322 (1991). 
97 R. Falk, The Rights of Peoples (In Particular Indigenous Peoples), in J. Crawford (ed.) The Rights of Peo-
ples 25 (1988). He continues, Id.: “Typically, patterns of rule embody societal hierarchies or constella-
tions of power groupings in a manner that is abusive to those in subordinate positions. In some respect, 
the circumstance of indigenous peoples is at the extreme, as these peoples have been marginalized by virtu-
ally every modern government, endangering their very survival as distinct cultural, political and social reali-
ties.” (emphasis added) This is of particular interest because in sub-Saharan Africa practically all peoples 
are, if not ‘indigenous peoples’ in a legal sense per se, nevertheless aboriginal to the land, with obvious 
lineages dating prior to the imposition of European state-centric colonial rule. 
98 James Crawford adds an additional layer of understanding to the concept in that Article 1(2) presents 
the concept of ‘permanent sovereignty over natural resources’, and “it locates that principle firmly within 
the matrix of self-determination […] and it is clear that Article 1(2) is of general application, and is not 
limited to ‘peoples’ under colonial rule or foreign occupation”. See J. Crawford, Aboriginal Self-
Government in Canada, Unpublished Research Report for the Canadian Bar Association (January 1988), 
as reprinted in Musgrave, supra note 64, at 150-151. 
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government provisions of the Friendly Relations Declaration. However, the reality put forth by 
Patrick Thornberry (in referring to a research report by the Minority Rights Group), demon-
strates the existence of a substantial gap between theory and practice that is unsurprising.99 In 
short, self-determination of peoples as defined by decolonisation has on the one hand broken 
the monolith of legally-constructed statehood inherent in the original colonial relationship. On 
the other hand, it has replaced the original monolith of the metropolitan colonial state with an 
indigenised replica of itself, in the form of post-colonial juridical statehood in the European 
model. Whether as a result of specific coercive government policies or of institutional weak-
nesses, this reality has caused great distress to certain populations within these post-colonial 
states. Therefore, post-colonial self-determination must pay closer attention to the particular 
unifying characteristics of groups within these post-colonial juridical states. Given the rich di-
versity of ethnic groups throughout sub-Saharan African societies (in contrast with the artificial 
nature of almost all African states themselves), these particular unifying characteristics must be 
ethnically based. More specifically, the ‘ongoing scope’ of what constitutes a people must be 
based primarily on ethnicity. In that way, self-determination—albeit in a much more limited 
scope than that was granted wholesale to colonial peoples, during the decolonisation period—
has regained a measure of its original Wilson-Lenin nationalist meaning, which was subsumed 
by the ‘statist (yet-separated-by-saltwater-barrier)’ perspective within the UN context. 
‘Peoples’ in greater focus: The primacy of land or the primacy of humans? 
At this point, discussions of a definition of ‘peoples’ usually return to the ‘saving clause’ of 
the Friendly Relations Declaration. Ian Brownlie’s aforementioned ‘core of reasonable cer-
tainty’ of what constitutes a ‘people’ is recalled,100 as it adds layers of understanding to the tradi-
tional criteria of race or religion. It may be useful to refine, further, the definitional distinctions 
of a ‘people’ by viewing them through two separate pathways, all the while casting an eye on 
what role(s) the ‘peoples’ concept plays, on the principle of territorial integrity and Article 2(4) 
of the Charter. The first such path is quite representative of the original UN proposals on de-
colonisation; the second path is more in line with the emergence of a system of international 
human rights law. Therefore, although it would be fair to say that the former is more rooted in a 
positivist perspective and the latter rooted in more of a moralistic, or natural law, perspective 
both have substantial positivist grounding, by virtue of the fact that elements of that morality 
have been codified in the International Bill of Human Rights.101 It should be further stated that 
incorporation of some measure of a natural law perspective in an analysis of this sort should not 
be automatically be met with trepidation, for the principal underlying element of contemporary 
                                                                  
99 Cf. Thornberry, Self-determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of the International Instru-
ments, 38 ICLQ 867 (1989): “When a colony or subject people accedes to independence in the name of self-
determination, political unity and integral statehood will rarely be matched by national unity and ethnic 
homogeneity.” 
100 As repeated from Chapter two, Cf. I. Brownlie, Rights of Peoples in International Law, in J. Crawford 
(ed.) The Rights of Peoples 5 (1988): “This core consists in the right of a community which has a distinct 
character to have this character reflected in the institutions of government in which it lives. The concept of 
distinct character depends on a number of criteria, which may appear in combination. Race (or nationality) 
is one of the most important of the relevant criteria, but the concept of race can only be expressed scien-
tifically in terms of more specific features, in which matters of culture, language, religion and group psy-
chology predominate. The physical indicia of race and nationality bay evidence the cultural 
distinctiveness of a group but they certainly do not inevitably condition it. Indeed, if the purely ethnic cri-
teria are applied exclusively many long-existing national identities would be negated on academic 
grounds—such as, for example, the United States.” 
101 For discussion, see J. Allan, Positively Fabulous: Why It Is Good To Be a Legal Positivist, 10 Can. J.L. & 
Juris. 231 (1997), at 239 et seq. 
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positivist international law—that decisions are taken by consent, by the relevant parties—finds 
its grounding in ‘natural’ law. Thus it seems clear that the present state of the more ‘positivist’ law 
of self-determination tends to have more of a bias in favour of emphasising the role of the land to 
be ‘self-determined’, whilst the more ‘natural’ law of self-determination tends to have more of a 
bias in favour of the primacy of humans, whose primary concern is ‘self-determining’ themselves 
in the first instance, with less overt concern for substantive territorial matters. The distinction 
between these perspectives will be useful to open the second half of this study, as the ‘peoples’ 
definition is put through the Friendly Relations Declaration framework, and the concepts of in-
ternal and external self-determination are considered in greater depth. 
For the moment, reference may be made to two distinct sources in the literature that seem 
to have first identified this distinction. Both articles, written in the early 1990s, seem particularly 
focused on the issue of post-colonial external self-determination, as this period witnessed great 
increases in state fragmentation, concurrent with the general end of the decolonisation process. 
Lea Brilmayer, in a 1991 article, asserts that it is the historical claim to territory by a specific 
group which sets the framework for that group’s claims to self-determination. She maintains: 
What distinguishes separatist from other minority claims is the fact that the group wishes to 
establish a new state on a particular piece of land […] A theory of secession necessarily de-
pends upon a theory of legitimate sovereignty over territory. Separatists are typically moti-
vated by a perceived historical injustice, in which land that was rightfully theirs was taken by 
another group. The land was seized either by the dominant group in the current state, or by 
a third group which then conveyed the territory to the currently dominant group. In evaluat-
ing the persuasiveness of separatists’ arguments, it is necessary to investigate these historical 
claims […] In few cases will the equities point unambiguously in one direction.102 
An article responding to Brilmayer’s assertions came the following year by Catherine 
Iorns. Although the ‘people’ in question in Irons’ article were indigenous peoples, the juridical 
separation between ‘peoples’ claims and ‘indigenous peoples’ claims should not be overempha-
sised, as the present discussion is more on the conceptual, rather than technical, level. Iorns dis-
counts the challenges made to the principle of territorial integrity in Brilmayer’s argument by 
framing the ‘people’ in a more human rights-oriented perspective.  
Where I differ from Brilmayer is in her description that, because we can regard claimants to 
territory as making competing claims to territorial integrity, we can say that the human rights 
claims do not really clash with territorial integrity and that, therefore, territorial integrity 
does not pose a real barrier to the achievement of self-determination. Yet it is the territorial 
integrity of present states that is a fundamental norm of the present world system of states 
and state sovereignty. The concept of territorial integrity poses a barrier to secession as long 
as it is conceived of as protecting the present boundaries of states. Brilmayer is quite correct 
in arguing that this should not be the case, because everyone is really appealing to territorial 
integrity. However, a simple appeal to the concept of territorial integrity is not the barrier in 
question; the real barrier is the assumption that protection of the present boundaries of 
states is so necessary that no derogation will be permitted unless the state concerned agrees 
to them. 103 
Iorns thus identifies a significant element in the discussion: the attitude of the existing state 
is of primary importance in the first instance, for if such a state is receptive to claims to self-
determination by a collective grouping, that ‘people’ is positively defined as much by what is 
granted by the state to that specific collective grouping, as is it negatively defined. For the mo-
ment, then, it can be seen how defining a ‘people’ from a human rights perspective is more re-
                                                                  
102 L. Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 Yale J. Int’l L. 177 
(1991). 
103 C.J. Iorns, Indigenous Peoples and Self-Determination: Challenging State Sovereignty, 24 Case W. Res. J. 
Int’l L. 199 (1992). 
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ceptive to addressing the specific interests and concerns of particular situations beneath the ju-
ridical state monolith, as opposed to a primary concern of maintaining the status quo of a people 
being exclusively defined by a geographic line. Thus, the effect of the application of self-
determination vis-à-vis the territorial integrity of an existing state is an inescapable question. To 
that end, then, as Iorns states, this 
[…] will necessarily entail debate on the interests being protected by the principle of territo-
rial integrity and how the various interests involved, including [collective human rights] 
should be balanced. I suggest that one of the primary factors included in the discussion must 
be the justification of all territorial entitlements. We must reinstate the human rights com-
ponent of self-determination, and reinstate the belief that the state exists for the benefit of 
people, rather than the reverse […]. Any other approach is tantamount to a rejection of 
world order based on principle and an embrace of might as right.104 
That said, the human rights element of self-determination (in its historical conception, 
i.e., decolonisation; and in its contemporary conception, i.e., governance), contrasted with the 
reality of ‘might as right’, could be seen as a succinct restatement of the reality of contemporary 
African states. To that end, the general theoretical discussion now progresses, more specifically, 
toward the African context, particularly through the provisions of the African Charter on Hu-
man and Peoples’ Rights. 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and its influence on the law 
of collective groupings 
Human rights, as defined in the African context, will broadly be seen to be representative 
of the dynamic interactions between the individual and the collective. What is particularly strik-
ing, however, is that the conceptualisation of such interactions, when viewed through the con-
temporary African reality, leads to stark inconsistencies between the theory and practice of these 
concepts.  
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights was the product of a 1981 Assembly 
of Heads of States and Governments of the Organisation of African Unity (now African Union 
(AU)).105 Since the 1986 entry into force of the Charter, its effectiveness, and that of its associated 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, has been limited, particularly due to the 
substantive ambivalence of African states towards the institution and the structural ineffective-
ness and lack of resources of the African Commission itself.106 However, the African Union has 
enacted a Protocol to the Charter, which provides for the establishment of a regional Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, with jurisdiction over cases concerning the interpretation of the 
Charter and human rights instruments ratified by Member-States and the ability to provide advi-
sory opinions on relevant legal matters.107 
                                                                  
104 Id. at 200. 
105 For documents of the Organisation of African Unity/African Union, see generally G.J. Naldi, Docu-
ments of the Organization of African Unity (1992). The African Charter is also available in 21 ILM 58 
(1982) under the title of Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights [hereinafter African Charter]. 
106 However, as Steiner and Alston point out, the Commission has advocated the promotion of human 
rights education as one of its core functions. See H.J. Steiner and P. Alston, International Human Rights in 
Context: Law Politics Morals 700 (1996) [hereinafter Steiner and Alston]. See generally E.A. Ankumah, 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Practice and Procedures (1996) for a discussion 
of the Commission greater than that permitted by the present study. 
107 See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, CAB/LEG/665, Adopted June 9, 1998 and entered into force Janu-
ary 1, 2004, at http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/court_en.html. The African Court of Justice is in-
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It should be further noted that the African Charter marks a point of departure between the 
International Bill of Rights or the European and American regional human rights conventions, 
perhaps due to the fact that “African countries had to contend with both their own notions of 
human rights as well as those imposed on them by their erstwhile colonisers”.108 Indeed African 
voices have questioned the legitimacy of the system on this basis. 109 The Charter deviates on oc-
casion from the specific language of the other human rights instruments and is notable for its 
emphasis on collective rights as being fundamentally supplementary to individual rights. 
Communal solidarity is seen as more of an active, positive right in Africa than in Europe or the 
Americas, or in the universal human rights law of the UN.110 Such an emphasis no doubt stems 
from the fact that the vast majority of Africans are outwardly-identifiable, in some form of socie-
tal grouping. Whether termed as ‘ethnic group’, ‘race’, or ‘tribe’ one wonders if, in some other 
collective nomenclature, this is the intangible, specific element left wholly disregarded in the 
Berlin Conference. Alternatively, as Obijiofor Aginam states, “The inclusion of group rights in 
the African Charter is intended as a mechanism to salvage the social cohesion of African socie-
ties which was adversely affected and partially truncated by colonial rule and imperialism”.111 
Thus it seems clear that group rights have a natural place in the Charter, although this is not to 
say that the legal formulation of the Charter and the implementation of these formulations, 
through the Commission, are unimpeachable.  
The African Commission is the only implementing organ for human rights in the African 
Charter. It has primarily concerned itself with the receipt of individual communications112 and 
the biannual reporting requirements of AU member-states on the actions taken in implement-
ing into national legislation the rights established in the African Charter.113 As reported by Henry 
Steiner and Philip Alston, the Commission itself has been less than a success, hampered by a 
relatively weak constitutive document, a general sense of illegitimacy and lack of integrity per se 
(as it is the actual product of African governments, themselves), a relative invisibility to most Af-
ricans and a general mistrust on the part of those who have had the occasion to interact with it.114 
Institutional deficiencies aside, the chief problem with the promotion and protection of 
human rights in Africa is the abundance of abuses by a multitude of actors and paucity of effec-
tive juridical remedies to prevent and protect against such abuses. This problem has a particu-
larly distinctive feature, in that all African individuals can, aside from peaceful collective 
groupings, be pigeonholed into one of three rather amorphous groups: (a) private citizens, (b) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
tended to take over the function of the Court upon its eventual establishment. 
108 O. Gye-Wado, The Effectiveness of the Safeguard Machinery for the Enforcement of Human Rights in 
Africa, 2 JHRLP 144, 150 (1992).  
109 Cf. M. wa Mutua, The African Human Rights System in a Comparative Perspective, 3 Rev. of African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 11 (1993): “We cannot and should not continue to delude 
ourselves that we have a human rights system. What we have is a façade, a yoke that African States have 
put around our necks. We must cast it off and reconstruct a system that we can proudly proclaim as ours.” 
110 This is not to say that the rights established in the African Charter differ significantly in terms of ap-
plication and interpretation. Indeed Articles 4-6 correspond closely with Articles 6-9 of the ICCPR, Arti-
cle 7 with Articles 14 and 16, Article 8 with Article 18, Articles 10-18 with Articles 21-25 and Article 12 
of the ICCPR and Articles 20-24 of the African Charter with Article 1 of the ICCPR. 
111 O. Aginam, The African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights, in E.K. Quashigah and O.C. Okafor, Le-
gitimate Governance in Africa: International and Domestic Legal Perspectives 350 (1999) [hereinafter 
Aginam], citing W. Rodley, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (1972). 
112 See African Charter, supra note 105, at articles 55-59. 
113 See African Charter, supra note 105, at article 62. 
114 Steiner and Alston, supra note 106, at 703-704, citing comments by U.O. Umozurike, M. wa Mutua and 
E.J. Sirleaf in Fund for Peace, Proceedings of the Conference on the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, at 10, 25 and 27, respectively (1991). 
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agents of the state, or (c) rebels. To be certain, this problem is not specifically limited to the Afri-
can continent nor even postcolonial states specifically, but the levels of economic and social 
underdevelopment so prevalent in much of sub-Saharan Africa, coupled with the complicated 
legal systems inherited by African colonies on their independence, and the apparent desire for 
the African Union to emulate the European Union, in practical form, leads to a set of circum-
stances ripe for examination.  
Private citizens may range from peasants living on subsistence agriculture in the most ru-
ral of environments, to educated, reasonably content middle-class urban professionals. Agents 
of the state could range from the most pedestrian of bureaucratic functionaries to the most dan-
gerous of special-force soldiers. Although these observations are neither particularly extraordi-
nary nor unusual, for any given state per se, what is striking about the African context is the 
episodic grouping of certain individuals as neither private citizens nor agents of the state, but as 
rebels, or individuals acting in collective opposition to the state in some way, either overtly or 
clandestinely. But herein lies the amorphous element: clandestine rebels are not ‘visible’; they 
would otherwise be seen as private citizens in their daily lives, or perhaps less likely, agents of 
the state themselves. To complicate matters further, given the fact that coups d’état are hardly un-
heard of in Africa, it seems reasonable to expect that the armed foot-soldier of an ancien régime 
could quite easily become the disaffected militiaman of a new era. This reality only contributes 
to the general uncertainty in defining sub-state groups in the African context, for the passions, 
frustrations and senses of mysticism usually observed in the phenomenon of ethnicity spill over 
into the already complicated politics of the daily lives of modern African citizens.  
Rachel Murray highlights how the OAU/AU has provided a framework for declaring un-
lawful unconstitutional changes in government, but observes that unconstitutional changes to 
non-democratic governments are not similarly unlawful. She writes, referring to a 1997 Deci-
sion of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU,115 that military coups d’état 
against democratically elected governments, entail intervention by mercenaries to replace de-
mocratically elected governments, replacement of democratically elected governments by 
armed dissident groups and rebel movements and the refusal to relinquish power to the win-
ning party, after elections that are free, fair and regular.116 
Nevertheless, the point remains that conceptualisations of military changes to govern-
ment are not merely hypothetical. A good example comes from 1997, three years after the 
Rwandan genocide, as the country faced tremendous problems in reconciling its population 
and reintegrating its fractured societies, attempting all the while to operate under something of a 
veil of normality. With the monitoring presence of the international community having been 
greatly decreased, some external observers remarked that there had been the start of a new 
genocide—“un génocide froid”117—by Hutu extremists, particularly in the south-western part of 
the country. Insurgents were said to be “operating within a population […] they put on civilian 
clothes during the day; they go from village to village at night. It’s like the Vietnam War,” as Pat-
rick Mazimhaka, the then-Rwandese Minister of State, told the Washington Post.118 As massa-
cres continued, e.g. 1,000 ethnic Tutsi and some moderate Hutu refugees were estimated as 
                                                                  
115 Decision on the Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa, AHG/Dec.150 (XXXVI), 33rd 
Ordinary Session, Harare, June 1997. See also Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to 
Unconstitutional Changes in Government, AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI). 
116 See R. Murray, Human Rights in Africa: From the OAU to the African Union (2004), at 77 et seq. 
117 J. Gasana, and N. Nsengimana, D’un Génocide à l’Autre, 3 unpublished paper of Project NOUER (Nou-
velle Espérence pour le Rwanda) on file with author (May 1997). 
118 S. Buckley, Rwanda’s Rising Tide of Violence, Washington Post Foreign Service, 14 December 1997, p. 
A25 (available on Lexis). 
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having been killed in a well-documented December 1997 attack119, the essence of which a typi-
cally African cycle of violence can be observed. The cycle starts when militia groups carry out 
attacks on civilians. In this example, Hutu extremists perpetuated violent attacks against 
chiefly—but not exclusively—Tutsi victims. The cycle is perpetuated as national armed forces, 
in this case, the Tutsi-dominated Rwandese Patriotic Army, immediately retaliates with extra-
judicial executions and indiscriminate killings of those suspected of attacks, in this case between 
5,000 and 8,000 in a large cave in Gisenyi préfecture, between 23 and 28 October 1997.120 Hence, 
the cycle of violence further reinforces and perpetuates instability and uncertainty amongst 
populations.121 
The concept of ‘peoples’ as used by the African Charter 
The law most applicable to collective groupings in the African Charter is found in Arti-
cles 19-24 of the Charter, reproduced herewith: 
Article 19. All peoples shall be equal; they shall enjoy the same respect and shall have the 
same rights. Nothing shall justify the domination of a people by another.  
Article 20. (1) All peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable 
and inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their political status 
and shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policy they have 
freely chosen. – (2) Colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves 
from the bonds of domination by resorting to any means recognized by the international 
community. – (3) All peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the States Parties to the 
present Charter in their liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it political, eco-
nomic or cultural. 
Article 21. (1) All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right 
shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people be de-
prived of it. – (2) In case of spoliation the dispossessed people shall have the right to the law-
ful recovery of its property as well as to an adequate compensation. – […] – (5) States 
Parties to the present Charter shall undertake to eliminate all forms of foreign economic ex-
ploitation, particularly that practised by international monopolies, so as to enable their peo-
ples to fully benefit from the advantages derived from their natural resources. 
Article 22. (1) All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural develop-
ment with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the com-
mon heritage of mankind. – […] 
Article 23. (1) All peoples shall have the right to national and international peace and security. 
The principles of solidarity and friendly relations implicitly affirmed by the Charter of the 
United Nations and reaffirmed by that of the Organization of African Unity shall govern rela-
tions between States. – (2) For the purpose of strengthening peace, solidarity and friendly re-
lations, States Parties to the present Charter shall ensure that: (a) any individual enjoying the 
right of asylum under Article 12 of the present Charter shall not engage in subversive activi-
ties against his country of origin or any other State Party to the present charter; (b) their 
territories shall not be used as bases for subversive or terrorist activities against the people 
of any other State Party to the present Charter. 
                                                                  
119 Agence France-Presse, Rwanda says international community shares blame for massacre, 15 December 
1997 (available on Lexis). 
120 See Amnesty International, Rwanda: Civilians trapped in armed conflict, AI Index AFR 47/43/97, 19 
December 1997, at 8-19. 
121 Again, while Africa hardly holds a monopoly on this formula—replace Rwanda with Chechnya or Co-
lombia, for example, to obtain similar results—such disease is indeed an African pandemic in no uncer-
tain terms. Cf. P. Schwab, Africa: A Continent Self-Destructs 31 (2001): “Enough [countries underwent 
thoroughgoing hardship] that by 2001 calamity just about became the norm by which much of the conti-
nent was appraised.” 
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Article 24. All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to 
their development. 
Identifying the existence and appraising the character of post-colonial African collective 
groupings 
Under the overall chapeau of ‘Human and peoples’ rights’, the rights of individuals are 
generally in articles 2-18, while the rights of peoples are enunciated in articles 19-24. For the 
purposes at hand, the most salient articles to consider are 19 and 20, as supplemented by se-
lected provisions of the remaining articles. 
On a more universal level, the historical development of international human rights law 
witnessed ‘economic, social and cultural’ rights being promulgated by the Soviet Union and 
‘civil and political rights’ asserted by the United States. These two ‘sets’ of rights were recognised 
as having been artificially split in the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, which, in its Vi-
enna Declaration and Programme of Action, proclaims all rights to be “universal, indivisible, 
and interdependent and interrelated [...]”.122 The end result, however, is that over the last 50 
years, on paper at least, the standards for individual human rights have been set, yet as has been 
observed, ‘third-generation’ collective or group rights have entered into the debate, on a global 
scale, with much less overall clarity. Although Oscar Schachter wrote in 1995 that “opposing 
views have been expressed on whether social ends such as ‘development’ or ‘self-determination’ 
should be treated as rights”,123 there is evidence of precisely these social ends, throughout the Af-
rican Charter. What can be observed in this context is that the Charter deals both with individual 
and group rights from the outset, beginning with the ‘civil and political’ aspects of group rights in 
articles 19 and 20, and the ‘economic, social and cultural’ aspects of group rights in articles 21-
24.124 It may be assumed that the intent of the African Charter is that the rights of the group are to 
be read in conjunction with the rights of the individual, primarily as specific provisions are 
made, first, for the rights of the individual (in articles 1 to 19125) and then for the rights of groups. 
It will come as no surprise to observe that the question that becomes immediately appar-
ent, in a closer analysis of articles 19 and 20, is definitional in character. If, conceptually, all Afri-
can peoples are equal, not subjected to external domination and endowed with a specific right 
to existence and self-preservation, how could contemporary practice suggest anything other 
than the only accurate definition of ‘people’ in the African context would be the ‘people’ occu-
pying the presidential palaces and other seats of state power? For in terms of equality, the con-
cept must be historically viewed through the prism of Article III of the OAU Charter, which 
provides that Member-States declare adherence to, inter alia, the principles of sovereign equal-
ity of all member-states, non-interference in the internal affairs of states and respect for the sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for the state’s inalienable right to independent 
                                                                  
122 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN document A/Conf.157/23 at Sec. I, para. 5. 
123 O. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice 334 (1995). 
124 Cf. Rapporteur’s Report, OAU Doc. CM/1149 (XXXVII), Ann. 1, at 4, para. 10, as cited in N.S. Rembe, 
Africa and Regional Protection of Human Rights 121 (1985): “Noting that in Africa, Man is part and par-
cel of the group, some delegations concluded that individual rights could be explained and justified only 
by the rights of the community. Consequently, they wished that the Draft Charter made room for the 
Peoples’ Rights and adopted a more balanced approach to economic, social and cultural rights on the one 
hand and political and civil rights on the other.” 
125 Some overlaps between individual and group rights can be observed, particularly as article 13 refers to 
the rights of citizens to participate in government, and article 18 refers to the family as being the basis of 
society, as well as the protection of the rights of women and the aged. 
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existence.126 
The Commission, for its part, has been cautious in addressing the topic of collective 
rights, considering the matter in an impromptu fashion. As observed by a recent study concern-
ing actions by the Nigerian military in the Ogoniland: 
[W]hereas the Commission could have adjudicated on these [cases] by mere reference to 
the equality provisions in Article 2 of the Charter, it chose to utilise the group rights provi-
sions in Articles 19-23. Strangely enough, it did so without distinguishing the application of 
the two sets of rights especially as the communication was not necessarily a class action 
measure and individuals had alleged violations of their rights. Neither does the Commission 
describe the nature and content of the rights especially as these sets of cases are the only 
occasions where the Commission has ventured into the application of collective rights or the 
rights of ‘peoples’.127 
Thus, it would not be facetious to observe at first glance that the most obvious ‘people’ 
with the most obvious set of ‘rights’ are those acting as the agents of the state. As stated in 1983: 
The OAU maintained an indifferent attitude to the suppression of human rights in a number 
of independent African states by unduly emphasizing the principle of noninterference in the 
internal affairs of member states at the expense certain of other principles particularly the 
customary law principle of respect for human rights. President Sekou Toure’s prohibitory as-
sertion that the OAU was not “a tribunal which could sit in judgement on any member 
state’s internal affairs” was typical of the inhibition to the members imposed on themselves, 
not so much to protect their legitimate states’ rights as to fend off international concern for 
gross abuses of human rights in some African states.128 
The true meaning of self-determination in the African Charter is to be found in Article 20, 
paragraph 2; namely, that opposition to colonisation or oppression would exemplify what is 
meant by a people. Here, the scope of the concept is genuinely called into question, for if a ‘peo-
ple’ is to be found only in the context of decolonisation, then there are no ‘peoples’ per se left, en-
dowed with a right of self-determination in contemporary Africa, save for Western Sahara. This 
was the approach taken in 1982 by Richard Gittleman,129 who clearly saw the ‘people’ as nothing 
more than the product of the uti possidetis-defined colonial creation.130 This perspective reflects 
the view that self-determination of peoples is a one-off exercise, endowing the successor gov-
ernment with control over the principles of sovereign equality and non-interference in the in-
ternal affairs of states, with comparatively little concern for the actual standards of governance 
within those states (i.e., a formalised indifference to notions of internal self-determination). 
Clearly, this is contrary to the very notion of international human rights law. State practice be-
yond the African region clearly recognises that self-determination by an entity other than the 
                                                                  
126 See Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, 2 ILM 766 (1963). 
127 N.B. Pityana, The challenge of culture for human rights in Africa, in M. Evans and R. Murray (eds.), The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 233 (2002). It continued, however, by stating that “inter-
national law and human rights must be responsive to African circumstances. Africa will make its own law 
where necessary. Clearly, collective rights, environmental rights and economic and social rights are es-
sential elements of human rights in Africa.” Cf. Social and Economic Rights Action Centre/Centre for 
Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, Communication 155/96, as reprinted in Id.  
128 O. Umozurike, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 77 AJIL 903 (1983). 
129 R. Gittleman, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights – A Legal Analysis, 22 Virginia J. Int’l 
L. 667 (1982). 
130 Cf. Id. at 680: Aside from the Namibians, the non-white South Africans and the nomadic populations of 
the Western Sahara, he states that “all other groups or peoples have either successfully exercised their 
right to self determination and have thus become a sovereign state as the Republic of Zaire or are a people 
not qualified to be included under the rubric of ‘people’ permitted to exercise the right of self determina-
tion.” (emphasis added) 
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state itself, “is an ongoing process and is indissociable”131 from other human rights and funda-
mental freedoms, a conclusion grounded in the established theoretical analyses of self-
determination.132 
Defining a ‘people’ through the African Charter framework 
Such a perspective is reflected elsewhere in the literature. In a 1988 article,133 Richard Ki-
wanuka proposes four interpretative definitions of ‘people’ in the context of the African Charter: 
(a) all persons within the geographic limits of an entity yet to achieve political independence 
or majority rule; 
(b) all groups of people with certain common characteristics who live within the geographic 
limits of an entity referred to in (a), or in an entity that has attained political independ-
ence or majority rule (i.e., minorities under any political system); 
(c) the state and the people as synonymous (however, this is only an external meaning of 
“people”); and 
(d) all persons within a state.134 
In arriving at his definition (d), Kiwanuka states that when the essential distinction is 
made between the external conception of a state and its internal components, the limitations of 
the latter definitions become apparent. Thus, although such a definition is not inherently inva-
lid,135 it is insufficient as a universal definition, because of the potential for misuse of the concept 
by unscrupulous governments in terms of violating individual human rights in the name of the 
group.136 Kiwanuka takes a step in this direction as well, as he goes on to state that a “‘people’ in 
this sense amounts to the aggregate of the different peoples in the sense noted […] referring to 
minorities”.137 
It becomes increasingly clear that there must be some level of divergence between the 
state and the people, which steers the discussion toward Kiwanuka’s definition (c). Although at 
first glance, the proposal seems discordant with the present analysis, a closer look reveals that it 
is through the prism of articles 21 and 22 of the African Charter that the state and the people can 
                                                                  
131 See United Kingdom statement on behalf of the European Community, UN GAOR, 47th Sess., Third 
Committee, UN Doc. A/C.3/47/SR.45, 5 Oct 1992, at para. 22, which mirrors the statement of the Repre-
sentative of the United Kingdom to the Third Committee, 12 Oct. 1984 as cited in 55 BYIL 432 (1984): 
“Self-determination is not a one-off exercise […] It is a continuous process.” 
132 Cf. J. Crawford, The Rights of Peoples: Some Conclusions, in J. Crawford (ed.) The Rights of Peoples 167 
(1988) [hereinafter Crawford, Conclusions]: “[…][t]he right to self-determination, vested in a particular 
people, is a right against the State which presently administers and controls that people […] and one of its 
main effects is to internationalize key aspects of the relationship between the people concerned and that 
State, represented by its government […]. The right of self-determination, where it exists, is not vested in 
any government but is vested in the people concerned.” 
133 R.N. Kiwanuka, The Meaning of “People” in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 82 
AJIL 80 (1988) [hereinafter Kiwanuka]. 
134 Id. at 100-101. 
135 Indeed, governments themselves may rely upon a certain peoples’ legitimate right to self-
determination, as was the situation in the South West Africa Cases. See Crawford, Conclusions, supra note 
132, at 164. 
136 Cf. Kiwanuka, supra note 133, at 100: “The lofty ideals of the peoples’ rights in the Banjul Charter—
such as peace and development—depend, in large measure, on respect for individual rights. Peoples’ 
rights cannot be a substitute for individual rights.” 
137 Id. at 99. 
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be viewed synonymously, for the sense of group solidarity in this sense is economic in character, 
and therefore all members of the group would presumably have a common interest to promote 
economic development.138 Here, Kiwanuka warns against over-equating the people with all 
persons within a state. He writes: 
In sum, the apparently progressive introduction of the concept of “peoples” into the Banjul 
Charter could actually turn out to be counterproductive in some respects, that is, where the 
rights and interests of the people are not respected by the state. In such situations, peoples 
rights might initially be treated as state rights and then degenerate into sectarian, class, gov-
ernment, regime and clique rights. In the extreme, they could become certain individuals’ 
rights. This ultimate perversion has already come to pass in many African countries […]. The 
outrageous exploits of such dictators as Amin, Bokassa and Nguema are legendary. Indeed, 
politics in Africa, and the developing world generally, sometimes seems like a business ven-
ture.139  
Definition (b) submitted by Kiwanuka refers to the overlap in meaning between minority 
and people, as discussed earlier in this chapter.140 With reference to observations from the 1980 
Gros Espiell study,141 he refutes the notion that “contemporary international law does not rec-
ognize the right of minorities to self-determination”142 and echoes Ermacora’s earlier assertion 
that minorities are not precluded from accessing the right to self-determination, particularly 
when they are, in some way, territorially defined, having a particular culture or religion, having 
political organisation and economic viability. Ermacora asserts that “it does not depend on gov-
ernments as to how they are describing an entity as a people; it depends on objective and subjec-
tive criteria of a group. It depends also on the self-consciousness of identity”.143 Further, 
Kiwanuka’s most insightful observation in support of minorities and self-determination con-
cerns article 20 of the African Charter, which endows all peoples with the right to existence, 
thereby addressing the non-hypothetical “problem of genocide”144 in contemporary Africa. 
What is left, then, is definition (a), and it will be noted that there have been numerous 
changes to the landscape since 1988. Kiwanuka makes reference to the opposition to the apart-
heid regime in South Africa, independence for Namibia and resolution of the Western Sahara 
problem in following the previously conceived line of reasoning that these were the only ‘peo-
ples’ per se left endowed with a right of self-determination in contemporary Africa. In his further 
analysis, the lack of a measure of self-determination for the Eritreans leads him into the equation 
of self-determination with secession, which demonstrates how his thinking was still rooted in 
the decolonising process145 -- a point that is made explicit when he states: 
We can conclude that the first meaning of “people” is all the different communities (peoples), 
in fact, all persons within the boundaries of a country or geographical entity that has yet to 
achieve independence or majority rule. Once independence (or majority rule) is achieved, no 
further independence is permissible. The rights of the different peoples would thereafter be 
                                                                  
138 Kiwanuka cites M. Bedjaoui, The Right to Development and the Jus Cogens, 2 Lesotho L.J. 93, 98 (1986): 
“The individual’s pursuit of the right to development vis-à-vis his State can only weaken the State and 
would occur at the very time when the State needs to be strengthened if it is to neutralize the negative ef-
fects of the international factors which counteract its collective development.” 
139 Kiwanuka, supra note 133, at 97-98. 
140 See, in this chapter, text supra accompanying note 41 et seq. 
141 See H. Gros Espiell, The Right to Self-Determination: Implementation of United Nations Resolutions, 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.1 (1980), at para. 56. See also commentary in this study, supra chapter 
two, at text accompanying note 96. 
142 Kiwanuka, supra note 133, at 93. 
143 F. Ermacora, The Protection of Minorities Before the United Nations, 182 Rec. des Cours 247, 327 
(1983 IV). 
144 Kiwanuka, supra note 133, at 94. 
145 Id. at 89. 
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protected as minority rights.146 
In this characterisation, he seems to be appealing to the conception of self-determination 
which would be seen as a one-off exercise, with the ‘ongoing process non-dissociable from 
other human rights and fundamental freedoms’ reconciled through the protection of individual 
human rights via a municipal minority rights regime. The chief problem with such a concep-
tion, however, is that, whilst minority rights guarantees that municipal African legal systems are 
not to be rejected out of hand as lacking merit, the structural deficiencies demonstrated above in 
the construction of most contemporary African states, calls into question the practical effective-
ness of such a scheme. For example, if a ‘people’ is, say, facing a potential violation of its right to 
existence, as protected in article 20, para. 1 of the African Charter, the procedural implementa-
tion of mechanisms designed to protect a ‘self-determining minority’ (necessitated by the limita-
tions of his definitions (a) and (b) and, as further amalgamated in his definition (d)) would have 
to be performed in a most expedient and even-handed fashion, given that the very existence of 
the ‘people’ is under question. Such procedures may well run past the capacities of many states, 
individually, or the African Commission regionally.147 
Kiwanuka’s own analysis implies that, barring such an effective system, the deference to 
post-colonial peoples’ rights as subjects of domestic minority rights legislation and the limited 
protection afforded by international law to persons belonging to minorities could be something 
of a dead letter under the most difficult of circumstances,148 not least of which circumstances ex-
ist whereby a government could make the assertion that there are no minorities on its territory. 
Therefore, while it seems clear that Kiwanuka’s overall analysis aims at characterising the self-
determining ‘people’ as something more than a decolonising act, according to uti possidetis-
defined lines, the totality of his four definitions seems, in some way, insufficient, or too anxious 
to avoid successful assertions of self-determination through secession. Perhaps this is due to its 
formulation prior to Franck’s 1992 democratic entitlement thesis, itself no doubt grounded in 
the post-Cold War acceptance that self-determination has a post-colonial internal character. 
The concept of a negatively-formed ‘people’ 
What seems clear though is that there is room to manoeuvre in assessing African collec-
tive groupings as ‘peoples’. In the first instance, it can be observed that some of these collective 
groupings may be identified as requiring specific guarantees to uphold, inter alia, their right to 
exist, as in article 20(1) of the African Charter. Such entities would be particularly likely to be 
negatively defined vis-à-vis the state—that is, to be defined, in some way, against the state,149 but 
defined in such a way as to provide direct access to the language and remedies of self-
determination of peoples, as opposed to self-determination of minorities. What seems lacking is 
an institutionalised, ‘peoples’-based response mechanism to geographically-defined collective 
groupings, specifically targeted by the state, as was the Ogoni (also known as Kana or Khana) 
                                                                  
146 Id. at 90. 
147 Thus making the possibility of sanctions something of an empty threat to e.g. potential violators of Ar-
ticle 20(1) of the African Charter. For comprehensive discussion on the practice of the African Commis-
sion on Human and Peoples Rights, see F. Viljoen, International Human Rights in Africa (2007). 
148 Cf. Id. at 99: Kiwanuka states that peoples (herein synonymous with minorities) have certain “collective 
rights against their state. One of these is the uninterrupted enjoyment of the right to self-determination, 
which should protect the people against oppression and exploitation”. He does not, however, speculate 
what should protect the people in question, in the event of an interruption in the enjoyment of the right to 
self-determination. 
149 See discussion supra at text accompanying note 104. 
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people in Nigeria during the 1990s, for example.150 It can also be observed how another concep-
tion of ‘peoples’ can be viewed as stemming from the African Charter: that a ‘people’ can be 
formed as a specific response to the specific actions of a state. Such a conception would recog-
nise an important nuance in the discussion, for it would form a useful linkage in the relationship 
between a group of citizens, the population at large, and the organs of the state. In the same way 
in which minority protection regimes tend to find definitional substance by defining a minority 
in opposition to the majority, it is conceivable that a people could be defined in opposition to 
the government of a state. Thus, in the same way that equality between the majority and the mi-
nority forms the endgame for a minority rights regime, a negatively-formed ‘people’ could 
credibly obtain a measure of self-administration within a territorial state if, particularly, it could 
demonstrate a persistent lack of such access and societal damages as a result of such exclusion.  
It seems that such a formulation is not in inherent opposition to the group rights provi-
sions of the African Charter. To proceed beyond this stage, however, it will be necessary to con-
sider what, if any, state practice supports these distinctions. In the African context, although 
Eritrea (and to a large extent the unrecognised territory of Somaliland) is something of a unique 
circumstance in that it is a territory which had previously sought to secede, the recognition of 
Eritrea as an independent state most clearly reflects the assertion that a ‘people’ can be con-
structed as a response to the specific actions of a state.151 Further afield, similar recognition of in-
dependent statehood followed the postcolonial secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan, and, in 
more contemporary terms, there may be similar examples to be extracted from the dissolution 
of Yugoslavia. 
Before the discussion proceeds to the conceptualising of a more contemporary definition 
of an African ‘people’ endowed with the right to self-determination, another important analyti-
cal element must be addressed. This is the fact that the committee of experts that drafted the 
Convention took the decision to leave the concept of ‘peoples’ undefined.152 Thus, although the 
drafters of the Charter took pains to include the concept of group rights to reflect the realities of 
African life and the difficulties in establishing post-colonial state structures that could be re-
sponsive to these realities, these difficulties were explicitly reflected in the timidity of the drafting 
committee. Therefore, to attempt to break somewhat free from that timidity, it would be of in-
terest to recall the principal governance concepts brought forth earlier in this study—
particularly the importance and relevance of ‘consent’ and ‘consensus’, implying a measure of 
communal solidarity within the state. As suggested in 1987: 
Third generation rights therefore imply an interdependence of individuals and nations and, by 
extension, of individuals in all countries. But this interdependence would be essentially nega-
tive if it involved only mutual obligations. Its positive aspect is that it also involves mutual in-
terests in so far as every individual shares with every other one the need for a suitable 
international order. This comprehensive interdependence is what is meant by brotherhood 
                                                                  
150 For discussion, see references in Amnesty International, Nigeria: On the Anniversary of Ken Saro-
Wiwa’s Execution, Human Rights Organizations Call for Reform, AI index AFR 44/26/96 (6 November 
1996), available from <www.amnesty.org>, accessed 4 December 2002. In view of the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, it should also be seriously considered that the Ogoni may also be con-
sidered an ‘indigenous people’ per se in the Nigerian context. However, this confuses the matter slightly as 
it may also be reliably asserted that all African populations are indigenous to the continent and are faced 
with the burden of accepting the European state. 
151 Cf. K.J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War 75 (1996): “The United Nations of course could not 
create a ‘nation’ where none existed. It was the war itself which created an Eritrean ‘people’.”  
152 See Report of the OAU Secretary-General on a Draft African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
OAU Doc. CM/1149 (1981), at para. 13.  
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or, to use the alternative term now gaining favour, solidarity.153 
It may be the case that the failure of the African Charter’s committee of experts to define 
‘peoples’, specifically, reflects an intellectual hostility towards the concept. For some, a tangible 
measure of communal solidarity could be seen as threatening to some government. Or, per-
haps, due to the fact that such notions of solidarity are themselves derivatives of the global lex 
lata of the international human rights law conceived since the second world war—and therefore 
a potential threat to some governments—attempts may be made to frame the theoretical con-
cepts of ‘consent’ and ‘consensus’ in particularly ‘African’ terms that are anti-Western in nature. 
However, care should be taken in allowing such claims to go unchallenged. As Chabal and 
Daloz write: 
It is difficult to conceive of what a non-Western, particularly ‘African’ path to modernization 
is, both because we live in a Western world and because, historically, the West modernized 
first. Nevertheless, it is useful to remind ourselves that there are today a (growing) number 
of modern, economically dynamic and scientifically sophisticated countries, such as Japan and 
the other Asian ‘tigers’, following their own distinct development path. Indeed, their very 
progress has been defined in culturalist terms, so that at this stage we might simply define 
modernization as the ability to function and compete in the contemporary world, according 
to the economic and technological norms of the West.154 
It seems that an alternative definition of peoples in the context of the African Charter 
would draw its inspiration from self-determination’s place as the cornerstone of international 
human rights standards. It would be formed in response to actions by the state, generally, 
through actions involving systemic and widespread human rights violations involving violations 
of the right to life. It would be negatively-formulated, in that the people would be constructed in 
opposition to the state, most likely from a conflict situation. In order for the people to be obvious 
in composition, it seems quite likely that it would need to be territorially-defined. More phi-
losophically speaking, it would need to base its claim for recognition as a ‘people’—and there-
fore its access to the African Charter’s ‘right to existence’—on the fact that it is exercising self-
determination precisely to protect the international human rights standards being denied by the 
status quo. More concretely, such an approach would very strongly imply that the ‘people’ was 
committed in the administration of its affairs (whether within the existing state, or perhaps inde-
pendently) to the implementation of the “universal and holistic […] interrelatedness and indi-
visibility of all human rights—economic, social, cultural, civil and political”,155 a contemporary 
prism through which human rights must generally be viewed.156  
                                                                  
153 D. Ott, Public International Law in the Modern World (1987) 244, as cited in Aginam, supra note 111, 
at 351. 
154 P. Chabal and J.-P. Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as a Political Instrument (African Issues) 50 (1999). 
155 United Nations Development Programme, Integrating Human Rights with Sustainable Human Devel-
opment. UNDP policy document 16 (January 1998), as cited in S.P. Marks, The Human Rights Frame-
work for Development: Five Approaches, Harvard School of Public Health, FXB Center Working Paper 
No. 6 (2000), at 2. The five approaches are: ‘holistic’, ‘capabilities’, ‘right to development’, ‘responsibilities’ 
and ‘human rights education’.  
156 Cf. Id.: “We are considering human rights and development after 50 years of distinguishing between 
civil and political rights on the one hand and economic, social, and cultural rights on the other. It has been 
argued that the former are ‘freedoms from’ or ‘droits-attribut,’ whereas the latter are ‘rights to’ or ‘droits-
créance.’ The former are absolute or of immediate applicability, whereas the latter are relative or for pro-
gressive realization. The former are characterized by violations that must be redressed regardless of re-
sources, while the latter are programmatic, calling for cooperation and utilization of resources. These neat 
distinctions, which developed throughout the Cold War, are disappearing in theory and practice. This is 
one of the most promising achievements of the post–Cold War period: there is no longer an ideological 
rationale for favoring one category of rights over another. The holistic approach connects all human 
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Furthermore, it cannot be overlooked that, at some point in the self-determining process, 
the people in question will have to undergo a conceptual shift from being in opposition to the 
state to solidifying the state, through its demonstrated commitment to universal and holistic hu-
man rights. Such challenges are not insurmountable—the very different experiences of Mo-
zambique and South Africa during the early 1990s are two examples of the implementation of 
such a shift—but a people claiming self-determination in this manner will be expected to per-
form, and indeed will be unlikely to win recognition as a ‘people’ without a likelihood of im-
provement of the situation on the ground. Or, it may be accurate to assume that in the African 
context individuals are, as was previously classified, either (a) peaceful private citizens or peace-
ful private groups, (b) agents of the state or (c) rebels. If this would be so, the principal aim of 
any such ‘people’ would be to develop an overall administrative climate of judicial equality and 
procedural expediency, to prevent rebels from resorting to violent, extra-judicial processes to 
achieve social ends. This would also logically apply to private citizens acting under the colour of 
state authority, as could be observed in Algeria, for example, as militias were directly armed by 
the Algerian state in the mid-1990s to respond to terrorist threats.157 
To extrapolate this formulation into a wider framework, it would be of use to nominate 
practical examples in whose light elements of the ‘peoples’ definition under submission could 
be observed, such as Bangladesh, Eritrea and Yugoslavia. In this way, Bangladesh is the most 
obvious because it is one of the few cases of contested post-colonial external self-determination 
to eventually become recognised by the international community. The Eritrean population can 
be identified as a ‘people’, primarily due to the fact that they fought a thirty-year war with Ethio-
pia, although this example is less clear-cut than the secession of East Pakistan leading into the 
state of Bangladesh. Eritrea, federated with Ethiopia in 1952, was later annexed into the Ethio-
pian state. This led to war, a negotiated settlement, an Eritrean referendum in favour of inde-
pendence in 1993 and a 1998 border war, resolved by boundary delimitation by an international 
commission in 2002.158 But in Yugoslavia, it could be observed that the social cohesion of the 
Yugoslav people—always held in check through Tito’s social engineering—started to be out-
weighed by the almost mythical social cohesion of the historical ethnicities and national groups 
on Yugoslav territory. So began the dissolution of the Yugoslav state, from the secession of Slo-
venia, to the separation of Serbia and Montenegro, and everything in between.159 
All these examples are grounded in the substantive reality that a ‘people’ exercised a form 
of ‘self-determination’ in direct opposition to another entity: in Dacca, it was Islamabad; in As-
mara it was Addis Ababa; in Yugoslavia it was itself. 
It simply reflected the post-socialist reality that as a multi-ethnic entity, the sum of its parts 
was much less than its whole. In assessing the tensions generally between non-coercive state 
consolidation and sub-state societal preservation (e.g. the right of an African ‘people’ to exis-
tence), these examples will be seen as reflective of past practice.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
rights, dispensing with many of the traditional distinctions between categories of rights.” 
157 See United Nations, Report of the Panel Appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to 
Gather Information on the Situation in Algeria in order to Provide the International Community with 
Greater Clarity on that Situation, Introduction (1998), particularly at Part Three (C). 
158 See also discussion in the conclusion of this study. 
159 For discussion, see D. Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (2002), at 356-366. 
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Observations from chapter four 
This chapter has attempted to re-frame the legal analysis presented in chapter two in a 
more practical perspective, focusing on the African decolonisation experience. The fundamen-
tal distinctions between a ‘state’ and a ‘nation-state’, as outlined in the first chapter of this study, 
have found practical representation in the contemporary formulations of statehood as having 
‘juridical’ and ‘empirical’ elements. If, as was discussed, Europe is the ‘tap-root of the nation-
state’, then Africa is the ‘tap-root of the juridical state’. The vast majority of sub-Saharan African 
states have emerged from the colonial experience into negative-sovereignty regimes employing 
coercion as a principal means of governance.160 This has led to inherent deficiencies in govern-
ance for post-colonial African states vis-à-vis the rest of the world, coupled with a geographic 
reality that inhibits many African states from exercising true effective control over the whole of 
their territory. 
Indeed, it may appear that the more a state overtly and violently coerces its citizens, the 
greater the risks of overall state failure (in legal, political and economic senses). This leads not 
only to systemic human rights violations by the state against individuals, but also to the rise in 
groups of such individuals who wish to register their opposition against the policies of the state. 
From here, the collective element of ‘collective groupings’ is further identified. As similar indi-
viduals group themselves collectively, within a particular state (or, in the case of a trans-border 
grouping, within neighbouring states), these collective groupings can most broadly be seen as 
‘minorities’, ‘indigenous peoples’ and ‘peoples’; however, there is little legal clarity on the actual 
meaning of these terms, as the concepts have been intentionally left undefined, or the political 
meaning has changed, or there may be circumstances where a particular situation may not fit 
squarely into any one of these specific concepts.161 What is most significant is the general pre-
sumption of deference of sub-state issues to state-based legal and political concerns; what has 
been shown in the African context is a tremendous protection gap for large segments of com-
pletely disenfranchised elements of the population as a whole. 
The African Charter is in many ways unique to universal human rights law, as it guaran-
tees, inter alia, the right of a people to exist. However, the drafters of the Charter intentionally 
avoided defining what comprises a people. It can be reasonably assumed that self-
determination of peoples in the African context acknowledges the existence of collective group-
ings, if not because African states have never possessed any colonies per se from which decoloni-
sation (the original self-determining act to which a ‘people’ granted) could take place. Given the 
realities of contemporary African life, what is of particular interest, however, is the extent to 
which a people can be negatively-formulated; that is, defined in opposition to a state, particu-
larly due to having been targeted for the most serious of human rights violations, i.e., warfare. 
                                                                  
160 The origin of these terms stem from the major themes introduced by R. Jackson, in Quasi-states: Sov-
ereignty, International Relations and the Third World (1990). 
161 Consider the situation of the Twa ethnic group in Rwanda and Burundi. They are a group of pygmies 
which are widely considered to be the indigenous people of the land, inhibiting the territory before the ar-
rival of the Hutu from the West and Tutsi from the North. Their indigenous language is different than 
Kinyarwanda or Kirundi, the national languages of Rwanda and Burundi. Their ethnic and racial charac-
teristics are markedly different than their fellow citizens. They comprise, particularly following the 1994 
genocide, less than one percent of the total population of both countries. They could be a minority. They 
could be an indigenous people. And, particularly in view of the brutality and hatred regularly exhibited 
against them by practically all other entities, official and informal, state and sub-state in these central Af-
rican countries, they could be a ‘people’—save, perhaps, for their territorial disbursement and dwindling 
numbers, but mitigated by the particularities of their own collective history. See generally e.g. M. 
Mbonimpa, Hutu, Tutsi, Twa: Pour une société sans castes au Burundi (1993). 
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For any hope of being a success, such a formulation by a would-be ‘people’ must provide a spe-
cific climate for the actual ‘universal and holistic’ implementation of all human rights for all. 
This re-frames the present overall discussion in a context whereby the tensions generally be-
tween non-coercive state consolidation and sub-state societal preservation can be examined in 
greater depth. 
 
 
 CHAPTER FIVE 
Applying the law of modern territorial statehood 
One way of conceptualising the postcolonial territorial state is to break the methods of sov-
ereignty employed by the state into vertical and horizontal elements, with the territorial as-
pect of statehood being held fixed, without prejudice to an eventual modification to the uti 
possidetis standard. The vertical aspect may be seen as representative of the cumulative effect 
of the state to manifest its independent sovereignty, whilst the horizontal aspect represents 
the ability for collective groupings to respond effectively to the territorial administration of 
the postcolonial state. International law broadly advocates systems of administration that up-
hold political circumstances leading to elections by citizens. However, an ‘election-oriented’ 
view of democracy may prove insufficient to fulfil the requirements imposed by the present 
state of public international law with respect to the precept of ‘access to government’, par-
ticularly in the case of postcolonial states. Although a nascent understanding of what may be 
manifested by holders of a legitimate claim for ‘civil society’ may be observed, internal self-
determination largely corresponds to the right of a people for access to government. Such a 
formulation may prove exclusionary in practice. Yet in the postcolonial era, particularly in the 
new millennium, the legitimacy of such a precept has implications for a right to democracy, 
particularly as territorial circumstances may genuinely serve to inhibit a peoples’ internal 
‘right to self-determination’. While this may not often be the case, it may be that a territori-
ally defined juridical entity is able to demonstrate certain administrative deficiencies derived 
from particular deficiencies observed on the ground. Thus, it is conceivable that claims for 
territorial administration would be recognised by both its populations on the ground, as well 
as the international community through particular forms of recognition. Along similar lines, it 
may also be observed through state practice how states may assert forms of administration 
that may retain a juridical weight serving to inhibit governance on a municipal level. In short, 
it may be the case that the postcolonial state finds itself regularly drawn into a nexus be-
tween situations defined both by administrative (i.e., ‘democratic’) and territorial circum-
stances. The case being advocated at present is that territorial definitions should not 
necessarily comprise the dominant variable in this relationship. 
PART A: Territory and ‘the new sovereignty’ 
As observed most recently through the UN’s Millennium Declaration process, interna-
tional human rights law, including the rights and protections afforded to collective groupings, is 
evolutionary.1 The effectiveness of the postcolonial state is indeed variable, but the sovereign 
state remains the fundamental building block of global society, regardless if that state is the 
product of centuries of national cohesion, or decades of postcolonial independence. What re-
                                                                  
1 A brief literature review illustrates the point. Cf. J.S. Watson, Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the 
Development of Human Rights Norms in International Law, 1979 U.Ill. L.F. 609: “What human rights 
advocates are seeking is a supranational legal order of the hierarchical, coercive type prevalent in 
domestic systems to act as a check on governmental malfeasance. But international law is not such a 
system and it cannot be turned into one no matter how desirable that may be from a humanistic stand-
point.” And cf. Damrosch et al, International Law: Cases and Materials (4th ed., 2001), Preface to the 
Fourth Edition [hereinafter Int’l Law, Damrosch et al]: “In the [eight] years since the previous edition was 
published, international law has been invigorated with ideas and energy from peoples around the world. 
Grass-roots movements, transnational networks, and non-governmental organizations have focused at-
tention on issues where international law can make notable contributions to solution of problems affect-
ing all humanity. New standards of conduct have been elaborated in fields as diverse as human rights, 
trade, the environment, and disarmament; and new institutions are coming into being to realize ambitious 
goals through law […]. The transformations in the hitherto largely state-centered nature of our discipline 
have been a major theme of the present revision. Along with emphasizing the centrality of human rights 
in contemporary international law, we have given enhanced attention to non-state actors and their influ-
ence on the theory, content, and implementation of international law.” And cf. Id. at 587, Ch. 8, Human 
Rights: “What was once unthinkable had become normal by the end of the 20th century.” 
Nicholas Hansen 
Chapter Five: Applying the law of modern territorial statehood 
Page 208 
mains to be considered are the ways in which this artificially monolithic form manifests sover-
eignty whilst adhering to the obligations now attached to statehood, in this comparatively mod-
ern era. 
Louis Henkin’s seminal 1989 book proclaimed the existence of an ‘age of rights’. Writing 
from his usual US constitutional perspective, he noted that the age of rights implied the existence 
of a new reality, whereby “there are few voices now to insist that human rights elsewhere are not 
the business of the United States”.2 Indeed, as international human rights are universal in scope, 
this statement may be mirrored with equal veracity. Thus, given that international human rights 
law is now based on the basic premise that states have duties to uphold human rights in respect 
of their own citizens, as well as to the international community, what can be simultaneously ob-
served is a palpable sense of unequivocal value in preserving the rights of individuals in domes-
tic governance. This reflects a dramatic transformation in the ability of international law to give 
specific recognition to entities other than states. The dynamic has shifted towards an expansive 
conceptualisation of sovereignty, given that individuals have rights in domestic law deriving di-
rectly from international law. While the rights outlined in the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights must be given immediate effect, those in the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights are more aspirational.3 Yet, a chicken-and-egg question 
arises. The most severe violation of human rights is violation of the right to life, regardless if a 
violation of such a right is the result of a state’s inability to curb its punitive excesses, or its inabil-
ity to afford the most fundamental of human needs, such as food and shelter. Perhaps, with the 
exception of some regions of South and Southwest Asia, sub-Saharan Africa has a dispropor-
tionate share of such violations vis-à-vis the rest of the world, and it has been suggested that the 
nature of the construction of Africa’s states plays a role in the establishment of this situation.4 
The ongoing existence of a ‘right of peoples to self-determination’ leaves room for hope, at the 
very least, as self-determination developed on the international stage, earned African states’ in-
dependence and is continually perpetuated in a burgeoning system of rights. However, it is the 
‘burgeoning’ nature of this system that requires closer examination. 
Both ‘sets’ of rights introduce, through treaty accession, a horizontal enforcement of in-
ternational human rights standards. This should come as little surprise, as international law itself 
is horizontal,5 and therefore dependent in large measure upon political actors for its own en-
forcement. States, when claiming violations of international law, must do so on their own initia-
tive, against one of their juridical peers, using established mechanisms in established forums. 
                                                                  
2 L. Henkin, The Age of Rights 66 (1989). One feels further compelled to recall the following comments, 
Id.: “No one in the United States suggests that the United States should end human rights violations in 
other countries by war and conquest; that would be a violation of international law and would bring more 
human suffering than it would cure.” 
3 Beyond the human rights provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, most Afri-
can states have agreed to the contemporary international human rights standards, as Botswana, Maurita-
nia, Mozambique and Swaziland are the only African states to have not ratified both human rights 
covenants. All other African states have done so. Indeed, as at July 2007, out of 192 UN Member-States, 
there are 156 state-parties to the ICESCR and 160 state-parties to the ICCPR, with the majority of non-
state-parties being island states in the Pacific and Caribbean as well as some Asian and Middle-Eastern 
states and a small number of European micro-states. See the conceptual linkages the regularly updated UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human 
Rights Treaties at www.unhchr.ch. In addition, 29 African states are party to the Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court and its complementary jurisdiction to national courts. 
4 See generally J. Herbst, States and Power in Africa (2000) [hereinafter Herbst]. 
5 For commentary, see R. Higgins, Time and the Law: International Perspectives on an Old Problem, 46 
ICLQ 501 (1997), at 501-504. 
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A significant part of the discussion in this chapter reflects a reality such that, while interna-
tional human rights law is of horizontal extraction, it vertically instils a universal system of 
shared expectations about human behaviour, in respect of sovereign states. After discussing ver-
ticality and horizontality in legal systems ordinarily, the discussion will then shift from the inter-
national plane to the municipal plane, and it will be asserted that a major challenge to effective 
human rights promotion and protection in postcolonial African states may be observed due to 
inherent geographical tensions and structural weaknesses. Postcolonial power consolidation, 
clearly, has been messy, and although it would be foolish to say that such messiness was preor-
dained, a more balanced assertion would suggest that the level of violence frequently targeted 
against civilians by agents of African states has had a destabilising effect. However, as the pre-
cepts of international human rights law have been vertically integrated into the domestic legal 
systems of states-parties to the International Bill of Rights, the horizontal enforcement of inter-
national human rights law is premised upon preventing or responding to situations in other 
countries, chiefly though the established United Nations framework. This is to say that the gen-
eral concept of ‘international human rights’ is largely faced with the peer-based methods of en-
forcing international law, which are grounded in classical legal positivism. Rather, it should not 
go overlooked that the subject matter involved with the process of horizontal enforcement of in-
ternational human rights law is the treatment of individuals within a state. This is not inconse-
quential; indeed, it exemplifies the extraordinary nature of the new sovereignty regime, at least 
when contrasted with the classical legal positivism.  
Framed within the larger context, one is reminded that the underlying universal human 
rights principles are being filtered through the various forms of statehood observed heretofore, 
broadly classed as having ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ sovereignty forms, where ‘positive sovereignty’ is 
roughly analogous to the ideal of the nation-state, and ‘negative sovereignty’ is roughly analo-
gous to the reality of the purely juridical state.6 Here one could reasonably conclude that the 
positive sovereignty forms tend to be more receptive to the effective implementation of human 
rights norms into a state’s domestic law than do the negative sovereignty forms. Coercive behav-
iour, by definition, exacerbates tensions between state and society, and such inherent disagree-
ment can cause tremendous discord. Hence the rigidity of the horizontal construct of 
international human rights law as translated into the domestic laws of states, as international law 
alone lacks the automatic vertical reach into the inner workings of many states, particularly 
those taking a more coercive or negative-sovereignty form. 
‘International law’ per se does not, except in extraordinary circumstances of state failure, 
directly manage or administer a territory. This job is quite clearly left to the states, and for that to 
remedy the violation, the state must undertake its own reforms, whether it is Western European 
or Central African. Thus on the one hand, it can be held to task in the appropriate intergovern-
mental forum, with a full spectrum of responses from the feeblest expression of concern about a 
situation in a territory right up to lawful humanitarian intervention, for human rights protection 
and promotion is the business of all states.7 On the other hand, a genocide in Rwanda, to which 
the world turned a blind eye, occurred quite recently. But this leads to a perverse reality, for if 
                                                                  
6 For discussion, see R. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World 
(1990), particularly at 26-31. 
7 There is of course an innate hesitancy to approach situations with direct countermeasures, as Antonio 
Cassese notes that the self-determination situations in East Timor, Eritrea, the Baltic States and Yugosla-
via were those with “more political and military overtones than any other question concerning human 
rights and States therefore show a strong propensity to take into account a whole gamut of extra-legal 
considerations before deciding to intervene in this area”. See A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A 
Legal Reappraisal (1995), at 157. 
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international human rights law cannot be a ‘supranational legal order of the hierarchical, coer-
cive type prevalent in domestic systems to act as a check on government malfeasance’, as it were, 
then what does it say about the nature of the states, themselves, when prohibitions against such 
types of behaviour have been firmly written into their own domestic legal systems for decades? 
What is further implied—theoretically, at least—is the development of a commonality of 
circumstances in the domestic socio-legal systems of the states-parties to the regime of contem-
porary international human rights law. Even more difficult to express, however, is the com-
monality of circumstances reflecting the increasing rejection in positivist international law of 
suprema potestas. The seal has been punctured that the standard of treatment afforded to the citi-
zens of any state by that state’s own government is without any concern whatsoever to any other 
state. But rare are the cases whereby the repeated effectuation of massive and systemic human 
rights violations lead to effective censure and subsequent cessation. The incorporation of inter-
national principle into a state’s domestic laws is primarily effectuated by the consent of individ-
ual states themselves, given that these actions are taken by treaty ratification and the obligations 
undertaken, through membership in intergovernmental organisations. 
The states themselves, sovereign as they are, remain. Indeed, as Pieter Kooijmans stated, 
drawing upon Georg Hegel, the suprema potestas principle is the classical guarantor of the sover-
eign equality of all states.8 Yet the sovereign equality of states is not in question. It is, however, re-
flective of the fact that, in both morality (e.g. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) and 
legality (e.g. the two human rights covenants as well as the African Charter), in the international 
human rights legal system, a state retains its external sovereignty and independence, exclusive of 
its external accession to internal obligations concerning its own behaviour. This thus serves to 
mitigate the absolutist nature of its internal power, without significantly undermining its external 
trappings of sovereignty.9 What is really at issue is the manner in which these universal and re-
gional standards are implemented in domestic sovereignties. To this end, a logical barometer of 
the practical relevance of the right of peoples to self-determination is identified, for if all rights 
are seen to flow from self-determination—as has been asserted in the present text—the success 
of the system established and reinforced by self-determination in its classical and ongoing 
forms, will be reflected in the degree to which universal principle is given domestic effect. In-
deed, it is here where the nature of African state construction is examined, particularly in the 
case of civil and political rights, which becomes immediately enforceable at the moment of ac-
cession to the ICCPR,10 whether by a ‘state’ or a ‘quasi-state’, to use Robert Jackson’s phrasing.11 
The ‘state-strength’ dilemma of negative sovereignty regimes in postcolonial states 
A pattern is beginning to emerge, which demonstrates how aspects of coercion within 
postcolonial states, including those in Africa, may become structurally ingrained. It can be fur-
                                                                  
8 See P.J. Kooijmans, The Doctrine of the Legal Equality of States: An Enquiry into the Foundations of 
International Law 127-128 (1964), citing G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie der Rechts (4. Aufl. 
Herausgegeben von Johannes Hofmeister, 1955) at § 331. 
9 Cf. Id. at 129: “For [Hegel], the state is perfection personified, and the welfare of the state the highest aim. 
The state as such is absolutized, both internally and externally. It is the absolute power on earth; conse-
quently it is sovereign and independent in its relations with other states.” 
10 In contrast, the ICESCR reflects aspirational goals, to which a state pledges itself to realise through an 
ongoing process. 
11 See Jackson, supra note 6, at 29. Jackson broadly equates the quasi-state formulation to states exercising 
primarily so-called ‘negative sovereignty’. See also R.H. Jackson, Negative Sovereignty in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 12 Rev Int’l Stud 247 (1986), particularly at 260 et seq. 
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ther observed, by using the methodology proposed by Kalevi Holsti,12 that this situation leads to 
a practical reality whereby the actual living conditions within these post-colonial states remain 
rooted in a coercive hegemony not dissimilar from that which anti-colonial self-determination 
sought to repel. Holsti argues that, as time passed and greater numbers of African states decolo-
nised, the most fundamental governance challenge was to improve the structures of the state be-
yond those inherited from colonialism. Often, the negative, ongoing effects of the widespread 
use of violence, and the subsequent propensity to adversely affect regional peace and security, 
have caused resentment, disaffection and isolation amongst populations governed within a 
state’s boundaries. As a result, it may be observed that the more a state coerces its population 
into respecting its authority, the more repellent are its actual effects. This phenomenon is, again, 
not uniquely or inherently African; one need only to consider difficult state-society relations in 
many Asian regions which were also once deeply affected by colonialism to find parallels.13 
It is the coercive element to the hegemony perpetuated by post-colonial states that is most 
troublesome, given its correlation with repression and violence. Regardless of the negative ef-
fects inflicted upon the populace by state leaders in terms of human rights violations toward 
various individuals, there is also a fundamentally destabilising element to such actions, when 
viewed in aggregate. That hegemony exists, in the first instance, is not the inherent problem. 
Rein Müllerson, in referring to an earlier work by Adam Watson, points out that hegemony it-
self—on the global plane—is more value-neutral than liberal international lawyers and diplo-
maticists would tend to think, if only for its long-standing and widespread prevalence in human 
interactions.14 Watson’s formulation of hegemony reflects this, calling it “the ability of the most 
powerful states to determine the nature of the society, and especially its practice”.15 Making a 
leap from the international plane to the domestic, it seems, similarly, that the political apparatus 
of a sovereign state has a corresponding ‘ability to determine the nature of the state society’, and, 
indeed, to determine its practice. Yet, when that practice is observed to contain coercive repres-
sion, the linkages to what, in an ‘age of rights’ may be termed illegitimacy in governmental ac-
tions have become overt. Holsi calls this the ‘state-strength’ dilemma, in that: 
[t]he weak state is caught in a viscous circle. It does not have the resources to create legiti-
macy by providing security and other services. In its attempt to find strength, it adopts preda-
tory and kleptocratic practices or plays upon and exacerbates social tensions between the 
myriads of communities that make up the society. Everything it does to be a strong state ac-
tually perpetuates its weakness. […] States seek to gain the strength that would give their 
external sovereignty domestic content. Attempts to increase state strength generate resis-
tance that weakens the state. In attempts to overcome resistance, governments rely on co-
ercive measures against local power centers of various types. […] Their “right to rule” is 
undermined by their actions, which are frequently discriminatory, short-range, and self-
serving.16 
Under such circumstances, the ‘rule of law’ may be seen as more akin to protracted armed 
                                                                  
12 See generally K.J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (1996), particularly at 102 et seq. [herein-
after Holsti]. 
13 This is reflected by the profound levels of political repression perpetrated by Asian governments of du-
bious legitimacy against their disenfranchised populations. States emerging from empires and colonial 
construction, such Iraq and Burma (Myanmar) are two of the most glaring examples, but certainly not the 
only ones. 
14 Cf. R. Müllerson, Ordering Anarchy: International Law in International Society (2000), at 140: “Hegem-
ony can be legitimate as well as illegitimate. In the contemporary world, where concepts of democracy and 
legitimacy have become powerful ideas shaping and reshaping many societies only hegemony that is seen 
as legitimate by a substantial number of actors has a chance of being durable.” 
15 A. Watson, The Limits of Independence 147 (1997), as cited in Müllerson, Id. 
16 Holsti, supra note 12, at 117. 
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conflict than to effective governance. These assertions are substantiated by objective criteria. 
According to Holsti, Africa led the world, in terms of the numbers of actual armed conflicts on 
the ground, from the period 1945-1995 (excluding anti-colonial liberation wars), with 44 such 
conflicts, most of which were classified as ‘secession/resistance’ (21) or ‘ideological/factional’ 
(16), which seems to agree with the notion of coercive hegemony against the peoples of a state 
by the leader of that state, whereas ‘state vs. state/intervention’ situations accounted for only 
seven of the remaining armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa. This is further demonstrated by 
the fact that 37 of the 44 conflicts—fully 84 percent of them—were considered to be internal con-
flicts, not involving external intervention.17 Holsti refers to this phenomenon as exemplary of the 
‘wars of the third kind’.18 He writes: 
In wars of the “third kind” there are no fronts, no campaigns, no bases, no uniforms, no pu-
bicly displayed honors, no points d’appui, and no respect for the territorial limits of states. 
There are no set strategies and tactics. Innovation, surprise, and unpredictability are necessi-
ties and virtues. […] In wars of the third kind, just as the civilian/soldier distinction disap-
pears, the role of outsiders becomes fuzzy. The laws of neutrality no longer apply because 
those who are militarily weak rely on outsiders for arms, logistical support, and sanctuary.19 
In considering the implications for these circumstances, it should be considered that a 
basic phenomenon is being considered here: the inter-temporal effectiveness of sovereign in-
dependence contrasted with the factual, definitional circumstances readily observed in exis-
tence on the ground. In some senses, the discussion replicates that put forth in chapter two 
whereby the legal principles of self-determination of peoples and uti possidetis juris were com-
pared and contrasted. In a postcolonial setting, however, the power dynamic is more relative. 
To this end, some time will be spent casting the present discussion in ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ 
                                                                  
17 Viz. Holsti, supra note 12, at 22 (Table 2.1, Armed conflicts by type and region, 1945-1995). This table 
is the product of data provided in the fifteen-page appendix in his book, compiling “the major instances of 
armed conflict that have occurred in the international system since 1945 up to, and including, 1995. The 
list is comprehensive and includes conflicts that would not necessarily be defined as war in the Eurocen-
tric conception (i.e., a contest fought between two distinct national armies who engage each other with the 
objective of inflicting enough casualties/destruction to compel one party to surrender, with a minimum of 
1,000 battle-related deaths)”. Holsti’s main focus in the African context is on sub-Saharan Africa, as he 
groups North African countries with the Middle East. 
18 Cf. Id. at 28 et seq.: “Since 1648, war has been of three essentially different forms. We can call them ‘in-
stitutionalized war,’ ‘total war,’ and wars of the third kind, sometimes called ‘peoples’ wars.’” Holsti be-
lieves that institutionalised war was conventionally institutionalised inter-state war waged quite 
separately from civilian life, thereby respecting certain inherent limits in warfare, such as the Thirty 
Years War. Total war demonstrated greater involvement of the local populace, such as the 1792 Napo-
leonic levée en masse. Further, wars were waged with a view towards annihilation of the enemy, not just a 
forced surrender as was previously sought out. This had the knock-on effect of codification of basic stan-
dards of warfare, through the positivist development of an international law of armed conflict. The resis-
tance developed by collective groupings of individuals against the oppressive powers of coercive 
hegemony has come to represent this third kind of warfare, exemplified by the revolutionary theories of, 
inter alia, Mao Tse-tung, Vo Nguen Giap and Che Guevara. 
19 Id. at 36-37. It is interesting to note that Holsti on the one hand asserts that territorial limits of states do 
not apply in this type of warfare, while, on the other hand, he points out that African civilians have had 
some of the greatest numbers of casualties in such wars, despite the evidence that very few armed conflicts 
in post-colonial Africa are inter-state in nature. Cf. Id. at 37 (citations omitted): “One estimate is that be-
tween two and three million African civilians died in wars during the 1980s. Gurr estimates that between 
one-half million and 1.7 million Africans died from government policies of genocide or ‘politicide’ in the 
1980s. The figures for the 1990s, which include vast numbers of civilian casualties in Liberia and Rwanda 
and the continuation of the war in Sudan, will probably not be significantly lower.” Whether such figures 
can be seen as diminishing in the new century is a conceptual possibility, albeit one beyond the scope of 
this study. 
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terms, both on the municipal plane, as a question of effective governance within territorial 
boundaries, and universally, in the same sense as the manner in which it is now uncontroversial 
to establish that there is a system of public international law, with standards of behaviour 
formed from international provenance, since the ICCPR and ICESCR, as part of the Interna-
tional Bill of Rights, are treaty-based voluntary obligations undertaken by states. The obsessive 
parity sought by the earlier classical legal positivists to incorporate all colonised, or otherwise 
‘civilised’, territorial entities into an overarching legal system grounded in the sovereign equality 
of states has been replaced with a reality whereby states retain their external sovereignty and 
membership within the United Nations, but do so with wildly differing capacities to demon-
strate genuine ‘effective governance’ on their territories—that is to say that, although the ICCPR 
prohibits violations of its terms, and certainly its core precepts, from the moment when a state 
signs, ratifies or accedes to the international treaty, it may well be the case that some postcolonial 
states have neither the capacity nor the political will to implement such treaty obligations.  
Interpreting the ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ aspects of postcolonial statehood 
A conceptual breakdown of ‘horizontality’, ‘verticality’, ‘positive sovereignty’ and ‘nega-
tive sovereignty’ is useful to understand the curious roles played by postcolonial states, having 
been guided by uti possidetis but also now broadly subscribing to the UN human rights pro-
gramme, which holds (postcolonial) self-determination of peoples as sacrosanct. Under such 
circumstances, the ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ concepts take on more precise meanings. The ‘ver-
tical’ element remains relatively static, as it refers to the direct application of sovereignty by a 
state. The wavelength of the ‘horizontal’ element is more dynamic, as it shifts away from the su-
pranational, macro-scale system of interactions and enforcement mechanisms, common to the 
international community of states, to the municipal, micro-scale machinery employable within 
a sovereign state, to ensure non-discrimination and full legal protection for all citizens.20 Positive 
sovereignty is the ideal, in that it is largely the product of the International Bill of Rights, whereas 
negative sovereignty may be the reality, in that repressive coercion may be a prevalent governing 
technique. 
It will be asserted that, in postcolonial African statehood, ‘vertical state consolidation’ 
represents the cumulative effect of the state to manifest its independent sovereignty, while ‘hori-
zontal societal preservation’ represents the ability for collective groupings to maintain some 
sense of postcolonial coherence. General conceptions of horizontal and vertical orders, as 
means of describing the distribution of authority in a legal system, certainly have their own theo-
retical antecedents, although one must bear in mind that there are few direct parallels in such 
forms of analysis. Nevertheless, to set the tone of the discussion, a prime example from 1964 by 
Richard Falk examined the interplay between domestic courts and the international legal sys-
tem.21 Falk unsurprisingly identifies greater horizontal authority in international law than 
                                                                  
20 For if there is such a thing as sovereign equality of states, then, in states subscribing to the international 
human rights regime, there must be some exigent form of equality amongst citizens within the state, al-
though cultural differences will admittedly find opportunities to denigrate this assertion over time. 
21 See R.A. Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order (1964) [hereinafter Falk], 
particularly at chapter three, pages 21-52. Cf. Id. at 22: “The distinction between ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ 
is a metaphor to describe the two basic distributions of power in a legal order. However, it is not a rigid 
distinction in which the presence of one form of legal order excludes the other. Thus, for example, when 
one state in the United States is compelled by a federal court to give effect to a judgement of another state 
by virtue of ‘the full faith and credit clause,’ there is introduced a vertical element in an essentially hori-
zontal legal order.” In view of Falk’s comments, given that international law is a system arranged in the 
main to govern sovereign states, it should be seen as something less than and therefore more horizontal 
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through municipal legal systems, in that power is distributed amongst sovereign states interna-
tionally, while it retains an inherent hierarchical authority, when formulated within one par-
ticular state.22 The idea of an international legal order is one that is inherently horizontal in 
definition, in reflection of the lack of a dominant vertical polity,23 and therefore must automati-
cally reflect some of the underdeveloped concepts in postcolonial juridical states, namely a po-
tential incapacity to enforce a uniform system of international law.24 
Furthermore, it has become difficult to the point of irrationality to deny that the basic core 
of international human rights standards have become synonymous with a uniform system of in-
ternational law standards and no deeper allusions are necessary to establish the synonymous re-
lationship between the two. As homage is paid to democratic governance as something which 
has emerged into the modern law of nations, self-determination will be a legal principle of rein-
forcing value. International human rights law takes on an elliptical meaning, for it is grounded 
in self-determination of peoples, but self-determination of peoples is an ongoing process re-
flecting a system possessed with the right to choose: leaders, systems, beliefs. As opposed to a 
snapshot taken at a ‘critical date’, it is an ongoing process, a system of its own accord to respond 
to situations and to develop jurisprudence. Its ongoing character is why it has become a corner-
stone of the modern international legal system, and yet the enforcement of international human 
rights law, as has been discussed, exhibits all of the flaws and trappings of a horizontal enforce-
ment system. 
The legal status of the documentation of human rights abuses and the levels of protection 
earned by human rights defenders have taken on greater complexity in recent years. The ellipti-
cal nature of international human rights law demonstrates how, simultaneously, a morally-
inclined legalism is given practical effect, despite having a dubious jurisprudential pedigree. 
Self-determination is the engine that drives this elliptical dynamic, as it truly does blend the 
aspriational nature of economic, social and cultural rights with the systemic and procedural na-
ture of civil and political rights. Thus, a more contextual understanding of sovereignty develops, 
since, for this to occur, the underlying requirement of democratic governance, in the first in-
stance, takes on the form of something akin to autonomy arrangements under the rubric of ‘in-
ternal self-determination’. It is therefore possible to observe how ‘what was once unthinkable 
had become normal by the end of the 20th century’. 
In a recent conference paper, Hans Köchler stated the issue differently, pointing out that 
the UN Charter is an ‘anachronism’ because it has not undergone a substantive—and presuma-
bly democratising—revision since decolonisation.25 He asserts: 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
than a fully federated system; nevertheless, the same type of underlying structure has an inherent vertical 
characteristic to it, as sovereign states undertake to vertically-integrate, within their own municipalities, 
all juridical forms including the international human rights standards: those which have been horizon-
tally promulgated across the community of nations, including—cultural relativist arguments aside—
newly-decolonised states. 
22 Id. at 21-23.  
23 Cf. Id. at 22: “[A horizontal distribution of authority] results in giving a central ordering role to various 
patterns of self-help and self-restraint. With the possible exceptions of the control of international vio-
lence and the avoidance of extreme unfairness to aliens, the maintenance of international order is primar-
ily a horizontal endeavor.” 
24 With ‘enforcement’ meaning an organisational method residing somewhere in the nexus between text-
book coercion, i.e., repression, and textbook anarchy, i.e., an absence of polity, this could mean agents of 
the central government acting on authority from a state capital, or a local agent acting on matters of local 
jurisdiction, or (more practically) an ad hoc mixture of the above. 
25 See H. Köchler, Self-determination and Democratization of the UN System, in Y.N. Kly and D. Kly, In 
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It is no unfair demand, in terms of democratic values and principles, that the reality of decolo-
nization (which brought about the admission of the majority of present member states since 
World War II) be reflected in the UN Charter itself, if the Organization wants to regain its 
legitimacy and credibility vis-à-vis the majority of mankind.26 
So while desirable modernisations, such as the reform of the Security Council, have not 
taken place, improvements in the efficacy of the international legal order remain channelled 
through the existing procedures, inefficient as they may be.27 Although self-determination of 
peoples is not mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights per se, the Universal 
Declaration itself, as one of the nascent United Nations’ greatest gifts to post-war society, en-
courages an expansive reading of protective measures both for individuals and collectivités vis-à-
vis the state. Of course, as the Universal Declaration began its existence largely as a gentleman’s 
agreement regarding the expected direction of post-war legal development, it is only when the 
Universal Declaration is given specific legal effect, through international and regional cove-
nants, relevant custom, peremptory norms of expected global behaviour and universal jurisdic-
tion for certain crimes that the veracity and evidence of a system of international human rights 
law becomes evident. Self-determination of peoples, as common article one to the two princi-
pal multilateral treaties in international human rights law, is the Grundnorm of this system. That 
the entry into force of the ICCPR and ICESCR was contemporary to the independence of most 
of the world’s colonies was a fortunate circumstance for human rights advocates. It also implies 
an organic character for self-determination, within contemporary international human rights 
law. That the implementing legislation of this organic law—the two principal human rights 
covenants, before unification in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action—holds self-
determination of peoples as their one and only common element should be seen as reflective of 
the need for progressive implementation of the elements contained therein. This manifests itself 
between the administrative bodies of a sovereign state and universal standards of the interna-
tional legal order. 
Although his ideas predated the entry into force of the modern postcolonial human rights 
legal regime, a return to Falk’s earlier commentary on interactions between horizontal and ver-
tical structures illustrates the situation clearly. Falk cites Percy Corbett’s assertion that “progress 
towards clarity and effectiveness of the international legal order will depend less upon the for-
mation and reformulation of general principles, or on codification, than upon the arrangements 
for the supranational administration of specific common interests”.28 Falk, finding himself out of 
agreement, responds: 
Professor Corbett regards the only alternative to the development of effective vertical insti-
tutions to be the rather fruitless formulation of shared aspirations. Such an argument fails to 
take serious account of the horizontal possibilities to attain legal order. This position also 
compels one to identify progress in the stabilization of international relations exclusively with 
centralizations of authority and power.29 
In short, it seems apparent that ‘verticalisation’ and ‘horizontalisation’ of intellectual con-
cepts can be applied in different forms, dependent upon the circumstance at hand (e.g. modern 
public international law is largely enforced horizontally—that is, when a state brings a claim, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Pursuit of the Right to Self-Determination: Collected Papers and Proceedings of the First International 
Conference on the Right to Self-determination and the United Nations (2001), at 135.  
26 Id. at 136 (emphasis in original). 
27 The fact that this is not always the case remains notwithstanding. 
28 Falk, supra note 21, at 23, citing P.E. Corbett, Law and Society in the Relations of States 12, 68-69 
(1951). 
29 Id (footnotes omitted). 
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complaint, situation, dispute or the like to an intergovernmental body to seek possible reme-
dies). The phenomenon could also be observed vertically, when a state emerging from colonial 
rule, having inherited artificial external boundaries and an imported formal legal system, and 
undergoes periods of consolidation and internal contraction as it develops and refines its em-
pirical characteristics. 
At this point, a short measure of stock-taking is in order to tailor the ideas presented 
herein back to an earlier theme in the discussion, which is the deconstructed postcolonial state 
and the after-effects of uti possidetis juris on Africa. As was asserted in chapter two, at the heart of 
the interplay between self-determination and uti possidetis is the question of whether the con-
cepts are legal rules or legal principles, and it will be recalled that a sympathetic reading of self-
determination is urged vis-à-vis uti possidetis, because uti possidetis is a legal rule governing the 
form of decolonisation whilst self-determination is a legal principle with an organic character, 
as it sets the underlying foundation for the interdependent basket of rights to be found in the 
ICESCR and ICCPR.30 Moving that discussion into the present light, a blueprint for how hori-
zontal frameworks of legal order can be observed in the postcolonial African state. For it is uti 
possidetis which drew the line at the ‘critical date’ and postcolonial self-determination of peo-
ples, within the sovereignty of the nascent state (or the lack thereof), which dominated the rela-
tionship thereafter. Effective self-determination of peoples, as a human right itself, must 
undertake to protect at a bare minimum the customary international law of human rights,31 and 
in states-parties to the ICESCR and ICCPR, the core of the ‘international bill of rights’. Further-
more, it must do so—or genuinely endeavour to do so at the very least—without fault, for the 
basket of international human rights law, with customary human rights law at its core, preserves 
human lives by linking decorum, presumably to be found in ‘statehood’, to the rights and re-
sponsibilities of individuals subjected to those states’ own administrations. The ways in which 
this is done, however, have been opened up considerably due to the actions of the ‘grass-roots 
movements, transnational networks, and non-governmental organizations’ referred to at the 
outset of this chapter. This opens a new realm of possibilities for the task at hand, in that self-
determination of peoples expands the frontiers of sovereignty. It does so by demanding interac-
tivity between state and society, and furthermore, it implies that, in circumstances where the 
state finds itself substantively less than perfect, society has a full entitlement to pick up the slack, 
as a product of its own initiative. 
That is to say that ‘self-determination’ is just that, and that is how the ‘self’ defines itself. 
Self-determination is an obvious manifestation of natural law in the modern world, as it can be 
observed that the law as it is actually—and perhaps uniquely as shown by its mainstream accep-
tance as a legal principle,32 with influence over the composition of a state’s government—
juxtaposing the concepts of the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’. Moreover, it does so at a deep structural level, 
driving the process onward, however repugnant it may be for certain individuals—lawyers and 
non-lawyers alike—in that morality, for lack of a better word, has become the law, at least in a 
nascent, conceptual sense.33 That this is so serves neither to refute the ‘ought’/’is’ separation, nor 
to neglect the pluralism of a non-discriminatory legal system. Nevertheless, some may immedi-
                                                                  
30 See discussion supra chapter two of this study. 
31 For these purposes, the provisions of the US Restatement (Third) suffice, as at § 702 states are prohib-
ited from practicing, encouraging or condoning genocide, slavery, disappearances, torture, arbitrary de-
tention, racial discrimination or consistent patterns of gross violations of human rights. 
32 See generally J. Crawford, The Rights of Peoples: ‘Peoples’ or ‘Governments’, in J. Crawford (ed.) The 
Rights of Peoples (1988) 
33 Yet one which should even find basis amongst otherwise ‘exclusive’ legal positivists. This is self-
evident, for what effectively self-determining entity would actually want to harm itself? How could that 
ever be genuinely construed as ‘self-determination’ by a territorially-defined collectivité? 
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ately identify a problem, as seemingly unskilled human rights advocates are often thought by 
mainstream lawyers to over-identify with morality and to argue that unjust laws cannot be seen 
as laws, in and of themselves. 
The validity of this escapes larger concerns, however. For at issue here is a hierarchical ju-
ridical question of interactions between sets of rules and groups of principles. Of particular con-
cern is the ability of states to exhibit and manifest the universal properties of sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, independence, et al, which they must do in order to be states, and to do so in 
a way that does not run afoul of modern obligations. This is where international human rights 
law takes on a role of its own in linking international and municipal law. Hedley Bull noted that 
one of the main limitations of international law is that it cannot act independently of itself; that is, 
it can “mobilise the factors making for compliance with rules and agreements in international 
society only if these factors are present”.34 These factors are, indeed, present: sovereign (vertical, 
on the international and domestic planes) states have undertaken voluntarily-ascribed treaty 
obligations (horizontal, most clearly on the international plane). The problem is that it is the na-
ture of the states’ own constructions which should come under greater critical examination, if 
self-determination is to have any practical, tangible meaning. Yet it may well be the case that 
component societies within the state, and thus the totality of the territorial state itself, can—if 
empowered to do so—assume some of the roles which otherwise would be played by the gov-
ernment of a state, manifesting its effectivités within its territory.35 
In sum, if the overladen demands on state systems emerging from colonial domination 
can be deconstructed into both horizontal and vertical forms, and self-determination is seen as a 
legal principle taking on the amorphous forms just discussed herewith, the question turns to the 
extent to which civil society groups can legitimately and fairly take on administrative tasks in the 
absence of a state’s own effectiveness.36 
Many possible answers could be conceived. It could be the case, as occurred in Algeria at 
the height of six years of insurgency, that civilian militias were armed and positively encouraged 
to act under the colour of state authority by performing paramilitary activities.37 It could also be 
the case that civilian groups provide the essential human services that would be seen as contrib-
uting to the telos of flourishing in developed, primarily European states. That is to say, rather, 
that forms broadly reflective of the distinctions between empirical and juridical statehood are 
contrasted, with the horizontal as the empirical and the vertical as the juridical. Indeed the lit-
erature of the time recognised this circumstance—particularly that the juridical has the upper 
hand—as observed by A.A. Fatouros:  
                                                                  
34 H. Bull, The Anarchical Society 137 (1st ed., 1977). 
35 But see the discussion on effectivités, original title and historical consolidation, infra this chapter, Part 
B. 
36 Cf. J.A. Perkins, The Changing Foundations of International Law: From State Consent to State 
Responsibility, 15 B.U. Int’l L.J. 433 (1997), at 504: “Frustrating as the enforcement of international law at 
times surely is and will continue to be, the essential fact is that the power of international law is not de-
rived from state consent but from its cogency as policy. It is policy that drives states in the development 
of international law as well as in their adherence to it and in their commitment to its enforcement. The 
power of law lies in its unique problem solving, conflict resolving, peace building and security enhancing 
capacities and its resulting role in serving the interests, the convictions and the security of states.”  
37 Cf. New York Times, Algeria to Arm More Civilians for Fight Against Islamic Militants, 22 January 
1998, page A13, available on Lexis. Most interesting is the statement of then-Prime Minister Ouyahia that 
the government intends to “arm more civilians in self-defense units and will establish more than 100 new 
police brigades [in 1998] to take over from the army in the fight against Islamic militants [... ] with the 
goal of returning the army to its role of defending the country's borders”.  
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The rigid wholesale adoption of a legalistic traditional viewpoint on international law seri-
ously restricts the potentialities of the new states. These states admittedly have a very lim-
ited choice between alternatives in international political, economic, or legal relations; but 
they limit themselves further by failing to perceive and identify some of the alternatives which 
are in fact available. This accounts in part for the fact that the actual impact of the actions 
and policies of the new states on international legal order is far less radical and far-reaching 
than their rhetoric at the United Nations may lead one to expect. (Their lack of power, in its 
more traditional formulation, is, of course, another important reason for this.)38 
Having set the stage, then, for a more contemporary discussion of horizontal and vertical 
conceptualisations of power in the postcolonial African state, Falk’s defence of the potential for 
contributions to legal order to be made, from observations on these horizontal and vertical per-
spectives, can aid in understanding of the underlying phenomena at hand. 
The crux of the matter: The variables of ‘vertical state consolidation’ and ‘horizontal societal 
preservation’ explained 
In particular, the horizontal form is called horizontal societal preservation and is defined 
in opposition to the prevalence of coercion in the governance of a postcolonial state. Sub-
Saharan Africa is an appropriate model for analysis of this phenomenon, due primarily to the 
widespread economic underdevelopment and underperformance found there, which further 
serves to destabilise an already fragile system of human interaction. However, it is the regular 
manifestation of inter-societal cohesion that preserves some dignity for human existence—‘le 
système D’ which allows life to carry on regardless of circumstances, as it undoubtedly does each 
day across the continent. 
The vertical societal consolidation form is that which reflects the latest inter-temporal re-
ality of uti possidetis juris, namely, that the modern meaning of the concept as something bearing 
little resemblance to its ancient Roman origins has evolved both into a practical measure, to pre-
vent land grabs by outside powers in nascent postcolonial Latin American, and into a rule of 
general scope with particular application in Africa and Asia. Some would also say it encapsu-
lates a socio-legal phenomenon, which simultaneously represents ‘the heritage of states’ in the 
European tradition, and the lasting implications in terms of territorial delineation in postcolo-
nial sub-Saharan Africa. The vertical state consolidation form is just that: an attempt for a post-
colonial state to try to centralise its own authority in order to take fully its place amongst the 
community of states. 
The tensions between vertical state consolidation and horizontal societal preservation 
now emerge. The vertical aspect reflects the manner in which a state is entrusted with the 
authority and responsibility for the hegemonic discharge of some rights over its citizens,39 and 
separately, the domestic obligation of preservation of certain individual rights. Furthermore, 
given the shift away from the requirement of the existence of an effective government, as ob-
                                                                  
38 A.A. Fatouros, Participation of the “New” States in the International Legal Order of the Future, in R.A. 
Falk and C.E. Black (eds.), The Future of the International Legal Order Vol. I: Trends and Patterns 342 
(1969). 
39 An analytical guide is provided by Müllerson, supra note 14, at 141: “Taken in abstract, neither hegem-
ony nor independence (anarchophilia) in international society are necessarily either good or bad. What 
really matters is the purpose, direction and methods of the use of hegemonic power or independence. It is 
not at all rare that newly independent states have started with violation of human rights of their ethnic or 
religious minorities. Also, struggle for independence is often associated with terrorism. It seems that this 
should warn us against treating independence as something inherently good or positive and seeing all 
those who fight for independence as heroes and not as villains.” 
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served from League of Nations practice,40 towards the acceptance of the legitimacy of a state 
achieving independence through an act of decolonisation regardless of the capacity to deliver 
effective governance, it seems that modern international law recognises that all states are sepa-
rately assumed to possess the capacity to do so. 
Nevertheless, there simultaneously exists a right of peoples to self-determination. Con-
ceptualising the juridical state as the by-product of both horizontal and vertical tensions reflects 
the friction—and indeed hostility—between ‘state’ and ‘quasi-state’. The ‘horizontal societal 
preservation’—if it is to be accepted that “peoples’ rights and minority rights are the flip sides of 
the same coin”41—will challenge the outmost limits of legality, at least from a traditional interna-
tional legal perspective. And yet, there is the ‘right of peoples to self-determination’. It could also 
be observed that ‘vertical state consolidation’ reflects little more than what some might observe 
as a ‘twilight zone’ among international law, history and politics: ‘a state is a state is a state’, so 
long as it has successfully been subjected to the juridical processes which confer statehood per se 
upon a particular territory, but it can and should simultaneously be observed that the amalgam 
of law, history and politics creates facts and factual situations, observable on the ground and de-
batable in intergovernmental forums such as the Security Council. 
Some states clearly have been formed as products of coercion and in terms of practical 
fact (as measured by the level of widely-reported human rights violations, for example) have 
obviously not profited from their nascent statehood. Furthermore, it appears to be the case that 
‘the new sovereignty’ also reflects circumstances whereby a disenfranchised segment of a state’s 
population can seek redress through the international legal framework to its right of access to 
government and its level of parity with the majority of the state. 
In short, modern sovereignty accepts, as a matter of fact, that there has been an intersec-
tion between the broader social sciences and a heretofore ‘pure’ globalised system of law. 
Throughout this study, it has been repeatedly asserted that the ‘classical’ European state came 
into being through an inter-societal process rooted in ‘consent’ and ‘consensus’, whereas the 
modern African state primarily came into being through the process of decolonisation and ‘co-
ercion’, as leaders tried to diffuse their power across the territories of their states. At present, a 
corollary question can be observed—namely, to what extent the nature of African state con-
struction has influenced the levels of severity of their human rights violations.  
This question may be examined most readily by placing the horizontal and vertical con-
cepts at different ends of the spectrum on a prism. On the one hand, there is ‘vertical state con-
solidation’, or the right of a state to employ its monopoly on the use of force within its territory, 
in order to secure its own power throughout its own territorial limits. Such a concept is derived 
from the early legal formulations of self-determination of peoples, in that ‘self-determination’ 
meant decolonisation and the ‘people’ exercising the right were all the people in an overseas co-
lonial territory. Thus, as states emerged from colonialism, the new leaders tried to forge a spe-
cific sense of national cohesion, understandably and quite often in anti-colonialist terms, to 
instil a sense of unity, and indeed to practically establish effective governmental control over the 
post-colonial state. The problem is that, as Mobutu Sese-Seko, Jean-Bédel Bokassa, Idi Amin 
and Robert Mugabe, amongst others, have demonstrated through their actions, in dealing with 
these difficult questions of identity it is easy to enforce in extremis the will to ‘create’ a sort of em-
pirical post-colonial nation-state.42 Such ‘creations’ have often been to the detriment of the indi-
                                                                  
40 See discussion supra chapter two. 
41 See discussion supra chapter four. 
42 See e.g. Zimbabwe’s torture training camps, BBC News Online, 27 Feb 2004, broadcast as Panorama: 
Secrets of the Camps, Sunday 29 Feb 2004, BBC One, making concrete allegations of training and indoc-
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vidual rights of the citizens of many African states, particularly the right to life, most likely be-
cause the European methods of governance do not always make easy translations into local re-
alities.43 That there is a greater disposition for a collective, as opposed to individual, rights 
violation cannot be overlooked. Thus it becomes increasingly apparent why the language of 
self-determination is attractive to the aggrieved within the postcolonial state: the collective ele-
ment inherent in self-determination contains the potential to provide a measure of needed pro-
tection to a group of individuals against the harmful actions of the state. Yet the rights as derived 
from international human rights law are mainly individual in nature, and violations of such in-
dividual rights by the state through the practice of vertical state consolidation can, particularly 
when they are directed against members of a geographically-contiguous or territorially-defined 
group, be seen as impinging upon the right of that group to preserve itself—a violation of, inter 
alia, article 20 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
On the other hand, ‘horizontal societal preservation’ makes the assumption that, whatever 
the actual ambit of post-colonial self-determination, it is fair to assume there exists, in principle 
at least, some sort of more modern, post-colonial law of self-determination of peoples,44 that 
self-determination means something beyond decolonisation, and that it will therefore necessar-
ily involve operation within one particular state alone. This is significant as in definition, the so-
cieties being preserved are collective groupings competing for the benefits of a state, not 
necessarily ethnic groupings separated by existing state boundaries, such as the Kurds or the 
Hungarians of Vojvodina. Horizontal societal preservation is an entirely domestic proposition 
reflecting the reality that members of a community can and do self-identify as a societal group-
ing in their daily lives, as much as it reflects the reality that the community’s members can be spe-
cifically targeted by the governmental powers, as the Eritreans were by the Ethiopians before 
obtaining their independence, or as the Southern Sudanese were by the Northern Sudanese, or 
indeed as the current inhabitants of Darfur are by militias and other groups operating under the 
colour of state authority. 
Thus horizontal societal preservation assumes that a geographically-contiguous ‘people’ 
within a sovereign state has a right to maintain its own cultures and traditions even in the face of 
vertical state consolidation. Again, the acceptance of the uti possidetis standard is tempered by 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
trination of Zimbabwean youth in rape, torture and killing programmes at “job training” camps across 
the country in advance of expected Zimbabwean elections in 2005. However, the government of Zim-
babwe has unequivocally denied the allegations, stating that “no sane government would set up institu-
tions of torture and violence and expect to continue gaining the support of its people”. See Zimbabwe 
brands BBC torture film ‘unfounded rubbish’, Reuters, 5 March 2004, available on Lexis. 
43 Cf. P. Chabal and J.-P. Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument 51 (1999) [hereinafter 
Chabal and Daloz]: “Whereas in the west, politics is predicated on a well-defined separation between, on 
the one hand, the political realm and, on the other hand, the more economic, social, religious or cultural 
issues, this is clearly not the case in Africa. We cannot assume that we know what is or is not ‘political’.” 
They go on to discuss the simultaneously inclusive and extensive nature of African political relationships 
due to the fact that an individual’s own communal ties are so deeply entrenched in practically all African 
societies. Id. at 52: “Whatever social changes have taken place in post-colonial Africa have not (so far at 
least) resulted, as they have in the West, in the gradual but seemingly permanent erosion of the communal 
in favour of the individual.” 
44 But cf. A.P. Rubin, Secession and Self-Determination: A Legal, Moral, and Political Analysis, 36 Stan. J 
Int’l L. 253 (2000): “As a matter of positive international law, there seems to be no right to self-
determination.” He seems to promote the notion that the actual meaning of self-determination is only that 
of decolonisation and that as decolonisation has run its course, the ambit of self-determination is now 
closed since peoples’ rights have now been reduced to purely municipal interactions between treasonous 
rebels and existing governmental authority. The inappropriateness of this assertion is addressed infra at 
text accompanying note 185 et seq. 
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the notion that it is most likely true that most self-determination claims, formulated as products 
of the horizontal societal preservation mould, should be able to be resolved through good-faith 
internal self-determination arrangements.45 If the horizontal societal preservation concept is ac-
cepted, as a detached reading of the modern law of self-determination would seem to allow, its 
very existence also represents a logical démarche towards a deeper post-colonial intermingling 
of ‘identity questions’ with ‘self-determination questions’ inherently anchored in a mutually-
exclusive ‘collective’ basis: a ‘national’ basis of sorts, which is quite different than that of the more 
macro-level notion of the ‘nation-state’.46 Again, whether this is lamentable or laudatory will 
depend in the main on the examiner’s own perspectives and interests.47 Yet in the face of the 
most severe and sustained forms of human rights violations targeted against a specific entity, 
where attempts to create a viable framework for internal self-determination have not been met 
with success, external self-determination procedures may have to be introduced into the equa-
tion. Questions related to group identity—as formulated here in a way much akin to the concept 
of ‘national identity’,48 implying an intermingling between ethnicity and location—will have to be 
filtered through the positivist rubric of self-determination of peoples. The overlap has become 
too great to ignore. 
Nevertheless, the extent of international law’s ambivalence towards the relevance of these 
                                                                  
45 Or, indeed, if it is not the truth, this is the bias exhibited by public international law generally through 
the presumption in favour of the continuity of the state, which is something not to be easily overlooked. 
46 Cf. A. Smith, National Identity 176 (1991) [hereinafter Smith]: “There is both danger and hope in the 
division of humanity into nations and the persisting power of national identity throughout the world. The 
dangers are clear enough: destabilization of a fragile global security system, proliferation and exacerba-
tion of ethnic conflict everywhere, the persecution of ‘indigestible’ minorities in the drive for greater na-
tional homogeneity, justification of terror, ethnocide and genocide on a scale inconceivable in earlier ages 
[…]. [Yet it provides] a source of pride for downtrodden peoples and the recognized mode for joining or 
rejoining ‘democracy’ and ‘civilization’. It also provides the sole vision and rationale of political solidar-
ity today, one that commands popular assent and elicits popular enthusiasm.” 
47 Such a statement is extracted from the French jurist Georges Scelle in that juridical institutions operate 
simultaneously on their own authorities and on behalf of the international community as a whole. Cf. A. 
Cassese, Remarks on Scelle's Theory of “Role Splitting” (dédoublement fonctionnel) in International Law, 
1 EJIL 210, 214 (1990): “Progress, in Scelle's view, can be made in the international community only if 
one moves towards restraining the authority of rulers and succeeds in establishing a set of international 
social agencies or bodies capable of bringing the international legal order into line with the basic configu-
ration of state systems. For, in Scelle's opinion, the ideal social system is that to be found in ‘state socie-
ties’: Scelle calls the state ‘the prototype to which our mind should reduce any political organization’ and 
points out that it is only within the state system that law and order can be realized, on account of the mo-
nopoly of force by social organs and the hierarchical structure of the state. This entails that in his view the 
international lawyer must fight against state sovereignty and lay emphasis on individuals, peoples and na-
tions, as well as all those human collectivités other than states which exist on the international scene (inter-
national trade unions, churches, international confederations of political parties, non-governmental 
organizations, etc.): they can play a decisive role in rendering the world community less sovereignty-
oriented.” (footnotes omitted) 
48 Smith, supra note 46 at 21, identifies six attributes of ethnic community, amalgamated into the French 
term ethnie: (a) a collective proper name; (b) a myth of common ancestry; (c) shared historical memories; 
(d) one or more differentiating elements of common culture; (e) an association with a specific ‘homeland’ 
and (f) a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population. To support these attributes, his main 
citation is D.L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985, 2d. ed. 2000), at chapters one and two. Greater 
definitional clarity is provided by Horowitz (2000), Id. at 51: “[…] ethnicity is connected to birth and 
blood, but not absolutely so. Individual origins count, but exceptions are made. Ethnic identity is rela-
tively difficult for an individual to change, but change sometimes occurs […] ethnic identity is established 
at birth for most group members, though the extent to which this is so varies. Ethnicity is based on a 
myth of collective ancestry, which usually carries with it traits believed to be innate. Some notion of as-
cription, however diluted, and affinity deriving from it are inseparable from the concept of ethnicity.”  
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group identity questions within post-colonial self-determination is of fundamental importance. 
Whether or not such processes would permit self-determination to the point of post-colonial 
external self-determination will most likely depend on how the vertical and horizontal tensions 
play themselves out in any given scenario. It may well be the case that the horizontal and vertical 
tensions between a state and its subjects can amicably be resolved through specific processes 
which are not disruptive to the status quo of the international legal order. However, this may not 
be the case under all circumstances. Simply put, the level and nature of human rights violations 
prevalent within a given state will define the relationship between vertical state consolidation 
and horizontal societal preservation. Self-determination, state sovereignty and the maintenance 
of the territorial integrity of independent states all create a nexus around what are probably the 
most controversial subjects in international law, to be sure. But widespread and readily docu-
mented human rights violations, particularly violation of the right to life,49 may be seen as re-
flecting the breaking point between state consolidation and societal preservation. 
Conceptually, in the face of egregious violations of human rights and fundamental free-
doms, the mere presence of the violations on this scale are reflective of a paucity of self-
determination, a lack of effective state sovereignty and an artificial sense of territorial integrity. 
Universal statehood continues to be a dominant legal phenomenon, but in an ‘age of rights’, 
natural rights written into a positive legal form have emerged, through a series of concrete 
measures by, in particular, UN member states. This should be seen as offering strength and sup-
port for the state itself, for it has been asserted that if a state truly is in existence, it is proceeding 
towards a specific end of human activity, a ‘telos’ of ‘flourishing’, to use Lisska’s terminology.50 
Few would disagree with the fact that manifest respect for human rights would cause a state to 
make progress towards this telos. Yet, as would be clear to e.g. the civilian victims of the conflicts 
in Central Africa, if a state is only juridically in existence, its capacity to uphold basic rights and 
to make progress towards its telos is drawn into serious question under the most egregious of cir-
cumstances. These apparent breaking points between vertical state consolidation and horizon-
tal societal preservation, as delineated by the ambit of a postcolonial ‘self-determination of 
peoples’, are neither inevitable nor ubiquitous. But rare is the modern international lawyer who 
can turn away from such circumstances without acknowledging that such a direct connection 
exists. 
The ‘right of peoples to self-determination’ as a neutral legal precept 
Working from an exclusively historical perspective, self-determination concerned itself 
primarily with determining if a population is under colonial domination, is subject to a racist 
regime or if it suffers from alien occupation. While these legal criteria continue to hold true, if 
one assumes the great rush towards ‘decolonisation-as-secession’ in self-determination’s his-
torical evolution has been completed, the ongoing ‘internal’ nature of self-determination of 
peoples remains, making modern self-determination synonymous with self-administration, or 
                                                                  
49 See e.g. Amnesty International Report 2007, introduction to the Africa section, at 15 (also available 
from thereport.amnesty.org, accessed May 2007), citing armed conflict, under-development, extreme 
poverty, widespread corruption, inequitable distribution of resources, political repression, marginaliza-
tion, ethnic and civil violence, and the HIV/AIDS pandemic as the main challenges to the human rights 
situation in Africa, particularly as a result of armed conflict, lack of effectuation of economic, social and 
cultural rights, repression of dissent, the death penalty, impunity, violence against women and girls and 
the relative ineffectiveness of regional institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights. To 
be certain, sub-Saharan Africa has no monopoly on these types of human rights violations, but the acute-
ness of their prevalence is significant and noteworthy. 
50 See A.J. Lisska, Aquinas’s Theory of Natural Law: An Analytic Reconstruction (1996), at 4-40. 
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self-government, and gives it an ongoing scope. Since individual rights are the product of ‘good’ 
administration, it can then be conceptually accepted that all other rights practically flow from 
self-determination/ self-administration/ self-government, and that a true right of political par-
ticipation, as well as a ‘peoples’ right to existence, could be used to provide a measure of protec-
tion to those caught between vertical state consolidation and horizontal societal preservation. 
The biggest question with this formulation is, thus, the usual difficulty in determining what 
comprises the ‘people’, as discussed at length in the previous chapter. However, if one allows for 
the possibility of a momentary suspension of disbelief about self-determination claims, an in-
herent bias against peoples’ rights in favour of the presumption of the actual existence of the 
trappings of universal statehood can be observed. It is here where an element of detachment 
may provide analytical benefit, provided the examiner is cautious enough to make an essential 
distinction.  
The perspectives put forth by Zelim Skurbaty vis-à-vis the inherent biases held by the ex-
aminer of any self-determination question reflect this distinction and should not go unnoticed: 
that self-determination has been misappropriated to reflect political goals completely discon-
nected from anything even vaguely related to human rights.51 In practical terms, the manifesta-
tions of self-determination are those to which e.g. an international civil servant, a member of a 
foreign ministry, or a grass-roots human rights activist might hold equally strong levels of opin-
ion, yet would be likely to produce widely differing policies.52 The modern predisposition of 
nationalism itself, in its unbalanced, hatred-producing, violently exclusionary form, is a major 
hurdle for any self-determination claimants to cross. It is epitomised by the concepts of state-
defined nationalism rooted in racism, such as the concept of ‘Ivoirité’ as formulated by the ex-
President of Côte d’Ivoire, Henri Konan Bédié,53 or the anti-colonialist dogma of the ZANU 
                                                                  
51 See Z. Skurbaty, As if Peoples Mattered (2000), at 196-197. He writes, Id. at 196: “Now, the perception 
of ‘national self-determination’ as a disease is so ubiquitous in legal and political writing that it has 
evolved into something closely (and deceptively) resembling common knowledge.”  
52 In the practitioner’s world, it would not seem unreasonable to expect a member of a foreign ministry to 
view manifestations of ‘the right of peoples to self-determination’ with suspicion, as there does exist a 
(misguided) tendency for it to be automatically equated with secession—a notion to which no state would 
give wholesale advocacy. An international civil servant would likely hold a wide-range of opinions based 
on that person’s own responsibilities of oversight and administration, whereas a local activist may make 
impassioned and indeed zealous self-determination claims. The totality of these perspectives forms the 
main part of the practical framework for addressing, and potentially solving, self-determination prob-
lems. 
53 Although not explicitly formulated as a specific self-determination claim per se, the underlying premise 
is relevant for the illustrative purposes at hand, in that ethnic and religious differences between popula-
tions of a state are inflamed for political purposes. Bédié’s Ivorité concept dates from the 1995 presidential 
election and is based on the belief that foreign parentage disqualifies oneself from some forms of political 
participation, particularly candidature for the presidency (and even Ivorian citizenship), and is widely 
seen by commentators as the knock-on effect from the 1993 death of the country’s first president, Félix 
Houphouët-Boigny, when Bédié faced a challenge from a political rival, Alassane Ouattara, the prime 
minister under Houphouët-Boigny. Ouattara, drawing his political support primarily from the Muslim 
northern part of the country, was deemed (primarily by the then-president Bédié) to have Burkina Faso 
parentage, and was forced to withdraw from the 1995 presidential race. The new 2000 Ivorian constitution 
states that any presidential candidate must have been born in Côte d’Ivoire, and the Supreme Court took a 
decision in October of that year, in an arrêt read on Ivorian national radio by the president of the Court, 
Judge Tia Koné, that Ouattara and thirteen other presidential candidates were disqualified from the elec-
tion due to their parental provenance. See e.g. Human Rights Watch, Vol. 13, No. 6, The New Racism: The 
Political Manipulation of Ethnicity in Côte d'Ivoire (August 2001). In 2007, a peace accord between the 
government and rebel forces led to Guillaume Soro, leader of the New Forces rebels, being named Prime 
Minister alongside rival President Laurent Gbagbo. Cf. New Forces website, http://www.nouvelleci.org/, 
accessed 27 March 2007.  
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(PF) party, dominated by Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, or, outside the African context, the con-
cepts of ethnically-constructed nationalism, such as the impromptu “no one should dare to beat 
you” speech given by then-Serbian Communist party official Slobodon Milošević in 1987 to 
Kosovar Serbs in the town of Polje.54 Thus it is not wholly irrational to approach self-
determination claims with a broad degree of scepticism, particularly when some claims en-
compass the language and spirit of racist, zero-sum nationalism. In that regard, the underlying 
hesitancy on the part of some parties, to maintain a sense of intellectual detachment from the 
subject is exposed; in such cases, prima facie biases against such cynical denigration in the name 
of self-determination are probably not unworthy of maintenance.55 Two points follow, how-
ever: (a) that such biases are acceptable only when they are not cloaks for the avoidance of diffi-
cult and unclear substantive questions on the part of socio-juridical actors, and (b) that ‘the evils 
of self-determination’ must not outweigh the benefits of self-determination. It is undeniable that 
the international community heralds decolonisation as one of the greatest actions taken in the 
history of the United Nations and it is similarly undeniable that common article one of the hu-
man rights covenants set the framework for the contemporary existence and development of 
self-determination as a right of peoples. Therefore, ‘nationalism-as-racism’ claims benefiting 
individual political leaders must not be seen as the only formulation of self-determination 
claims. 
Indeed, such claims should not be seen as formulations of self-determination claims at 
all. To paraphrase Skurbaty, ‘self-determination of peoples’ in and of itself is nothing more than 
a value-neutral juridical phenomenon.56 Thus, valid self-determination claims are likely to in-
voke a potential meaning quite different from the manifestation of the extreme nationalist phe-
nomena; it therefore seems quite appropriate for all parties potentially involved with the 
evaluation of a self-determination claim to remain as critically detached as possible and to take 
intelligent decisions based on the actual circumstances at hand, as best as they can be conceptu-
alised. The examples provided by the actions of Milošević and Tudjman were clear-cut cases of 
an unfortunate, historically European form of inter-societal exclusion, albeit one which is a 
complete aberration in the days of European Union and the Council of Europe, and therefore, 
easily dismissible.57 Other self-determination claims, however, may be less clear-cut. This is 
why accurate information as to the actual situation on the ground is of absolute importance in 
circumstances of ‘quasi-states’, Africa particularly included, as such outsiders to a particular so-
ciety, which can begin to provide an accurate assessment of the inter-societal reality, at a par-
ticular moment in time. To this end, the work of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights and respected international non-governmental human rights organisations, such 
as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, is now regularly complemented with re-
                                                                  
54 This sentiment-laden appeal, rooted in myths and legends of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo, later came to 
define his presidency of Yugoslavia. Cf. W. Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its 
Destroyers 39-40 (1996): “The aggressive and authoritarian nationalism of Slobodon Milošević in Serbia, 
and later of Franjo Tudjman in Croatia, was a classic case of this nationalism-as-racism. The two leaders 
combined the worst features of communism and nationalism. They took the management skills that are a 
part of standard communist training, plus the instruments of communist power—a large and intrusive 
party apparatus, control of key elements of the press, an intimidating secret police, and a centralized eco-
nomic structure—and put them at the service of the demagogic advancement of narrow national interests.” 
55 The most illustrative example of this pattern of thought is presented in A. Etzioni, The Evils of Self-
Determination, Foreign Policy, Winter 1992-1993, at 21, 22-27.  
56 For discussion and additional examples to be found in the literature, see Skurbaty, supra note 51, at 197. 
57 Thus Milošević was brought to The Hague (where he died in custody, in 2006) whilst Tudjman died be-
fore the ad hoc international criminal tribunal could have ever possibly rendered a substantive judgement 
against him. 
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ports and analysis from national non-governmental organisations.58 
Along a similar line of addressing definitional misconceptions of group rights, it is neces-
sary to definitively cast aside the automatic equation of self-determination with secession. Such 
measures can be traced to those proposed by Lee Buchheit in 1978 and recalled by Thomas 
Franck in 1993, when Buchheit wrote that “one must be careful not to confuse the debate over 
the status of a general right of self-determination with the arguably quite distinguishable ques-
tion of the place of secessionist self-determination”.59 Thus the discussion begins to question 
anew the ambit of post-colonial self-determination. Whereas the original scope of colonial self-
determination was grounded in a catalysed doctrine of decolonisation, it now seems that legiti-
mate claims to post-colonial self-determination are anathema to dogmatism and are much 
more receptive to pragmatism. Self-determination claims, following decolonisation, are re-
sponses to situations of daily life in post-colonial independent states and while these circum-
stances can be subject to wild and dramatic fluctuations in terms of outcome, they nevertheless 
remain incorporated under the uniform, blunt instrument of law. The problem lies in the ter-
minology. Those charged with enforcing ‘international law’ would be likely to make pro-
nouncements on such measures; nevertheless, the exceptional fluidity of such situations can 
serve to cause a real challenge for the ‘examiner’ to whom the self-determination claim is 
made.60 Furthermore, during the course of execution of the most credible self-determination 
claims, the reality of circumstances on the ground can quite easily reveal a perverse, Hobbesian 
existence for the ‘examined’. The earlier concern for how ‘international human rights’ translates 
into municipal systems is now obvious, as the propensity for avoiding human rights violations 
in a postcolonial state will translate readily to the efficacy of self-determination norms, and 
move the state long in its presumed quest for ‘good governance’. 
The concept of self-determination itself should not be feared by states. By returning to 
Skurbaty,61 his equation of self-determination with sex hardly seems facetious if one considers 
that both are human actions which, as he says, depending on the circumstances, can be some-
thing of the highest order (e.g. love) or the product of the lowest forms of criminal vice (e.g. 
rape).62 Both are, in some way, essential human functions, interpersonal interactions taken on 
either very personal or very public terms. Thus, without prejudice to the inherent value in vig-
orous, yet fair, evaluatory mechanisms for self-determination claims, the automatic equation of 
self-determination claims with something ‘inherently bad’ should be rejected, for such auto-
matic equations have the potential to improperly wield the blunt object of law in the face of an 
otherwise already hopeless set of circumstances. Skurbaty writes: 
                                                                  
58 See e.g. ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, Consultative relationship between the United Nations and non-
governmental organizations, which, in updating the previous ECOSOC Resolution 1296 (XLIV), estab-
lished mechanisms for purely national non-governmental organizations, including national human rights 
organisations, to consult directly with the council, particularly with regard to notification of a meeting’s 
provisional agenda, to attend such meetings and to make written statements and oral presentations during 
meetings. 
59 L.C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination 127 (1978) [hereinafter Buchheit], as 
cited in T.M. Franck, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, in C. Brölmann et al. (eds.) Peoples 
and Minorities in International Law 16 (1993). 
60 Ideally this would mean the international community as a whole, but in practice, it cannot be denied that 
it might also be more likely to mean ‘interested parties’ within the international community: indeed, each 
individual party with their own individual interests. 
61 Skurbaty, supra note 51, at 197. 
62 This reasoning likely follows that of M. Deutsch and E. Brickman, in Conflict Resolution, 15 Pediatrics 
in Review 16-22 (1994), asserting that conflict is like sex, as a regular occurrence which is an important 
and pervasive aspect of life. 
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[Self-determination] can make or break nations depending on the general political and legal 
framework within which it is dealt with, and on—without any doubt—the power vectors of 
the moment. The thrust of my argumentation is that the perception of self-determination as 
a ‘disease’ can and should be replaced with the vision of it as a phenomenon struggling its 
way towards greater ease, actualization of its specific message, idea, individuality, singularity—all of 
which I sum up by the term ‘individuation’. From this perspective, self-determination is a spe-
cial—disciplinary and time-and-place specific—manifestation of a broader precept of individua-
tion.63 
Sovereignty’s evolution from suprema potestas to an ‘age of rights’: Implications for postcolo-
nial Africa 
To recapitulate, it may now be observed that a new Realpolitik was born, one having to 
contend with a system that is international in origin and domestic in scope, with an essence to 
forming the heart of modern public international law itself. First and foremost, new states were 
created through decolonisation. In due course, these states bound themselves to international 
human rights regimes. In acceding to the international human rights regimes, specific princi-
ples, guarantees and obligations of international provenance were integrated into municipal le-
gal systems, allowing recourse to protections derived from international instruments in the 
event of violations. Particularly by the 1980s and certainly 1990s, once the African Charter was 
given practical effect and most African states had ratified at least the two main human rights 
covenants with which African states themselves became endowed, if not by way of the same le-
gal tools as their former colonial administrators, then via purportedly reasonable facsimiles—
conceptually, at least. And yet the ‘state-strength dilemma’, the prevalence of coercion as a gov-
ernance technique and the difficulties in projecting the authority of the state from administrative 
capital to territorial Hinterland, not to mention a perpetual state of underdevelopment in most 
countries and a feeble and questionable independence of national judiciaries, draws the appro-
priateness of these facsimiles under closer examination. 
The new states will fairly and uniformly have to apply the domestic law of the land, under 
all circumstances, including international human rights obligations of international origin. Ex-
trapolated to the multilateral plane, within the supranational legal system of human rights law, 
the uncertain nature of horizontal enforcement systems is shown. States tend to exercise their 
prerogatives in horizontal-enforcement mechanisms sporadically, often with a high degree of 
subjectivity and with a keen eye to the overall political situation at the time. Yet of a similar im-
portance, while the mixed effectiveness of horizontal enforcement does reflect the general un-
willingness of states to submit themselves to the external scrutiny inherent in the examination of 
international human rights, it also masks an elementary inability for some states to achieve a 
genuine congruity between their territories and their constituents. This represents the manifes-
tation of a deeper phenomenon, whereby the evolutionary manner of legal systems and politi-
cal structures, from colonial inheritance of sovereign state rights to the independent 
preservation of individual rights, is both theoretically and practically germane for further ex-
amination. Thus, international principle translates into domestic practice through ‘positive 
sovereignty’. 
However, it is still the case that the divergent ways in which colonial administrations de-
veloped and were swiftly abandoned may have formulated circumstances of ‘negative sover-
eignty’, particularly in postcolonial states that never genuinely experienced territorial integration 
under colonialism. For example, consider how Britain and France—certainly the two largest 
African colonialists—tended to take immediate steps for the wholesale incorporation of their 
                                                                  
63 Id. at 197-198, emphasis in original. 
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own legal structures within their colonial possessions,64 and indeed to develop nominally repre-
sentative institutions or limited measures of self-rule,65 whether through district officers (in the 
case of the French), or indirect rule through traditional authorities (in the case of the British and 
indeed the Portugese).66 In contrast, however, the mammoth Democratic Republic of Congo 
(Congo-Kinshasa),67 demonstrates that the primary sources of colonial law and administration 
are extracted from decrees and orders by the former Congo Free State of Belgium’s Leopold II 
and his local officials, yet are also complimented by judicial guidance to apply general princi-
ples of Belgian law as well as “local custom insofar as these customs are not contrary to the 
higher principles of order and civilization”.68 Indeed, the establishment and development of a 
comprehensive colonial civil code was largely a work-in-progress reflecting Leopold’s evolving 
desires for a legal framework to protect his economic interests.69 This seems ironic, however, in 
that, despite a measure of respect for local custom in its domestic legal system, actual Congolese 
self-government, self-administration or self-improvement was utterly unthinkable to the Bel-
gians right up to the time of departure of the last colonial administrator.70 Nevertheless, this has 
now slipped into the realm of practical irrelevance: ‘independent states’ are precisely that, or at 
least it is to be assumed. But whereas general practice may evidence the relative inability for, say, 
‘a Belgian colony’ to achieve effective postcolonial self-administration as compared to, say, ‘a 
British colony’, this is a phenomenon quite difficult to express in legal terms.71 It is, in large 
measure, impossible to do so under the historical doctrines of suprema potestas, the sovereign 
equality and independence of all states and the provisions of the Montevideo Convention. 
It is here where added attention should be paid to an important conceptual distinction 
with particular regard to the requirement of the existence of a government, as identified by a 
number of established commentators.72 At issue is the capacity for statehood in the absence of 
                                                                  
64 J.W. Salacuse, An Introduction to Law in French-Speaking Africa, Vol. I, 444 (1969) [hereinafter Sala-
cuse]. 
65 Id. at 474. 
66 See Chaval and Daloz, supra note 43, at 12. 
67 The name ‘Congo-Kinshasa’ or ‘Congo’ is used here to distinguish from neighbouring Congo-
Brazzaville. The former Congo Free State and Belgian Congo took on the name Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (La République Démocratique du Congo) following its independence in 1960. In 1971, Presi-
dent Mobuto Sese-Seko, in a process of ‘Africanisation’ of the post-colonial state, changed the name of the 
state to Zaire. Following his ouster (by Rwandan troops) in 1997, his successor, Laurent-Désiré Kabila 
reverted the country’s name back to the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
68 Report of the Administrator-General of July 16, 1891 to the King, 1 RULEIC at 589 (1876-1891), as 
cited in Salacuse, supra note 64, at 445. 
69 Salacuse, supra note 64, at 448. 
70 Cf. Id. at 474-475: In Congo, “only two years before independence, there was only a handful of college 
graduates. In [1958] when Nigeria, for example, had approximately 800 African lawyers, the Congo had 
none. Nor were there Congolese doctors or engineers. In short, the Congo had large numbers of mechan-
ics and clerks, but few men trained to understand the tasks of government and administration.” 
71 M. Koskenniemi reports that ‘sovereignty’ was equivalent to ‘terror’ in the Congo, writing without ob-
vious irony in The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (2000), 
at 154-170; however, his telling of the story how the Congo Free State evolved into a Belgian colony does 
not negate the legal fiction of this paradigmatic ‘juridical state’, to use Jackson’s terminology, because the 
colony was then decolonised along uti possidetis lines, albeit with a woeful relative inability for postcolo-
nial self-governance/self-administration/self-determination, whereas the ex-British colonies (such as 
those in East Africa), having obtained comparatively greater measures of development, training and sup-
port in civil administration under a European legal system, could be just as simply ‘juridical’ as the 
Congo, but with a greater potential for effective self-government/self-administration/self-determination: 
‘all states are equal, but some are more equal than others’. 
72 Int’l Law, Damrosch et al, supra note 1, at 256-57, citing R. Higgins, Development of International Law 
Through the Political Organs of the United Nations 21-23 (1963) and J. Crawford, The Criteria for State-
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an effective government. Recalling the Åland Islands dispute, the Commission of Jurists before 
the League of Nations concluded that Finland achieved effective government, and therefore 
statehood, only when the civil war ended in 1918 and foreign troops left the country.73 However, 
these commentators also observe that the standard of what is considered an ‘effective govern-
ment’ was seen to be considerably less in the ex-Belgian colonies of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Rwanda and Burundi than that of Finland in 1920, due to the fact that these were 
colonies being granted independence, as opposed to a new state being created through a revo-
lutionary war of secession. Thus the “state of civil war and virtual anarchy”,74 as was found in 
Finland in 1917, emerged into a positivist legal state only when Russian and German troops left 
the country; by contrast, the more contemporary observer notes that in the cases of the Democ-
ratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Burundi, independence was granted without a formal 
government per se. From here it is impossible to deny that the aforementioned ‘state of war and 
virtual anarchy’ has weighed heavily in each of these states’ postcolonial existences. The differ-
ence of course is that while it is extremely difficult to argue in positivist legal terms that e.g. the 
Democratic Republic of Congo is anything but a state, the extra-legal truth of the matter is that in 
contrast to the earlier example of Russian and German troops in Finland preventing the juridi-
cal emergence of the state, the juridical existence of the DRC was sustained, despite the presence 
of Rwandan and Ugandan troops in the eastern part of the country at the very least through the 
late 1990s, if only through their exercise of nominal control over a geographic region of the gar-
gantuan territorial state, where the authority of the capital does not find sufficient reach and 
large territorial swathes are under rebel control.75 
The paradox thus brought into examination is that at a time of diminished importance in 
suprema potestas, one finds the parallel emergence of a measure of irrelevance for the actual ca-
pacity of a state to govern. Yet despite the apparent confusion into which the postcolonial Afri-
can states were born, it was an emerging ‘age of rights’. Therefore, quite obviously, the stark 
differences in governance standards—measured through the level of human rights violations 
manifested against civilian populations, in particular—take on a more urgent importance. The 
question then turns to the ways in which effective structures for postcolonial government could 
develop from their colonial origins. Indeed, particularly through African states’ near-universal 
accession to the International Bill of Rights, and given the existence of the African Charter 
through consensual actions taken by states themselves, more recent history has fated all of the 
now-independent municipal legal systems in African states with the duty to uphold basic sub-
stantive human rights obligations. This is no longer controversial; however, particularly with 
regard to civil and political rights, these activities are undertaken with complete disregard of 
how their legal and administrative frameworks developed. 
This is the ultimate reflection of the legal vacuum that is independent statehood. Yet as 
Martti Koskeniemmi makes reference to the ‘wonderful’ artificiality of states,76 this leads one to 
observe through the present prism how an overabundance of artificiality can produce an in-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
hood in International Law, 48 BYIL 120 (1976).  
73 See discussion supra chapter one of this study. 
74 Id. 
75 This differs further from the example of Somalia where a similar type of nominal control throughout 
the country is held in practice primarily by indigenous warlords despite the amorphous trappings of a 
central government in Mogadishu. 
76 See M. Koskenniemi, The Wonderful Artificiality of States, 1994 ASIL Proceedings, at 22, asserting that 
the concept of legality is an indicator of social power. He writes, Id. at 23: “The familiar case law inferring 
territorial rights from effective occupation or other effectivités, for example, emanates from such a con-
ception. Its great pride is that, being unconnected with the spheres of the moral or the ideological, it can 
produce verifiable—and in this sense reliable—conclusions about international law.” 
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verted consequence, whereby quasi-states make quasi-laws, at least in terms of their uniform 
application (thus reaffirming the ‘negative sovereignty’ concept and the ‘state-strength’ di-
lemma). 
Tension between national autonomy and international responsibility is paradigmatic for 
the manners in which many post-colonial African states attempted: (a) to consolidate power 
across their territories and project administrative power over their citizens from capital to Hin-
terland; (b) to improve upon a ruinous post-colonial aftermath of socio-economic affairs;77 and 
(c) to do so while respecting uti possidetis juris, with its propulsion of a multiplicity of ethnicities 
into most arbitrary administrative groupings; and, perhaps most importantly for the ongoing 
societal development of the postcolonial state, (d) to do so while respecting the obligation to 
undertake governmental activities in respect of the principles of equality and self-
determination.78 In this way, it becomes increasingly apparent that the aforementioned supra-
national legal order of human rights is, at this stage at least, the accumulated product of the do-
mestic legal orders that have voluntarily subscribed to the international human rights regime. It 
seems at the very least possible that some states will have a greater disposition towards the suc-
cessful implementation of human rights legislation, presumably leading to a decrease in human 
rights violations, by having a more sincere commitment, in practice, to domestic implementa-
tion (and capacity to do so) and less of a need to refer to external resources such as the United 
Nations secretariat for advisory services, technical assistance, training and implementation 
funds. 
The ‘relatively fixed’ and ‘relatively fluid’ aspects of statehood in a postcolonial context 
As shown at the outset of this study, some of the Montevideo Convention criteria for 
statehood are more fluid in composition than others. Namely, the provisions for a defined terri-
tory and a permanent population are more fixed, whereas the requirement for a state to be un-
der the control of its own government and independent on the international plane are reflective 
of the principle of effectiveness and are therefore more fluid.79  
A more discerning level of understanding of the interplay between societal groupings has 
to be approached, and if one hopes to achieve a genuine understanding of the postcolonial 
state, such discernments may develop an even greater importance when attempting to under-
stand circumstances where a state lacks the ability to enforce its own writ, such as in the eastern 
Democratic Republic of the Congo.80 The assertion made is that the state simply lacks effective 
                                                                  
77 For if the anti-colonialist Jean-Paul Sartre is to believed, “the only good thing about colonialism is that, 
in order to last, it must show itself to be intransigent, and that, by its intransigence, it prepares its ruin.” 
J.-P. Sartre, Colonialism and Neocolonialism 47 (Routledge trans., 2001). 
78 See generally Herbst, supra note 4, at chapter one (‘The Challenge of State Building’). 
79 See discussion supra at the closure of chapter one in this study. 
80 This is a relatively controversial assertion, as it runs contrary to statements made by President Joseph 
Kabila of the DRC and President Paul Kagame of Rwanda, that UN troops are no longer needed in the 
eastern DRC, and that Rwanda has no troops there. See, respectively, DR Congo peacekeepers ‘can leave’, 
BBC News Online, 9 February 2004, and Talking Point Special: Ask Rwanda’s President, broadcast on the 
BBC World Service and archived online, 8 February 2004, 1406 GMT. But see also UN Says Rwanda 
Troops in Congo Stop Peacekeepers, Reuters, 24 April 2004, available on Lexis. And cf. Rwanda President 
Warns of Troops to Congo, Reuters, 1 May 2004: Although Kigali denied that Rwandese troops entered 
the DRC in April 2004, Paul Kagame was quoted by Reuters, monitoring Radio Rwanda, as saying that 
“the United Nations and Congo should ‘be informed that we shall not hesitate to send our troops back into 
Congo if the attacks continue. We shall do it, and do it in broad daylight.’” 
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control over its own territory.81 It is the state’s own effectiveness encapsulating the ‘relatively 
fluid’, as opposed to the ‘relatively fixed’, provisions of the Montevideo Convention that is 
drawn into question.82 One may therefore observe the ‘Somalia syndrome’, whereby on the one 
hand, no governmental apparatus even approaching the most rudimentary trappings of control 
outside of (or indeed inside) the capital city can be observed to exist in a sustainable manner. Yet 
the fact also remains that the actual existence of the Somali state has never been subjected to se-
rious legal challenge.83 Indeed, its membership in the United Nations and the African Union has 
never been contested and other states regularly proclaim its existence as a state. The reason for 
this is clear: Somalia is a territorially defined entity with a permanent population. It is also an in-
dependent state, by virtue of having been ‘discovered’, ‘civilised’ and ‘decolonised’. The Somali 
state thus ‘exists’ without interruption, despite the lack of a government. Although the ‘more-
fixed’ provisions of the Montevideo definition are seen to be in existence, the ‘more-fluid’ provi-
sions are allowed to slide—indeed, apparently, to the point of irrelevance. 
In sum, this is evidence to suggest that sovereign states cannot legally regress into terrae 
nullius, regardless of their actual standards of governance, because terra nullius negates territo-
rial integrity, and a cardinal precept in the contemporary international socio-legal system is the 
dual awareness that, first, humankind has territorially delineated all regions of the planet,84 and 
second, that the classical, ‘decolonising’ form of self-determination has run its course. So the 
‘Somalias’, in a world of Janus-faced sovereign states, retain their ‘external’ sovereignty whilst 
completely lacking anything even remotely approaching ‘internal’ sovereignty (i.e., ‘govern-
ance’, or even simply ‘a government’). Thus there exists some deeper definition of the formula 
between the principles of effectiveness and territorial integrity,85 in that Somalia demonstrates 
how effectiveness is defined from territorial integrity itself. Territorial integrity obviously is the 
dominant variable in the relationship; in much the same way uti possidetis juris is the defining 
                                                                  
81 As was stated supra chapter one, this seems not to automatically disqualify a state from having ‘state-
hood’. Cf. US Restatement, at §201, reporter’s note 2: “Some entities have been assumed to be states when 
they could satisfy only a very loose standard for having an effective government, e.g. the Congo (Zaire) in 
1960 […] A state may continue to be regarded as such even though, due to insurrection or other difficul-
ties, its internal affairs become anarchic for an extended period of time.” 
82 See discussion supra chaper one of this study. 
83 The argument for the withdrawal of Somalia’s recognition as a state has been made by G. Kreijen in 
State Failure, Sovereignty and Effectiveness (2004), at 347 et seq. Cf. Id. at 355: “What is interesting about 
Somalia is not that it shows that States may come into existence with an ineffective government […] but 
that they may also continue to exist with out any government at all. Somalia is proof of the preserving 
impact of negative sovereignty on the continued existence of a State. Somalia’s denomination as a ‘failed 
State’ is therefore something of a misnomer. […] [Somalia] is a ‘phantom State’: it is no longer palpable, 
because it exclusively exists in a legal dimension only. Somalia demonstrates that the abandonment of ef-
fectiveness has progressed beyond the creative phase of the African States well into the phase of its con-
tinued existence.” Kreijen concedes, however, Id. at 356, that “[i]t will remain very difficult, however, to 
determine the point at which withdrawal of recognition from a failed State would be justified. […] Per-
haps, the only thing that can be said when it comes to judging critical cases is that each of them has to be 
assessed according to its particular circumstances and that it is neither possible nor wise to formulate 
standard criteria for the withdrawal of recognition from a failed State. It will be clear […] that the pro-
tracted and total absence of government from a State may constitute sufficient reason for other States to 
pull the plug.” However, no such states have undertaken this idea in their dealings with Somalia, either in 
bilateral or multilateral form. 
84 Imperfectly, to be sure, but the world’s border disputes are the exceptions which, through their irregu-
larity, prove the existence of the rule that most of the world’s borders—from the imaginary line dividing 
Hinterlands to the most tightly-controlled militarised frontier—are broadly established and traceable to 
an authoritative source.  
85 As was asserted in chapter one whereby ‘territory + population + effectiveness (≈ territorial integrity) 
= sovereignty (≈ statehood)’. 
Nicholas Hansen 
Chapter Five: Applying the law of modern territorial statehood 
Page 231 
variable in the first instance vis-à-vis self-determination. 
The notion of self-determination as self-defence 
From this, it could be asserted that effectiveness matters little in the overall statehood pic-
ture. Once a populated territory is deemed capable by other states (and thus, eventually, the in-
ternational community as a whole) of reciprocating the recognition of statehood it confers upon 
that territory, and that territory maintains its independence, it could be argued that the standards 
of public international law have little else to say about actual capacity to govern. The thinking 
along these lines follows that Somalia is an unfortunate situation, but once the political situation 
stabilizes, the institutional needs of the state will be filled by the new governing entity—one 
which will be indigenous and not a product of the discredited system of colonialism. Effective-
ness thus remains defined in relation to the self-determining act of decolonisation. 
 But on the other hand, it appears that effectiveness matters a great deal. Self-
determination-as-decolonisation, certainly did increase the numbers of sovereign states. How-
ever, in the mid-1960s, soon after self-determination-as-decolonisation took hold as a genuine 
legal and political phenomenon, it started to grow new wings: self-determination-as-human-
rights. When these new institutions began to undertake these new obligations—to provide a 
right to food as well as a right to political participation, or a right to education as well as a right to 
freedom of expression—‘effectiveness’ gained a new lease on life, for certain aspects of self-
determination-as-human-rights were naturally filtered through the effectiveness prism: capacity 
and independence take on new meaning when “all peoples have the right to self-determination” 
to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development”.86 The terms take on an even richer meaning when states are considered to be in 
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples by virtue of be-
ing “possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory with-
out distinction as to race, creed or colour”.87 Indeed, when all African peoples “shall have the 
right to existence” and “oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from the bonds 
of domination”,88 the focal point reflects the reality that ‘self-determination of peoples’ must take 
on multiple meanings. Most likely this will reflect the overlap made by claims of oppressed 
populations, between the minority rights/peoples’ rights sides of the same coin suggested by 
Thornberry. 
In short, effectiveness is defined in relation to a multifaceted socio-legal phenomenon: 
self-determination as a phenomenon of decolonisation-cum-postcolonial-human-rights as 
governmental legitimacy and democracy, yet a phenomenon conceived in the context of ‘struc-
tural injustice’ of coercion as a postcolonial governance tool. But human rights promotion and 
protection is an effectivité of the decolonised African state: it must be, for African states have in-
ternational human rights obligations for which their governments have responsibilities to up-
hold through the actions of their governmental agents, throughout the land. Practical results fall 
short of theoretical expectations; yet, with particular regard to economic, social and cultural 
rights, non-state actors, i.e., civil society, pick up the slack. The end result of this logical thread is 
that effectivités are manifested by those with a potential for providing social benefit in a territorial 
region, but may not formally be endowed with a state’s full powers. The work of local non-
governmental organisations, for example, may be of great use in improving the overall effec-
tiveness of a state’s governance. It is hard to see how, at this stage of the discussion, societal con-
                                                                  
86 Common article 1, ICCPR and ICESCR. 
87 Friendly Relations Declaration, UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV), 1970. 
88 Article 20, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
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tributions from non-governmental organisations should be discounted, particularly given their 
establishment as ad hoc responses to fill local needs. 
A curious reality is thus revealed. Emerging states repelled a colonial menace to safeguard 
the peoples within a state, but those peoples, in a postcolonial context, are also in need of a form 
of protection against the possibility of predatory measures by a postcolonial state. Once the 
saltwater barrier was severed in the metropolitan, colonial/colonised state, the colonial power 
no longer retained the ability to do as it wished in its overseas territory, if it no longer retained 
that colony. But the more contemporary aspect of the decline of suprema potestas is even more 
significant, as at this point in international law’s historical evolution, a state was no longer unre-
strained in its choice of actions against its own population. So it seems unsurprising that ethnic 
groupings, either disfigured or disenfranchised through the uti possidetis definitional nature of 
self-determination, would wish to make claims for protection on the basis of self-
determination—‘self-determination-as-self-defence’, including, perhaps, claims legally unjusti-
fied in scope or definition,89 but not prima facie morally objectionable, on the basis of human 
rights. 
The concept of ‘self-determination as self-defence’ serves to encapsulate the idea that 
once the process of decolonisation had run its course, and a critical mass formed around the be-
lief that self-determination had an ongoing scope beyond decolonisation through common ar-
ticle one of the human rights covenants, the contemporary outcome of a peoples’ right to self-
determination would be judged from either a permissive or a restrictive developmental path in 
articulating the meaning of ‘postcolonial’ state development. In this sense, the concepts of ‘nega-
tive’ and ‘positive’ sovereignty and the notions of ‘horizontal societal preservation’ and ‘vertical 
state consolidation’ are also recalled, as a territorial entity making claims, either domestically or 
internationally, for ‘self-determination-as-self-defence’ would reflect a circumstance whereby a 
collective grouping seeks to exercise a form of ‘horizontal societal preservation’ as a direct re-
sponse to a specifically coercive act of ‘vertical state consolidation’. Such actions would un-
doubtedly come as the result of ‘negative sovereignty’, and in drawing on a possible definition of 
the concept of ‘peoples’, derived from chapter four.90 When based upon Article 20 of the Afri-
can Charter on Human and People Rights, in particular, it could be observed how a people 
could also be formed in opposition to the specific acts of a state, e.g. in South Sudan or Darfur as 
contrasted with the Sudanese state as a whole, or perhaps, if formulated through comparatively 
less dramatic mechanics, in Somaliland as contrasted with Somalia. 
Clearly, most significant unresolved question, in the postcolonial world, reflect interna-
tional law’s response to the level and direction of human rights violations, and it is here where 
the notion of ‘self-determination as self-defence’, formed from common article 1 to the principal 
human rights covenants, holds a particular attraction to significantly disenfranchised groups 
within a state. It is as if a cycle of self-determination has been reborn as lex ferenda, only just 
                                                                  
89 Cf. H. Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 Virginia J. Int’l L. 1, 32 (1993) [hereinafter Han-
num]: “[The international bill of human rights and the Friendly Relations Declaration] and the traveaux 
préparatoires of the covenants do not establish that the right of self-determination, defined as a unilateral 
right to independence, was intended to apply outside the context of decolonization. As noted above, self-
determination has meant at least decolonization since 1945. However, when addressing self-
determination claims based on ethnicity or nationalist sentiment, one must recognize the shift from the 
territoriality based right of self-determination developed by the United Nations in the context of decolo-
nization to the ethnic-linguistic-national principle of self-determination advocated by Wilson and others 
in 1919. The difference is not only semantic. It reflects a fundamental limit on the definition that self-
determination has acquired during the past four decades.” (emphasis supplied) 
90 See supra chapter four, discussion of a people bring defined in opposition to the actions of a state. 
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slightly askew. The original ‘act of decolonising self-determination’, having attained a territori-
ally-defined legal personality has a general obligation in the Realpolitik of contemporary inter-
national human rights law, at the very least, to avoid regression into the types of systemic state 
practices deemed so egregious under colonialism. The juridical state is formed in something of 
an unsustainable manner, however. So over time, the cumulative effect of targeted human rights 
violations is amalgamated into a counterbalance to the violations, themselves: because the vio-
lations persist, and they are violations per se, as such, an ever-expanding countervailing force 
builds up against the state. The intrinsic weight of the fact that targeted violations against a spe-
cific population have occurred over a period of time, and the truly shocking scope of the extent 
of such violations, leads to a perpetual need for self-government/self-administration/self-
determination. In the most extreme circumstances, when the state lacks both the practical ca-
pacity and the political will to deliver upon these perpetual needs, the civilian populations are 
forced into most difficult situations, quite literally from genocide on down. When such circum-
stances occur—and it is generally accepted as being practically desirable, for a geographically-
contiguous people, such as ‘Somaliland’, has infinitely more relevance than a geographically-
intermixed people, such as the Tutsis or the Hutus—then a circumstance of post-postcolonial 
external self-determination could be envisaged on the basis of the level and nature of human 
rights violations targeted by a government against a people. In such a circumstance, secession 
could occur. So be it then, for secession is not expressly forbidden as a matter of course in public 
international law. But simply because secession is disruptive to the international system, while it 
is neither legal nor illegal per se, it is never politically encouraged. To what extent, then, can 
postcolonial self-determination put forward effective governance as a way of implementing 
global standards? Or, rather, to what extent can internal self-determination improve the effec-
tiveness of a postcolonial, juridical, sub-Saharan African state—and at this point, a good com-
promise question in more concrete terms would be: what governance practices would be likely 
to ameliorate the dichotomies between the empirical and the juridical? To be certain, the con-
cepts of ‘democracy’ and ‘civil society’ have been much discussed in the social sciences at the 
outset of the new century, but specific policy models and laws enabling or backing such models, 
may prove elusive. 
PART B: Democracy and civil society in the postcolonial state 
As discussed in the previous chapter, given factual evidence that circumstances of armed 
or civil conflict exist within a region of a state and civilians are not provided adequate protec-
tions against such hostilities, in the most extreme of such situations, it could also be the case that 
a ‘people’ may be observed to have formed in opposition to the most extreme actions of a state, 
particularly when such actions are repeatedly and consciously targeted against a specific seg-
ment of its own citizenry. Through a deconstruction of postcolonial statehood into vertical and 
horizontal conceptualisations, this chapter has just introduced the concept of ‘self-
determination as self-defence’, asserting broadly that the present state of international human 
rights law is sufficiently developed, and is able to provide conceptual remedies to populations 
particularly targeted by the state, when called upon to do so by factual circumstances on the 
ground. This is because, underlying all self-determination claims, is a basic sense of entitlement 
of access to government, the principal trust of internal self-determination. It is now evident that 
the ‘new sovereignty’, particularly as manifested in postcolonial states, is highly cognisant of the 
implications of a right of access to government. The disbursement of political participation 
amongst various populations within a state has developed into a significant aspect of modern 
territorial statehood. 
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The ‘old’ and ‘new’ forms of sovereignty and the application of state power: De-
mocracy and civil society as a conceptual framework for analysis 
To apply Arned Lijphart’s now-classical formula to the situation at hand, what is being 
advocated is the ‘consensus model’ of democracy over the ‘Westminster model’.91 He writes: 
Especially in plural societies—societies that are sharply divided along religious, ideological, lin-
guistic, cultural, ethnic, or racial lines into virtually separate subsocieties with their own po-
litical parties, interest groups, and media of communication—the flexibility necessary for 
majoritarian democracy is likely to be absent. Under these conditions, majority rule is not 
only undemocratic but also dangerous, because minorities that are continually denied access 
to power will feel excluded and discriminated against and may lose their allegiance to the re-
gime.92  
To begin to understand the impact of this assertion, it must be observed that one of the 
chief alternatives to the ‘election-oriented’ viewpoint of democracy is that of ‘deliberative de-
mocracy’, a concept that holds collective decision-making at its core.93 Such a perspective views 
democracy as a permanently self-perpetuated system of social interactions incorporating meet-
ing, discussion, negotiation and eventual agreement on lawmaking and societal administration. 
Such a perspective is of interest, as it is considerably more developed than a mere system of ma-
jority rule, in that the actual circumstances on the ground are allowed to take on full promi-
nence, both in terms of the extent of political participation by the citizens of a state, and the 
progressive development of governance structures which are reflective of a society’s own needs. 
In this way, democracy takes on a relatively pure form, given that it is a public process with a 
purported aim towards human self-sustenance, and is relatively less encumbered with the 
complexities of an often discordant political process.94 It would not be without merit to assume 
                                                                  
91 See A. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries 
(1999), particularly at 9-47.  
92 Id. at 32-33. Where Lijphart’s analysis diverges from the modern African situation is with regard to the 
coherence of minority rule against the majority. Cf. Id. at 33: “In the most deeply divided societies, like 
Northern Ireland, majority rule spells majority dictatorship and civil strife rather than democracy. What 
such societies needs is a democratic regime that emphasizes consensus rather than opposition, that in-
cludes rather than excludes, and that tries to maximize the size of the ruling majority instead of being sat-
isfied with a mare majority: consensus democracy. […] The consensus model is obviously also 
appropriate for less divided but still heterogeneous countries, and it is a reasonable and workable alterna-
tive to the Westminster model even in fairly homogenous countries.” The problem is that, although this 
is not to cast a complete blanket across all of sub-Saharan Africa, the standard Westminster major-
ity/minority model does not find a direct parallel in the African context given the relative lack of coher-
ence in opposition politics against the oftentimes coercive nature of African governance, as asserted 
herewith.  
93 See particularly C.S. Nino, The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (1996), J. Elster (ed.), Delibera-
tive Democracy (1998), J.S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations 
(2002), and J.S. Fishkin and P. Laslett, Debating Deliberative Democracy (2002) for primary conceptuali-
sations of the idea. For practical manifestations of the concept (admittedly geared more towards estab-
lished democracies than those in postcolonial circumstances), see B. Ackerman and J.S. Fishkin, 
Deliberation Day (2004), which advocates the establishment of a two-day holiday with specific financial 
compensation for participants to take place in the United States two weeks before major elections so that 
neighbourhood groups can discuss central issues to the electoral campaign. But cf. criticisms that the idea 
is both impractical and unnecessary by Seventh Circuit US Court of Appeals Judge R. Posner in Jan.-Feb. 
2004 Legal Affairs, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2004/toc.html. 
94 Cf. J. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society (1991) (trans. T. Burger, 1996): “Even before the control over the public sphere by 
public authority was contested and finally wrested away by the critical reasoning of private persons on 
public issues, there evolved under its cover a public sphere in apolitical form—the literary precursor of 
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then, that deliberative democracy is prima facie akin to internal self-determination. There are 
differences between the concepts, to be sure, but as deliberative democracy and internal self-
determination both aim toward the improvement of the political process, and thus the im-
provement of a state’s own effectiveness, with particular regard to the promotion and protection 
of human rights. 
However, before undertaking such an analysis, it is useful to take one short step back-
wards, as it has been made clear how democracy risks finding itself amidst that most trouble-
some of circumstances, and, with that, its popular commonality with self-determination is 
revealed: being all things to all people. This is deeply ironic because on the one hand, this is ex-
actly what democracy should be, as democracy means a citizen’s right to directly or indirectly 
participate in the political life of the state.95 However, as was clearly observed in the emerging 
democracies of Central and (more obviously) Eastern Europe in the 1990s, often citizens’ lack of 
knowledge about the actual functions of democracy was masked by their exuberance for the 
concept, which reflected a simple majoritarian voting pattern with comparative disregard for ei-
ther the reflection of societal liberalism,96 or a practical ability to effectuate the necessary struc-
tural reforms. Thus the political participation principles, from which the purported ‘democratic 
entitlement’ flows, actually serve to define the elected polity, as opposed to being defined by it. 
As James Crawford writes: 
[…][e]very person, whether a member of a majority or minority, has basic rights, including 
rights to participate in public life. Thus the authority of a government, elected by a majority, 
to conduct for the time being the public affairs of the society is a consequence of the exercise 
of the rights of participation in public life of all citizens, whether they belong to the majority 
or the minority.97 
This should not be seen under any circumstance as being controversial; rather, it reflects 
the underlying core of what comprises the universal democratic process. Bearing this in mind, 
the role played by territoriality comes to the forefront, due to the limitations of ‘universal state-
hood’. If there were not states, and therefore there were not defined territories, frontiers, capitals 
and capitols, Hinterlands and other euphemisms for the core-periphery model which reflects 
the distribution of state power amongst most if not all states,98 peoples’ rights would be consid-
erably less controversial, because there would be no so-called ‘negatively-defined’ peoples. 
Vertical state consolidation would not be such a critical factor; indeed, not so particularly in Af-
rica, for the lack of fluidity inherent in the transfixion of postcolonial state borders would be al-
lowed to be altered. As should be the case, different situations will be met with different 
substantive legal challenges, but a certain jurisprudence would be likely to grow with relative 
ease, as important judicial decisions would be unencumbered with the omnipresent, in addi-
tion to substantive defects of the postcolonial state conceived by the uti possidetis line. The prob-
lem is that the general presumption in international law in favour of the continuity of the state 
translates into a general deference to the preservation of the existing territorial status quo. Given 
the caustic interplay between state delineations and local populations in some postcolonial Af-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the public sphere operative in the political domain.” For further discussion, see J. Habermas, Between 
Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Studies in Contemporary 
German Social Thought) (1998) and J. Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory 
(Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought) (2000), particularly at chapter five (“On the Relation 
between the Nation, the Rule of Law and Democracy”).  
95 Viz. Article 25 ICCPR  
96 See F. Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, 76(6) Foreign Affairs (Nov/Dec 1997), at 22-44. 
97 J. Crawford, Democracy and International Law, 64 BYIL (1993) 114 [hereinafter Crawford, Democracy]. 
98 City-states and micro-states being the obvious exceptions. 
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rican circumstances, only a very few, if any, derivations from the declaratory Cairo Declaration99 
are likely to be reflected in the politique of the modern African Union, such as it is.  
Significantly, however, when considering the variables of territoriality, democracy and 
‘civil society’, the question of justice remains as a common thread throughout. The interplay be-
tween empirical and juridical statehood may well advocate a linkage between the concept of 
‘fairness’, and that of ‘juridical practicability’, as will now come as little wonder as following in 
the footsteps of Thomas Franck’s 1992 AJIL thesis on democracy,100 and his 1995 book entitled 
Fairness in International Law and Institutions. To illustrate the point, in the 1995 work, Franck 
equates ‘justice’ with ‘equity’ in the jurisprudence of international legal tribunals, and states that: 
[i]n its international as in its domestic legal context, equity is sometimes derided as a ‘count-
less’ norm amounting to little more than a license for the exercise of judicial caprice. This 
criticism, while addressing a potential problem, ignores the very real ‘content’ attributed to 
equity by scholars and international courts, arbitral proceedings and organizations. In fairness 
discourse, the most restrained justice-based claims may be advanced in the form of equity, 
which embodies a set of principles designed to analyse the law critically without seeming to 
depart too radically from the traditional preference for normativity in the exercise of author-
ity, nor to present too bold a challenge to the community’s expectations of legitimacy in legal 
rules and processes.101 
Yet the trouble is with the potential for ‘justice’ to mean all things to all people. In an in-
ternational legal world still dominated by juridical statehood, the inherence of the concept of 
justice can be both inclusive and exclusionary: this is why the present thesis advocated a sever-
ance of the ‘nation’ and the ‘state’ at its outset. For in juridical statehood, so-termed exclusionary 
justice would reflect a state’s own enforceable actions, which have the practical effect of systemi-
cally damaging a particular population; and on the contrary, inclusive justice would reflect the 
tangible desire for self-preservation of individual dignity, which is inherent in humanity.102 
However, given that, as will be observed in particular by the Cameroon v. Nigeria case before 
the ICJ,103 it may be the case that past treaties involving the cession of territorial title from pre-
colonial authorities to European colonialists—the legal antecedents to the transference of the uti 
possidetis principle from Latin America to Africa—have served to cause the bereavement of cer-
tain disaffected populations. 
That said, potential remedies to the variables of territoriality, democracy and ‘civil soci-
                                                                  
99 Cf. Cairo Declaration on Border Disputes among African States, AHG/Res. 16(I) 1964: “The Assembly 
… Considering that border problems constitute a grave and permanent factor of dissension; Conscious of 
the existence of extra-African manoeuvres aimed at dividing African states; Considering further that the 
borders of African states, on the day of their independence, constitute a tangible reality; Recalling the es-
tablishment in the course of the Second Ordinary Session of the Council of the Committee of Eleven 
charged with studying further measures for strengthening African unity; Recognising the imperious ne-
cessity of settling, by peaceful means and within a strictly African framework, all disputes between Afri-
can states; Recalling further that all member states have pledged, under article IV of the Charter of African 
Unity, to respect scrupulously all principles laid down in paragraph 3 of article III of the Charter of the 
Organization of African Unity: 
1. SOLEMNLY REAFFIRMS the strict respect by all member states of the Organization for the 
principles laid down in paragraph 3 of article III of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity; 
2. SOLEMNLY DECLARES that all member states pledge themselves to respect the borders ex-
isting on their achievement of national independence.” 
100 See T.M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AJIL 46 (1992) [hereinafter 
Franck, Democratic governance]. 
101 T.M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions 47 (1995) [hereinafter Franck, Fairness]. 
102 Whether this is reflected in the doctrine is completely another matter, however. 
103 See discussion infra at text accompanying note 279. 
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ety’, may be obtained through what Allen Buchanan calls the ‘Democratic Internal Peace Hy-
pothesis’. He encapsulates his ideas as follows: 
Recent liberal theorists of human rights, reviving a thesis advanced by Kant over 200 years 
ago in his essay “Perpetual Peace,” stress another compatibility between peace and justice. 
According to the Democratic Peace Hypothesis, developed democracies tend not to go to 
war with another. A more controversial thesis, but one which enjoys considerable empirical 
support, might be called the Democratic Internal Peace Hypothesis: developed democra-
cies—those which facilitate political participation by all, including minorities, and which effec-
tively constrain majority rule by entrenched human rights—as a general rule are not plagued 
by large-scale internal violence (government terror or ethnic violence). If either of these the-
ses is correct, even as a broad generalization, and if democracy is a requirement of justice, 
then again it is mistaken to assume that peace and justice are inherently compatible goals. 
Nevertheless, it would be obtuse to deny that conflict between the pursuit of justice and the 
pursuit of peace occur, at least during the transition from out very unjust world to a more 
just one. […] What examples of conflicts between pursing peace and pursuing justice show is 
not that justice cannot be a primary goal of a system that takes the value of peace seriously, 
but only that clashes between these goals can be expected to occur during the transition to-
wards justice. This hardly detracts from the plausibility of the assertion that justice is a chief 
moral goal of international law. After all, there may be almost no cases in which the pursuit 
of a moral good consisting of the attainment of more than one goal, or of a moral ideal com-
posed more than one value, is immune to this sort of conflict.104  
It may be the case that Margaret Moore makes an even better restatement of the criteria 
necessary for the evaluation of ‘justice’, in that she envisions a linkage between “the historical 
treatment, and especially dispossession, of indigenous peoples and their ongoing disadvantaged 
status”.105 As was observed in the previous discussion between the primacy of humans versus the 
primacy of territory,106 the rights of indigenous peoples are legally distinct from those of ‘peoples’ 
per se, but the underlying inherent phenomena need not be conceptually distinct. Therefore, 
despite the potentially dubious legal pedigree of historical treatment of local populations, cast-
ing a critical eye on these phenomena can serve as a useful mechanism for evaluating internal 
self-determination claims (and the associated questions of ‘justice’). Indeed the phraseology of 
the process of European colonisation of Africa, coupled with its subsequent decolonisation, as 
being the ‘overlay’ of the European (and therefore international legal) state onto the African 
continent is perfectly evident: whether the circumstance can be translated into a specific legal 
form is a wholly separate matter.107 
                                                                  
104 A. Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law 
79-80 (2004). 
105 M. Moore, Indigenous Self-Determination, in S. Macedo and A. Buchanan, Nomos XLV: Secession and 
Self-Determination 94 (2003) [hereinafter Moore].  
106 See discussion supra chapter two. 
107 However, a major point of divergence between her argument (rooted in indigenous peoples’ rights) and 
the postcolonial self-determination of peoples in the African context must be acknowledged. In Africa, 
while it is true that the totality of almost all African populations are in fact indigenous, indigenous peo-
ples’ rights per se have taken on a particular legal meaning, due to the fact that specific populations wish to 
maintain their identity in the face of actions by the state as an overlord. As opposed to indigenous peoples’ 
rights in the Americas, where the colonial administrative presence never fully retreated back to Europe, 
the peoples’ rights in question in Africa reflect the reality that complete transfer of sovereignty to the 
various indigenous populations within the colonially-delineated state has been seen as perfectly normal, 
as decolonisation primarily meant the recall of most European administrators. The peer disapproval of 
Rhodesia and, eventually, apartheid-era South Africa bear out this assertion. Thus the indigenous popula-
tions could lay legitimate claim to the government of these newly independent states, which is quite an-
other governance circumstance indeed, from that which deals with the after-effects of colonialism in the 
new world of the Americas, as there, the colonialists settled in considerably greater numbers than as has 
been the case in sub-Saharan Africa.  
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Moore proposes the concept of ‘rectificatory justice’, which seems to reflect, with relative 
ease, certain aspects of the phenomenon inherent within the postcolonial African situation. The 
thrust of her argument is towards the righting of past wrongs, given that the “current poverty and 
marginalization are the direct result of the past injustice […] suffered at the hands of the white 
colonialists”108 and that there is a collective definitional element to indigenous peoples’ rights—
again, this not being dissimilar to the general African context. It would appear that she exhibits a 
tendency to recall the nature of the treaties signed between indigenous peoples and European 
colonialists as the basis for her broad-based, ‘rectificatory’ perspective. 
Indeed this seems to reflect concisely the dichotomy between the de jure and de facto 
situations on the ground, which she views as the intersection of grievances with historical colo-
nising treaties and claims of justice. She illustrates the concept for groups as being relatively 
analogous to claims made by individuals for reparations for injuries suffered, or similar injuries 
measured for collectivitiés.109 She writes that “(a) the group must be disadvantaged in comparison 
to other social groups; and (b) there must be an objective history of discrimination and oppres-
sion, which can be connected to the present disadvantaged status”.110 This also lends evaluatory 
credibility to claims for internal self-determination in particular, specifically those circum-
stances driven by notions of collective self-government and influenced by the administration of 
particular economic resources, “including land, control over natural resources, and straight-
forward transfers of money”.111 
Economic considerations aside, ‘rectificatory justice’ is a concept which can still merit 
genuine consideration, as the rectifying action aims towards promoting good governance stan-
dards for the future, by acknowledging that “groups are in the best position to judge their own 
interests and so should be given the requisite resources and jurisdictional authority to resolve 
their own problems and overcome the disadvantages that they face”.112 Beyond this point, 
Moore’s argument, itself, delves into circumstances more relevant to indigenous peoples’ rights 
than the legally-distinct ‘self-determination of peoples’ under examination at present. Conse-
quently, her line of argumentation will be progressively less germane, as she progresses from the 
general towards the specific. However, it is not to be overlooked that her ‘remedy’ to indigenous 
self-determination is indigenous self-government, and not necessarily “cultural justifications for 
self-determination”.113 Adding the ‘democratic governance’ thesis into the equation, predicta-
bly, complicates the matter even further. While it would be fictitious to proclaim a blanket, uni-
versal and global rule of customary international law (for example) mandating a right to 
democracy under all circumstances, the critical mass behind the argument would still seem to 
reflect the ‘emergence’ of such a right. Indeed, then, this is why, drawing upon Moore’s assertion 
that local groups are the best-placed authorities to respond to their own situations, the discus-
sion should be steered back to the potential role that can be played by civil society, in bridging 
the governance gap, in the most dysfunctional of situations—that is to say, those being placed 
under particular examination in the course of this study.  
 
                                                                  
108 Moore, supra note 105, at 95. 
109 Id. at 96, citing J. Thompson, Historical Injustice and Reparation: Justifying Claims of Descendents, 112 
(October 2001) Ethics 114-135. 
110 Id. at 96-97.   
111 Id. at 98. 
112 Id. at 100. 
113 Id. at 110. 
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‘Civil society’ and international law: Compiling the sum of the ‘democratic entitlement’ 
If civil society is a repository for societal power which is not vested within the state itself, it 
would be useful to identify briefly the types of societal powers which could be practically ob-
served. Adam Seligman provides an interesting theoretical model, in that he views the roles 
played in the early United States as modelling the core of a modern formulation of ‘civil society’. 
He does so by listing certain social rights afforded in the United States, which were broadly de-
nied to the working classes in Western Europe and for which social compensation was made in 
the new world. He identifies in particular, “the rights of unionization; the freedoms of speech, of 
the press, of assembly; the freedom of movement (within the confines of the nation-state), of as-
sociation (or combination); and, most importantly, the right to organize political parties and the 
right of the franchise”.114 Moreover, Seligman goes on to translate these political forms into the 
logical restatement that ‘civil society’ and indeed ‘citizenship’ each take on a form which holds 
reason at is core and “would include the ties of solidarity existing between citizens and not just 
their political and legal autonomy”.115 Beyond that, it is but a small leap to the equation of reason 
and equality,116 which allows the underlying ideas herewith to be expressed in a form more tan-
gible to the modern international lawyer: the equal treatment of all persons before the law, with 
the associated expectation that the law is substantively capable of such uniform application.  
If one were to cast aside momentarily the significant legal distinctions between the differ-
ent sets of ‘minority rights’, ‘peoples’ rights’ and ‘indigenous peoples’ rights’, a liberal interpreta-
tion of ‘equality’ can be observed as underlying. The object of minority rights is for the 
progressive granting of rights to individuals belonging to the minority so that they will eventually 
be brought into line with the majority. When a ‘people’ effectuates an act of self-determination, 
in particular internal self-determination, this autonomising action serves to provide to members 
of the ‘people’ an increased form of political participation, which improves the political rele-
vance of the people in question vis-à-vis other populations within the state, and thus, contrib-
utes to the equality of sub-state groups. In addition, indigenous peoples’ rights serve a particular 
function, in that the encroachment of the modern, postcolonial state on the native societies, is 
inhibited and, were rights to be upheld sufficiently, indeed prohibited; thus, under these cir-
cumstances, to preserve the status quo is to preserve inter-societal equality.117 One is therefore 
reminded anew of the inescapable interplay between the individual and the group, coupled 
with the parallel reality that the three main definitional forms provided in legality are painfully 
cumbersome, as a result of their being developed, as it were, under hermetic seal. Furthermore, 
violations of human rights are, in the main, incorrectly seen as something primarily effectuated 
against a bereaved individual;118 group rights per se, only come into play when the level of hu-
man rights violations is such that it reaches the systemic and widespread level, and would there-
fore be categorised as ‘minority’ ‘people’ or ‘indigenous’, depending on circumstances. 
Fortunately, however, there is indeed room for greater nuance in making such assessments. As 
Carozza writes: 
The inherent dignity of the individual, however, does not mean that he or she exists in iso-
lated, existential loneliness. […] The form of human rights discourse is strongly oriented to-
ward the individual; the guarantees of human rights instruments are framed in terms of the 
                                                                  
114 A.B. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society 103 (1992) [hereinafter Seligman].  
115 Id. at 126. 
116 For discussion, see Id. at 127 et seq. 
117 See also discussion of the concept of ‘ethno-development’ in P. Thornberry, International Law and the 
Rights of Minorities (1991). 
118 For discussion see particularly P.G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International 
Human Rights Law, 97 AJIL 38 (2003), at 46 et seq.  
Nicholas Hansen 
Chapter Five: Applying the law of modern territorial statehood 
Page 240 
rights due to each person as an individual human being, not by virtue of his or her status 
within a group. […] Yet any fair reading of international human rights documents provides a 
much more complex picture. At the outset, the solidarity of the human family is as much a 
building block of the structure of human rights as is individual dignity. More specifically, each 
of the documents of the International Bill of Rights amply recognizes and protects many of 
the social dimensions of human life, including marriage and family; nationality; religious affilia-
tion, association, and assembly; cultural life; organized labor; and education.119 
Thus, while no real attempt is being made at asserting a particular judicial status for ‘civil 
society’, the existence of the concept cannot be overlooked, at least in the parlance of scholars 
and practitioners. That may be so; however, the cumulative effects of the underlying constitutive 
elements cannot be merely cast aside as a matter of expediency. This leads directly into the no-
tion of civil society promulgated by Philip Allott, who contributes to the contextual understand-
ing of ‘civil society’ and ‘democracy’ in a way that is useful for the assessment exercise at hand 
and in a manner that is logically consistent with the notion of citizens’ equity in the eyes of do-
mestic legal systems. He writes: 
The semantic shift from government to governance and from society to civil society may seem to 
be slight, but its theoretical and practical implications are profound. Governance is govern-
ment seen as the social function of a governing class whereas, in the liberal democratic tradi-
tion, government is seen as society’s self-government. Civil society implies that there is a realm 
of collective non-governmental societal social action which is parallel to, but not an integral 
part of, the function of ‘governance’ whereas, in the liberal democratic tradition, it is society 
in its entirety which integrates all social systems in the process of public-realm decision-
making. To disintegrate the integrity of society and to separate the people from their govern-
ment is a theoretical counter-revolution against liberal democracy, a nostalgia for the bad old 
days of more and less enlightened absolutism.120 
In sum, it is asserted that deliberative democracy, on the one hand, is better placed to reflect so-
cietal norms than is majoritarian democracy, because, particularly in divided societies, the con-
sultative process provides a closer connection to the principles of equality, justice and reason. 
These principles, in turn, make further contributions to transforming a society toward a more 
egalitarian construction, and therefore, it is further assumed, a more functional society would 
follow. On the other hand, however, deliberative democracy can also be seen as something of 
an ignis fatuus. The problem is that deliberative democracy obviously draws upon the delibera-
tive process for its systemic legitimacy, and peaceful, rational deliberation, while certainly pos-
sible to observe in local African societies, does not always easily translate to the postcolonial 
African state. Or as Jorge Valadez writes, the possibility cannot be overlooked of  
[derailing] the whole project of basing democratic decision making in multicultural societies 
on public deliberation, namely, the absence of unitary political communities, the existence of 
moral and cognitive incommensurable differences within the polity, and the dilemma of group 
inequalities.121 
                                                                  
119 Id. at 46-47, citing the family as the “natural and fundamental group unit of society” in UDHR Art. 16, 
ICESCR Art. 10 and ICCPR Art. 23; the right to nationality in UDHR Art. 15 and ICCPR Art. 24; the 
right to marry in UDHR Art. 16 and ICCPR Art. 23; freedom of religion “in community with others” in 
UDHR Art. 18 and ICCPR Art. 18; freedom of information in UDHR Art. 19 and ICCPR Art. 19; free-
dom of assembly in UDHR Art. 20 and ICCPR Art. 21; participation in the cultural life of the community 
in ICESCR Art. 15 and ICCPR Art. 27; the right to form and join trade unions in UDHR Art. 23, ICESCR 
Art. 8 and ICCPR Art. 22; the right to education in USHR Art. 26 and ICESCR Art. 13; and, indeed, com-
mon article one to the ICCPR and ICESCR on self-determination of peoples.  
120 P. Allott, The Health of Nations: Society and Law beyond the State 162 (2002) [hereinafter Allott]. 
121 J.M. Valadez, Deliberative Democracy, Political Legitimacy and Self-Determination in Multicultural 
Societies 30 (2001). He continues, Id. at 31: “Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that deliberative democ-
racy faces its greatest challenges in multicultural societies. It is in these societies that we can most clearly 
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A swift rebuttal to this point can be made, however, in that while there indeed may be an 
absence of unitary political communities, the creation of such structures is better effectuated in 
the building of a genuine body politic through a collaborative process, as opposed to an elec-
toral process whereby the first party across the goalpost dictates, perhaps quite literally, public 
policy. 
Deliberative democracy, with its emphasis on consensus-building, is in many ways a dif-
ferent concept than that which is most commonly observed as comprising internal self-
determination, as the latter concept will tend to heavily rely upon devolutionary political meas-
ures and regional autonomy for a ‘people’.122 The end result, however, is that such compartmen-
talisation of a state’s unitary political apparatus does allow all parties within the state to have a 
more equitable chance at political participation. 
‘Democracy’ and ‘civil society’ in postcolonial African states 
The topic of democracy has become a fixture on the agenda of the African Union, par-
ticularly following the Lomé Declaration of the Organization of African Unity,123 the Declara-
tion on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa,124 Constitutive Act of African 
Union (AU),125 into which the former Organization of African Unity was merged. In particular, 
a Conference on Elections, Democracy and Governance was convened in Pretoria in 2003.126 
Although its outcome was nonbinding, the Conference adopted certain principles towards the 
promotion of good governance and the strengthening of democratisation, calling for, inter alia, 
constitutional and legal frameworks able to entrench democratic values, basic international and 
regional human rights standards, the establishment of anti-corruption bodies, independent ju-
diciaries and election management bodies and liaisons with civil society, including a right to 
monitor elections.127 
The AU built upon these principles with work towards a Draft Charter on Democracy, 
Elections and Governance,128 with AU ministers assisted by a group of Independent Experts,129 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
identify the limits of deliberative democracy as well as its most fundamental problems.” 
122 See discussion in H. Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 Virginia J. Int’l L. 1 (1993). 
123 See Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government, 
OAU Doc. AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI), adopted by the 36th ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government, Lomé, Togo, 10-12 July 2000, noting that “the strengthening of democratic institutions 
will considerably reduce the risks of unconstitutional change on our Continent” and that democratically 
elected governments should be afforded particular protections against coups d’état, mercenary interven-
tion, armed dissident groups and rebel movements. Furthermore, the refusal of a government to relin-
quish power after free, fair and regular elections is to be seen as ‘unconsitutional’. See also Grand Bay 
(Mauritius) Declaration and Programme of Action, OAU Doc. CONF/HRA/DECL (I), which reaffirmed 
the OAU’s commitment to implementing international human rights law throughout its member states, 
and the African Charter for Participation in Development (Arusha, 1990). 
124 See OAU Doc. AHG/Decl.1(XXXVIII) (2002) [hereinafter Democratic Elections Principles]. 
125 See OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/23.15 (2001), particularly at article 4, whereby member states are commit to 
the following democratic principles: (a) respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law 
and good governance; (b) promotion of gender equality; (c) promotion of social justice to ensure balanced 
economic development; (d) respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity 
and political assassinations, acts of terrorism and subversive activities; and (e) condemnation and rejec-
tion of unconstitutional changes of governments. 
126 See http://www.africa-union.org/News_Events/Calendar_of_%20Events/Election%20Democratie/ 
Pretoria%20conference%20Statement%20April%201003.pdf (accessed August 2007) 
127 Id. 
128 See Meeting of Government Experts held in Addis Ababa, 15-17 May 2004. 
129 See AU Press Release 12/2006 (Addis Ababa, 31 March 2006). 
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which will become binding on AU member states, following its adoption. Significant in the 
Draft Declaration is that the AU intends to resolve that “the peoples of Africa have a right to de-
mocracy and it is the obligation of its Governments and the peoples themselves to actively pro-
mote and defend it”.130 In addition, the Draft Declaration states that: 
[t]he effective exercise of representative democracy is the basis for the rule of law and of the 
constitutional regimes of the Member States of the African Union. Representative democracy 
is strengthened and deepened by permanent, ethical, and responsible participation of the citi-
zenry within a legal framework of constitutional order.131  
In addition, certain linkages are made between democracy and human rights, in particu-
lar the right to political participation, in that: 
[a]ny person or group of persons who consider that their human rights, with regard to the 
participation in the democratic process, and particularly in the electoral process have been 
violated may present claims or petitions to appropriate agencies for the promotion of human 
rights and consolidation of democracy in the continent. […] The principles of democracy and 
popular participation, equal opportunity and equitable access and transparent redistribution 
of resources for all people must underlie all development objectives and strategies.132 
Such an apparent fondness for democracy on the part of the African Union must be 
viewed in the light of what one commentator terms “the decay of the state” at the hands of “one-
party states and regimes that tolerated no opposition” and therefore revealed political systems 
which “had failed to deliver the goods”.133 In this sense, by undertaking such a transformative ex-
ercise, the African Union has demonstrated considerable commitment towards implementing 
standards of democratic rule, in the postcolonial state. Whether there exists the actual capacity 
to implement such initiatives is another question, however. In any event, the initiatives under-
taken by the African Union have served to link the concepts of democracy and human rights in 
ways heretofore unforeseen. Rachel Murray encapsulates the sum of expectations in the African 
Union with regard to democratic participation, and its conceptual evolution from the ‘West-
minster model’ to the ‘consensus model’. She characterises this evolution as follows: 
There is a general agreement that democratic elections should be ‘free and fair’ and give ex-
pression to ‘the will of the people’. This has been affirmed by the OAU organs, and reiter-
ated in its recent Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa and 
in the CSSDCA [Conference on Security, Stability Development and Cooperation in Africa] 
process. The OAU has said that there should be free choice as to who governs a state in full 
recognition of voting rights. On several occasions the OAU has stated that elections should 
reflect the wishes of the people of the state. Therefore, […] where there is ‘some consis-
tency between the will of the voters and the result of the election, elections could be said to 
be ‘authentic’, where ‘the exercise of political rights is an essential element of representative 
democracy, which also presupposes the observance of other human rights’.134 
                                                                  
130 See Draft AU Charter on Elections, DOC. EX.CL/258 (IX), available on: http://www.africa-
union.org/News_Events/Calendar_of_%20Events/Election%20Democratie/Draft%20AU 
%20Declaration%20on %20election.pdf, accessed August 2007 [hereinafter Draft AU Charter], at §1.1. 
For an overview of its drafting history, see http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/conferences/past/2006/ 
april/pa/apr7/meeting.htm, accessed August 2007. 
131 Draft AU Charter, supra note 130, at §1.3 
132 Id. at §2.2 and §3.6 
133 B. Freund, The Making of Contemporary Africa: The Development of African Society since 1800 260 
(2d. ed., 1998). He continues, Id. at 266: “Certainly it is likely that those with state connections, past or 
present, are still apt to be the best placed […]. In Zaire, where the ‘second economy’ is so powerful and ob-
vious, the state often seems to observers like a parasite that lives off a burgeoning, highly commercialised 
and unregulated world.” 
134 R. Murray, Human Rights in Africa: From the OAU to the African Union 83-84 (2004). (footnotes 
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In determining standards for how elections are to be held, on the basis of African Char-
ter-based and UN covenant-based international human rights law, Murray makes the following 
observations: (a) multi-party elections appear to be a necessity; (b) the fairness of the elections 
must be measured by the international community and the state’s own population; (c) this fair-
ness is dependent upon the level of voter participation; (d) elections should be peaceful; (e) in-
stitutions should be impartial; (f) basic human rights standards should be vigilantly upheld at 
times of elections; (g) fraud should be prevented; (h) elections should benefit from adequate se-
curity and funding; and (i) elections should be transparent.135 But particularly as can be ob-
served in the language of the Draft Declaration, it can be demonstrated how the AU’s efforts with 
regard to the promotion of democracy has sought to incorporate both concern for elections and 
concern for governance standards. As Murray concludes, leaving the problem of enforcement 
notwithstanding : 
[t]he concept of self-determination was initially expanded to prompt the OAU to focus on 
elections and the manner in which governments came to power as an element of what con-
stituted a democratic state. Over more recent years it has been willing to examine wider is-
sues including the way in which countries are run. In some respects the OAU/AU, as 
elsewhere, has interpreted this to encompass a variety of human rights issues. […] With re-
cent changes in respect of the AU and its Constitutive Act, […], the potential to maintain the 
link between democracy and human rights is large.136 
 ‘Positively’ and ‘negatively’ defined peoples and questions of civic participation 
With the importance of periodic elections becoming so apparent, potential overlaps be-
tween the right to political participation and the effectuation of internal self-determination in 
postcolonial states may be observed. The question of political participation in postcolonial 
states serves to recall Skurbaty’s concept of individuation, referenced earlier in this chapter.137 
The concept stands to reason in that it allows a collective grouping (collectivité) to develop based 
upon the characteristics that matter most to the group. It furthermore reflects an aspect of the 
principle of effectiveness (measured by effectivités) whereby a governmental entity wields a con-
siderable measure of legitimately-identifiable power over a territorial unit. Individuation is a 
building block of governance. It manifests power invested into political leaders, in such a way as 
to reflect consent (at the very least), or consensus (ideally) amongst a population. Alternatively, 
individuation delimits the extent to which a collective grouping can legitimise territorial power 
activities. Thus an evaluation of the contemporary ambit of self-determination would seem, 
prima facie, not to benefit from an automatic excess of definitional conservatism, as legitimate 
claims for self-determination can be made on the basis of factual circumstances and not just on 
extremist, irrational and indeed nihilistic criteria. Raw nationalism is, in actual fact, something 
which is very hard to come by in this day and age: to self-identify on the basis of the genuine 
popular will of a grouping (whether a true ‘people’ per se or otherwise) is to heed the simple fact 
that, within any modern territorially-defined ‘nation’, it is extremely likely to find embedded sig-
nificant numbers of ethnic, linguistic or cultural minorities. The point remaining is that ethnicity 
is universal, and inherent in a universal phenomenon is the possibility for differences in inter-
pretation, with some interpretations ripe for a thematic re-evaluation. As Chabal and Daloz 
write: 
Ethnicity is commonly considered in Africanist circles as a problem: either because it is seen 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
omitted) 
135 Id. at 85 et seq., referring to the Democratic Election Principles. 
136 Id. at 112-113. 
137 See text supra this chapter accompanying note 63. 
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as an inconvenient leftover from a previous ‘traditional’ age and a hindrance to moderniza-
tion or else because it is viewed as a divisive political weapon used by unscrupulous political 
operators. Both these views, however, are themselves throwbacks to mechanistic interpreta-
tions of African realities, casting ethnicity as a simplistically ‘tribalist’ form of identity or mere 
tool. We need to conceptualize ethnicity as a dynamic, multi-faceted and interactive cluster 
of changeable self-validated attributes of individual-cum-collective identities. There is no ‘sin-
gle’ ethnicity out there cast in stone for ever. There are ways of defining oneself and others 
in accordance with a set of beliefs, values and subjective perceptions which are both emi-
nently malleable and susceptible to change over time.138 
These ‘eminently malleable’ perceptions reflect the awareness that, particularly in Africa, 
‘culture’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘people’ ‘nation’, ‘state’, and indeed ‘minority’, are all terms used in widely in-
terchangeable circumstances with varying effects. Or, as Eric Hobsbawm writes more generally, 
“[t]he idea of ‘the nation’, once extracted, like the mollusc, from the apparently hard shell of the 
‘nation-state’, emerges in distinctly wobbly shape”.139 Thus in evaluating self-determination 
claims, one would be likely to derive the most benefit by listening to the claims put forth by the 
parties, based upon what they could be expected to say and based on the specific circumstances 
at hand. From there, the underlying principles need to be carefully worked through, mindful, 
all the while, that self-determination effectively means some configuration of self-government. 
Yet, above all, it is suggested that the nature of the construction of ‘people’ will play a significant 
role in determining what configuration of self-government will be deemed an adequate 
‘horizontal’ response to ‘vertical’ state consolidation pressures. A more proactive, ‘positively 
defined’ people—‘a people that knows what it is in relation to what it is’140—will require less of a 
‘horizontal’ reflex to ‘vertical’ state consolidation than will a more reactive, ‘negatively defined’ 
people, or ‘a people that knows what it is in relation to what it is not’.141 It is in those 
circumstances, where the societal preservation of a collective grouping—a ‘people’, perhaps—is 
in greatest doubt, that greater doses of ‘horizontal societal preservation’ will be required through 
the configuration of self-government. This, effectively, means two things. First, a comparatively 
greater degree of ‘horizontal societal preservation’ will require a comparatively greater degree of 
self-determination. Second, post-colonial ‘self-determination of peoples’ has the potential to be 
something more dynamic than ‘national self-determination’, in that, as was observed in the pre-
vious chapter discussing the basis of a peoples’ right to existence in Article 20 of the African 
Charter, a ‘people’ can be constructed as a societal stopgap response to excessive state hegem-
ony. 
To explain this premise, consider the following. Across the states of sub-Saharan Africa, 
in particular, an individual has the desire to act in community with others, in a manner which 
differs from that usually seen in European societies. The roots of community lie in its collective 
consciousness, with whom a shared history exists for its members. However, there is no ‘one 
size fits all’ rule for determining, defining and delineating these communities. Under the prem-
ise being examined, on one extreme, this ‘shared history’ could well mean upholding particular 
ethnic, racial, cultural, social, religious and linguistic traditions, which go back hundreds, if not 
thousands of years. 
This reflects the notion of a ‘positively-defined’ people. Such communities, which form a 
                                                                  
138 P. Chabal and J.-P. Daloz, Africa Works: the Political Instrumentalization of Disorder 56 (1999). 
139 E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780 190 (2d. ed., 1990). He bases this statement on a 
1972 public opinion survey in the Federal Republic of Germany which observes the fluid definitions pro-
vided by respondents for the terms ‘nation’, ‘people’ and ‘state’, in view of the coexistence of two German 
states and one ‘people’, as such. 
140 Think of the Faeroe Islanders or the Fresians, as well as those in Somaliland and the South Sudanese. 
141 Think of the Eritreans, or as a result of acts of genocide, inhabitants of Darfur. 
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cohesive majority in a well-defined administrative area, are in principle at least quite likely to be 
able to exercise the right to self-determination on the basis of self-government, within the exist-
ing state framework.142 With their own self-governing rights comes their own administrative re-
sponsibilities; indeed, the legitimacy of such communities, in an ‘age of rights’, will also be 
reflected in the degree to which the rights of all minorities, within this administrative area, are 
guaranteed and protected. But it seems prima facie likely that most self-determination claims of 
‘positively-defined’ peoples are good candidates for internal self-determination measures. A 
pathway seems to exist under the rubric of internal self-determination, whereby such an admin-
istrative entity can make certain specific claims following a natural progression, in levels of self-
government. These forms can include, inter alia, cultural autonomy, internal political auton-
omy, formal geographic autonomy (e.g. a ‘federated region’), a federation and a confederation. 
Such forms reflect the mainstay of ways in which self-determination means self-administration 
by a group willing and able to represent the interests of this community as a whole. The range of 
political possibilities provided to effectuate self-determination reflects the notion of horizontal 
societal preservation and as such, reflects a ‘right of peoples to self-determination’ defined in 
more proactive terms, with a gradient of practical responses.  
However, in the present day it must also be recognised that, at the other extreme, a ‘shared 
history’ could also mean that a unique community is formed in direct response to specific ac-
tions related to their relationship to their own state. This point is significant, as it serves to illus-
trate how so-called ‘negatively-defined’ peoples might be identified in factual situations. A 
number of illustrative examples could be considered. 
For example, Sudan is a state comprised, in the main, of two mutually-exclusive peo-
ples:143 the power-wielding, comparatively unified Islamic Arabic populations of the North and 
the marginalized and largely discordant Christian/animist Black populations of the South and in 
Darfur. Warfare has been waged against the South Sudanese since 1984. And yet, the Southern 
Sudanese ‘people’ is, in actual composition, little more than the product of myriad different eth-
nicities, galvanized and battered, over four decades of an wickedly violent, multilevel, internec-
ine, municipal conflict, both amongst the other fragmented populations of the South and the 
dramatically more unified population of the North which acts primarily from the state capital 
and seat of power, Khartoum.144 More recent developments since 2003 in West Sudan have fol-
lowed a similar pattern of domination in the Darfur region (approximately the size of France, 
with between four and five million people), whereby uniform-wearing militiamen known as 
Janjaweed, acting under the command of the central government, have displaced, with impu-
nity, up to one million black Muslim agrarians.145 This has been confirmed by a report of the UN 
                                                                  
142 This assertion, however, remains dependent on good-faith bargaining between the state authorities in 
the capital and the local authorities on the ground—something which is not always guaranteed. 
143 For if there is to ever exist such a thing as a ‘people’, the manner in which such fundamentally different 
populations have been grouped together in Sudan must pay acknowledgement to the inclusion of the two 
mutually-exclusive Sudanese ‘peoples’ formed on geographic, administrative, racial, social, cultural, eth-
nic and religious—not to mention linguistic—lines. By analogy, if the Flemish and Wallonians are gener-
ally accepted as being ‘peoples’, how could the North and South Sudanese be considered anything other 
than ‘peoples’ as well? 
144 For a practical representation of this fragmentation, see the Declaration of Principles by the Parties to 
the Sudanese Conflict, 20 May 1994, between the ‘Government of the Republic of the Sudan’ and the ‘Su-
dan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army’ and the ‘Sudan Peoples’ Liberation 
Movement/Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army – United’ (SPLM/SPLA and SPLM/SPLA – United), now 
nominally unified under the rubric of the ‘Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)’ (docu-
ments on file with author). 
145 See e.g. New York Times, In Sudan, Militiamen on Horses Uproot a Million, 4 May 2004, available on 
NEXIS; see also Human Rights Watch, Darfur in Flames: Atrocities in Western Sudan, Vol. 16, No. 5 (A), 
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High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Security Council. The report, facilitated by the 
Secretary-General,146 documents a systematic or widespread pattern of violations on the part of 
the Sudanese government, including indiscriminate attacks on civilians, rape and other serious 
forms of sexual violence, destruction of property and pillage, forced displacement, disappear-
ances, persecution and discrimination.147  
Similarly, in the Ethiopian/Eritrean situation, given that Eritrea’s place within Ethiopia 
had remained so deeply contested, once the conflict had reached the levels of the 1998 border 
war, there could be no doubt that Eritrea’s population constituted a specific ‘people’, for they 
could be one of two things and they certainly were not Ethiopian. 
Further afield from the Horn of Africa, one could also go so far as to observe that the cir-
cumstances experienced by civilians of all ethnic groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of 
Congo, could be those which would establish a ‘people’ per se. However, having neither had ac-
cess to any measures of self-rule under colonial domination, nor, having been under any 
sought-after form of control by any post-colonial administration, they unsurprisingly lack any-
thing close to the formal, administrative cohesion needed to be considered a ‘true’ people, due 
no doubt to having been subjected to conditions akin to genocide, in a geographic region where 
such events are not hypothetical. Furthermore, it is not generally accepted that the population of 
the eastern DRC reflects one specific ethnic grouping.148 It therefore follows that people live 
where foreign armies dominate and savage militias and act with impunity, and where the power 
projected from the capital does not reach out kindly, or even at all. 
Does this reveal a latent ‘people’ not dissimilar from the Southern Sudanese ‘people’, some-
thing akin to the Sudanese hodgepodge of ethnicities and liberation movements and armies 
both united and disunited, or are these Congolese civilians merely unorganised-yet-victimised 
individuals lacking a formal administrative hierarchy, and therefore caught in one of the nu-
merous ‘internal conflicts’ of the modern age? Although the answer to such a question cannot 
adequately be foretold, the underlying point nevertheless remains. These are the places where 
the daily life has seen little advancement since the days of and the standards set by the Belgian 
thesis.149 As it is impossible to deny that civilian members of the various ethnicities in the eastern 
DRC are, in malformed understatement, ‘disenfranchised’ and that the only ‘part of national life’ 
being undertaken at present takes on genocidal overtones, the relative uniqueness of this phe-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
April 2004, and Human Rights Watch, Sudan: Government and Militias Conspire in Darfur Killings, 
press release, 23 April 2004. 
146 This facilitation was on the basis of the Security Council’s usual examination of the situation in Sudan, 
including its supervision of the ongoing peace process, and was not specifically under Article 99 of the 
UN Charter as such, but rather, was linked to a high-level humanitarian mission led by the World Food 
Programme’s Director and the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs for the Su-
dan. 
147 See United Nations, Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: Situation of human rights in 
the Darfur region of the Sudan, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/3, 7 May 2004, particularly at paragraphs 46-107. 
Unfortunately the Council’s non-response to the report was a disappointment. 
148 The Alur, Azande, Luba, Lugbara and Mangbetu ethnic groups inhabit the eastern DRC. See The Dia-
gram Group, Encyclopedia of African Peoples 309 (2000). 
149 See discussion supra chapter two at text accompanying note 34, particularly recalling the statement by 
the Belgian delegate to the General Assembly in GAOR 9th Sess. 4th Ctte. 419th Mtg. Para. 20 (1954) that 
non-self-governing territories other than trust territories under the Trusteeship Council were those 
which were “administering within their own borders territories which were not governed by the ordinary 
law; territories with well-defined limits, inhabited by homogeneous peoples differing from the rest of the 
population in race, language and culture. Those populations were disenfranchised; they took no part in na-
tional life; they did not enjoy self-government in any sense of the word […].” 
Nicholas Hansen 
Chapter Five: Applying the law of modern territorial statehood 
Page 247 
nomenon can be simultaneously observed: it does not occur in the southern, or central, or 
western parts of the country.150 Residents of the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo are by 
no means ‘full members of the state’ (as it is). The state, as such, has not held actual authority 
over their territory for quite some years now. As such, whether ‘a bunch of unfortunate people’ 
or a ‘people’ per se, regardless of what they actually ‘are’ in definition, they remain negatively-
defined: they ‘know what they are in relation to what they are not’.  
In view of the reality that a ‘shared history’ does not always reflect ideal human circum-
stances, on the one hand, positively-defined ‘peoples’ would show a tendency to take so-called 
‘horizontal’ actions aimed at promoting good governance and internal self-determination. By 
having already received a measure of self-government through decolonisation (to be sure) and 
an additional measure of self-government, through interactions with the state powers in the 
capital (perhaps), a positively-defined people will aim toward working within the existing state 
to achieve more broad-based political participation, increased protection, and prevention from 
discrimination and constructive steps taken toward the implementation of the right to develop-
ment, which, as Paul Ochoeje identifies, all make effective contributions to good governance.151 
As the state matures, the thinking goes that the less threatened it is by peoples’ rights, there are 
corresponding improvements in overall governance standards. It also seems likely that a ‘posi-
tively-defined’ people would be likely to have more of an essential awareness of inter-social 
connectedness within the group than would a ‘negatively-defined’ people. A ‘positively-defined’ 
people would therefore be more likely to reflect the classical formulation of a unique ethnicity, 
something not far removed from a “homogeneous people differing from the rest of the popula-
tion in race, language and culture”, to use the language of the Belgian thesis. 
‘Negatively-defined’ peoples as self-determination’s guarantee of last resort 
By contrast, negatively-defined ‘peoples’ would tend to take so-called ‘horizontal’, i.e., 
preservational, actions by, primarily, geographically-contiguous ‘peoples’ per se, aimed at up-
holding the right of all peoples to be free from foreign domination. Forming a numeric majority 
in a reasonably well-delineated area, there are more Black Africans than Arabic Africans in 
South Sudan; there are more Eritreans in Eritrea than Ethiopians, and there were (most likely) 
more targeted civilians than arms-bearers in the eastern DRC during the aftermath of the Rwan-
dan genocide. All of the above share a common need for self-government to preserve these re-
spective societies, their welfare and indeed, their right to life.152 These are the animate ‘peoples’ 
for whom the inanimate ‘nation-state’ has no particular meaning. Indeed these are the circum-
stances where the violence, civil strife and widespread and systemic violations of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms inherent in secessionist circumstances (as in the Bangladeshi exam-
ple), are already so pervasive and entrenched, that things are unlikely ever to improve. A nega-
                                                                  
150 It is difficult to dispute that the cycle of violence, seen in the late 1990s and early 2000s in the DRC, 
runs much wider, with a greater intensity, in the eastern part of the state than anything that can be ob-
served in the rest of its territory. 
151 See P. Ocheje, A “Rights” Approach to Governance in Africa, in E.K. Quashigah and O.C. Okafor (eds.), 
Legitimate Governance in Africa 193-194 (1999). He comments, Id.: “The estrangement of the mass of Af-
ricans from their state rests to a significant degree on the lack of commonality between the interests of the 
governing elites and those of the governed. To bridge the gap, African countries need to take rights seri-
ously. Efforts to strike a basis for increased relevance of the state among the populace is not likely to yield 
desired results until civil society is able to enjoy greater and more liberal space in governance, basic hu-
man needs are seriously addressed, equality is guaranteed, and development is pursued in a more humane 
manner.” 
152 Although it is admitted that the final example is considerably less geographically-congruous than the 
others. 
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tively-defined ‘people’ will thus tend to have a lower propensity for success in working within 
the existing state to achieve self-government than will a comparatively more peaceful, compara-
tively more mono-ethnic, state.153 However, there are circumstances wherein unavoidable geo-
graphic realities will compel a negatively-defined ‘people’ to overcome this limitation.154 
A note on the concept of ‘positively’ and ‘negatively’ defined ‘peoples’ 
It should be noted that the appellation of ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ when conceptualising the 
‘people’ concept is built upon the aforementioned notions of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ sover-
eignty. It is used merely to facilitate discussion of the topic and not to confuse matters further. It 
may be seen that a ‘positively-defined’ people would show a propensity for making claims 
rooted in internal self-determination (i.e., supportive of the territorial status quo) and ‘nega-
tively-defined’ peoples would be likely to display a greater propensity for making claims rooted 
in external self-determination. This is not, however, to say that the final outcomes are predeter-
mined, but it is to say that awareness of the definitional predispositions of self-determination 
claims, can be helpful in the evaluation of such claims: the self-determination threshold will be 
higher, in the ‘negative’ formulation, and therefore internal self-determination measures may, in 
some circumstances, prove insufficient. 
This is to suggest that there is no contradiction between the statements that “without a 
right to secession, there is no people’s right of self-determination”, and “if the right of self-
determination included automatically the possibility of secession, there could not be any right 
of self-determination”.155 Dietrich Murswiek, in balancing territorial integrity and self-
determination, concludes that, while a stable system of sovereign states is still greatly favoured 
by states (being, themselves, the basic actors in global society), at the point of greatest tensions 
between vertical state consolidation and horizontal societal preservation, 
[t]he conservation of the status quo has no absolute legal value. International stability and 
peacekeeping may normally be bound to the territorial status quo, but this is not a question of 
necessity. Particularly the non-fulfilment of legitimate self-determination claims often is a 
source of conflicts. There are situations in which durable maintenance of peace can only be 
reached by territorial alterations, e.g. by secession of a part of a territory.156 
                                                                  
153 Again, such circumstances will have to be fairly judged based upon what the claimants could be ex-
pected to say, whereby the examiner will have to identify and process the underlying principles while 
aiming for an effective configuration of self-government. 
154 Such is the case when ideology becomes deeply entrenched in a conflict situation, as was the case with 
UNITA in Angola for example (where support for the government or for UNITA ran from village to vil-
lage and house to house rather than across great geographic swathes inhabited by “homogeneous peoples 
differing from the rest of the population in race, language and culture”). Nevertheless, the Angolan con-
flict, by virtue of its protraction (continually from Angola’s 1975 independence until Jonas Saivimbi’s 
death in February 2002), and goals (access to government and the resources of the Angolan state), must be 
seen as taking on at least some of the trappings of self-determination.  
155 D. Murswiek, The Issue of a Right of Secession – Reconsidered, in C. Tomuschat (ed.) Modern Law of 
Self-Determination 21 (1993). 
156 Id. at 36. He continues, Id. at 37: “The subject of the offensive right of self-determination is every peo-
ple that first can clearly be distinguished from other peoples by objective ethnic criteria, particularly by 
culture, language, birth or history. Secondly, a people must settle in on a coherent territory, on which it 
forms at least a clear majority. Mere minorities are not subjects of the right of self-determination. […] 
But it is important to recognize that the terms ‘minority’ and ‘people’ do not totally exclude each other; 
rather they partly overlap: one group that is a minority in relation to the whole population of a State can, 
on the one hand be a national minority in the meaning of the law relating to minorities. But on the other 
hand, it can be a people in the meaning of the right to self-determination at the same time. This is the case 
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In the end, the summation of the negative and positive definitions of a ‘people’ demon-
strates the need for ‘horizontal societal preservation’ in a postcolonial state. While not a ‘new 
right’ per se, horizontal societal preservation is grounded in a so-called process of ‘individualisa-
tion’ in relation to the postcolonial ‘right of peoples to self-determination’. It is an attempt to ad-
dress the limitations of the blunt instrument of the Montevideo Convention’s definition of 
statehood. It is an attempt to add an element of contextual distinction to the ethnic ambivalence 
of uti possidetis juris. It is an attempt to expose the conceptual underpinnings behind self-
determination so that a genuine sort of self-governance is able to follow as a matter of course.157 
Moreover, it is an attempt to reflect the assertion that if the self-determination/self-
administration/ self-government door is open to ethnic or national groupings, with a growing 
awareness of the fluidity of such concepts, it is conceptually irrational to dismiss out of hand a 
‘people’ formulated from the most extreme circumstances, whereby self-determination means 
not self-government, but collective self-preservation and individual survival. 
The right to political participation in the postcolonial state: Channelling human 
rights law through vertical and horizontal forms: 
To consider more deeply the role international human rights law plays in improving the 
effectiveness of the postcolonial state, we must return to the now oft-repeated assertion: the 
European-designed state is a foreign body imposed upon postcolonial, e.g. African, societies. 
Some might argue this no longer matters: that postcolonial states earned their independence 
through a successful manifestation of the ‘right of peoples to self-determination’, that a truly or-
ganic law of self-determination was trumped by uti possidetis and that the European-designed 
state is now juridically manifested in the independent postcolonial state. In large measure, they 
would be correct. For, indeed, every state has a capital city with the basic trappings of statehood: 
formal executive offices, with luxurious residences, a capitol, a judiciary with a formal legal sys-
tem, a central bank, a national military and local civilian police, an administrative and regula-
tory bureaucracy, principal ports of entry and exit, periodic territorial markings to delineate 
international boundaries, et al. 
This leads, once more, to the oft-repeated response: the independent postcolonial state 
fails at achieving the same results as the European state, because of the depth of the comparative 
disconnectedness between the state and its constituents. In many ways, this reflects the dichot-
omy between the ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ planes of societal interactions in postcolonial states, 
such as those in contemporary Africa. As Donald Rothchild and Letitia Lawson write: 
Over time, as African economies deteriorated and state institutions lost considerable legiti-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
if the group is the only population or if it forms a clear majority on a territory that is suitable for State-
building and where the group has traditionally settled.” 
157 For discussion, see generally The Nation As Mind Politic (Chapter Four) in Allott, supra note 120. In 
particular, his method for explaining the process of self-identification (and therefore the intellectual ante-
cedent to the self-determination process), Id. at 113, deserves mention. He asserts that self-identification 
is a three-layered process involving “projection of the individual’s self-process onto the collectivity; in-
trojection of the collectivity’s self-process onto the individual and the forming of a subjective totality 
identified as the collectivity (the nation)”. He continues, Id. at 114: “The subjective totality (the nation) is 
neither a thing which is created and which then takes on a life of its own nor is it merely an illusion shared 
by an indefinite number of individuals. The subjective totality is and remains an integral part of the psy-
chic process of the individual but it always surpasses the process of any given individual […]. The nation 
is thus just one of those countless remarkable phenomena of the human reality, the reality made by the 
human mind, which depend on us to think them into existence and to maintain them in existence by our 
thinking but which at the same time think us into existence, and sustain us in existence.” 
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macy and sense of purpose, the routines of state-society relations were disrupted. Economic 
deterioration increased state softness (i.e., the inability of the state to regulate society and to 
implement public policies in an effective manner) and societal demands on the state. Though 
perceived as the key distributor of resources, the state lacked the capacity to satisfy public 
demands. Overstaffed, overbureaucratized, overcentralized, and itself a major consumer of 
scarce revenues, the state found itself unable to implement its own developmental programs, 
particularly in the hinterlands […]. As the state failed to meet public expectations, then, its 
legitimacy eroded, and the public began to perceive it as an alien institution “suspended, as it 
were, above society.”158  
Thus, inter alia, political movements, non-governmental organisations, trade unions, re-
ligious groups, women’s organisations, public health facilities, neighbourhood groups, envi-
ronmental committees, professional associations, recreation clubs and welfare organizations all 
play significant roles, which go unrecognised in ‘official’ terms. Indeed, the proliferation of mo-
bile telephones and the development of internet access, while comparatively less widespread in 
sub-Saharan Africa, has contributed to the establishment of informal ‘networks’ of like-minded 
groups, and has contributed to an increasingly free and critical press.159 The point is that these 
are all elements in existence in ‘developed’ societies, yet these are elements that, in postcolonial 
states, are spotlights on their own comparative inadequacies. The problem is that in practical 
terms, these are the types of organisations which could well bring a given society one step closer 
to the ‘telos of flourishing’, but because they are not actual agents of the state, they have the poten-
tial to be problematic.160 Thus in the absence of these building blocks of governmental effective-
ness, political actions that would normally be initiated and supported by a local governmental 
authority are undertaken by those not specifically mandated to exercise the appropriate func-
tions.  
One may wonder why, in circumstances whereby the ‘state-strength dilemma’ has been 
so apparent, agents of the state should actually hold a ‘monopoly’ on the ‘power’ that is pre-
sumed to exist. The line between ‘state’ and ‘society’ blurs further—a matter that is important be-
cause it can draw the appellation of ‘state authority’ into question: in situations whereby state 
agents operate in the Hinterlands, the sense of connectedness to the bureaucratic function of the 
state, and the administrative and regulatory pull of the capital is not often felt. Local societies of-
ten function independently of macro-level political delineations. The after-effects of colonial 
possession, and, thus, the relevance of the original legal title, are profound.161 Nevertheless, it 
has been demonstrated that the actual societal situation, upon which this legal title is built, is 
variable. 
An illustration of this is, by analogy, akin to the biological process of dissecting the walls 
of individual cells. Cells are broken down into organic and inorganic types. In the days of state-
                                                                  
158 D. Rothchild and L. Lawson, Interactions Between State and Civil Society, in J.W. Harbeson et al (eds.) 
Civil Society and the State in Africa 257-58 (1994) [hereinafter Rothchild and Lawson], citing G. Hyden, 
Problems and Prospects of State Coherence, in D. Rothchild and V.A. Olorunsola (eds.) State Versus Eth-
nic Claims 69 (1983). 
159 The establishment and maintenance of the site allafrica.com is exemplary of this type of development. 
160 Many enterprises which would be under private control in the European context, even before its recent 
spate of large-sector privatisations, are indeed agents of the state in sub-Saharan Africa. Cf. J.C.N. Paul, 
Participatory Approaches to Human Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa, in A.A. an-Na‘im and F.M. Deng 
(eds.) Human Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives (1990): “The colonial state built the founda-
tions—legal, economic and political—of the postcolonial state […]. The state became the major employer 
of salaried workers; the incomes and perks of its higher officials were extraordinarily large, relative to the 
local economy, and the status ascribed to these offices was great.” 
161 See e.g II R.S.A.1324, Honduras-Guatemala Border case, as cited in M. Kohen, Possession Contestée et 
Souveraineté Territoriale 473 (1997) [hereinafter Kohen].  
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hood where effectiveness had primacy over territorial integrity, the ‘cells’ of statehood were 
more akin to inorganic types. They had cell walls, as such, which could be seen as the presence 
of juridical effectiveness inherent in ‘civilising’ statehood.162 But when colonialism had to be 
abandoned, the cell walls were made to undertake some form of reaction which—to continue 
analogously—transformed them from inorganic to organic. The symbolic dissolution of the cell 
wall, by comparison, reflects the equity between states (and types of cells), as well as the under-
lying differences between the various sub-types of the synonymous object. That is to say, fur-
ther, that, if the structures (the principle of effectiveness as a rigid cell wall) have been corroded 
to the point of irrelevance (the process of decolonisation creating a hybrid-organic cell), to what 
extent do ‘agents’ of ‘the state’ actually need to work for ‘the state’ per se? 
More specifically, the positivist aspect of statehood holds dear a ‘civilising’ effect, yet those 
who have a legal, postcolonial title to carry on the ‘civilising’ mission may not always be, com-
paratively speaking, the best placed to do so. For if the colonial menace was overthrown, and 
indeed, if something like modern democratic governance has been fated to replace colonial 
‘civilisation’, who really is to say whether e.g. a hierarchical state military provides a greater so-
cial benefit on the ground than e.g. a consortium of local women’s associations; or, for that mat-
ter, a local taxation authority versus an informal network of local goods providers? This is where 
postcolonial self-determination becomes deeply convoluted, as if self-determination were to 
mean the right to choose, then local societies would act in such a way as to benefit themselves 
the most. That such societies are not always homogenous, that minority rights regimes can be 
ineffective, that peoples’ rights are problematic, then factual situations could easily lead to legal 
conundrums. Still, if the ‘ethical positivism’ framing natural law as a philosophical underpin-
ning of rights can be accepted, some of the rigidity in assigning the ‘governance’ function exclu-
sively to direct agents of the state can be mitigated. In other words, it could be argued—and, 
indeed, it should be argued—that whoever can do the job should do the job. 
The notion of political accountability then takes on a more complex meaning, as Patrick 
Chabal writes. If decolonising self-determination created political accountability as a new prin-
ciple,163 and political accountability could not be inherently be supported by the bureaucracy,164 
then the roles played by ‘civil society’ should be reconsidered. Drawing on Jean-François Ba-
yart, he seems to frame ‘civil society’ with a pragmatic response to the weaknesses of the post-
colonial African states: 
[…] in the African context, civil society, in so far as it can be formally defined, consists not 
just of what is obviously not part of the state but also of all who may have become powerless 
or disenfranchised: not just villagers, farmers, nomads, members of different age groups, vil-
lage councillors, or slum dwellers, but also professionals, politicians, priests and mullahs, in-
tellectuals, military officers and all others who are, or feel they are, without due access to the 
state. Civil society is thus a vast ensemble of constantly changing groups and individuals 
                                                                  
162 The fact that colonialist states came nowhere near the level of widespread governmental effectiveness 
directly correlating to the absolute rigidity to be found in inorganic cells is irrelevant, as the endgame of 
the civilizing mission was societal replication. Cf. J.F.C. Ferry, Speech Before the French Chamber of 
Deputies, March 28, 1884, in Discours et Opinions de Jules Ferry, ed. Paul Robiquet (1897), 210: “Gen-
tlemen, we must speak more loudly and more honestly! We must say openly that indeed the higher races 
have a right over the lower races [...] I repeat, that the superior races have a right because they have a duty. 
They have the duty to civilize the inferior races [...] In the history of earlier centuries these duties, gentle-
men, have often been misunderstood; and certainly when the Spanish soldiers and explorers introduced 
slavery into Central America, they did not fulfill their duty as men of a higher race [...] But, in our time, I 
maintain that European nations acquit themselves with generosity, with grandeur, and with sincerity of 
this superior civilizing duty.” 
163 P. Chabal, Power in Africa: An Essay in Political Interpretation 65 (1994) [hereinafter Chabal]. 
164 See Id. at 67. 
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whose only common ground is their exclusion from the state, their consciousness of their 
externality and their political opposition to the state.165  
Civil society, generally speaking, is a repository for societal power that is not vested within 
the state itself. It is not a particularly new idea, identifiable by an inward-looking view of society 
that came about by the end of the seventeenth century, fuelled by the Scottish enlightenment 
and the writings of Cicero, Grotius, Puffendorf and Barberyrac.166 A definitional framework for 
a more contemporary era is provided by Nancy Thede, in her paper to the UN seminar on the 
interdependence between democracy and human rights. She writes: 
Civil society as a theoretical concept refers to a relational sphere of ideology and power 
where individuals associate for ends determined collectively and autonomously. It is “out-
side” the state because no coercion from the latter is involved. […] The approach commonly 
used to civil society in operational terms raises several issues. First, there is a strong ten-
dency to reduce the scope of the notion to concrete actors, and in particular to nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs) only. In many cases, the reference is to those NGOs dedicated 
to involvement in the policy process only. Second, civil society is often considered as being in 
opposition to the state, an alternative or even antithetical to it. In reality, however, the state 
is the necessary guarantor of the autonomous space in which civil society operates. Third, 
civil society is often treated in a strictly instrumental manner, as an actor that can channel 
programming determined by other agencies, but not as an autonomous agent on its own 
terms.167 
The problem is that often in a postcolonial state, such as in the African context, when the 
rulers of very weak states become practically indistinguishable from warlords,168 “a ‘civil society’ 
of independent entrepreneurs may consist of the very same people a ruler regards as menacing 
rivals or local people identify as warlords”.169 While this may indeed be possible, this appears to 
be more due to the knotty delineation between state and society under those circumstances, 
rather than due to an inherently dysfunction-causing syndrome. The point is encapsulated by 
Steven Ndegwa: 
As one observer of civil society in Africa [Louis Helling, in a personal communication to 
Ndegwa] noted, being in civil society is the alternative to employment in the civil service. 
This statement expresses both the possibility and likely contradiction that civil society may 
hold for democratic development in Africa. In the 1960s, scholars and development practi-
tioners believe that the African state was the only institution capable of developing newly in-
dependent countries. […] But today, the civil service and the state in general have become 
liabilities to African development and democracy. The current situation presents a reversal of 
sorts. Development aid is increasingly channelled through nonstate actors, and progressive 
elites for social, economic, and political change are situated in civil society. Will civil society 
act any differently from the civil service (the state) to deliver on the promise of democ-
racy?170  
Indeed that is the question at hand, and it must be acknowledged from the outset that the 
answer may be in the affirmative, due to the distinctly blurred nature between the public and 
private realms. The ‘complex social milieu’ through which this process is borne is well-
                                                                  
165 Id. at 83, citing J.-F. Bayart, Civil Society in Africa, in P. Chabal (ed.) Political Domination in Africa 
(1986), at 112: “Though it is arguable that the concept of civil society is not applicable outside European 
history I shall define it provisionally as ‘society in its relation with the state […] in so far as it is in con-
frontation with the state’ or, more precisely, as the process by which society seeks to ‘breach’ and counter-
act the simultaneous ‘totalisation’ unleashed by the state.”  
166 See Seligman, supra note 114, at 21 et seq. 
167 N. Thede, Civil Society and Democracy, paras. 4-5, Seminar on the Interdependence Between Democ-
racy and Human Rights, UN OHCHR, 25-26 November 2002, available from www.unhchr.ch. 
168 See W. Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (1998), at 3 et seq. 
169 Id. at 33. 
170 S.N. Ndegwa, The Two Faces of Civil Society: NGOs and Politics in Africa 5 (1996). 
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encapsulated by Donald Rothchild and Letitia Lawson: 
In many countries, vertically organized interest groups continue to be more influential than 
horizontally organized ones. Horizontally organized interest groups such as labor unions, bar 
associations, women’s organizations, and farmers associations are making increasing demands 
on the state, adding to its legitimacy even while challenging the government; however, verti-
cally organized communal groups continue to weaken the authority of the state, and the pub-
lic realm more generally, through clientlistic politics and other privatizing strategies. Thus, as 
we attempt to understand the operation of civil societies in Africa, we must be alert to the 
sometimes reinforcing but often contradictory demands of communal groups (which may ex-
ert centrifugal forces on both state and civil society) and emerging class and economic inter-
est groups (which more often exert centrifugal forces), as well as the continued salience of 
societal disengagement.171  
 What is recognised is that the institutions which reflect the best forms of societal self-
preservation are those which may not necessarily be associated with the state per se, and that in-
dividual rights protections, including the minority rights regime, may also prove problematic in 
implementation. This is problematic because elements in the human condition that allow for 
self-organisation and self-protection, such as those going back to ancient Sumerian societies, 
predate the imperial ‘civilising’ mission by thousands of years. Now, the postcolonial state must 
look inward at itself to recapture the essence that has long since gone missing.172 As Rothchild 
and Lawson conclude: 
Civil society is made up of publicly active groups that implicitly recognize the legitimacy and 
authority of the state (although not necessarily the government or the existing regime). 
These groups, in interaction with the state (both cooperation and conflictual), attempt to de-
fine and control the political, economic, and social norms that will govern society at large. 
Elites who represent sectional interests against the state often operate outside the confines 
of civil society, insofar as they fail to accept the boundaries of the society and the legitimacy 
of the state.173 
The problem of disenfranchisement in the postcolonial state has become apparent to the 
extent that some African scholars want to ‘redefine’ legitimate (African) statehood.174 Prima fa-
cie, it would appear that, given the increasing relevance of ‘civil society’ to the administration of 
postcolonial states, and the resulting implications for public international law generally, a lib-
eral reading of what constitutes an effectivité would contribute to the manifestation of internal 
self-determination in the postcolonial state. 
The contributions of internal self-determination to the concept of a ‘national life’ 
The non-universal, relativist view of human rights is in fact a very state-centred view and 
loses sight of the fact that human rights are human rights and not dependent on the fact that 
states, or groupings of states, may behave differently from each other so far as their politics, 
economic policy, and culture are concerned. I believe, profoundly, in the universality of the 
                                                                  
171 Rothchild and Lawson, supra note 158, at 256. 
172 Cf. J.D. van der Vyver, Religious Freedom in African Constitutions, in A.A. An-Na‘im (ed.), Proselytiza-
tion and Communal Self-Determination in Africa 139 (1999): “There is more to human rights protection 
than simply constitutional guarantees. Besides effective enforcement mechanisms, including a courageous 
judiciary willing to stand up to the powers that be, human rights protection is also to a large extent de-
pendent upon a certain consciousness—a public morality founded on respect for human rights and fun-
damental freedoms—that manifests itself in a belief on the part of the government and the subjects of state 
authority that implementation of the values embodied in the doctrine of human rights makes for better 
living conditions within the body politic.” 
173 Rothchild and Lawson, supra note 158, at 256. 
174 See generally O.C. Okafor, Re-Defining Legitimate Statehood: International Law and State Fragmenta-
tion in Africa 65 (2000). 
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human spirit. Individuals everywhere want the same essential things: to have sufficient food 
and shelter; to be able to speak freely; to practise their own religion or to abstain from relig-
ious belief; to feel that their person is not threatened by the state; to know they will not be 
tortured, or detained without charge, and that, if charged, they will have a fair trial. I believe 
there is nothing in these aspirations that is dependent upon culture, or religion, or stage of 
development.175  
A concise segment of Hurst Hannum’s work elucidates discussion of the ‘self-
determination as self-defence’ idea, by melding the viewpoints of three articulate scholars to be-
gin fleshing out post-colonial responses to tyranny. The discussion suggests that threatened 
groups have a right to societal existence,176 and indeed some measure of equality vis-à-vis other 
groups within the state;177 perhaps most significantly, too, the effectuation of this right is not ex-
pressly delineated by the make-up of existing state boundaries.178 Such a viewpoint is likely to 
succeed in reflecting the essence of the contemporary ambit of self-determination. What is sig-
nificant to highlight, however, is the increased role that internal self-determination mechanisms 
can play to guarantee these ends. Hannum’s 1993 article equates ‘self-determination-as-self-
defence’ with the automatic sense of ‘self-determination-as-secession’, or indeed revolution, but 
not explicitly drawing reference to the reasoned persuasiveness of either democratic processes 
or devolutionary powers as a catalyst for manifesting postcolonial internal self-determination. 
He writes: 
If a minority’s physical existence is threatened, or if there is intense discrimination against a 
particular segment of society, some reaction against oppression is undoubtedly justified; even 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights refers to “rebellion against tyranny and oppres-
sion” as a “last resort.” However, secession may not be the most appropriate remedy. Over-
throwing the oppressive government and restoring human rights would be as philosophically 
and politically sound as secession.179  
Although questions of secession are problematic by default, it can be further imagined 
that an effective “reaction against oppression” could be achieved without necessarily invoking 
secessionist claims. For if self-determination means access to government, a genuinely devolved 
governance system, with equal opportunities to receive the benefits of the state and adequate 
minority protection guarantees, would be an operative counterbalance to the status quo: a ‘reac-
tion against oppression’. It therefore seems logical to assume that, in an inter-societal conflict, 
once the wisdom of the abandonment of the military option becomes apparent, and steps to 
that end are taken (through a the implementation of a negotiated peace, the emergence of the 
phenomenon of ‘war fatigue’ or perhaps in direct response to secessionist claims as such), the 
notion that further inter-societal developments will involve a concrete ‘reaction against oppres-
sion’ is doubtless. 
                                                                  
175 R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use it 97 (1994) [hereinafter Hig-
gins]. 
176 Cf. B. Neuberger, National Self-Determination in Postcolonial Africa 71 (1986), as quoted in Hannum, 
supra note 89 at 44: “There can be compelling reasons for secession such as if the physical survival or the 
cultural autonomy of a nation is threatened, or if a population would feel economically excluded and per-
manently deprived.” 
177 Cf. O. Kamanu, Secession and the Right to Self-Determination: An OAU Dilemma, 12 J. Mod. Afr. Stud. 
335, 362 (1974), as cited in Hannum, Id.: “The ultimate justification of all social institutions, including the 
state, is the welfare of the individual, not just some metaphysical institution called ‘the majority’.” 
178 Cf. L. Buchheit, supra note 59, at 222, as cited in Hannum, Id. at 45: “Remedial secession envisions a 
scheme by which, corresponding to the various degrees of oppression inflicted upon a particular group by 
its governing State, international law recognizes a continuum of remedies ranging from protection of in-
dividual rights, to minority rights and ending with secession as the ultimate remedy.” (emphasis sup-
plied) 
179 Hannum, Id.  
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The continual perpetuation of self-determination 
This demonstrates once more that the ambit of self-determination is certainly not con-
ceptually closed or, as was suggested by Kiwanuka,180 a one-off exercise, for there is no inherent 
preclusion for further acts of self-determination after decolonisation.181 As Crawford writes, 
governments themselves are highly unlikely to address violations of peoples’ rights,182 but indi-
vidual human rights are sometimes functionally insufficient,183 and “if you regard self-
determination as essentially a summary of other rights […] then a key right to self-determination 
is the right to participate democratically in the political system to which you belong […]. On this 
view, self-determination is a continuing right, the collective expression of the individual rights of 
the members of each political society”.184 And yet one must tread lightly in this regard, as refuta-
tions of the distinctions between colonial self-determination and postcolonial self-
determination still can be observed. Rubin’s previous comments identifying ‘self-determination’ 
with ‘secession’ and ‘self-government’ as mere ‘morality’ exemplify this assertion.185 It would 
seem that he fails to consider a legal middle ground between status quo and secession, for if “the 
general multilateral treaty terms referring to national self-determination as a right represent 
agreement as to moral or political principle, not legal entitlement,”186 then this must be seen as a 
compulsory rejection of the democratic entitlement theory and a legal repudiation of anything 
but decolonising secession through self-determination. Such a viewpoint seems stiflingly rigid, 
in that it implies only that decolonisation has become a fait accompli with no further relevance in 
terms of law or policy. Indeed, the correlation of postcolonial self-determination with democ-
racy has demonstrated how the modern law of self-determination is something more than a 
one-off exercise.  
It has become impossible to deny that a juridical status for a middle ground between 
these points should not be seen as mere conjecture. This middle ground is the specific measure 
of a state’s effectiveness towards the promotion and protection of the basic core of international 
and regional human rights standards, the level of access to the decision-making structures made 
available to citizens of a state and the level of practical independence of judges and lawyers. If 
this is not yet recongisable as specific right per se, it must nonetheless be accepted as demonstra-
tive of recent trends in the development of the postcolonial law on self-determination. Thomas 
Franck asserts that such a step is fundamental in order for this ongoing, postcolonial ‘right of 
peoples’ to avoid what he terms a “descent into incoherence”.187 That is to say, it has become dif-
ficult to ignore Franck’s repeated assertions; as he illuminates: 
                                                                  
180 See R.N. Kiwanuka, The Meaning of “People” in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 82 
AJIL 80 (1988), and discussion supra chapter four at text accompanying note 133.  
181 Other acts of self-determination could occur, such as a devolutionary arrangement as part of an internal 
self-determination package, or, perhaps, a continuation of that process into external self-determination 
through either consensual or contested means. 
182 J. Crawford, The Right of Self-Determination in International Law, in P. Alston (ed.) Peoples’ Rights 22 
(2001) [hereinafter Crawford]. 
183 Id. at 24. 
184 Id. at 25. He continues, Id. at 38, stating that the lex lata of self-determination is that it applies to all 
peoples, for that “it would be strange if self-determination was defined only by its [contemporary] de-
nial.” 
185 See Rubin, supra note 44, at 253: “Since there is no holder of such a right and no standing in any state to 
speak for the national or other minority or majority of another, and all states deny such a right to their 
own secessionist movements, it is doubted that this category, although much discussed and asserted 
loudly, exists.” 
186 Id. at 269. 
187 T.M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AJIL 713, 746 (1988). 
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The current trend of efforts to redefine self-determination by ameliorating the underlying 
problems does recognize an international legal right, not to secession, but rather to cultural 
autonomy and democracy. In the transition from colonial to post-colonial contexts this right, 
as interpreted in the practice of states, has begun to be applied vigorously to measure the le-
gitimacy of a secessionist regime. […] Probably, the uti possidetis claim of a totalitarian state, 
or one which has persecuted its minority and denied petitions for regional autonomy, is 
weaker than a similar claim advanced by a democratic society which consistently accords 
equal rights to its minorities.188 
However, indeed, the circumstances currently under discussion are not those related to a 
‘secessionist regime’, as such (as these circumstances are those which are, in the first instance, to 
be pursued in order to avoid the implications to uti possidetis), but rather, the extent to which 
steps can be taken to develop and strengthen autonomous structures, without a wholesale dis-
ruption to the status quo. To that end, what really seems to be at issue is that, in order to advance 
through to the more comprehensive, adversarial stages of self-determination (e.g. asserting a 
greater level of ‘horizontal societal preservation’, in response to actions undertaken in the name 
of ‘vertical state consolidation’), a ‘people’ would have to overcome certain burdens of proof, in 
order to credibly advance along a further irreversible act of state-creation in an already-
decolonised state. Such is the formulation advanced by Paul Brietzke, in an articulate and me-
ticulously referenced 1995 article.189 In it, amongst his numerous conclusions, is the observation 
that a self-determining entity will have to bear considerable burdens in demonstrating its wor-
thiness towards the self-determination process, as well as toward demonstrating its democratic 
credentials. He adds: 
The nation’s burden of proof would increase to the extent that it demands one of the more 
extreme self-determination remedies. Self-determination provokes so much conflict because 
states have long equated the right with the most extreme remedy: secession. Thus […], in-
ternational law should expand the repertoire or menu of less extreme self-determination 
remedies so that international evaluators can achieve a better fit between a remedy and a 
particular denial of self-determination that is proved.190 
This perspective fits squarely within the framework put forth by Frederic Kirgis,191 deserv-
ing further consideration in light of more recent discussions concerning postcolonial statehood 
in particular. Drawing upon the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration and the 1994 Vienna Dec-
laration and Programme of Action, Kirgis refines his earlier attempts to measure “custom on a 
sliding scale”192 through the interactions between levels of democracy on the ground and the 
tolerance of the international community for changes to the status quo. The essence of his argu-
ment is as such: 
If a government is at the high end of the scale of democracy, the only self-determination 
claims that will be given international credence are those with minimal destabilizing effect. If a 
government is extremely unrepresentative, much more destabilizing self-determination claims 
may well be recognized. In this schema, a claim of right to secede from a representative de-
mocracy is not likely to be considered a legitimate exercise of the right of self-determination, 
                                                                  
188 See Franck, Fairness, supra note 101, at 168. 
189 P.H. Brietzke, Self-Determination, or Jurisprudential Confusion: Exacerbating Political Conflict 14 
Wisc. Int’l L.J. 69 (1995) [hereinafter Brietzke]. His comments, Id. at 128, are evocative of the general tone 
of his article: “The relevant legal and political issues would be more fairly joined if scholars recast the ju-
risprudence of self-determination into something like a dialectical pragmatism.” 
190 Id. at 129. He continues, Id.: “Although self-determination has grown stronger and more concrete as a 
process, it needs an institutional home in order to develop an adequate civil law-style doctrinal jurispru-
dence, to resolve disputes more effectively and to strengthen sanctions on misbehavior.” 
191 F.L. Kirgis, Editorial Comment: The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era, 88 AJIL 
304 (1994) [hereinafter Kirgis]. 
192 See F.L. Kirgis, Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AJIL 146 (1987). 
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but a claim of right by indigenous groups within the democracy to use their own languages 
and engage in their own noncoercive cultural practices is likely to be recognized—not always 
under the rubric of self-determination, but recognized nonetheless. Conversely, a claim of a 
right to secede from a repressive dictatorship may be regarded as legitimate.193  
Simply put, if the tensions between ‘vertical state consolidation’ and ‘horizontal societal 
preservation’ are low, the balance of legitimacy in self-determination claims tips towards the 
preservation of the status quo, whereas, if the tensions escalate beyond a certain point—not just 
violations of cultural and linguistic rights, but large-scale civil and political rights violations, in-
cluding violations of the right to life—the balance of legitimacy for those self-determination 
claims tips towards the allowance of a modification to the status quo. This is so because such a 
claim would very likely be automatically ‘less destabilising’; indeed, as these are the socio-
political circumstances, genuinely mired in the mud of the Hobbesian floor, if undertaking such 
a drastic measure to establish self-rule were capable of pushing all people on the territory in 
question further towards the Kantian ceiling through significant decreases in violations of the 
right to life,194 the only thing becoming destabilised would be the borders of the states in ques-
tion (and ‘quasi-states’, at that). Many of these characteristics may be observed in sub-Saharan 
Africa, as observed by Bayart, Ellis and Hibou:  
There is a strong possibility that sub-Saharan Africa is returning to the ‘heart of darkness’. 
This, we must repeat, is not synonymous with ‘tradition’ or ‘primitiveness’, but is related to 
the manner in which Africa is inserted in the international system through the economies of 
extraction or predation in which many of the leading operators are foreigners, whose local 
African partners have to a considerable degree based their careers on the use of armed 
force. The relevance of Joseph Conrad’s novel is clear for anyone who has an interest in 
situations like those of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Central 
African Republic, Sudan or Equatorial Guinea.195 
Consequently, further evidence is given to the confluence of democratic governance with 
contemporary public international law. But before examining this juridically questionable 
premise in greater detail, some initial delineation should be made, on ways in which the inter-
national community should address such self-determination claims. By now, the relative un-
willingness of the international community to examine the topic critically comes no longer as a 
surprise. One way to proceed through these circumstances is to employ the two-part test first 
devised by Lee Buchheit in the late 1970s, by categorising the ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ condi-
tions related to the situation on the ground.196 He suggests that objective criteria, such as race, 
ethnicity, language, history, culture and geography, are matched against the extent to which a 
territorial group self-identifies as a ‘people’ and expresses a sufficient commonality of interests as 
likely to continue to do so in the future.  
Provided such objective and subjective conditions can be identified, one would then 
want to find a means of assessment for the vertical and horizontal tensions that are aiming for 
reconciliation. Patrick Thornberry, although referring to minority groups and not ‘peoples’ per 
se, provides six criteria that can be put to good use, in identifying repressive circumstances 
which would make an aggrieved population want to improve its level of self-rule.197 He identi-
                                                                  
193 Kirgis, supra note 191, at 308. 
194 The best way to measure this would be using Bangladesh and Eritrea as examples. Both should be seen 
as relative successes in this regard, despite the intense armed conflicts that respectively catalysed and fol-
lowed their secessions. 
195 J.-F. Bayart, S. Ellis and B. Hibou, The Criminalization of the State in Africa 114 (1999). Note that this 
work does not use ‘criminalization of the state’ to mean the invocation of state responsibility as such.  
196 Buchheit, supra note 59, at 10. 
197 See P. Thornberry, International Law and the Rights of Minorities (1991), at 1 et seq. 
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fies: (a) assimilation (creation of a homogenous society for the purpose of strengthening the 
state); (b) integration (merging elements of various cultures whilst guaranteeing equal rights); 
(c) fusion (encouraging the cultural amalgamation of groups over time); (d) pluralism (encour-
aging the intermingling of separate cultural groups over time); (e) segregation (a domi-
nant/dominated power arrangement epitomised by the apartheid-era South Africa or the pre-
Hernandez v. Texas198 and Brown v. Board of Education199-era United States); and (f) ethno-
development (an inverted Leitkultur of sorts, exemplified by the actions taken by indigenous 
peoples’ rights advocates, aimed at the self-empowerment and preservation of the distinctness 
in a society’s own culture in the face of a more dominant political reality). Particularly in the 
most damaging of such circumstances, such as (forced) assimilation and segregation in the list 
above, the extent to which coercive state behaviour is seen to exist becomes apparent. In addi-
tion, as has been advocated, coercion has indeed become a dominant governance theme 
throughout postcolonial Africa. Based upon the discussions presented heretofore, it can be fur-
ther implied that this coercive activity does little to alleviate a hegemonic core-periphery model 
within a state, and therefore works to perpetuate the maintenance of inter-societal tensions; it is, 
after all, coercion. Therefore, the extent to which these situations can be remedied are the ex-
tents to which self-determination of peoples can improve the effectiveness of the governance 
over a particular territorial entity. The ‘democratic governance’ thesis thus deserves deeper 
analysis. 
A recapitulation of modern territorial statehood: Sovereignty in view of the con-
cepts of democracy, internal self-determination and minority rights 
Self-determination has never simply meant independence. It has meant the free choice of 
peoples. During the era of colonialism, that choice was focused on the possibility of inde-
pendence or other post-colonial status. That is the aspect of colonialism that reflects the en-
titlement referred to in Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
that all peoples may ‘freely determine their political status’. But the entitlement goes beyond 
that (and this is the part that is conveniently forgotten by those who limit self-determination 
to a historical moment of decolonization)—the entitlement is also to ‘freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development’. And how can that be done if self-determination 
does not also provide for free choice not only as to status but also as to government? […] 
And the right remains an ongoing one. It is not only at the moment of independence from 
colonial rule that peoples are entitled freely to pursue their economic, social and cultural de-
velopment. It is a constant entitlement. And that in turn means that they are entitled to 
choose their government.200 
≡ 
The principle of democracy is now universally recognized. The right of all people to take part 
in the government of their country through free and regular elections, enshrined in Article 
21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is not peculiar to any culture. People of all 
cultures value their freedom of choice, and feel the need to have a say in decisions affecting 
their lives. Increasingly, they understand that democracy, properly implemented, provides the 
best guarantee of a climate of free discussion, in which people can learn from each other's 
ideas, and reach agreement on solutions to their common problems. One of the greatest 
challenges to humankind in the new century will be the struggle to make the practice of de-
mocracy equally universal. In that struggle, nations in which democracy is already well estab-
lished will need to be vigilant in preserving that achievement, and to work together to help 
those where democracy is still new or emerging.201 
                                                                  
198 See 347 U.S. 475 (1954). 
199 See 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
200 Higgins, supra note 175, at 119-120. 
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‘Democracy’ per se is a sentiment expressed with increasing, and presumably welcome 
frequency, from its legal antecedents in the Friendly Relations Declaration to the interwoven 
rights of self-determination and political participation and other United Nations actions in the 
field of human rights.202 If, as the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action proclaims, all 
human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated, and self-determination 
of peoples is not a one-off exercise, then it is a claim to self-rule—a legitimate claim to democ-
racy—that an aggrieved people would seek to obtain in the first instance, in order to achieve a 
measure of horizontal societal preservation. To be certain, while the classical international law 
makes few critical demands that a state is to be democratic in order to earn legitimate recogni-
tion as a state per se,203 under the most contentious of circumstances, whereby claims are being 
made within a state that the state itself is not living up to the requirements put forth in the 
Friendly Relations Declaration with regard to governmental representation “without distinction 
to race, creed or colour”, democracy is, in fact, of great relevance in pushing a state closer to-
ward the fulfilment of these requirements. Democracies are the product of systems of laws, so 
they must therefore reflect the wills and needs of lawmakers chosen by those with a voting enti-
tlement within a state. This highlights the problem to be found so often in sub-Saharan Africa, in 
that the systems of laws tends to reflect the wills and needs of the original colonialists which rep-
licated, to varying degrees, the European socio-political institutions in their colonial administra-
tions. This reflects a deeper reality that the ‘wills and needs of the lawmakers’ are, in reality, 
largely still the ‘wills and needs of the colonialists’, or, at the very least, are constructed from that 
mould.204 
 The scholarship of Philip Allott is instrumental in advancing this view, in that he dissects 
the social function of law into “the presence of the social past”, “an organising of the social pre-
sent” and a “conditioning of the social future”, and, from that, he suggests the implications of 
how law affects society.205 His argument is that law develops a society’s ‘self-constituting’ aspects 
in law, ideas and actions, creating a specific social form and a universalising, particularising sys-
tem, as a means to determine the ‘middle ground’—a common interest for a society—as well as a 
theoretical basis for explaining a society “whose structures and systems make possible the mu-
tual conditioning of the public mind and the private mind, and the mutual conditioning of the 
legal and the non-legal”.206 Democracy, then, by ensuring the right to choose, also contributes to 
the ‘positive’ definition and formulation of a people, in that, as members of the state would form 
a true society, able to articulate common interests grounded in a universal framework, to regis-
ter their complaints and promote common interests. The phenomenon of horizontal societal 
preservation is integrated into the vertical state consolidation through the democratic process. 
To this end, the state and its different societies aim at working in tandem to develop the social 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Community of Democracies”, UN Press Release SG/SM/7467 (27 June 2000). 
202 See particularly Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/36 on Strengthening of popular 
participation, equity, social justice and non-discrimination as essential foundations of democracy (23 
April 2000) considers the interplay between democratic development, poverty and sustainable human 
development. In addition, CHR resolution 2000/47 on Promoting and consolidating democracy (25 April 
2000), aims at improving the processes of democracy and the functioning of democratic institutions and 
mechanisms within the framework of administrative and regulatory law. States are called on to promote 
and consolidate democracy by taking actions to strengthen human rights and fundamental freedoms; the 
rule of law; electoral processes; civil society; good governance; sustainable development; and social cohe-
sion and solidarity, including strengthening state-society relations through devolution.  
203 But see discussion of the Badinter Commission, supra chapter two. 
204 For greater definition, see generally M. Koskenniemi, ‘Intolerant Democracies’: A Reaction, 37 Har-
vard Int’l. L.J. 231 (1996). 
205 Allott, supra note 120, at 90. 
206 Id. at 290-91. 
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form. The promotion of the cultural interests of one particular group—indeed, ideally, all such 
groups—proceeds in such a way as to not be inherently threatening to others within the state.  
Such is the ideal balance between vertical state consolidation and horizontal societal 
preservation in post-colonial states. Obviously, however, such idyllic formulations of inter-
societal harmony will be practically difficult to achieve in many African states; nevertheless, it is 
precisely these formulations that represent the true potential of internal self-determination. 
Were the ‘democratic governance’ theorists to be correct, international human rights law would 
witness further structural reinforcements. Domestic legal systems would guarantee citizens a 
genuine say in how they would be governed and therefore—in much the same way self-
determination of peoples is the genesis of all other basic human rights—governments would 
have a direct incentive to uphold those basic human rights, and a sub-state ‘people’ could use its 
status as such to its advantage in negotiating concessions from the central government. 
Furthermore, there would be a dual-faceted international aspect to the right to democ-
ratic governance. First, because the core of human rights, from which the right to democratic 
governance was extracted, was international in origin, there would be something of an interna-
tionally-defined global standardisation process, whereby domestic jurisdictions would have 
relatively similar competences to respond to claims of violations of democratic governance is-
sues from domestic groups. Moreover, if the domestic remedies became exhausted without a 
satisfactory resolution for the aggrieved party, there would be recourse to the treaty-monitoring 
bodies of the various UN covenants, as well as the horizontal enforcement system in the interna-
tional forums of the UN Human Rights Council and the General Assembly.207 It therefore be-
comes increasingly apparent that what is under consideration, at present, is the role internal self-
determination plays vis-à-vis the promotion of other human rights, and to what degree it is able 
to do so in view of a particular circumstantial reality (i.e., to what degree internal self-
determination is able to respond to the needs of the entire populace and therefore increase the 
effectiveness of the state).208 To this end, it is here where we return to Franck and his general as-
sertion that it is only when a measure of coherence is inserted into the governance system of a 
particular state can actual compliance with the rules of that system logically be expected to fol-
low.209 This has strong implications for the aforementioned concept of ‘individuation’, because 
it is the actual guarantor of good-faith in effectuating democracy, and therefore in effectuating 
internal self-determination.  
Thus the equation of internal self-determination with democracy gains further strength, 
particularly when projected through the core of Franck’s related message—namely, that ‘de-
mocracy matters’ in assessing the legitimacy of states. The standard of democratic governance 
existing in a particular county would be a legitimate counterbalance to the exercise of purely co-
ercive power by governments. Indeed, Franck asserted, democracy matters to such an extent 
that there are now legitimate legal expectations derived from the essence of international human 
rights law, which, when taken in aggregate, would dramatically reinforce the basic civil right to 
political participation. Obviously then, there is a tangible knock-on effect in terms of internal 
self-determination. This reinforcement would come primarily through four indicators for de-
                                                                  
207 However, the hesitancy of the Human Rights Committee to accept group claims, discussed supra chap-
ter four, must be recalled. 
208 For discussion, see K. Doehring, Effectiveness, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), 7 Encyclopdia of Public Interna-
tional Law 70, at section 3 (“Effectiveness as a Pre-condition of the Creation of Rights”). 
209 For discussion, see T.M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (1990), at 91 et seq. See also 
generally Franck, Fairness, supra note 101, Franck, Democratic governance, supra note 100, Crawford, 
Democracy, supra note 97, at 113 and J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law 148-155 
(2d. ed., 2006). 
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termining the legitimacy of rules: (a) pedigree, or the rule’s root in historical processes; (b) de-
terminacy, or the rule’s ability to communicate content; (c) coherence, or the rule’s consistency 
with other rules; and (d) adherence, or the rule’s vertical connectedness to higher normative 
principles.210 However, in Franck’s formulation, perhaps the element of greatest significance is 
the necessity for regular elections for a state to be deemed ‘legitimate’, a requirement which 
Franck notes is being met with increasing incidences of democratic elections—or nominally 
democratic at least—in all parts of the world.211 It can be furthermore inferred that such a re-
quirement would demonstrate an evolution in international law further away from the effec-
tiveness principle towards a more qualified judgement of the actual effectivités, in that to have 
genuine effective control over a territory, the government of a state would, at the very least, have 
to offer the opportunity for citizens in otherwise disaffected regions to have the right to vote on 
national affairs, as well as in local administration.212 Such a formulation involves direct respon-
siveness between the administration of a territory and its administrators—certainly something 
quite different from overt coercion, and certainly the government which employs the former 
over the latter will be seen as ‘more legitimate’ in international law. 
But let it be explicitly clear: democracy matters, profoundly, both as a matter of law—
opinio juris sive necessitates—and as a matter of policy. In Fareed Zakaria’s words: 
We live in a democratic age. Over the last century the world has been shaped by one trend 
above all others—the rise of democracy. In 1900 not a single country had what we would 
today consider a democracy: a government created by elections in which every adult citizen 
could vote. Today 119 do, comprising 62 percent of all countries in the world. What was 
once a peculiar practice of a handful of states around the North Atlantic has become the 
standard form for humankind. Monarchies are antique, fascism and communism utterly 
discredited. Even Islamic theocracy appeals to only a fanatical few. For the vast majority of 
the world, democracy is the sole surviving source of political legitimacy. Dictators such as 
Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe go to great effort and expense to 
organize national elections—which, of course, they win handily. When the enemies of de-
mocracy mouth its rhetoric and ape its rituals, you know it has won the war.213  
A more specific entry-point into democracy’s role in contemporary international (hu-
man rights) law comes from the Seminar on the Interdependence Between Democracy and 
Human Rights, held in November 2002, at the United Nations Office at Geneva.214 While Shad-
rack Gutto, in a conference paper, observed that “in the modern social sciences as well as in le-
gal understanding, self-determination means political and economic, social and cultural self-
determination in all the spheres and at all the levels of social organisation and governance”,215 
                                                                  
210 See Franck, democratic governance, supra note 100, at 52 et seq; see also discussion of Franck’s democ-
ratic governance argument supra chapter two of this thesis. 
211 Id. at 64, referring to ICCPR Article 25, whereby all citizens have the right “(a) to take part in the con-
duct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; and (b) to vote and to be elected at 
genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret bal-
lot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors”, as viewed through e.g. GA Resolution 
45/150 (21 Feb. 1991), at para 2: “…that periodic and genuine elections are a necessary and indispensable 
element of sustained efforts to protect the rights and interests of the governed…” 
212 Although some, such as Elihu Lauterpacht, recognise the direct, ongoing and permanent linkages be-
tween the acquisition of territorial title by a state and its ongoing sovereignty over that territory. See E. 
Lauterpacht, Sovereignty: Myth or Reality?, 73 Int’l Affairs 149 (1997), at 149 et seq. 
213 F. Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad 13 (2003). 
214 Commission on Human Rights' resolution 2001/41 (adopted 23 April 2001 in a 44-0-9 vote) on 
Continuing dialogue on measures to promote and consolidate democracy mandated the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights to organize an expert seminar to examine the interdependence between 
democracy and human rights, and to report on its conclusions to the Commission’s 59th session. 
215 S. Gutto, Current concepts, core principles, dimensions, processes and institutions of democracy and the 
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what is perhaps more revealing is the emphasis given in the mandating resolution itself, which 
[r]eaffirms that democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental free-
doms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing;216 and also reaffirms that free and fair 
elections are an essential feature of democracy and must be part of a broader process that 
strengthens democratic principles, values, institutions, mechanisms and practices, which un-
derpin formal democratic structures and the rule of law.217  
What is immediately shown is that elections are a recurring natural feature of democracy, 
and are thought of as essential benchmarks for demonstrating its existence. As will become ap-
parent in the course of the present discussion, although the electoral process is an important 
one, it will be something of a challenge to remain focused on the idea of democracy in a larger 
scope, one which takes due account of the criteria promulgated by e.g. Franck and Thornberry 
in the course of the present discussion. That the electoral process was seen, in the chairperson’s 
conclusions of the UN seminar on democracy and human rights, as a particular procedure in 
the context of a series of larger societal phenomena, is even more revealing.218 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
inter-relationship between democracy and modern human rights, para. 7, Seminar on the Interdependence 
Between Democracy and Human Rights, UN OHCHR, 25-26 November 2002, available from 
www.unhchr.ch. 
216 CHR Resolution 2001/41, at para. 2. 
217 Id. at para. 3. 
218 These conclusions are reproduced in full: 
• Democracy and human rights are interdependent and inseparable. Human rights standards must be 
seen to underpin any meaningful conception of democracy, and democracy offers the best hope for 
the promotion and protection of all human rights. 
• The High Commissioner for Human Rights opened the seminar with a call for a concept of democ-
racy that is holistic, encompassing the procedural and the substantive, formal institutions and in-
formal processes, majorities and minorities, female and male, government and civil society, the 
political and the economic, the national and international. 
• There is no single model of democracy or of democratic institutions. Indeed, the ideal of democracy 
is rooted in past and emerging philosophies and traditions from all parts of the world, including 
particular philosophical writings, ancient texts, spiritual traditions, and traditional mechanisms 
originating in east and west, north and south. Thus, we must not seek to export or promote any par-
ticular national or regional model of democracy or of democratic institutions. To the contrary, a key 
strength of this approach is its recognition that each society and every context has its own indige-
nous and relevant democratic institutional traditions. While no single institution can claim democ-
ratic perfection, the combination of domestic democratic structures with universal democratic 
norms is a formidable tool in strengthening both the roots and the reach of democracy, and in ad-
vancing a universal understanding of democracy. 
• The basis of democracy is its principles, norms, standards and values, many of which are enumerated 
in international human rights instruments. Democracy thus goes beyond formal processes and insti-
tutions, and should be measured by the degree to which these principles, norms, standards and val-
ues are given effect and the extent to which they advance the realization of human rights.  
• The language of democracy has sometimes been misused. There is a value in helping the interna-
tional community to be consistent in its use, by emphasizing its internationally agreed normative 
human rights content and by further clarifying its constituent principles and elements. 
• Giving effect to democratic principles and to the standards contained in the human rights instru-
ments necessitates the building of strong institutions of democratic governance, based on the rule of 
law, and including an accountable executive, an elected legislature, and an independent judiciary. 
Democratic institutions ensure popular control of power. Free and fair elections are essential, as are 
appropriate and effective institutions for popular participation and consultation between elections. 
Ombudsman offices, national human rights commissions, well-constituted electoral commissions, 
national oversight mechanisms, public audit offices, and other such bodies can all contribute to en-
hancing democratic governance in a society.  
• Popular participation and control, collective deliberation, and political equality are essential to de-
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The practical effect of democracy remains a most complicated business, with regard to 
the need for regular elections and sustainable structural conditions alike, for the politics of iden-
tity are complex enough in the European context alone,219 but in circumstances whereby dis-
                                                                                                                                                                                           
mocracy, and these must be realized through a framework of accessible, representative and account-
able institutions subject to periodic change or renewal. Democracy is a mechanism of self-
determination, and must be based on the freely expressed will of the people, through genuine elec-
tions, with free information, opinion, expression, association and assembly. 
• In a democracy, the rights, interests and ‘voice’ of minorities, indigenous peoples, women, disem-
powered majorities such as some populations of post-colonial societies, and vulnerable, disadvan-
taged and unpopular groups must be safeguarded. 
• Democracy is never ‘achieved’ and the process of democratization is never complete. Popular vigi-
lance is required. All countries, and the international community itself, are engaged in ongoing 
processes of democratization, and these processes should be strengthened and supported. 
• The appeal of democracy includes its association with the advancement of the quality of life for all 
human beings. There is an inextricable link between democracy, all human rights and socio-
economic progress and development. There is no ‘either-or’ dichotomy between socio-economic 
progress and democracy. To the contrary, democracy, development and human rights are interde-
pendent and mutually reinforcing, and should thus be pursued together. Meaningful and informed 
political participation is in fact dependent upon fulfillment of economic and social rights such as the 
right to food and the right to education. The right to development is itself a crucial area of public af-
fairs in every country, and requires free, active and meaningful participation. 
• In the current context of globalization, whereby decisions affecting people’s lives are often taken out-
side the national context, the application of the principles of democracy to the international and re-
gional levels has taken on added importance. What should be pursued is a continuum of democratic 
governance, extending from the village, to the State, to our regional and international institutions 
and back. 
• The effective application of the rule of law and the fair administration of justice are vital to the good 
functioning of democracy. Democracy thus demands attention to ensuring judicial independence, 
applying human rights law in judicial decisions, combating corruption in judicial systems, 
strengthening judicial administration, assuring adequate resources for the justice sector, and en-
hancing judicial training and education. 
• The essential role of democratically elected legislatures requires particular emphasis. Properly con-
stituted legislative bodies represent a vital institutional link between the people, their democracy 
and their human rights. 
• The media should play an important role in democracies, contributing to the dissemination of hu-
man rights information, facilitating informed public participation, promoting tolerance, and con-
tributing to governmental accountability. To do so, however, they must promote tolerance and 
social responsibility and be careful in their use of terminology and fair and responsible in their re-
porting. At the same time, concentration of media power can undermine democracy.  
• A freely functioning, well-organized, vibrant and responsible civil society is essential to democratic 
governance. This presumes an active role for NGOs, women’s groups, social movements, trade un-
ions, minority organizations, professional societies and community groups, watchdog associations 
and others. Such groups have historically made important contributions to the formulation and ad-
vocacy of democratic rights. Civil society must itself adhere to the principles of human rights and 
democracy.  
• Democracy, in form and substance, is threatened by concentrations and abuse of power, poverty, cor-
ruption, foreign occupation and aggression, inequality, discrimination, repression of minorities, ex-
clusion of women, terrorism, abusive counter-terrorism measures, inadequate education, ineffective 
and unaccountable civil service, and, in general, all abuse of human rights. Building, protecting and 
consolidating democracy means, necessarily, countering these threats. 
• Well-functioning democracies require adequate resources and technical expertise, both of which are 
appropriate subjects of international cooperation and assistance, where requested by countries seek-
ing to strengthen democratic processes and institutions. 
219 That European states have become able to successfully accommodate stark differences in religious 
practice, language, culture, custom and tradition despite inconstancies in the full and exclusive definition 
of their own borders is, of course, a relatively recent development. 
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jointed ethnicities, collective identities and ungrounded power structures dominate the political 
landscape, a genuine rationale to one person is often a genuine absurdity to another. Further-
more, all is not always genuine, particularly when one considers how various ideologies exac-
erbate the stresses of ethnicity, myth, nationalism, emotion and misrepresentation, which can 
be so easily used by leaders to cause new discord,220 or to perpetuate the discord left behind by 
colonials.221 In addition, if one particular bit of territory within a state does not have access to ef-
fective government, if it has not enjoyed access to effective government, and, (as long as the 
status quo is maintained) if it is unlikely ever to have access to effective government, by virtue of a 
self-determination claim acceding to the level of a legal principle, an exception to the uti pos-
sidetis rule may be seen as valid, and an alteration to the status quo may well be within legal 
reach. However, if the internal character of self-determination can be preserved, this is clearly 
the most desirable outcome, as international law generally upholds the territorial holdings of a 
state “at least if it has controlled those holdings long enough for the rest of the world to get used 
to it”.222 Such an attitude is reflective of the desire of the state-based international system to per-
petuate itself. Certainly, by the end of the 20th century, it seems fair to say that the world has, in-
deed, gotten used to the arbitrary nature of African borders. Simultaneously, international 
society was also beginning to observe that states which uphold liberal democratic practices have 
a tendency to avoid warfare with other liberal democratic states, as shown in a classic study by 
Michael Doyle.223  
Although the line between interstate and intrastate relations is blurred, these thought 
processes do not occur in a vacuum, and less than a decade after Doyle’s ground-breaking asser-
tions, Thomas Franck was making his proclamation of democratic governance as an ‘emerging 
right’ as well as discussing its alter ego, the concept of ‘postmodern tribalism’ in regions lacking 
practices of good governance.224 Yet it became increasingly observed in the international affairs 
literature that “the weak are more likely to accept the principles forwarded by the strong, in the 
first instance, if such principles are convincingly framed as universal rather than particularis-
tic”.225 So, liberal democracy reached the universal stage, on the basis of some intrinsic worth. It 
is the root of a desirable system of future international order, to paraphrase Anne-Marie Slaugh-
                                                                  
220 For discussion, see M. Barrett, The Politics of Truth, from Marx to Foucault (1991), at 166-67. 
221 Cf. A. Pagden, Peoples and Empires: Europeans and the Rest of the World from Antiquity to the Pre-
sent 166 (2001): “Africa, as its postcolonial history has demonstrated all too brutally, is a land violated 
not just by the activities of European freebooters but by a false conception of ethnicity. Unlike India or 
much of Asia, or even ancient Mexico or Peru, sub-Saharan Africa before the arrival of the Europeans had 
very few very large-scale societies. One of the tragic consequences of indirect rule […] was the assump-
tion that Africans were divided into what, in honour of some supposed affinity with early European socie-
ties, were called tribes. Most of these were either too large or too small to capture the complex ethnic 
divisions of most parts of the continent. The Bangala of Zaire, the Baluyia of Kenya, the Bagisu of Uganda, 
and the Yorba and Ibo of Nigeria were all colonial inventions.”  
222 J. Reiman, Can Nations Have Moral Rights to Territory?, in J.R. Jacobson (ed.), The Territorial Rights of 
Nations and Peoples: Essays from The Basic Issues Forum 168 (1989). 
223 M. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, 12 Philosophy and Public Affairs 213 (1983). 
But see E.D. Mansfield and J. Snyder, Democratization and War, 74(3) Foreign Affairs 79 (May/June 
1995), observing that transitions to democracy lead to volatility between authoritarian elites and mass 
politics, and that statistical evidence demonstrates how this transitional period causes a greater propen-
sity for greater aggression and warmongering. 
224 See generally Franck, democratic governance, supra note 100. 
225 M.N. Barnett, Bringing in the New World Order: Liberalism, Legitimacy, and the United Nations, 49 
World Politics 526, 546 (1997), reviewing B. Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace (2d. ed, 1995); Commis-
sion on Global Governance, Our Global Neighborhood (1995); G. Evans, Cooperating for Peace (1993) 
and the Ford Foundation Report of the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations, 
The United Nations in Its Second Half-Century (1995). 
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ter, in an article published concurrently with Franck’s democratic governance thesis.226 This is in 
many ways a new development, as it has assumed the ‘natural’ governance position previously 
associated by Robert Dahl with “monarchy and aristocracy, by despotism and oligarchy”.227 
Dahl equates modern democracy with ‘polyarchy’,228 and identifies certain institutions neces-
sary for government ‘of, by and for’ the people. These criteria are reproduced in full: 
(a) control over governmental decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected offi-
cials; (b) elected officials are chosen and peacefully removed in relatively frequent, fair and 
free elections in which coercion is quite limited; (c) practically all adults have the right to 
vote in these elections; (d) most adults also have the right to run for the public offices for 
which candidates run in these elections; (e) citizens have an effectively enforced right to 
freedom of expression, particularly political expression, including criticism of the officials, the 
conduct of the government, the prevailing political, economic, and social system, and the 
dominant ideology; (f) they also have access to alternative sources of information that are 
not monopolized by the government or any single group; (g) finally they have an effectively 
enforced right to form and join autonomous association, including political associations, such 
as political parties and interest groups, that attempt to influence the government by compet-
ing in elections and by other peaceful means.229  
While Dahl goes on to state that polyarchy is less likely to be achieved in circumstances 
whereby “the political triumph of one poses a fundamental threat to another”,230 when recalling 
the general African focus of this study, particularly in equating democracy with a form of inter-
nal self-determination whereby the ‘self’ is defined by the ‘self’, and not through territorial de-
lineation,231 the dichotomy between peoples’ rights and minority rights is recalled, as there is an 
element of inescapable territoriality therein; this time, however, the territoriality is formulated 
within the independent postcolonial state. That is to say that the recurring importance of elec-
tions, as the most generally-accepted international benchmark for detecting an act of internal 
self-determination, has been identified and is worthy of closer examination, but to do so is to in-
terlink the concepts of ‘people’ and ‘minority’ once more, for there will always be such overlaps 
in practice, and overriding policy objectives will not allow the process to overrun minority 
rights protections for individuals. This further implies that, as the principal objective of such 
protections is progressive individual equality with the majority population, certain non-
discrimination provisions will have to be considered above and beyond the baseline levels of an 
individual’s right to political participation within the state, as potentially coupled with minority 
rights protections (and the inevitable point of reductio ad absurdum, where the question of infi-
                                                                  
226 A.-M. Slaughter, Towards an Age of Liberal Nations, 33 Harvard Int’l L.J. 393, 400-404 (1992). 
227 R.A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics 232 (1989) [hereinafter Dahl]. 
228 See generally Id. at 232-264. Dahl identifies seven institutions to be observed in a polyarchy, including: 
democracy, elected officials, free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage, right to run for office, freedom of 
expression, alternative information and associational assembly. See Id. at 221; see also R.A. Dahl, Polyar-
chy: Participation and Opposition (1971). 
229 Dahl, supra note 227, at 233. But cf. Brietzke, supra note 189, at 98: “The value and meaning of a collec-
tive right like self-determination is encompassed by its status as an ‘externality,’ a public or collective 
good. Like other collective goods, self-determination can only be produced jointly, through a ‘political’ 
cooperation, and no member of a nation can exclude another member from enjoying the benefits. There-
fore, neutral observers must scrutinize the fairness of a nation’s conditions for membership. […] This 
collective national identity justifies the imposition of duties on members, in ways that the interests of no 
single member, and no individualistic theory of human nature, can justify. This justification results from 
the whole being greater than the sum of its parts in collective activities, owing to the synergy of interde-
pendence.” 
230 Dahl, supra note 227, at 260. 
231 For discussion, see G.H. Fox, Self-Determination in the Post-Cold War Era: A New Internal Focus?, 16 
Mich. J. Int’l L. 733 (1995), at 737-752 (reviewing Y. Beigbeder, International Monitoring of Plebiscites, 
Referenda and National Elections: Self-Determination and Transition to Democracy (1994)). 
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nite minorities within minorities is brought into play) and, particularly in the case of a ‘nega-
tively-defined’ people, collective actions vis-à-vis the state itself. That is to say that if self-
determination has an external status as a ‘public good’, its benefits must be equitably distributed 
to all parties, including territorially-based, collective ‘peoples’, and yet this must be done with-
out infringing the basic rights of individuals, which are part of minority groupings within such 
territories. Furthermore, recalling Dahl’s earlier criteria for polyarchy, a recurring theme is 
identified, in line with earlier discussions, in that elections, as the right to choose becomes the 
original, but not the only, manifestation of democracy. Reading to Dahl’s earlier criteria, the 
right to choose ideally has implications for: (a) accountability for public officials; (b) frame-
works for stability in periods of administrative change; (c) inter-societal equity as the conceptual 
basis for such changes; (d) a sense of openness towards governance; (e) legal protections to 
permit and indeed encourage societal organisation to influence the outcome of elections; (f) an 
individual’s intellectual objectivity in effectuating one’s right to choose; and (g) access to civil so-
ciety, in the broader sense. 
Roles for civil society in a democratic state: Strengthening, not threatening, the status quo? 
The problem is that, particularly in Africa, the end results are so wildly mixed. Polyarchy 
is rare in juridical statehood—and the benevolent polyarchy conceived of by Dahl is even more 
so—and yet great institutional faith seems to be instilled in the idea of elections without consid-
ering fully the implications of such circumstances. This is what it means to say that self-
determination of peoples and uti possidetis juris do not fully contemplate the implications of 
their relationship over time. This may well be one reason why the breaking points between the 
legal principle of self-determination and the legal rule of general scope of uti possidetis juris are 
to be found particularly in Africa. What is not under examination is conflict between uti pos-
sidetis and self-determination per se,232 for, at this stage of the discussion, the ongoing rationae 
temporis of uti possidetis is greatly in doubt,233 as it is not completely synonymous with the prin-
ciple of territorial integrity in the first instance, and indeed has been replaced by that principle, 
by virtue of the fact of the African states’ independence for decades now. Rather, the onus is on 
self-determination of peoples to fulfil its destiny between the nexus of Articles 20 and 13 of the 
African Charter: that is, to fuse, through practical manifestation, peoples’ rights and the right to 
political participation. This is seen most clearly in the work of the African Commission on Hu-
man and Peoples’ Rights through its Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire decision,234 whereby the 
African Commission, in the context of an attempted secession of Katanga from Zaire, deter-
mined that, to effectuate this form of self-determination, the province would be required to “ex-
ercise a variant of self-determination that is compatible with the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Zaire”, in the absence of widespread and massive human rights violations or evi-
dence to the effect that Katangese citizens are being denied the right to political participation 
guaranteed in Article 13(1). The fact that the African Commission declared “that the case holds 
                                                                  
232 See also Frontier Dispute Case (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali), 1986 ICJ Rep. 554, 567, whereby the 
Court held in dicta that the two principles would not automatically be in conflict with each other as uti 
possidetis was seen as worthwhile as a stability-preserving measure. 
233 Thus, the origins are revealed of a common fallacy amongst certain international lawyers and African-
ists alike that uti possidetis juris, equated with the AU (OAU) Cairo Declaration, means that frontiers are 
eternally inviolable. Boundaries, it should be recalled, can be changed by mutual consent or by acts of se-
cession sufficiently credible to achieve adequate recognition by other states, first on a regional level, and 
then on a more widespread level. 
234 For discussion, see African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication 75/92, Ka-
tangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire, Eighth Activity Report 1994-1995, Annex VI, at 388, particularly at 
para. 6.  
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no evidence of violations of any rights under the African Charter [and that the] quest for inde-
pendence for Katanga therefore has no merit under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights”,235 this decision was reinforced by the UN Security Council, which rejected Katanga’s at-
tempted secession, and served to declare such actions contrary to Zairian municipal law and to 
demand a cessation of secessionist activities in the territory.236 
The stability that was originally to have been garnered from the employment of uti pos-
sidetis at the critical date of decolonisation is now better placed to be effectuated through the 
practical manifestation of this fusion. The fact remains that self-determination means two 
things: it is first a general legal principle setting the tone for the protection of a comprehensive 
package of rights;237 secondly, it is the cornerstone of the international legal entitlement to de-
mocracy, via internal self-determination. But herein yet another dilemma is revealed: democ-
racy, as the right to choose, is election-centric, and yet mere elections as such do very little 
inherently to promote and protect the civil and political rights identified through the African 
Charter. It is fatuous to equate the occurrence of periodic, free and fair elections with the basket 
of protections afforded by, in particular, articles 2-13 of the African Charter. What is more 
chiefly at issue is the human dignity of citizens of postcolonial African states.238 The concepts, 
not inherently dissimilar themselves, preserve the essence of what is least indisputably the cus-
tomary international law of self-determination—that of decolonisation—and project it into the 
modern age under the rubric of democracy.239 It does so in three forms: administrative, electoral 
and statutory. The administrative form is a peoples’ right to autonomy in government, as negoti-
ated with the central power. The electoral form is a citizens’ right to ensure that government is 
responsive to their needs. The statutory form captures the comparatively lesser-defined phi-
losophical energy that is generated by the legal weight of international and regional human 
rights law, as effectuated by the postcolonial state itself, in its municipal judiciaries and through 
horizontal enforcement of international human rights law. Thus, internal self-determination as 
an election-oriented process certainly does contribute to human dignity; however, the problem 
which remains lies rooted in the extreme limitations on state capacity. This is a problematic cir-
cumstance caused by the uncertain centre of gravity among the three distinct components. 
However, this is how internal self-determination serves to strengthen the postcolonial 
state, for it is a type of individuation that strengthens both the vertical and horizontal aspects of 
the state—perhaps to the chagrin of some members of that state’s government. But civil society is 
                                                                  
235 Id. 
236 See Security Council resolution S/Res/169 (24 Nov. 1961). 
237 Reflecting the core provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on civil and po-
litical rights, particularly non-discrimination and equality, the right to life, dignity and fair treatment, as 
well as personal security, due process in judicial processes and intellectual and associative freedoms. 
238 The idea of human dignity a judicial construct has figured in the literature since Oscar Schachter’s clas-
sical writings on the topic. See O. Schachter, Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 AJIL 848 (1983). 
Skurbaty, who works from the same construct, makes a germane restatement of the concept, particularly 
as he uses human dignity as a pathway towards development of his ‘individuation’ concept. Cf. Skurbaty, 
supra note 51, at 426: “(a) human dignity is the major goal value as well as the source of (international) 
human rights); (b) it is inter alia a normative concept; (c) its content as well as implications are unclear, 
‘left to intuitive understanding’; (d) the existing definitions are tautological, static and do not capture the 
dynamic nature of the concept, its—one can say—modus operandi; (e) given the paramount importance of 
the concept for the international law of human rights it would be highly desirable to offer a new definition 
and understanding of human dignity; (f) the new concept should ideally be able to bridge the domains of 
majority-minority problématique, Human Dignity, Human Rights and Self-Determination; and (g) the 
concept should become a fusion-word, a kind of linkage, a medium, a metaphor connection informing the 
new legal reasoning.”  
239 For discussion see e.g. S. Huntington, Democracy’s Third Wave, 2(2) Journal of Democracy 12 (1991). 
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a practical form of democracy in action, and it is, in some ways, not difficult to see how it can be 
perceived as inherently threatening to a government—as something akin to the manifestation of 
an effectivité which is being done by, in the main, organisations that are, by definition, ‘non-
governmental’. The question is more than the manifestation of governmental activity and the 
titular control over territory: it is a fact that, in the vast majority of rural Africa, there is often very 
little else left, other than the civil service and civil society, as centres of power, finance, intellect 
and the like. To that end, in referring to the amicus curiae report of Georges Abi-Saab to the Ca-
nadian Supreme Court on the question of secession of Quebec, Crawford writes that the a priori 
application of self-determination to a situation is followed by its effectiveness, which “can only 
be determined once the process has substantially run its course”.240 In this sense, it is not difficult 
to imagine how that process may have run its course, and it is now up to the internal compo-
nents of the state to contribute to the challenges of postcolonial governance. While this is appar-
ently wise, as a matter of policy,241 it is a circumstance very difficult to express or indeed enforce 
as a matter of law, however, lest it go forgotten that self-determination is a right of peoples and 
not a right of civil society, which, itself, is an even more amorphous and less-accepted concept 
than are ‘peoples’. Furthermore, to be practicable, a ‘people’ will be given more of an essential 
territorial definition and delineation than will ‘civil society’.242 But, it would be simultaneously 
foolhardy to ignore that civil society undoubtedly contributes to a more robust national life by 
compensating for the shortcomings of the state, and in so doing makes significant impacts on the 
relatively more easily accepted concept of effectiveness, and the increasingly-understood con-
cept of democracy. Thus, from a policy perspective, international law should be seen as incor-
porating an expansive view for the recognition of non-state actors, which may perform state-like 
functions. This is drawn from the possibility whereby individual states would legislate certain 
protections for societal groups, in their own domestic legislation, as could be most readily evi-
dent for international and grassroots development organisations, for example. It would also be 
assumed that the loosening of laws restricting the right of freedom of association would be a sine 
qua non under the same formula.243 
The fact of the matter is that self-determination of peoples is measured in simultaneous 
quantities of political development and legality, which need not necessarily be either equal or 
congruous. So, while “it is indispensable to conceptualise politics in Africa more in terms of the 
ever-fluctuating power relations between constantly changing state and civil society than in 
terms of the logistics and topography of formal power,”244 it is more important to stay true to the 
reality that “self-determination, having for years been denied as a legal right by vested interests in 
the West, Eastern Europe and the Third World alike, now faces a new danger: that of being all 
                                                                  
240 Crawford, supra note 182, at 52. 
241 And indeed is certainly is a matter of policy, as e.g. United States policy has been to advocate the pro-
motion of democratisation in African countries. For discussion see J.W. Harbeson, Externally Assisted 
Democratization: Theoretical Issues and Practical Realities, in J.W. Harbeson and D. Rothchild (eds.) Af-
rica in World Politics: The African State System in Flux (2000), at 244-257. 
242 Cf. Y. Dinstein, Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities, 25 ICLQ 102, 109 (1976), identify-
ing an essential characteristic for a ‘people’ is to be “located in a well-defined territorial area in which it 
forms a majority”. 
243 For example, in March 1991, the Government of Angola approved the Law of Association, and a few 
days later, it ratified a law on political parties confirming a multiparty system based on nation unity and 
pluralism of ideas. This led to rapid growth of organisation-building: political parties (as many as sixty), 
NGOs (from neighbourhood groups, to environmental committees, professional associations, women’s 
organizations, sports clubs, and welfare organizations). While many of these were short-lived, some con-
tinue to have an impact, especially development-oriented NGOs, which have access to economic resources 
through foreign aid. 
244 Chabal, supra note 163, at 93. 
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things to all men”.245 So, there is necessary regression into the relatively firmer ground of the 
‘democratic entitlement’ product of what Susan Marks, in a major critique of Franck’s democ-
ratic governance thesis, terms the ‘liberal revolution’.246 Marks’s observation that the democratic 
norm thesis is little more than an ‘election-oriented’ view is useful in identifying that the form of 
self-determination, whereby citizens ensure government is responsive to their needs, is the most 
easily-identifiable aspect of postcolonial internal self-determination. The problem is in assess-
ing the electoral phenomenon as a part of internal self-determination. Furthermore, Franck’s 
own conception of democracy holds paramount to determine the legitimacy of governance by 
way of “evidence of consent to the process by which the populace is consulted by its Government”.247 
But it will be of even greater interest to consider the electoral, administrative and statutory forms 
of self-determination, while simultaneously considering the roles that could be played by civil 
society in effectuating such tasks. To do so would provide about as clear of a picture of internal 
self-determination measures in postcolonial African states as could be imagined, and will be of 
even greater use in evaluating the practical situations of postcolonial self-determination. 
The challenge of linking democracy, rights and society in the postcolonial state 
Despite the apparent virtues of a consensus-oriented politique, the Westminister model of 
democracy remains prevalent. If the democracy, as an ‘election-oriented’ reality, is as it appears, 
then it is a reflection of the fact that elections are the most tangible and easily-identifiable mani-
festation of a ‘democratic norm’, which itself is hardly the most deeply-rooted and universally-
accepted concept in modern public international law.248 It could just as well be seen that ‘de-
mocracy’ is a logical step in the wholesale incorporation of the concept of justice into lawmak-
ing, as advocated by US Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cordozo.249 Also, a willingness to 
operate more on the conceptual, rather than technical, level is likely to be of benefit.250 These 
techniques will be useful, for the essence of Marks’s argument is to encourage an environment 
wherein the critique of ideology facilitates the analysis of the “asymmetrical power relations”,251 
which may occur given that the decision-making process is effectuated by ‘the people’ only 
through politicians.252 Marks considers the least-effective of democratic states to be undertaking 
“low-intensity democracy”,253 a concept she views as having an “electoral fixation”,254 and one 
                                                                  
245 Higgins, supra note 175, at 128. 
246 See S. Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ide-
ology (2000), particularly at chapter two: International Law and the ‘Liberal Revolution’ [hereinafter 
Marks]. 
247 T.M. Franck, General Course on Public International Law, 420 Rec. des Cours 102 (1993). 
248 Cf. Marks, supra note 246, at 41: “For Franck, the norm’s validity is clear; if he qualifies it as ‘emerg-
ing’, this is because of doubts about the adequacy of existing supervisory procedures. In his analysis, the 
democratic entitlement will lack full ‘coherence’ until enforcement measures are put in place which are 
both consistent in their application and compatible with other international rules (such as the principle of 
non-intervention).” 
249 See B.N. Cordozo, The Growth of the Law (1924), at 87 et seq. 
250 For discussion, see the report by C. Chinkin, in Theme Panel IV: The End of Sovereignty? (Roundtable), 
88 ASIL Proceedings 71 (1994). 
251 Marks, supra note 246, at 146. 
252 Cf. Id. at 50: “The role of the people is not to ‘decide issues’ but ‘to produce a government’”, citing J. 
Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 282, 269 (6th ed., 1987). 
253 Id. at 53. Her other synonyms for the idea include ‘cosmetic democracy’ and ‘façade democracy’, not un-
like the phenomenon of ‘Governmental Non-Governmental Organisations’, or GONGOs. Viz. World 
Federalist Movement, Background Paper on GONGOs, QUANGOs and Wild NGOs (2001), on file with 
author. 
254 Id. at 60, citing W.I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention and Hegemony 
345 (1996). 
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with which Franck’s democratic norm thesis can be associated through the wholesale extrapo-
lation of the liberal democratic to all circumstances. She writes: 
The purported norm of democratic governance identifies democracy with the holding of mul-
tiparty elections, the protection of civil rights and the establishment of the rule of law. It has 
international law endorse calls to institute formal or ‘political’ democracy in post-communist 
and developing countries, but needs to countervail moves to secure the development of so-
cial and pluralist democracy. At the same time, it adopts an affirmative approach to ‘actually 
existing democracy’, which tends to eclipse awareness of the enduring—and in some ways 
increasing—deficits of liberal states.255  
For Marks, the underlying problem revolves around “the pervasiveness of political exclu-
sion of various sorts”, whereby democracy amounts to little more than broken promises and 
rote actions. Superficial institutional reform, in the initial phase, can actually do more harm than 
good by maintaining the internal status quo under the guise of actual constitutional, administra-
tive and regulatory reform. This leads her to conclude that the democratic norm thesis can lead 
to “a dangerous inducement to complacency” in low-intensity democracy states: 
Against the promise of self-rule and political equality stands a reality of oligarchy and tech-
nocracy, invisible power and bureaucratic-business domination, individual political alienation 
and differentiated social opportunity. By encouraging the belief that liberal societies represent 
the near-pinnacle of democratic achievement, the democratic norm thesis promotes an un-
critical, affirmative approach to democratic life which shifts attention away from liberal de-
mocracy’s manifold broken promises.256 
After drawing reference to ideas promulgated by David Held on the notion of an alterna-
tive ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ largely rooted in the concept of autonomy,257 Marks concludes 
that, without deeper structural reform, the ‘democratic entitlement’ could well end up as a hin-
drance to genuine social development, due to the fragmentation caused by the ineffectiveness of 
the underlying structures. Rather than reinforcing the interdependence and interrelatedness of 
all human rights, Marks asserts that a blanket right to democracy, in its application, can have the 
unintended consequence of further societal fragmentation. For that, she asserts that the democ-
ratic entitlement should be seen as a ‘new legal principle’ rather than a ‘right to a right’. The core 
of her argument is that “the concept of democratic inclusion should function as a principle, to 
guide the elaboration, application, and invocation of international law”.258 Marks refers to the 
principles of sovereign equality and non-interference in domestic affairs as reference points 
“moulding the agenda of international law-making, shaping the interpretation of international 
legal norms, and influencing the procedures for asserting international legal rights and enforc-
ing international legal duties” to modify law slightly, by expanding the frontiers of legality to 
meet social needs.259 She writes: 
I propose the principle of democratic inclusion as a new principle, which might serve to re-
shape such established legal norms as the principle of sovereign equality of states and the 
principle of non-interference in domestic affairs, and also to orient future international legal 
developments in a particular direction. I envision the principle as weaving into the fabric of 
international law a kind of bias in favour of popular self-rule and equal citizenship, that is to 
say, a bias in favour of inclusory political communities.260  
                                                                  
255 Id. at 74-75. 
256 Id. at 73-74, citing N. Bobbio, The Future of Democracy: A Defence of the Rules of the Game 27 (1987).  
257 Id. at 106, citing D. Held, Democracy and the New Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmo-
politan Governance (1995), particularly at chapters seven and eight. 
258 Id. at 111. 
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Territorialism as an inhibitor to the principle of democratic inclusion? 
At the outset of this chapter, the variable of territorialism was left, ceteris paribus, analyti-
cally fixed. This was done both in the interest of analytical clarity, to conceptualise the postcolo-
nial state, and to recognise the existence of legal instruments, such as the uti possidetis juris rule 
and the OAU Cairo Declaration. However, international law shows more ambivalence towards 
the question of territorial modification, and would show considerably more neutrality towards 
the question of secession than e.g. the restrictive perspectives espoused by U Thant in 1960.261 
In actual fact, international law acts without prejudice toward an eventual modification 
of the uti possidetis standard, particularly whereby geographically-defined regions attempting to 
effectuate an internal right of peoples to self-determination are unlikely ever to obtain such ob-
jectives without a substantial change in factual circumstances throughout the relevant adminis-
trative structures and populations concerned. In the present analysis, the removal of 
territorialism as a dominant variable for critical examination was effectuated for analytical pur-
poses. It must be recalled, however, that recognition, to the extent that it may be determined, 
may be driven as much from political as legal motivations, although, in any event, the declara-
tory effect of such political actions is also indicative of juridical weight.262 It is another question 
altogether whether states, in practice, decide to use strict legal criteria under all circumstances to 
recognise new territorial entities as ‘peoples’, ‘minorities’ or any other legal form, including a 
new state, for that matter. 
Nevertheless, what may be observed is a concept in the same vein as the assertion that the 
original self-determination Grundnorm of decolonisation has been replaced with a Grundnorm 
of human dignity through internal self-determination, as well as broader frameworks of minor-
ity rights protections, democracy and civil society which form part of the law of modern territo-
rial statehood. This phenomenon may also be observed when considering implications for 
territorial sovereignty emanating from international environmental law as well. Nico Schrijver, 
for example, draws reference to certain aspects of the Corfu Channel case, in the context of Al-
bania’s failure to warn others of the existence of a minefield in its territorial waters, whereby the 
ICJ observed that every state has an “obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for 
acts contrary to the rights of other States”.263 Additionally, Schrijver goes on to identify the fol-
lowing principles of international environmental law with application to state sovereignty: (a) 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources; (b) due care for the environment and precau-
tionary action; (c) inter- and intragenerational equality; (d) good neighbourliness; (e) equitable 
utilization and apportionment of environmental resources; (f) prior information, consultation 
                                                                  
261 See discussion supra chapter two of this study. 
262 Cf. D. Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (2002), at 426-7 [hereinafter Raič]: 
“[C]ombining the law of self-determination and recognition practice in the field of unilateral secession 
leads to the conclusion that if an entity is recognized as a State, while it has been established as a result of 
unilateral secession, and its creation is sought to be justified on the basis of the right of external self-
determination, the recognition of statehood implies the recognition of the applicability of a right of uni-
lateral secession of the people in question. Recognition has thus assumed a dual role: it is not only the 
State which is recognized, but also the right of external self-determination of the people concerned.” Raič 
refers particularly to K. Knop, The ‘Righting’ of Recognition: Recognition of States in Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union, State Sovereignty: The Challenge of a Changing World (Proceedings of the 1992 Cana-
dian Conference on International Law), at 38. 
263 See N.J. Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties (1997) [hereinaf-
ter Schrijver], at 237, citing the Corfu Channel case (UK v. Albania), 1949 ICJ Rep. 22. Schrijver also re-
fers, Id. at 238, to the Lac Lanoux case (Spain v. France), 24 ILR 120 (1957), which followed similar 
reasoning, concluding that “territorial sovereignty plays the part of presumption. It must bend before all 
international obligations, whatever their source, but only for such obligations.” 
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and early warning; (g) state responsibility and liability; (h) termination of unlawful activities and 
the making of reparation; (i) preservation of res communis and the common heritage of man-
kind; (j) duty to co-operate in solving transboundary environmental problems; (k) common 
but differentiated obligations (e.g. collaboration between the developed and developing 
world); and (l) peaceful settlement of environmental disputes.264 
In sum, ‘inclusory political communities’ are mainstreamed into international legal par-
lance, and if equality is the cornerstone of these communities, all forms of social exclusion, dis-
crimination and racism must be seen as impermissible.265 The reinforcing series of societal 
improvements lead to circumstances whereby the right to life is held to a greater importance, 
and presumably societies make a Kantian step towards the telos of flourishing. The problem, of 
course, is that the problem of peace is equally universal and frustrating, and the least socially, 
politically and economically developed societies are undoubtedly the hardest hit. But what is 
really at issue is the search for a better way to control the power of the state in a manner accept-
able for all the state’s citizens.  
Whether the uti possidetis standard will be modified in any given practical circumstance 
will be determined by a largely immeasurable mixture of factual situations on the ground, evi-
dence documenting those situations, the level of horizontal enforcement by other states in re-
gional and UN bodies concerned with human rights, international peace and security and the 
practicality of implementing decisions taken in this regard. The more significant point for the 
present legal analysis is on the more theoretical level, however, and stems directly from the re-
moval of the ceteris paribus assumption, which was used to hold uti possidetis as a constant vari-
able in the postcolonial state equation. Such a removal of this assumption is broadly what has 
been advocated in the present analysis, particularly through the conceptions of a ‘negatively-
formed’ people, which is both relatively geographically-contiguous and formed more as an ex 
post facto result of predatory actions by a state, than on strict grounds of a singular ethnicity 
formed by race or religion. Particularly in situations where internal self-determination could be 
satisfied though a form of autonomy within a state,266 the question of modifying the territorial 
status quo will not normally arise. As a matter of course, however, should such forms of internal 
self-determination never actually come to fruition in practice, and indeed the state’s own obliga-
tion to protect its citizens comes clearly into question,267 the postcolonial relevance of uti pos-
sidetis will also be increasingly called into question. 
The underlying legal element remaining is that which constructed the colonial state in the 
first instance. In Africa, of course, this is to say that before discussions about territorial integrity 
of states and the manifestation of sovereign acts can be genuinely considered, questions of how 
and why state boundaries have been demarcated and delineated constantly loom in the back-
                                                                  
264 See Schrijver, Id. at 240-249. 
265 See particularly The incompatibility between democracy and racism, Commission on Human Rights 
resolution 2001/43, and the Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in document 
E/CN.4/2002/69. 
266 See Raič, supra note 262, at 264, and discussion supra chapter two of this study. 
267 The responsibility to protect, discussed supra chapter three of this study, is gaining currency as an ac-
cepted ‘modern’ human right in UN practice. This is most clearly observed in the Report of the High-
Level Mission on the situation of human rights in Darfur pursuant to Human Rights Council decision S-
4/101, Human Rights Council document A/HRC/4/80, 7 March 2007, particularly at section III (The Dar-
fur Peace Agreement, the Ensuing Violence and the Responsibility To Protect), section IV (Sudan’s Action 
Regarding the Responsibility to Protect), and Section V (The International Community’s Responsibility 
to Protect). In the Sudanese context, see also Security Council Resolution 1706 (2006), 31 August 2006, 
reaffirming the responsibility to protect as per the 2005 World Summit outcome document, A/RES/60/1 
(24 October 2005). 
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ground. That e.g. the after-effects of the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 continue to be a significant 
definitional variable in every African state of the 21st century clearly demonstrates how much 
influence the concept of original title has on the overall conceptualisation of statehood, and in-
deed how the territorial aspects are relatively more fixed in definition than are the administrative 
aspects of statehood.268 In sum, in order to genuinely understand the function of the postcolo-
nial state, aspects of its territorial construction must be given due consideration. Particularly as 
uti possidetis juris in its original employment was meant to prevent competing claims for territo-
rial occupation in colonial and decolonising geographic regions,269 it will be useful to briefly 
consider some additional jurisprudence of the ICJ, particularly with regard to territorial dis-
putes between states, to observe general trends on how the Court responds to the phenomenon 
of territorialism as a component of sovereignty. 
PART C: Capita selecta from recent state practice concerning territorialism 
In chapter two of this study, considerable time was spent discussing jurisprudence stem-
ming primarily from the ICJ concerning the interplay between the ‘right of peoples to self-
determination’ and the legal rule of uti possidetis juris.270 In this section, attention will briefly be 
given to the interplay among a number of ICJ cases, with particular relevance to the territorial 
aspect of statehood. Essentially, the legal weight of the original title to territory obtained through 
colonisation will be contrasted with that of the juridical manifestation of sovereignty—
effectivités, in postcolonial states.  
The underlying legal argument at present concerns the relative legal weight attributed to 
the formation of the postcolonial state in pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial stages, which 
all have particular correlations with the evolution of the principle of self-determination. In re-
calling the previous discussion, self-determination was first a political precept, then a right to 
decolonisation in the early UN context, and is now primarily a guarantor of access to govern-
ment in the postcolonial context.271 But as has been discussed, a juridically valid act of external 
self-determination may also follow an act of decolonisation to serve as a last-chance definitional 
guarantor of the practical applicability of internal self-determination in a postcolonial state.272 
The concept may be viewed in two contrasting perspectives. The first circumstance, i.e., ‘origi-
nal title’, may be observed when a territory is colonised and ‘civilised’, as most often occurred 
when colonial powers sought to cede territory to colonised administrations. This is the ‘civilis-
ing’ act, which brought so-called ‘uncivilised’ lands into the European global legal system, and 
given the strong juridical weight allocated to positivist perspectives in law, these original treaties 
of cession continue to hold genuine legal significance. This is particularly so in postcolonial 
states, whereby the uti possidetis juris is of obvious relevance, and may be most readily observed 
in Africa, as the intergovernmental Berlin Conference was convened, with the specific purpose 
of defining the geographical limits of territorial administration by colonial entities.273 Thus colo-
nising states also declared their intent to actually manifest colonial effectivités in territories 
separated by the ‘saltwater barrier’. Once these colonies actually became formed, and subse-
quently, once they were granted independence, the primary and secondary stages of self-
determination had been effectuated. What is significant for the present analysis, however, is the 
                                                                  
268 See discussion supra chapter one of this study. 
269 See discussion supra chapter one of this study, at text accompanying note 75. 
270 See particularly supra chapter two of this study, at text following note 125. 
271 See discussion supra chapter two of this study. 
272 See discussion supra chapter three of this study. 
273 See discussion supra chapter one of this study. 
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reality that the establishment of a title to territory, as it was an instrument of juridical positivism 
concerning the sovereign state, is both a nascent creation and an enabling function. In this 
sense, it is nascent because the agreement between coloniser and colonised was one between 
the unequal, between ‘sovereign’ and ‘the other’. In addition to gaining territory, the colonising 
entity also established its juridical status equivalent upon an otherwise ‘uncivilised’ territory as a 
matter of definition. Simultaneously, the phenomenon was also enabling, in that it served to 
structurally validate the universal nature of territorial statehood in early international law and 
therefore served the purpose of juridical globalisation as sought by classical legal positivism. 
In the third, postcolonial stage of self-determination’s evolution, if only for the existence 
of the uti possidetis rule, it is obvious that decolonisation was not meant by international law to 
be a free-for-all. This is borne out by practice, whereby most African states for example con-
tinue to retain essentially the same external frontiers as those of colonial times. However, it may 
also be observed, in particular circumstances, where the monolith of ‘original title’ proves insuf-
ficient to reflect the complexity of the actual situation on the ground in the postcolonial state, 
and that benefit would be derived from a more ‘modern’ evaluation of the aspects of sover-
eignty, e.g. fundamental human rights standards, the responsibility to protect, the advocacy of 
multi-dimensional democracy and the importance of protecting and involving civil society, it 
may be useful to critically assess the uti possidetis standard and determine if an additional meas-
ure of juridical consideration should be applied, in addition to the ‘original title’ standard of al-
locating sovereignty to a territory. Such a phenomenon could be most readily observed in states 
once colonised, ‘civilised’, decolonised and now subject to the various effectivités which may be 
manifested on a territory, with correspondingly variable standards of governance. Although it 
seems prima facie that the original title to territory is of primary importance, the historical con-
solidation doctrine and the roles played by postcolonial effectivités deserve closer examination, 
particularly given the arbitrary territorial constructions of many postcolonial states. It may even 
be the case that territorialism should reflect less of a stranglehold on the state than it does in cer-
tain circumstances. In particular, it may be the case that excessive reliance on original title may, 
in some circumstances, practically corrupt vertical state consolidation and substantively inhibit 
the potential for horizontal societal preservation, because the demands of maintaining the terri-
torial space are such that governance standards of postcolonial states are practically impossible 
to uphold and maintain.  
Thematic observations involving original title, effectivités and historical consoli-
dation  
Three principal cases will be referred to in determining the relationship between original 
title and historical consolidation. Most recently, the ICJ Nicaragua v. Honduras case is useful in 
acknowledging the interplay between uti possidetis and the effectiveness of the postcolonial 
state.274 This case demonstrates how the historical consolidation model is not to be rejected out 
of hand, as uti possidetis was shown to require the observance of colonial effectivités in order to 
be juridically valid. This was not seen to be so in this case,275 which led the Court to consider a 
limited possibility of including postcolonial effectivités as potential determinants of sovereignty 
over a disputed territory. 
                                                                  
274 Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. 
Honduras) [hereinafter Nicaragua/Honduras], available from http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/ 
120/14075.pdf, accessed 8 October 2007. 
275 See discussion supra chapter two of this study. 
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The Court’s reasoning in Nicaragua/Honduras follows Eritrea’s contested secession from 
Ethiopia, in which the historical consolidation doctrine was readily employed. In the Delimita-
tion Decision by the Boundary Commission of 13 April 2002, 276 subsequently acknowledged by 
both Eritrea and Ethiopia as final and binding, in accordance with the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement signed in Algiers on 12 December 2000, the neutral Boundary Commission, com-
posed of five members, was mandated to delimit and demarcate the territorial boundary be-
tween the secessionist Eritrea and the larger Ethiopia.277 Although the Commission’s decision 
served, in practice, to validate certain instances of historical consolidation, in discharging its re-
sponsibilities to delineate and demarcate the international frontier between two previously inte-
grated postcolonial states,278this decision stood in contrast with the outcome of the territorial 
dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria before the ICJ, which occurred just six months later.279 
In it, the Court avoided an approach supportive of the historical consolidation doctrine and in-
deed clearly favoured the concept of original title over that of territorial occupation and effective 
control,280 particularly by broadly reaffirming that agreements entered into, between colonising 
and colonised entities, were of primary legal significance in determining title to territory, from 
which sovereignty is derived.281In sum, of the three cases presently being surveyed, it appears 
that the Ethiopia/Eritrea arbitration was most responsive towards favouring the notion of his-
torical consolidation, whereas the ICJ can broadly be seen as ignoring this notion in the Camer-
oon/Nigeria case. However, the International Court’s willingness in the Nicaragua/Honduras 
                                                                  
276 See also Eritrea - Ethiopia Boundary Commission: Decision Regarding Delimitation of the Border be-
tween The State of Eritrea and The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, in annex to Letter from the 
Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2002/423, 15 April 2002 [herein-
after Boundary Commission Decision]. See also Security Council Resolution 1430 (2002), particularly at 
preambular paragraph three. 
277 See UN Doc. S/2000/1183, 40 ILM 260 (2001). The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission was es-
tablished pursuant to an agreement dated 12 December 2000, alternately entitled “Agreement between the 
Government of the State of Eritrea and the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia” 
and “Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Gov-
ernment of the State of Eritrea”. Cf. Id. at Article 4: “1. Consistent with the provisions of the Framework 
Agreement and the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, the parties reaffirm the principle of respect for 
the borders existing at independence as stated in resolution AHG/Res. 16(1) adopted by the OAU Summit 
in Cairo in 1964, and, in this regard, that they shall be determined on the basis of pertinent colonial trea-
ties and applicable international law. 2. The parties agree that a neutral Boundary Commission composed 
of five members shall be established with a mandate to delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border 
based on pertinent colonial treaties (1900, 1902 and 1908) and applicable international law. The Commis-
sion shall not have the power to make decisions ex aequo et bono. […] 13. Upon reaching a final decision 
regarding delimitation of the borders, the Commission shall transmit its decision to the parties and Sec-
retaries General of the OAU and the United Nations for publication, and the Commission shall arrange 
for expeditious demarcation. 14. The parties agree to cooperate with the Commission, its experts and 
other staff in all respects during the process of delimitation and demarcation, including the facilitation of 
access to territory they control. […] 15. The parties agree that the delimitation and demarcation determi-
nations of the Commission shall be final and binding. Each party shall respect the border so determined, 
as well as the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the other party. 16. Recognizing that the results of 
the delimitation and demarcation process are not yet known, the parties request the United Nations to fa-
cilitate resolution of problems which may arise due to the transfer of territorial control, including the 
consequences for individuals residing in previously disputed territory.” 
278 See Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission: Decision Regarding Delimitation of the Border between 
The State of Eritrea and The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, in annex to Letter from the Secre-
tary-General to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2002/423, 15 April 2002 [hereinafter 
Boundary Commission Decision] 
279 See Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Equatorial 
Guinea intervening (Merits), Judgement, 2002 ICJ Rep. 303 [hereinafter Cameroon-Nigeria case] 
280 See Id. at para. 65 et seq. 
281 See Id. at para. 205 et seq. 
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case to consider postcolonial effectivités, as being reflective of acts of sovereignty to a group of 
offshore islands not necessarily subjected to the colonial uti possideis, showed greater defini-
tional flexibility than was observed in Cameroon/Nigeria. The Nicaragua/Honduras decision 
may represent an intellectual démarche by the Court away from such a strong reliance upon 
original title when determining title to territory in addressing territorial disputes between (post-
colonial) states.  
 ‘Historical consolidation’ in the Ethiopia/Eritrea arbitration and in the Cameroon/Nigeria case 
Looking closer at these three examples of recent case law, the inclusion of Eritrea in this 
study is intrinsically linked to the border dispute between it and Ethiopia, from which it claimed 
independence following the victory of its military forces in 1991 at the end of a long secessionist 
war. Following a referendum in 1993, Eritrea achieved independent statehood. However, such 
independence was by no means pacific, and a vicious war erupted in 1998, followed by a con-
certed military drive by Ethiopia into Eritrea in 2000, which abated only through an OAU-
sponsored peace treaty in December of that year. 
Aside from a short, Italian occupation and annexation between 1935 and 1941, Ethiopia is 
something of the Thailand of Africa, in that it has never been colonised or subjected to foreign 
domination. But Eritrea, occupying the northernmost geographic position of the combined en-
tity, was subjected to control by Italians and was established as an Italian possession in the 1889 
Treaty of Uccialli.282 Italian colonisation of Eritrea lasted from 1890 until 1941, when control 
passed to the British, which from January 1942 administered both Ethiopia and Eritrea from 
Addis Ababa until 1952. What is problematic is the ad hoc boundary delimitation and demarca-
tion in 1900, 1902 and 1908 between the Colony of Eritrea, then governed by Italy, and the Em-
pire of Ethiopia.283 Because the Allied Powers could not resolve the final status of Eritrea in the 
time allocated to do so after the second world war, in the words of Alexis Heraclides, “Eritrea is 
one of a very few incremental secessions which were originally integral ‘non-self-governing ter-
ritories’, hence a ‘self-determination unit’,” and, as such, “Eritrea’s fate was decided at the United 
Nations in 1950 after prolonged debate”.284 In General Assembly Resolution 390A(V), the As-
sembly recommended that “Eritrea shall constitute an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia 
under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown”, and this was effectuated from 11 September 
1952. At such time, Ethiopia’s absolute ruler Emperor Halie Selassie I “set out to achieve what he 
could not obtain through the UN—the unqualified and total annexation of Eritrea to Ethio-
pia”.285 He began on 11 September 1952, by declaring null and void the aforementioned border 
treaties of 1900, 1902 and 1908, followed by voiding the Eritrean Constitution and dissolving the 
Eritrean parliament, thereby ending the federation between the two entities on 14 November 
1952. Eritrea was therefore to become a province of Ethiopia.286 
Despite this incorporation, diverse distinguishing characteristics may be observed in dif-
                                                                  
282 For discussion, see R. Albrecht-Carrie, Italian Colonial Policy, 1914-1918, 18 Journal of Modern His-
tory 123-147 (June 1946). 
283 See Boundary Commission Decision, supra note 276, at para. 2.7, p. 11. 
284 A. Heraclides, The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics 178 (1991) [hereinafter 
Heraclides]. But cf. Holsti, supra note 12, at 74: “In this manner, the United Nations, somewhat reminis-
cent of the Berlin Congress of 1884-5, decided the fate of a large territory.” 
285 Heraclides, supra note 284, at 178-179. 
286 Boundary Commission Decision, supra note 276, at para. 2.10, p. 12. But cf. Heraclides, supra note 284, 
at 179: “The incorporation process was finalized by the 1960s. On 14 November 1962 the Eritrean As-
sembly, by then reduced to a mere rubber-stamp of imperial decisions, announced the end of the Federa-
tion. Eritrea had become one province of Ethiopia, the fourteenth.” 
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ferentiating the Eritrean collectivité from that of the Ethiopians. This may be observed, despite the 
fact that the Eritrean population is diverse, divergent and at times divisive, with nine ethnic 
groups, divided amongst Christians and Muslims, but with ‘negligible’ internal social tensions 
based solely on ethnicity or religion.287 But nevertheless, Kalevi Holsti finds the grouping of such 
populations in the larger federation with Ethiopia to be a formative experience. He writes: 
[The UN GA] took a colonially defined territory with a collection of peoples of different re-
ligions, economic practices, social structures, and languages and decided to tack them on to a 
preexisting empire of immense comparative proportions, a state whose main groups shared 
nothing in common with the Eritreans, but which through this decision gained a maritime 
coastline. […] The idea that a vast territory should simply become part of an empire with 
which it had no affinity except geographic proximity was quite in keeping with the administra-
tive reorganizations of European and Russian colonies in Africa, Muslim Russia, and the Mid-
dle East during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The result was a thirty-year war 
in which the Eritreans—not without a civil war among themselves—undid the state-making 
effort of the United Nations by formally separating themselves from Ethiopia. The United 
Nations of course could not create a “nation” where none existed. It was the war itself 
which created an Eritrean “people.”288 
In determining the boundaries between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Boundary Commission 
spent considerable time evaluating the circumstances of the three treaties from 1900 (dealing 
with the central sector), 1902 (dealing with the western sector) and 1908 (dealing with the east-
ern sector).289 Broadly speaking, although the Commission did not use the term ‘historical con-
solidation’ per se in either its observations or its Dispositif, it can be observed how evidence of the 
manifestation of territorial administration was, indeed, recognised by the Commission in de-
termining demarcation points in the disputed boundary. As a result, the demarcation of the 
boundary occasionally modified the sovereignty of a particular locality, and factors were con-
sidered, by the Commission, that were not necessarily established by the three treaties of origi-
nal title.290 
The Commission’s reasoning for undertaking such an approach can be observed, in 
Chapter Three of the decision, whereby the Commission established its task and determined the 
applicable law. Here, the Commission noted that the provenance of a map that is not part of a 
treaty might be of juridical value, in determining how and where to allocate sovereignty in a dis-
puted frontier zone. In particular, although the substantive quality of the map and the extent of 
                                                                  
287 For a comprehensive discussion of the component parts of the Ethiopian and Eritrean peoples, a dis-
cussion of the conflict dynamic between the two and a résumé of conflict resolution responses taken by the 
international community, see European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, Ethio-
pia/Eritrea: A devastating war between former friends, available from http://www.euconflict.org, accessed 
18 October 2006. 
288 Holsi, supra note 12, at 74-75. 
289 See Boundary Commission Decision, supra note 276, at 31, 57 and 85. See also E. Hertslet, The Map of 
Africa by Treaty, Vol. 3 (3d ed., 1967). 
290 In forming its Dispositif, beginning from the position of the pertinent colonial treaties, the Commis-
sion sought evidence of sovereignty on the basis of (a) conduct relevant to the exercise of sovereign 
authority (effectivités); (b) diplomatic and other similar exchanges and records and (c) maps. While devia-
tions from the provisions of the three treaties by the Commission were limited in scope, it may be ob-
served that the relative lack of definition in the three treaties created an environment encouraging of the 
possibility to seek evidence of sovereignty from effectivités and to allocate a juridical weight from such 
manifestations. Cf. Id. at §4.78: “The Commission has already decided that the boundary line resulting 
from the 1900 Treaty must be adjusted so as to ensure that Tserona, the Acran region and Fort Cadorna 
are placed in Eritrean territory (see paras. 4.70- 4.72, above). The manner of that adjustment is set out in 
Chapter VIII, paragraph 8.1, sub- paragraph B, below. The Commission now accordingly decides that the 
boundary resulting from the 1900 Treaty must be further adjusted, in the manner also set out in Chapter 
VIII, paragraph 8.1, sub-paragraph B, so as to place Zalambessa in Ethiopian territory.” 
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its distribution will need to be considered, the actual uses of such maps, in practice, are signifi-
cant and not without legal consequences.291 More significantly for the purposes of the current 
analysis, however, the Commission established that sovereign actions might have more tangible 
practical legal effects, as noted: 
As to activity on the ground, the actions of a State pursued à titre de souverain can play a role, 
either as assertive of that State’s position or, expressly or impliedly, contradictory of the 
conduct of the opposing State. Such actions may comprise legislative, administrative or judi-
cial assertions of authority over the disputed area. There is no set standard of duration and 
intensity of such activity. Its effect depends on the nature of the terrain and the extent of its 
population, the period during which it has been carried on and the extent of any contradic-
tory conduct (including protests) of the opposing State. It is also important to bear in mind 
that conduct does not by itself produce an absolute and indefeasible title, but only a title rela-
tive to that of the competing State. The conduct of one Party must be measured against that 
of the other. Eventually, but not necessarily so, the legal result may be to vary a boundary es-
tablished by a treaty.292 
Furthermore, in determining the applicable law to be applied in determining the bound-
ary between the two states, the Commission noted that customary international law may also 
play a role in determining the role of original title in boundary delimitation situations, as it de-
termined: 
Turning to the requirement in Article 4, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the December Agreement 
that the decision of the Commission shall also be based “on applicable international law,” the 
Commission is much assisted by the consideration by the International Court of Justice of a 
comparable requirement in the Kasikili/Sedudu case. In that case, the parties by agreement 
prescribed that the decision should be made “on the basis of the […] Treaty […] and the 
relevant principles of international law.” The Court decided that the words “and the relevant 
principles of international law” were not limited in their effect to the international law appli-
cable to the interpretation of treaties; they also required the Court to take into considera-
tion any rules of customary international law that might have a bearing on the case, for 
example, prescription and acquiescence, even if such rules might involve a departure from 
the position prescribed by the relevant treaty provisions. Thus the Court accepted the pos-
sibility that an attribution of territory following from its interpretation of the relevant bound-
ary treaty could be varied by operation of the customary international law rules relating to 
prescription. As it turned out, the Court found in that case that there was insufficient pre-
scriptive conduct to affect its interpretation of the treaty. But what matters for present pur-
poses is that the Court read the applicable law clause before it as including recourse to such 
rules of customary international law.293 
The approach taken by the ICJ in favouring original title 
As discussed in chapter two of this study, the Court took a restrictive approach on the re-
lationship of the manifestation of effectivités and the provisions of original treaties of title, and 
sided widely with Cameroon in determining sovereignty over disputed territories. By invoking 
                                                                  
291 Cf. Boundary Commission Decision, supra note 276, at §3.21: “A map that is known to have been used 
in negotiations may have a special importance. […] But a map produced by an official government agency 
of a party, on a scale sufficient to enable its portrayal of the disputed boundary area to be identifiable, 
which is generally available for purchase or examination, whether in the country of origin or elsewhere, 
and acted upon, or not reacted to, by the adversely affected party, can be expected to have significant legal 
consequences. Thus a State is not affected by maps produced by even the official agencies of a third State 
unless the map was one so clearly bearing upon its interests that, to the extent that it might be erroneous, 
it might reasonably have been expected that the State affected would have brought the error to the atten-
tion of the State which made the map and would have sought its rectification.” 
292 Id. at §3.29, citing Case concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), 1999 ICJ Rep. 1100, at 
para. 87. 
293 Id. at §3.14 
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claims of historical consolidation, by virtue of its longstanding and peaceful occupation of dis-
puted territories in the Lake Chad disputed area, Nigeria claimed sovereignty over these ar-
eas.294The Court was patently unimpressed with this reasoning, as it identified a limited scope of 
conceptualisation, in the concept of ‘historical consolidation’ from the Fisheries (United King-
dom v. Norway) case.295It then proceeded to question the notion of historical consolidation 
generally.296However, the Court did recall its previous jurisprudence, establishing the legal va-
lidity of effectivités generally,297but ultimately found that Nigeria’s claims of effectivités in the Lake 
Chad area “did not correspond to the law”.298 
Furthermore, in the Bakassi Peninsula disputed area, the Court relied heavily upon the 
Anglo-German Agreement of March 1913, which ultimately was seen as having allowed Britain 
to pass title to Germany,299 thereby legitimising present-day Cameroon’s claim to this disputed 
territory. The Court took such a decision, despite the protestations of Nigeria that the 1884 
Treaty between Britain and the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar was of importance, as it was 
only a protector or administrator and not a sovereign,300 and, therefore, it was not in a position 
to cede territory in the 1913 treaty.301 The Court recalled its pronouncement in the Western Sa-
hara advisory opinion that “agreements concluded with local rulers […] were regarded as de-
rivative roots of title”, 302and as such the Court disregarded Nigerian acts of sovereignty on the 
peninsula, into which Cameroon acquiesced.303 
                                                                  
294 Cf. Cameroon/Nigeria case, supra note 276, at para 62, where Nigeria claimed sovereignty over certain 
named villages established on the shores of the receding Lake Chad. In doing so, Nigeria claimed “(1) long 
occupation by Nigeria and by Nigerian nationals constituting an historical consolidation of title; (2) effec-
tive administration by Nigeria, acting as sovereign and an absence of protest; and (3) manifestations of 
sovereignty by Nigeria together with the acquiescence by Cameroon in Nigerian sovereignty over Darak 
and the associated Lake Chad villages”.  
295 See 1951 ICJ Rep. 130. In the case, Norway had historically delimited certain maritime territories 
without opposition from any state, which in the view of the Court represented “a well-defined and uni-
form system . . . which would reap the benefit of general toleration, the basis of an historical consolidation 
which would make it enforceable as against all States”. See Id. at 137. However, the Court observed that 
historical consolidation has never been the basis of title, either alone or in case law. 
296 Cf. Cameroon/Nigeria case, supra note 276, at para 65: “The Court notes that the theory of historical 
consolidation is highly controversial and cannot replace the established modes of acquisition of title un-
der international law, which take into account many other important variables of fact and law. It further 
observes that nothing in the Fisheries Judgment suggests that the ‘historical consolidation’ referred to, in 
connection with the external boundaries of the territorial sea, allows land occupation to prevail over an 
established treaty title. Moreover, the facts and circumstances put forward by Nigeria with respect to the 
Lake Chad villages concern a period of some 20 years, which is in any event far too short, even according 
to the theory relied on by it. 
297 Cf. Id. at para 68, citing the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali) case, 1986 ICJ Rep. 587, at para 63: 
“Where the act does not correspond to the law, where the territory which is the subject of the dispute is 
effectively administered by a State other than the one possessing the legal title, preference should be given 
to the holder of the title. In the event that the effectivité does not co-exist with any legal title, it must in-
variably be taken into consideration.” 
298 Id. at para 70. 
299 See Id. at para 205. 
300 See Id. at para 207. 
301 See Id. at para 201. 
302 Id. 
303 Cf. P.H.F. Bekker, International Decisions, Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nige-
ria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), 97 AJIL 391 (2003): “As regards Nigeria’s ad-
ministrative activities, which it claimed were acts à titre de souverain that Cameroon failed to protest, the 
Court dismissed the precedents invoked by Nigeria as irrelevant, given that in none of them were the acts 
referred to acts contra legem. The question of whether effectivités suggest that title lies with one country 
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Clearly, the Court’s reasoning was designed to reflect a restrictive approach towards con-
sidering the role of effectivités and the notion of historical consolidation in addressing territorial 
disputes. However, in the operative part of the judgement, the judges produced a number of 
negative votes on substantive matters and demarcation points in the disputed territorial frontier 
zones, particularly from Judge Koroma and Judge ad hoc Ajibola. To this end, the dissenting 
opinion of Judge Koroma is of particular interest, as his reasoning is substantively closer to that 
employed by the Boundary Commission in the Ethiopia/Eritrea situation. In it, Judge Koroma 
claims that the court was wrong to accept the 1913 Anglo-German agreement, and the uti pos-
sidetis that was to stem from it, because, in citing Oppenheim, he was of the opinion that a pro-
tected state is its own legal person.304 He also recalls from past ICJ jurisprudence that the concept 
of ‘title’ is relatively flexible and definitionally fluid.305 Koroma notes that in the peninsula, Brit-
ain introduced new native courts as complements to local native council, and various public 
works, elections, administrative activities and military actions,306 and as such, particularly given 
Cameroon’s acquiescence to such activities, caution should be taken in excluding the notion of 
historical consolidation from a valid juridical framework. Koroma criticises an over reliance on 
the restrictions suggested by the Fisheries case, which he views as inappropriate,307and articu-
lates his framework for incorporating historical consolidation in the law of statehood. He writes: 
In my view, the categories of legal title to territory cannot be regarded as finite. The juris-
prudence of the Court has never spoken of “modes of acquisition”, which is a creation of 
doctrine. Just as the Court has recognized prescriptive rights to territory, so there is a basis 
for historical consolidation as a means of establishing a territorial claim. Nor can the concept 
of historical consolidation as a mode of territorial title be regarded as “over-generalized” and 
alien to jurisprudence. Both municipal and international law including the Court’s jurispru-
dence, recognize a situation of continuous and peaceful display of authority—proven usage—
combined with a complex of interests in and relations to a territory, which, when generally 
known and accepted, expressly or tacitly, could constitute title based on historical consolida-
tion. The “important variables” of the so-called established modes of acquisition, which the 
Court did not define, are not absent in historical consolidation. If anything, they are even 
more prevalent—the complex of interests and relations being continuous and extending over 
many years plus acquiescence. Historical consolidation also caters for a situation where there 
has been a clear loss of absence of title through abandonment or inactivity on the one side, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
rather than another must be distinguished from the question of whether such effectivités can serve to dis-
place an established treaty title. The Court confirmed the rule that preference will be given to title when 
there is a conflict between title and effectivités.” 
304 Cf. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma, Cameroon/Nigeria case, supra note 276, at para 17, [hereinaf-
ter Koroma], citing Sir R. Jennings and Sir A. Watts (eds.), 9 Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol. I, at 
269: “[I]t is characteristic of a protectorate that the protected state always has, and retains, for some pur-
poses, a position of its own as an international person and a subject of international law.” 
305 Cf. Id. at para 30, quoting the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) at para 18: “It is hardly necessary to 
recall that [the term ‘legal title’ denoting documentary evidence alone] is not the only accepted meaning of 
the word ‘title’. Indeed, the Parties have used this word in different senses. In fact the concept of title may 
also, and more generally, comprehend both any evidence which may establish the existence of a right, and 
the actual source of that right.” (emphasis added by Koroma). And cf. Id., quoting the Land, Island and 
Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening) at para 45: “The term ‘title’ 
has in fact been used at times in these proceedings in such a way as to leave unclear which of several possi-
ble meanings may therefore perhaps be usefully stated. As the Chamber in the Frontier Dispute case ob-
served, the word ‘title’ is generally not limited to documentary evidence alone, but comprehends ‘both any 
evidence which may establish the existence of a right, and the actual source of that right’.” 
306 Cf. Id. at para 23: “A considerable amount and volume of evidence was presented to substantiate the 
claim of historical consolidation including education, public health, the granting of oil exploration per-
mits and production agreements, the collection of taxes, the collection of custom duties, the use of Nige-
rian passports by residents of the Bakassi Peninsula, the regulation of emigration in Bakassi, and that the 
territory itself had been the subject of an internal Nigerian State rivalry.” 
307 Id. at para 25. 
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and an effective exercise of jurisdiction and control, continuously maintained, on the other 
(see Fitzmaurice, “General Principles of International Law”, Receuil des Cours, 1957, II, p. 
148).308 
In sum, the Court’s decision, particularly that concerning the Bakassi Peninsula, proved 
controversial on the ground, and the handover of the Bakassi Peninsula from Nigeria to Camer-
oon, as ordered by the Court, was at first resisted by the Nigerian state and local residents on the 
ground. However, in 2006, Nigerian troops eventually withdrew from the peninsula and sover-
eignty became transferred to Cameroon.309 This process was substantively completed in 2008.310 
Nevertheless, given the general unpopularity of the decision for individuals on the ground, par-
ticularly in assessing the impact of the Court’s decision on the peninsula, the disregard for any-
thing other than original title by the Court is lamentable. This viewpoint is particularly 
strengthened the lack of consultation with the affected population, revealing a corresponding 
disregard for the right of peoples to self-determination. When viewed through a prism of sover-
eignty which is fully cognisant of the basket of rights and responsibilities integrated into the 
modern state, it is difficult to see how the Court’s approach, in this case, was preferable to that 
employed in the Ethiopia/Eritrea Boundary Commission, or, indeed, the line of argumentation 
established in Judge Koroma’s dissenting opinion. This may be seen as being particularly so 
when, as e.g. could be observed on the Bakassi Peninsula, clear postcolonial effectivités could be 
observed by a state not clearly holding title. 
A middle ground in Nicaragua/Honduras: Taking postcolonial effectivités into considera-
tion 
However, soon after the Cameroon/Nigeria decision, the Court revisited the question of 
historical consolidation in a postcolonial circumstance, in the 2007 Case Concerning Territorial 
and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. 
Honduras).311 The question of postcolonial effectivités was of great importance, due to the fact 
that the Court was unable to observe acts of colonial administration on the four disputed islands 
of Bobel Cay, Savanna Cay, Port Royal Cay and South Cay in the Caribbean Sea. Honduras 
claimed that the disputed maritime boundary between the two states was formed on the basis of 
uti possidetis juris,312 and although the Court clearly found that uti possidetis was applicable to the 
territorial delimitation between Nicaragua and Honduras, as they were both Spanish colonial 
provinces,313the Court could not apply uti possidetis to the disputed islands, despite the theoreti-
cal applicability of uti possidetis to maritime possessions.314 In particular, the Court observed: 
[t]hat the mere invocation of the principle of uti possidetis juris does not of itself provide a 
clear answer as to sovereignty over the disputed islands. If the islands are not terra nullius, as 
both Parties acknowledge and as is generally recognized, it must be assumed that they had 
been under the rule of the Spanish Crown. However, it does not necessarily follow that the 
successor to the disputed islands could only be Honduras, being the only State formally to 
                                                                  
308 Id. at para 26. 
309 See e.g. BBC News, Nigeria hands Bakassi to Cameroon, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/ 
4789647.stm, accessed August 2007. 
310 See e.g. BBC News, Nigeria cedes Bakassi to Cameroon, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/ 
7559895.stm, accessed August 2008. 
311 See Nicaragua/Honduras, supra note 274. See also P. Bekker and A. Stanic, ASIL Insights: The ICJ 
Awards Sovereignty over Four Caribbean Sea Islands to Honduras, available from www.asil.org, accessed 
17 October 2007.  
312 See Id. at para 147 et seq. 
313 See Id. at para 154. 
314 Id. at para 156.  
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have claimed such status. The Court recalls that uti possidetis juris presupposes the existence 
of a delimitation of territory between the colonial provinces concerned having been effected 
by the central colonial authorities. Thus in order to apply the principle of uti possidetis juris to 
the islands in dispute it must be shown that the Spanish Crown had allocated them to one or 
the other of its colonial provinces.315 
As stated previously, given the Court did not find particular evidence of either Nicaragua 
or Honduras manifesting sovereignty on the disputed islands, it concluded that “the principle of 
uti possidetis affords inadequate assistance in determining sovereignty over these islands because 
nothing clearly indicates whether the islands were attributed to the colonial provinces of Nica-
ragua or of Honduras prior to or upon independence”.316 
Given the lack of evidence of colonial activity, so as to activate unquestionably the colo-
nial uti possidetis, in order to assign sovereignty over the four disputed islands, the Court was 
forced to seek evidence of postcolonial effectivités. Although a direct parallel with the Camer-
oon/Nigeria case cannot be made as the factual circumstances differed between the two, pri-
marily as a result of the considerable geographic definition and evidence of colonial effectivités 
provided in the Anglo-German Agreement of 1913,317 the Court’s attitude strongly favouring 
original title, in determining sovereignty under disputed circumstances was in some ways miti-
gated by the necessity for the Court to achieve a decision to the case. It could be observed that 
the Court employed postcolonial effectivités as a matter of last choice. Indeed, this follows the hi-
erarchy put forth in what Brian Taylor Sumner terms the ICJ’s ‘hierarchical decision rule’, 
whereby the Court, when addressing territorial disputes, “applies a tripartite, hierarchical rule 
that looks first to treaty law, then to uti possidetis, and finally to effective control”.318 
In particular, the legal argument put forth by Honduras revolved around its acts of legisla-
tive and administrative control effectuated in the disputed islands,319 whereas Nicaragua 
claimed “original title over the islands based on adjacency”.320 This ‘principle of adjacency’ pro-
posed by Nicaragua was readily disposed of by the Court on both conceptual and substantive 
grounds,321 which led the Court to examine specific postcolonial effectivités on the islands, as 
there was insufficient evidence to determine ownership of the islands at the moment of Hondu-
ras’s independence in 1821. Honduras, in the Court’s view, would need to satisfy the test of an 
“intention and will to act as sovereign, and some actual exercise or display of such authority” es-
tablished in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Judgement of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice,322 as well as “the extent to which sovereignty is also claimed by some other 
                                                                  
315 Id. at para 157. 
316 Id. at para 167. It continued, Id.: “Equally, the Court has been presented with no evidence as to colonial 
effectivités in respect of these islands.” 
317 The Court was also able to specify a starting point for the maritime boundary between Nicaragua and 
Honduras on the basis of the endpoint of the land boundary and instructed the parties to the dispute to ne-
gotiate remaining uncertainties in the demarcation of the maritime boundary. See Id. at para 277 et seq, 
and the decision’s operative clause, Id. at para 321. 
318 B.T. Sumner, Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice, 53 Duke L.J. 1779 (2004) 1803-
04 [hereinafter Sumner]. 
319 The Court, Id. at para 170, received considerable evidence from Honduras purporting to demonstrate 
considerable effectivités manifested by itself on the disputed islands, “including acts of legislative and ad-
ministrative control, the application of Honduran civil and criminal law to the disputed islands, the regu-
lation of immigration, fishing activities carried out from the islands, naval patrols, the oil concession 
practice of Honduras and public works”. 
320 Id. at para 171. 
321 See Id. at para 164, para 171. 
322 See Id. at para 172 and see also discussion supra chapter one of this study. 
Nicholas Hansen 
Chapter Five: Applying the law of modern territorial statehood 
Page 283 
Power”.323 However, the Court recalled, from the Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Si-
padan (Indonesia/Malaysia) case, that these tests could demonstrate relatively inconsequential 
sovereign acts, either in terms of frequency or force, given the specific intent for such acts to be 
sovereign per se.324 On the basis of submissions, the Court agreed with Nicaragua’s assertion that 
Honduras’s claim for legislative and administrative control of the islands was insufficient,325 but 
found evidence that e.g. in granting the US government overfly rights for some of the islands, 
Honduras had exercised sovereignty in the realm of the application and enforcement of crimi-
nal and civil law,326 had issued work permits to foreigners, had regulated immigration to the is-
lands (if only since 1999, however),327 had demonstrated certain public works to which legal 
significance could be accorded,328 and had “modestly” issued permits for the regulation of fish-
ing and housing on the islands.329 However, evidence of sovereignty on the basis of naval patrols 
by either party to the dispute was considered but not conclusively determined by the Court.330 
Ultimately, the Court accepted these effectivités by Honduras as evidence of sovereignty, 
and noted that “those Honduran activities qualifying as effectivités which can be assumed to have 
come to the knowledge of Nicaragua did not elicit any protest on the part of the latter”,331 which 
led to the Court’s unanimous finding that Honduras has sovereignty over the four disputed is-
lands. 
Implications for the territorial integrity of a postcolonial state 
In the absence of absolute clarity as to the original title to disputed territory, the Court’s 
willingness in Nicaragua/Honduras to recognise postcolonial effectivités as factors contributing 
to the determination of sovereignty is significant, particularly given the limited scope of such ef-
fectivités to be observed, in such remote locations.332 However, this does not imply that Court 
had, in some way, reversed its previous decision from Cameroon/Nigeria, particularly if the tri-
partite ‘hierarchical decision rule’ proposed by Sumner is, as should be observed, viewed as ac-
ceptable. However, as Sumner acknowledges, the categorisation of these three separate rules is 
not watertight. He writes, as also could be observed on the Bakassi peninsula, that the position-
ing of territorial title at the pinnacle of these rules serves to negate the roles played by self-
determination and affords unwarranted juridical weight to uti possidetis juris: 
When the court lacks guidance from treaties, uti possidetis, or effective control, it is most 
likely to proceed in enquiry infra legaem and halve the difference between the litigants’ posi-
                                                                  
323 Id. at para 173, quoting Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case (Denmark v. Norway), 53 PCIJ Rep. Ser. 
A/B (1933), at 45-46. 
324 Cf. Id. at para 174, quoting Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v. Malaysia) 
[hereinafter Indonesia/Malaysia], 2002 ICJ Rep. 625, para 134: “[The Court] can only consider those acts 
as constituting a relevant display of authority which leave no doubt as to their specific reference to the is-
lands in dispute as such. Regulations or administrative acts of a general nature can therefore be taken as 
effectivités […] only if it is clear from their terms or their effects that they pertained to [the territories in 
question].” 
325 Id. at paras 177-181. 
326 See Id. at para 185. 
327 See Id. at para 189. 
328 See Id. at paras. 206-207. 
329 See Id. at para 196. 
330 See Id. at para 201. 
331 Id. at para 208. 
332 This observation mirrors the Court’s reasoning in Indonesia/Malaysia, supra note 324, at para 143 et 
seq. whereby effectivités were observed as being manifested by Malaysia’s establishment of a bird sanctu-
ary and regulation of turtle eggs in these disputed island territories. 
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tions. The court—somewhat ironically—prefers prescribing an equitable solution over enter-
taining justifications based on geography, economics, culture, history, elitism or ideology. […] 
It is noteworthy that in [the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (France v. United Kingdom)], the 
parties did not present evidence as to what nationality the inhabitants of the Minquiers and 
Ecrehos groups considered themselves. In no way was self-determination a factor in the 
court’s decision.333  
Of course, it must also be recognised that the jurisprudence examined in this part of the 
chapter is not of a direct corollary to the questions of ‘vertical state consolidation’ and ‘historical 
societal preservation’ within a state. On the other hand, the Boundary Commission’s work in 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, itself, was the direct result of the part of a territory, albeit controversially, 
seceding from a larger state. In that sense, the relationship between the phenomenon of territo-
rial disputes between states and territorial disputes between states and collective groupings is 
conceptually tangible, albeit without direct juridical transferability from state-to-state relations 
to state-to-sub-state relations. Furthermore, the potential recognition of an act of secession by a 
‘negatively-defined’ people, employing a campaign for independence, motivated by the notions 
of ‘horizontal societal preservation’ and the possibility of postcolonial external self-
determination as a ‘right of last resort’ is theoretically conceivable, but not in a way whereby the 
ICJ would adjudicate the secession of a portion of a state. Rather, as observed in e.g. Bangladesh 
and Eritrea, and indeed as may be witnessed by the non-recognition of Somaliland, recognition 
of new states is a decision taken by states, whereby regional and interregional political consid-
erations play a hugely significant and substantial role. Thus, when viewed inter-temporally, 
since the globalisation of the European state established the planet’s primary legal and political 
form, a relatively limited number of successful secessions within the international community 
may be observed. All the while, the number of UN member-states has slowly increased, how-
ever. It is difficult to refute the conceptual validity of the theoretical juridical conceptualisation 
of a successful act of secession, whereby either through boundary delimitation and demarca-
tion, or through other forms of territorial dispute settlement, questions of territorial definition 
will be evaluated on the basis of certain criteria, such as the ‘hierarchical decision rule’ observed 
from the ICJ’s practice. 
Thus, as has been suggested throughout the course of this study, because the uti possidetis 
juris is the product of original title treaties, and the Court, as the primary judicial organ of the 
United Nations, will readily seek to evaluate territorial disputes on the basis of legal instruments, 
it is rather unsurprising that ‘other’ potential reflectors of sovereignty over a certain territory are 
broadly disregarded by the Court. The problem, however, is that when a ‘modern’ conceptuali-
sation of sovereignty is employed—one which is fully cognisant of self-determination of peo-
ples, the responsibility to protect, minority rights, indigenous peoples’ rights, the right to 
democracy and the potentially extra-legal effectivités employed by civil society organisations in 
contributing to the territorial integrity of a state, the steadfast insistence by the Court to maintain 
the primacy of original title in adjudicating territorial disputes is puzzling. As has been ob-
served, particularly through the Court’s willingness to entertain postcolonial effectivités as indi-
cators of sovereignty in the Indonesia/Malaysia and Nicaragua/Honduras cases, original title is 
not the only method of determining possession in territorial disputes. Tangible activities mani-
fested by states or collective groupings intended to act à titre de souverain, whilst not universally 
valid and, therefore, appropriate for critical analysis, are nevertheless evidence of intent and 
practice in modern territorial statehood. 
                                                                  
333 Sumner, supra note 318, at 1806-07 (footnotes omitted). However, the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case 
(France v. United Kingdom) dates from 1953, when self-determination as a legal concept was still in the 
early stages of its development in the UN framework. See 1953 ICJ Rep. 47. 
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Therefore, as some of these elements may prove controversial as they come to be evalu-
ated, the International Court of Justice, and public international law generally, would serve the 
cause of self-determination of peoples by affording it a place in the legal framework worthy of its 
position as common article one to the two main global human rights covenants. For example, 
as discussed herein, despite a general sense on the Bakassi Peninsula that inhabitants had a Nige-
rian identity, the Court’s decision shifted the disputed peninsula to Cameroon on the basis of 
original title. No referendum was held on the territory and no significant consultation was made 
with local residents in formulating this decision. Self-determination in this circumstance could 
be seen as having been marginalised in favour of uti possidetis, to which one might observe that 
the objective of international and regional peace and security may have been infringed, should 
the decision to transfer sovereignty to Cameroon have produced armed conflict, internecine 
violence, or widespread human rights violations. If this serves to heighten the juridical accep-
tance of the notion of ‘historical consolidation’, whilst mitigating the strength of the uti possidetis 
rule in its relationship with self-determination of peoples, in some circumstances it may well be 
the case that the dual causes of international peace and security, and the territorial integrity of 
the postcolonial state, would be served.  
Observations from chapter five  
Although the concept of ‘sovereignty’ per se has evolved greatly from its positivist theoreti-
cal origins of suprema potestas and the practice of ‘civilising the uncivilised’, the territorial sover-
eign state remains the baseline form of analysis in international affairs. In a system of 
international law whereby state power is not unlimited, it is sometimes difficult to observe 
where ‘traditional’ characteristics of statehood and sovereignty evolve into the more modern as-
pects. In geographic areas least likely to find natural correlations between ‘the nation’ and ‘the 
state’, such as postcolonial states, it is obvious how tensions exist within the state’s natural incli-
nation to solidify its power (i.e., ‘vertical state consolidation’). Simultaneously, when sovereignty 
is viewed in full light of its ‘modern’ aspects, self-associating groups may protect themselves 
against predatory actions by the states (i.e., ‘horizontal societal preservation’). When viewed in 
conjunction with theories of democracy that view democracy as an ongoing process, as op-
posed to a series of elections, the effectiveness and territorial integrity of the state are solidified. 
The relationship between a peoples’ right to self-determination and uti possidetis juris has 
been extensively discussed in this study, and, indeed, by considering recent examples of state 
practice, the tensions therein remain evident. The question outstanding, when considering ter-
ritorial disputes between states (including newly independent states and, to a certain extent, 
‘would-be’ states), corresponds to the relative juridical weight of original title versus subsequent, 
and particularly postcolonial, acts of sovereignty. It is relatively uncontroversial to observe how 
original title is an important and significant part of these deliberations. Indeed, the fact that e.g. 
in sub-Saharan Africa, state boundaries remain largely unchanged since the period of decoloni-
sation reflects the basic legitimacy of using original title to evaluate territorial disputes. This 
should be relatively unsurprising, as ‘statehood’ was chiefly a positivist conceptualisation and 
such cessions and annexations of territory were historically common and valid. However, this 
formulation serves to overlook, particularly, the rise and sustained validity of self-determination 
of peoples, as may be observed by situations whereby claims for autonomy or indeed inde-
pendence may be held subservient to uti possidetis, or circumstances whereby definitive actions 
related to their territorial status are taken without regard to the expressed will of local popula-
tions per referendum, the non-recognition of territorial entities making claims for sovereignty or 
other manifestations of popular opinion. 
 CONCLUSION 
The ‘modern’ aspects of statehood derived from international human rights law have fur-
ther complicated the already paradoxical nature of territorial administration. That this is so is 
broadly to be welcomed, however, as it reflects the extent to which international society has 
evolved away from the étatism of suprema potestas. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to observe the 
complications in viewing populations as subjects of law through the prism of states, peoples, 
minorities, indigenous peoples, other groupings, and indeed, individuals. The overarching 
question remaining is this: to what extent does the state define the population, or the population 
define the state?  
This is the essential idea put forth in the widely-cited separate opinion of Judge Dillard in 
the Western Sahara Case.1 The point remains that access to government is the baseline unit of 
analysis for self-determination of peoples. What can be assumed, in a more contemporary 
sense, is that although the uti possidetis juris principle transferred the colonial shape and form to 
the postcolonial state, uti possidetis juris is chiefly of historical value, whereas self-determination 
is continually perpetuated through Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR.  
Thus if, inter alia, self-determination of peoples has an ongoing scope beyond decoloni-
sation, if a ‘people’ can be more than the sum of a state’s populations within its frontiers, if a 
‘people’ can be defined in opposition to the actions of a state, if a peoples’ right to self-
determination is the flip side of minority rights guarantees and if ‘peoples’ rights’ as a topic of ju-
ridical examination continues to evolve in definitional form, in the face of genuine and formi-
dable claims to a state and the international community from a portion of a territorial state, 
territorial modifications may occur, even in postcolonial states. The cumulative end result may 
involve the acknowledgement that an effective administrative structure, lacking the status of 
government per se, is better poised to assume the official administrative function over that terri-
tory than that which would be expected, should the governmental (and perhaps territorial) 
status quo be maintained. 
Although Dillard does not frame his discussion in the context of such concepts specifi-
cally, he does tangentially consider the theoretical question of potential recourse to the admini-
stration of the state by its inhabitants—and the potential for the (remedial) modification of a 
state’s boundaries—by observing the following: 
To what extent, if any, does the right of self-determination limit the possible policy choices 
open to the General Assembly [in its supervisory power over future decolonisation proc-
esses in Western Sahara]? The Court has treated this delicate question with great circum-
spection in paragraphs 71 and 72 of the Opinion. In the former it states that the right of self-
determination “leaves the General Assembly a measure of discretion with respect to the forms and 
procedures by which that right is to be realized” (emphasis added). In the latter it calls attention 
to “various possibilities” which exist for the future action of the General Assembly as “for in-
stance with regard to consultations between the interested States, and the procedures and 
guarantees required for ensuring a free and genuine expression of the will of the people”. It 
seemed hardly necessary to make more explicit the cardinal restraint which the legal right of 
self-determination imposes. That restraint may be captured in a single sentence. It is for the 
people to determine the destiny of the territory and not the territory the destiny of the 
people. Viewed in this perspective it becomes almost self-evident that the existence of an-
cient “legal ties” of the kind described in the Opinion, while they may influence some of the 
projected procedures for decolonization, can have only a tangential effect in the ultimate 
                                                                  
1 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), separate opinion of Judge Dillard, 1975 ICJ Rep. 116 
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choices available to the people.2 
In the course of this analysis, it has been argued that the effectiveness of a state’s territorial 
administration can be improved by associating the concept of self-determination with that of 
self-defence. This is because a predatory environment can develop when a postcolonial state 
tries to consolidate itself vertically, through, inter alia, (coercive) assimilation. In such circum-
stances, a counterbalance must be made horizontally within the state, so that peoples, minori-
ties, indigenous peoples and other vulnerable groups3 are able to associate and interact as they 
so choose. Such a formulation is not excessively critical of the concept of assimilation per se, for 
it is certain that collective groupings assimilate amongst themselves in their interactions. It is, 
however, to very strongly imply that coercively assimilative activities—in practice, those which 
may be independently observed as upholding ‘territorialism’ over ‘effectiveness’—are punitive 
towards a peoples’ right to self-determination, and the international community should re-
spond appropriately. 
The importance of intelligent decision-making from genuinely factual circumstances 
This is most evident when a state’s responsibility to protect populations—itself quite a 
new, and therefore nebulous, international legal obligation—is factually called into question, 
or, in other circumstances of acute threat, viz. Darfur. On a more conceptual level, this may 
translate into the acknowledgement of a reality whereby international law should not disregard 
the will of the people, as observed in some aspects of the Cameroon v. Nigeria case, particularly 
with regard to the Bakassi Peninsula. Similar circumstances should be more critically reassessed 
in future cases before the International Court, as ‘verticality’ in modern territorial statehood 
may, in a state’s administration, represent assimilation to the point of abandonment of the prin-
ciple of consent in the conduct of a population’s democratic administration. Conversely, the 
‘horizontalism’ in modern territorial statehood, although it may form a practical counterbal-
ance to state activity, ultimately is largely subservient to the juridical weight of the state, particu-
larly when viewed in the context of the ability of such juridical entities, such as ‘peoples’ and 
‘minorities’, to effectuate tangible administrative change onto the structure of a state. 
In Judge Dillard’s separate opinion, he observes that:  
The concept of terra nullius has meaning with reference and only with reference to the well-
established principle of international law that title to territory may be acquired through “ef-
fective occupation”. A condition to the legitimacy of this method of acquiring original title is 
that the territory be sans maître, i.e., terra nullius. Furthermore the problem becomes legally 
important only when the legitimacy of the occupation either as originally manifested or as 
geographically extended is challenged by a third State as was true in many cases of which the 
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (P.C.Z.J., Series A/B, No. 53), the Island of Palmas (UNRZAA, 
Vol. II, p. 829), and the Clipperton Island (ibid., p. 115) cases furnish familiar examples.4 
The problem with ‘effective occupation’, in a postcolonial sense, is its subjectivity. Effec-
tiveness is a dominant variable in the matrix of statehood as defined by the Montevideo Con-
vetion. In a world whereby colonial actions were explicitly sanctioned, suprema potestas, 
whether deliberate or coincidental, unequivocally validated all activities of a state. In a world 
whereby suprema potestas and colonialism are both repudiated, the activities of a state, particu-
larly a postcolonial state facing difficulties in projecting power effectively throughout its terri-
tory, may become questionable from a legal perspective, following on from, inter alia, the access 
                                                                  
2 Id. at 122. 
3 I.e., the pragmatic amalgam term ‘collective groupings’ employed earlier in the context of this study. 
4 Id. at 123. 
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to government, respect for good (e.g. democratic) governance and ‘responsibility to protect 
populations’ provisions of modern international law. It may very well be that the government of 
a state finds difficulty projecting its power across distances, in which case the capital city may 
possess an overconcentration of governmental power vis-à-vis the rest of the territorial state.5 
Thus the territorial Hinterlands of such states may, or may not, be effectively governed from the 
capital. Nevertheless, in a modern sense, undoubtedly, the ‘effectiveness’ of a state is not only 
measured by its credentials to legitimate claim over territory; it is also measured by the ability of 
that territory to administer itself, in conformity with the precepts of modern public international 
law. In this manner, as has been observed when contrasting ICJ jurisprudence in Cameroon v. 
Nigeria and Nicaragua v. Honduras, questions may arise between the doctrine of ‘original title’ 
and that of ‘historical consolidation’. It has been argued in this study that incorporating the latter 
analytical framework into juridical decision-making may demonstrate comparatively greater 
levels of respect for self-determination of peoples, and therefore should be encouraged. 
This serves, in sum, to contribute towards the continued reinforcement of international 
human rights law into the practice of public international law and a wholly dispassionate juridi-
cal acknowledgement of the non-étatisme in modern public international law. For this to be 
practically so, it should be acknowledged that original treaties of cession, like uti possidetis juris, 
serve a necessary purpose as aspects of the wider law of statehood. However, as it is now three 
decades since the entry into force of the two principal human rights covenants, the ICCPR and 
ICESCR, self-determination of peoples must not be seen either as an inconvenience or potential 
oversight in terms of juridical decision-making with territorial application. The analytical start-
ing point for jurisprudential analysis should reflect gravitation away from colonial activity being 
the supreme basis for the formulation of the state towards an ongoing, practical assessment of 
whether a state possesses the capacity to govern itself effectively, while being mindful of basic 
civil and political, and economic, social and cultural rights, and whether such individual rights 
are universally distributed and upheld across the territory. To be certain, administrative and ju-
ridical decisions will be continually taken on the basis of factual circumstances that will vary 
from case to case. 
The challenge of applying factual circumstances to a legal fiction 
Beyond a certain point, it should also be acknowledged that modern territorial statehood 
is defined primarily by a number of specific legal fictions that have been allocated great defini-
tional and managerial powers, by virtue of circumstances. A state, a people, a minority, an in-
digenous people, an independent group, and an individual are all obviously-accepted, 
juridcally-grounded explanations for the human condition. It is precisely here how the broad 
concept of ‘human rights’, once either unimaginable, or a subject to be widely ignored or casti-
gated, has now evolved to such a point so as to establish itself squarely in the discourse of mod-
ern human society as well as in the lexicon of international law. 
Yet ‘human rights’, as a topic of legal examination, finds its credibility in the main through 
the prism of a state that has voluntarily accepted e.g. the ICCPR and ICESCR. The voluntarist na-
ture of this aspect of public international law is, as is the state, a theoretical construction, but 
with highly significant and practical consequences, particularly in circumstances whereby the 
ineffectiveness of such theory can be readily observed. It seems now considerably less contro-
versial to assert that the continual reinforcement of human rights provisions into the territorial 
                                                                  
5 See generally J. Herbst, States and Power in Africa (2000), at chapter five (‘National Design and the 
Broadcasting of Power’). 
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administration of a state is something to be welcomed, in contrast to three decades ago, when 
human rights emerged as an enforceable, treaty-based subject of law. 
In sum, it can be observed how the state, when viewed comprehensively in terms of 
composition and critically in terms of postcolonial substance, may be little more than an ‘imagi-
nary domain’ itself—hence the advocacy in this study for the avoidance of the term ‘nation-state’ 
when considering statehood as legal phenomenon. Costas Douzinas emphasises the concep-
tual point more fully, as such: 
The symbolic castration and the mirror stage that follows it create a projected sense of bod-
ily integrity, and imaginary completeness which replaces the feeling of fragmentation and lack 
of limb co-ordination. […] Becoming a legal subject denies in a similar fashion, as we saw, the 
bodily wholeness of the person and replaces it with partial recognitions and incomplete enti-
tlements. Rights by their nature cannot treat the whole person; this is the reason why no 
right to rights exists. Such a right would be the right of a person to be himself or herself, a 
unique human being in common with others, a right that would defeat the whole purpose of 
having rights. In law, a person is never a complete being but a combination of various partial 
and often conflicting rights, the contingent holder of legal entitlements that punctuate life. 
The sum total of rights constructs the legal subject as a rather imbalanced vehicle for the dif-
ferential investments of the law. If we were to imagine the portrait of the legal subject, it 
would have a passing resemblance with its human sitter but it would also be strangely alien, 
as if painted in the style of Cubism: a huge ear, a miniscule mouth, one protruding and ag-
gressive eye, an elephantine nose placed where the mouth should be. It would be the projec-
tion of a three-dimensional imago onto a flat and flattening canvas.6 
As such, as the multi-dimensional reality of postcolonial statehood continues to be pro-
jected onto the standard form of the state as a juridical construction, while international legal 
practice continues to reinforce the role of the individual in international law. In critically evalu-
ating circumstances between states or collective groupings within a state which lay claim to the 
administration of a portion of a territory, it may be helpful to suggest that the relatively fixed pro-
visions of statehood—defined territory and permanent population—could be mitigated by the 
relatively fluid provisions of statehood—governmental control and independence—if doing so 
would produce a demonstrably more effective state. 
As a juridical construct, creating and sustaining a state possessed with the capacity to sup-
port and uphold its various populations in social cohesion is the principal objective of modern 
territorial statehood. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                  
6 C. Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (2000). 
 
Nicholas Hansen 
Modern Territorial Statehood 
Page 291 
LIST OF WORKS CITED 
Abi-Saab, G. “The Effectivity Required of an Entity that Declares its Independence in Or-
der for it to be Considered a State in International Law”, in A.F. Bayefsky, Self-
Determination in International Law: Quebec and Lessons Learned. The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2000. 
Ackerman, B. and Fishkin, J.S. Deliberation Day. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005. 
Aginam, O. “The African Charter of Human and People’s Rights”, in E.K. Quashigah and 
O.C. Okafor, Legitimate Governance in Africa: International and Domestic Legal Perspec-
tives. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000. 
Albrecht-Carrie, R. “Italian Colonial Policy, 1914-1918”.18 Journal of Modern History 
123-147 (June 1946). 
Alexandrowicz, C.H. The Afro-Asian world and the law of nations: (historical aspects) 123 
Rec. des Cours (1968-I) 117-214.  
Alexandrowicz, C.H. The European-African Confrontation. Sijthoff: Rijswijk, 1973. 
Allan, J. Positively Fabulous: Why It Is Good To Be a Legal Positivist. 10 Can. J.L. & Ju-
ris. 231 (1997). 
Allott, P. The Health of Nations: Society and Law beyond the State. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002. 
Alston, P. “Downsizing the State in Human Rights Discourse”, in N. Dorsen and P. Gif-
ford (eds.), Democracy and the Rule of Law. Washington: CQ Press, 2001. 
Allott, P. Eunomia: New Order for a New World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. 
Amnesty International. Nigeria: On the Anniversary of Ken Saro-Wiwa’s Execution, Hu-
man Rights Organizations Call for Reform. AI index AFR 44/26/96 (6 November 1996). 
Amnesty International. Rwanda: Civilians trapped in armed conflict. AI Index AFR 
47/43/97, 19 December 1997. 
Anderson, M. Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World. Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1996.  
Andrews, J.A. The Concept of Statehood and the Acquisition of Territory in the 19th Cen-
tury. 94 LQR 408, 419 (1978).  
Andryesk, O. Report on the Definition of Minorities. Utrecht: 8 SIM Special. 
Anghie, A. Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law. Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univresity Press, 2004. 
Anghie, A. Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth Century 
International Law. 40 Harvard Int’l L.J. 1-80 (1999). 
Ankumah, E.A. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Practice and 
Procedures. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996. 
Annan, K. Statement at the International Conference: “Towards a Community of Democ-
racies”. UN Press Release SG/SM/7467 (27 June 2000). 
Arbour, L. The responsibility to protect as a duty of care in international law and practice, 
34 Rev. Int’l Studies 445 (2008). 
Nicholas Hansen 
Modern Territorial Statehood 
Page 292 
Asch, R.G. The Thirty Years War: The Holy Roman Empire and Europe. New York: St. 
Martin's Press,, 1997. 
Austin, J. The Province of Jurisprudence Determined. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995. 
Bagehot, W. Physics and Politics. London: Kegan Paul, 1887.  
Barnett, M.N. Bringing in the New World Order: Liberalism, Legitimacy, and the United 
Nations. 49 World Politics (1997). 
Barrett, M. The Politics of Truth, from Marx to Foucault. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1991. 
Barsh, R. “Indigenous Peoples and the Rights to Self-Determination in International 
Law”, in B. Hocking (ed.), International Law and Aboriginal Human Rights. Holmes 
Beach: Gaunt, 1988.  
Bayart, J.-F. “Civil Society in Africa”, in P. Chabal (ed.) Political Domination in Africa. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.  
Bayart, J.-F., Ellis S. and Hibou, B. The Criminalization of the State in Africa. Blooming-
ton: Indiana University Press, 1999.  
Bayefsky, A.F. Self-Determination in International Law: Quebec and Lessons Learned. The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000.  
Bedjaoui, M. “The Right to Development and the Jus Cogens”, 2 Lesotho L.J. 93, 98 
(1986).  
Beigbeder, Y. International Monitoring of Plebiscites, Referenda and National Elections: 
Self-Determination and Transition to Democracy. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1994. 
Bekker, P.H.F. “International Decisions, Land and Maritime Boundary between Camer-
oon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening)”, 97 AJIL 391 
(2003).  
Belgian Government Information Service (New York). The Sacred Mission of Civilisation: 
The Belgian Thesis (1953). 
Bobbio, N. The Future of Democracy: A Defence of the Rules of the Game. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1987.  
Boutkevitch, V. Freedom of Movement. Working paper for the Sub-Commission on Pre-
vention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/22, 
22 July 1997. 
Boutros-Ghali, B. An Agenda for Peace. UN Doc. S/24111, at para. 17 (1992, 2d. ed, 1995).  
Brierly, J.L. The Law of Nations. 6th ed.. London: Waldock, 1963. 
Brietzke, P.H. “Self-Determination, or Jurisprudential Confusion: Exacerbating Political 
Conflict”. 14 Wisc. Int’l L.J. 69 (1995).  
Brilmayer, L. “Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation”. 16 Yale J. 
Int’l L. 177 (1991). 
Brown, P.M. “Editorial Comment: Self-Determination in Central Europe”. 14 AJIL 235-
239 (1920). 
Brownlie, I. African Boundaries – A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia 11 (1979). 
Nicholas Hansen 
Modern Territorial Statehood 
Page 293 
Brownlie, I. Basic Documents on Human Rights, 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993. 
Brownlie, I. General Course on Public International Law, 225 Recueil. des Cours (1995).  
Brownlie, I. International Law and the Use of Force by States. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1963. 
Brownlie, I. Principles of Public International Law, 1st ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966. . 
Brownlie, I. Principles of Public International Law, 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1990. 
Brownlie, I. Rights of Peoples in International Law, in J. Crawford, ed., The Rights of Peo-
ples. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988. 
Buchanan, A. Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for Interna-
tional Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.  
Buchheit, L.C. Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination. London: Yale University 
Press, 1978.  
Buckland, W.W. A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian, 3rd ed. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963.  
Bull, H. The Anarchical Society. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, 
Buzan, B. People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-
Cold War Era. New York: Lynn Rienner, 1991 
Calleo, D.P. Reflections on the Idea of the Nation-State, in C.A. Kupchan, ed., Nationalism 
and Nationalities in the New Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995.  
Carozza, P.G. Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 
97 AJIL 38 (2003).  
Cassese, A. International Law in a Divided World. Oxford: Clarendon Press,1986.  
Cassese, A. “Remarks on Scelle's Theory of ‘Role Splitting’ in International Law”, 1 EJIL 
210 (1990) 
Cassese, A. Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press,1995.  
CBC News. “House passes motion recognizing Québécois as nation” 27 November 2006. 
Available at http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2006/11/27/nation-vote.html (last accessed 
16 August 2008).  
Chabal, P. and Daloz, J.-P. Africa Works: Disorder as a Political Instrument (1999). 
Chabal, P. and Daloz, J.-P. Africa Works: the Political Instrumentalization of Disorder 
(1999). 
Chabal, P. Power in Africa: An Essay in Political Interpretation (1994). 
Chen, T.C. The International Law of Recognition (1951). 
Chinkin, C., in Theme Panel IV: The End of Sovereignty? (Roundtable), 88 ASIL Proceed-
ings 71 (1994). 
Christian, T.J. “Introduction”, in L.C. Green and O. Dickanson (eds.), The Law of Nations 
and the New World (1989). 
Commission on Global Governance. Our Global Neighborhood (1995). 
Nicholas Hansen 
Modern Territorial Statehood 
Page 294 
Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 10th ed. (1999). 
Corbett, P.E. Law and Society in the Relations of States 12 (1951). 
Cordozo, B.N. The Growth of the Law (1924). 
Craven, M.C.R. The European Community Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia, 1995 
BYIL 333  
Crawford, J. Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada, Unpublished Research Report for 
the Canadian Bar Association (January 1988), as reprinted in Musgrave, Self-
Determination and National Minorities, (1997).  
Crawford, J. Responsibility to the International Community as a Whole, 4th Snyder Lec-
ture, delivered 5 April 2000, available from www.lcil.law.cam.ac.uk (last accessed 21 
August 2008). 
Crawford, J. The Creation of States in International Law, 2nd ed. 2006. 
Crawford, J. The Creation of States in International Law ,1st ed., 1979. 
Crawford, J. The Criteria for Statehood in International Law, 48 BYIL 93 (1976-77). 
Crawford, J. “The Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its Development and 
Future”, in P. Alston (ed.), Peoples’ Rights: The State of the Art . Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2001. 
Crawford, J. “The Rights of Peoples: ‘Peoples’ or ‘Governments’”, in J. Crawford (ed.) The 
Rights of Peoples. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.  
Crawford, J. “The Rights of Peoples: Some Conclusions”, in J. Crawford (ed.) The Rights 
of Peoples. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.  
Crawford, J., Peel J. and Olleson, S. The ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Inter-
nationally Wrongful Acts: Completion of the Second Reading, 12 EJIL 963 (2001). 
Dahl, R.A. Democracy and Its Critics (1989). 
Dahl, R.A. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (1971). 
Damrosch, L. F. et al, ed. International Law: Cases and Materials. 4th ed. New York: 
American Casebook Series, 2001.  
Davidson, B. Modern Africa: A Social and Political History. 2nd ed. London: Longman, 
1989. 
Deschênes, J. “Proposal concerning a Definition of the term ‘Minority’”. UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/31. 
Deutsch, M. and Brickman, E. Conflict Resolution. 15 Pediatrics in Review 16-22 (1994). 
Dinstein, Y. “Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities”. 25 ICLQ 102 (1976). 
Documenty Vneshnei politiki SSSR. Vol. I. Moscow, Gospolitizdat (1957). 
Doehring, K. “Effectiveness”, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), 7 Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law 70. 
Donati, C. Stato e Territorio (1924). 
Doyle, M. Kant, “Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs”. 12 Philosophy and Public Affairs 
213 (1983). 
Dryzek, J.S. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (2002). 
Nicholas Hansen 
Modern Territorial Statehood 
Page 295 
Dugard, J. and Raič, D. “The role of recognition in the law and practice of secession”, in 
M. Kohen (ed.) Secession: International Law Perspectives (2006). 
Dugard, J. Recognition and the United Nations (1987). 
Duke Adolphus Frederick of Mecklenburg, Into the Heart of Africa. London: Cassell, 
1910. 
Duursma, J.C. Self-Determination, Statehood and International Relations of Micro-States 
(1996). 
Eide, A. Minoritetsvernet, stebarn i det internasjonale menneskerettighetsvern? (1983). 
Eide, A. “Minority Protection and World Order: Towards a Framework for Law and Pol-
icy”, in A. Phillips and A. Rosas (eds.) Universal Minority Rights (1995). 
Eide, A. New Approaches to Minority Protection (1995). 
Eide, A. “Territorial Integrity of States, Minority Protection and Guarantees for Auton-
omy Arrangements: Approaches and Roles of the United Nations”, in European Commis-
sion for Democracy Through Law of the Council of Europe, Local Self-Government, 
Territorial Integrity and Protection of Minorities, International Colloquium (Lausanne, 
25-27 April 1996). 
Elster, J. (ed.) Deliberative Democracy (1998). 
Engers, J.F. From Sacred Trust to Self-Determination, 24 Neth. Int’l L. Rev. 88 (1977). 
Ermacora, F. The Protection of Minorities Before the United Nations, 182 Recueil des Cours 
247 (1983). 
Espiell, H.G. The Right of Self-Determination: Implementation of United Nations Resolu-
tions, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.1 (1980). 
Etzioni, A. “The Evils of Self-Determination”. Foreign Policy (Winter 1992-1993).  
Evans, G. Cooperating for Peace (1993).  
F.L. Kirgis, “Editorial Comment: The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Na-
tions Era”. 88 AJIL 304 (1994). 
Falk, R. “The Rights of Peoples (In Particular Indigenous Peoples)”, in J. Crawford (ed.) 
The Rights of Peoples (1988). 
Falk, R.A. The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order (1964). 
Fatouros, A.A. “Participation of the ‘New’ States in the International Legal Order of the 
Future”, in R.A. Falk and C.E. Black (eds.), The Future of the International Legal Order 
Vol. I: Trends and Patterns (1969). 
Fawcett, J.E.S. The British Commonwealth in International Law (1963). 
Fawcett, J.E.S. The Law of Nations. New York: Basic Books, 1968. 
Ferry, J.F.C. Speech Before the French Chamber of Deputies, March 28, 1884, in Paul Ro-
biquet (ed.), Discours et Opinions de Jules Ferry, (1897). 
Finnish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, OSCE: EU Statement on the so-
called ‘referendum’ and so-called ‘presidential elections’ in South Ossetia on 12 November 
2006, 9 November 2006. 
Fiore, P. Le droit international codifié et sa sanction juridique (1890). 
Fishkin, J.S. and Laslett, P. Debating Deliberative Democracy (2002). 
Nicholas Hansen 
Modern Territorial Statehood 
Page 296 
Fitzmaurice, G. “General Principles of International Law”. 92 Recueil des Cours 5 (1957). 
Ford Foundation Report of the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United 
Nations, The United Nations in Its Second Half-Century (1995). 
Fox, G.H. “Self-Determination in the Post-Cold War Era: A New Internal Focus?”, 16 
Mich. J. Int’l L. 733 (1995). 
Franck, T.M. Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995). 
Franck, T.M. General Course on Public International Law, 420 Recueil des Cours (1993). 
Franck, T.M. “Legitimacy in the International System”. 82 AJIL 713 (1988). 
Franck, T.M. “Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession”, in C. Brölmann et al. 
(eds.), Peoples and Minorities in International Law (1993).  
Franck, T.M. “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance”. 86 AJIL 46 (1992). 
Franck, T.M. The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (1990). 
Freund, B. The Making of Contemporary Africa: The Development of African Society since 
1800. 2nd. ed. Boulder: Lynne Rienner,1998. 
Friedmann, W. The Changing Structure of International Law. London: Stevens and Sons, 
1964. 
Gasana, J. and Nsengimana, N. D’un Génocide à l’Autre. Unpublished paper of Project 
NOUER (Nouvelle Espérence pour le Rwanda) on file with author (May 1997). 
Gilbert, G. “The Legal Protection Accorded to Minority Groups in Europe”. 1992 Neth. 
YB Int’l L. 71. 
Gittleman, R. “The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights – A Legal Analysis”. 22 
Virginia J. Int’l L. 667 (1982). 
Grant, T.D. “Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents”. 37 
Colum. J. Transnat'l L. (1999). 
Gros Espiell, H. “Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Subcommission on the Pre-
vention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities”, in The Right of Self-
Determination: Implementation of United Nations Resolutions. UN Sales Publication 
E.79.XIV.5 (1980). 
Gross, L. “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948”. 42 AJIL 20 (1948). 
Guerrero, J.G. La VIIe Conférence Panaméricaine : Montevideo, 3-27 décembre 1933. XLI 
Rev. Gén. de Droit Int’l Public 401 (1934).  
Gye-Wado, O. “The Effectiveness of the Safeguard Machinery for the Enforcement of 
Human Rights in Africa”. 2 JHRLP 144 (1992).  
Habermas, J. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy. Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought (1998). 
Habermas, J. The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory. Studies in Contem-
porary German Social Thought (2000). 
Habermas, J. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Cate-
gory of Bourgeois Society (1991). 
Hannum, H. Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Con-
flicting Rights. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990. 
Nicholas Hansen 
Modern Territorial Statehood 
Page 297 
Hannum, H. “Rethinking Self-Determination”. 34 Virginia J. Int’l L. 1 (1993). 
Harbeson, J.W. “Externally Assisted Democratization: Theoretical Issues and Practical 
Realities”, in J.W. Harbeson and D. Rothchild (eds.) Africa in World Politics: The African 
State System in Flux (2000). 
Hart, H.L.A. The Concept of Law (1961).  
Healy, D. James G. Blaine and Latin America (2001).  
Hegel, G.W.F. “Grundlinien der Philosophie der Rechts”. 4. Aufl. Herausgegeben von 
Johannes Hofmeister, 1955. 
Held, D. Democracy and the New Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan 
Governance (1995) 
Henkin, L. International Law: Politics and Values (1995). 
Henkin, L. International Law: Politics, Values and Functions. 216 Recueil des Cours 22 
(1989). 
Henkin, L. The Age of Rights (1990). 
Henkin, Pugh, Schachter & Smit. Int’l Law: Cases and Materials. 3rd. ed (1993). 
Henrard, K. Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: Individual Human 
Rights, Minority Rights and the Right to Self-Determination (2000). 
Heraclides, A. The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics (1991). 
Herbst, J. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control 
(2000). 
Hertselet, E. The Map of Africa by Treaty 996-998. 3rd. ed. London: 1909.  
Hertslet, E. The Map of Africa by Treaty, Vol. 3. 3rd ed. London: 1967. 
Higgins, R. Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United 
Nations (1963).  
Higgins, R. “General Course on Public International Law”, 230 Recueil des Cours (1991). 
Higgins, R. International Law and the Avoidance, Containment and Resolution of Disputes 
(1991). 
Higgins, R. “Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession: Comments”, in C.M. 
Brölmann et al (eds.), Peoples and Minorities in International Law (1993). 
Higgins, R. Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use it. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994.  
Higgins, R. The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the 
United Nations 13 (1963)  
Higgins, R. “Time and the Law: International Perspectives on an Old Problem”. 46 ICLQ 
501 (1997). 
Higgins, R. V. General Course on Public International Law, International Law and the 
Avoidance, Containment and Resolution of Disputes, 230 Recueil des Cours (1991). 
Hill, D.J. A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe, Vol. II. New 
York: Longmans Green, 1925. 
Hill, H. Claims to Territory in International Law and Relations (1945). 
Nicholas Hansen 
Modern Territorial Statehood 
Page 298 
Hobsbawm, E.J. Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. 2nd ed. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.  
Hochschild, A. King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial 
Africa. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998. 
Holsti, K.J. The State, War and the State of War. Cambridge: Cambridge Studies in Inter-
national Relations, 1996. 
Horowitz, D.L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. 2nd ed. (2000) 
Huntington, S. “Democracy’s Third Wave”. 2(2) Journal of Democracy 12 (1991). 
Hyde, C.C. International Law, Chiefly as Interpreted by the United States. 2nd. ed. (1947). 
Hyden, G. Problems and Prospects of State Coherence, in D. Rothchild and V.A. Olorun-
sola (eds.) State Versus Ethnic Claims 69 (1983). 
Indian and Foreign Review. 1 Jul. 1971.  
Initiative and Referendum Institute, Final Report of the Initiative and Referendum Insti-
tute’s Election Monitoring Team, 27 July 2002, available on 
www.iandrinstitute.org/international/FinalSomalilandReport7-24-01combined.pdf (last 
accessed August 2004). 
Iorns, C.J. “Indigenous Peoples and Self-Determination: Challenging State Sovereignty”. 
24 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 199 (1992). 
Jackson, R.H. Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.  
Jackson, R.H. Negative Sovereignty in Sub-Saharan Africa, 12 Rev Int’l Stud 247 (1986). 
Jellinek, G. Allgemeine Staatslehre. 3rd ed. (1914). 
Jennings, I. The Approach to Self-Government (1956). 
Kamanu, O. Secession and the Right to Self-Determination: An OAU Dilemma, 12 J. Mod. 
Afr. Stud. 335 (1974). 
Keller, A., Lissitzyn, O. and Mann, F. “Creation of Rights of Sovereignty Through Sym-
bolic Acts 1400-1800”. New York: Columbia University Press, 1938.  
Kelsen, H. Das Problem der Souveränität (1920). 
Kelsen, H. Law and Peace. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942.  
Kelsen, H. The Law of the United Nations (1951). 
Kelsen, H. Principles of International Law (1952). 
Kelsen, H. “Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations”, 35 AJIL 605 
(1941). 
Kennedy, D. A New Stream of International Law Scholarship, 7 Wisc. Int.L.J. 39 
Kirgis, F.L. “Custom on a Sliding Scale”. 81 AJIL 146 (1987). 
Kirgis, F.L. “Editorial Comment: The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Na-
tions Era”. 88 AJIL 304 (1994). 
Kiss, A.C. “Permissible Limitations on Rights”, in L. Henkin (ed.), The International Bill 
of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1981. 
Nicholas Hansen 
Modern Territorial Statehood 
Page 299 
Kiwanuka, R.N. “The Meaning of ‘People’ in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights”. 82 AJIL 80 (1988)  
Knop, K. “The ‘Righting’ of Recognition: Recognition of States in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union, Canadian Conference on International Law”, in State Sovereignty: The 
Challenge of a Changing World. 1992. 
Knox, T. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942. 
Köchler, H. “Self-determination and Democratization of the UN System”, in Y.N. Kly and 
D. Kly, In Pursuit of the Right to Self-Determination: Collected Papers and Proceedings of 
the First International Conference on the Right to Self-determination and the United Na-
tions (2001). 
Kohen, M. “Introduction”, in M. Kohen (ed.) Secession: International Law Perspectives 
(2006). 
Kohen, M. Possession Contestée et Souveraineté Territoriale (1997). 
Kohen, M.G. “L’uti possidetis révisité : L’arrêt du 11 septembre 1992 dans l’affaire El Sal-
vador/Honduras”. 4 Revue Générale de Droit Internationale Public (1993). 
Kohen, M.G. Possession contestée et souveraineté territoriale (1997). 
Kooijmans, P.J. The Doctrine of the Legal Equality of States: An Enquiry into the Founda-
tions of International Law (1964). 
Koskenniemi, M. “ ‘Intolerant Democracies’: A Reaction”. 37 Harvard Int’l. L.J. 231 
(1996). 
Koskenniemi, M. The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 
1870-1960 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.  
Koskenniemi, M. “The Wonderful Artificiality of States”. ASIL Proceedings, 1994.  
Krasner, S.D. “Compromising Westphalia”, 20(3) Int’l Security 115 (Winter 1995-1996). 
Kreijen, G. “Somalia and Withdrawal of Recognition”, in Kreijen (ed.), State, Sovereignty 
and International Governance (2002). 
Kreijen, G. State Failure, Sovereignty and Effectiveness (2004). 
Kurban, D. et al, Zorunlu Göç ile Yüzleşmek: Türkiye'de Yerinden Edilme Sonrası 
Vatandaşlığın İnşası (Confronting Forced Migration: The Construction of Citizenship in 
the Aftermath of Internal Displacement in Turkey) (2006).  
Lansing, R. “Self-Determination: A Discussion of the Phrase”. The Saturday Evening Post, 
May 1921. 
Lansing, R. The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative (1921). 
Lauterpacht, E. “Sovereignty: Myth or Reality?”, 73 Int’l Affairs 149 (1997). 
Lauterpacht, H. Recognition in International Law (1947). 
Lawrence, T.J. The Principles of International Law (1895). 
Lenin, V.I. Selected Works (1969). 
Lijphart, A. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six 
Countries (1999). 
Lindley, M.F. The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International 
Law. New York: Longroans and Co, 1926. 
Nicholas Hansen 
Modern Territorial Statehood 
Page 300 
Lisska, A.J. Aquinas’s Theory of Natural Law: An Analytic Reconstruction (1996), 
Lorimer, J. The Institutes of the Law of Nations (1883). 
Lugard, F.J.D. The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (1922). 
Mann, M. States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology. Oxford and New 
York: Basil Blackwell, 1988. 
Mansfield E.D. and Snyder, J. “Democratization and War”. 74(3) Foreign Affairs 79 
(May/June 1995). 
Marks, S. The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the Critique 
of Ideology (2000). 
Marks, S.P. “Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980s?”. 33 Rutgers L.R. 
435 (1981). 
Mbonimpa, M. and Hutu, Tutsi. Twa: Pour une société sans castes au Burundi (1993). 
McGoldrick, D. “Canadian Indians, Cultural Rights and the Human Rights Committee”. 
40 ICLQ 658 (1991). 
McNair, A.D. The Law of Treaties. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961. 
Menon, P.K. “Some Aspects of the Law of Recognition”. 66 Revue de droit international et 
de droit comparé 161 (1989). 
Moore, J.B. Costa Rica-Panama Arbitration: Memorandum on Uti Possidetis. Rosslyn: 
The Commonwealth Company Printers, 1913. 
Moore, M. Indigenous Self-Determination, in S. Macedo and A. Buchanan, Nomos XLV: 
Secession and Self-Determination (2003).  
Müllerson, R. International Law, Rights and Politics: Developments in Eastern Europe and 
the CIS. London: Routledge, 1994.  
Müllerson, R. Ordering Anarchy: International Law in International Society (2000). 
Murray, R. Human Rights in Africa: From the OAU to the African Union (2004). 
Murswiek, D. “The Issue of a Right of Secession – Reconsidered”, in C. Tomuschat (ed.) 
Modern Law of Self-Determination. London: Nijhoff, 1993.  
Musgrave, T.D. Self-Determination and National Minorities (1997). 
Naldi, G.J. Documents of the Organization of African Unity (1992).  
Nanda, V.P. “Self-Determination in International Law: The Tragic Tale of Two Cities—
Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan)”. 66 AJIL 321 (1972)  
Naqvi, A. “West Pakistan’s Struggle for Power”. 4 South Asian Rev. 213 (April 1971). 
Ndegwa, S.N. The Two Faces of Civil Society: NGOs and Politics in Africa (1996). 
Neuberger, B. National Self-Determination in Postcolonial Africa (1986). 
Nino, C.S. The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy (1996). 
O. Chimedu Okafor. Re-Defining Legitimate Statehood. The Hague: Nijhoff, 2000. 
O’Brien W.V. and Goebel, U.H. “United States Recognition Policy Toward the New Na-
tions”, in W.V. O’Brien (ed.), The New Nations in International Law and Diplomacy 
(1965). 
Nicholas Hansen 
Modern Territorial Statehood 
Page 301 
Ocheje, P. “A ‘Rights’ Approach to Governance in Africa”, in E.K. Quashigah and O.C. 
Okafor (eds.), Legitimate Governance in Africa. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1999. 
Okafor, O.C. Re-Defining Legitimate Statehood: International Law and State Fragmenta-
tion in Africa (2000). 
Okeke, C.N. Controversial Subjects of Contemporary International Law: An Examination of 
the New Entities of International Law and their Treaty-Making Capacity (1972). 
Oppenheim, L. International Law: A Treatise. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1912. 
Orentlicher, D.F. “Separation Anxiety: International Responses to Ethno-Separatist 
Claims”. 23 Yale J. Int’l L. 1 (1998). 
Ott, D. Public International Law in the Modern World (1987).  
Packer, J. On the Definition of Minorities in J. Packer and K. Myntti (eds.) The Protection 
of Ethnic and Linguistic Minorities in Europe (1993). 
Pagden, A. Peoples and Empires: Europeans and the Rest of the World from Antiquity to 
the Present (2001). 
Paul, J.C.N. “Participatory Approaches to Human Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa”, in A.A. 
an-Na‘im and F.M. Deng (eds.) Human Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives 
(1990). 
Pellet, A. “The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Commission: A Second Breath for 
the Self-Determination of Peoples”. 3 EJIL 178 (1995). 
Perkins, J.A. “The Changing Foundations of International Law: From State Consent to 
State Responsibility”. 15 B.U. Int’l L.J. 433 (1997). 
Phillips, A. and Rosas, A. (eds.) The UN Minority Rights Declaration (1993).  
Pipes, R. The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism 1917-1923 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964. 
Pityana, N.B. The Challenge of Culture for Human Rights in Africa, in M. Evans and R. 
Murray (eds.), The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2002). 
Pomerance, M. “The Badinter Commission: The Use and Misuse of the International 
Court of Justice’s Jurisprudence”. 20 Mich. J. Int’l L. 31 (1998). 
Radan, P. The Break-up of Yugoslavia and International Law (2002). 
Raič, D. Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (2002).  
Ratner, S.R. “Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States”. 90 AJIL 
590 (1996). 
Reiman, J. “Can Nations Have Moral Rights to Territory?”, in J.R. Jacobson (ed.), The 
Territorial Rights of Nations and Peoples: Essays from The Basic Issues Forum (1989). 
Rembe, N.S. Africa and Regional Protection of Human Rights (1985). 
Reno, W. Warlord Politics and African States (1998). 
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Sec-
retary-General, 25 January 2005, not issued as a UN document, available from 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf (last accessed 21 August 2008).  
Reyntjens, F. L’Afrique des Grands Lacs en Crise. Paris: Karthala, 1994.  
Nicholas Hansen 
Modern Territorial Statehood 
Page 302 
Rigo-Sureda, A. The Evolution of the Right to Self-Determination: A Study of United Na-
tions Practice (1973). 
Roberts, J. M. History of the World, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.  
Robinson, J. “From Protection of Minorities to Promotion of Human Rights”. 1948 Jewish 
Yb.Int’l.L. 115. 
Robinson, W.I. Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention and Hegemony 
(1996). 
Rodley, W. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (1972). 
Rodriguez, L.I.S. “L’uti possidetis et les effectivités”. 263 Rec. des Cours (1997). 
Rolling, B.V.A. International Law in an Expanded World. London, 1960.  
Rosenstock, R. The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Re-
lations: A Survey (1971). 
Roth, B. Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law (1999).  
Rothchild D. and Lawson, L. “Interactions Between State and Civil Society”, in J.W. Har-
beson et al (eds.) Civil Society and the State in Africa. Boulder: Lynne Riener, 1994.  
Rubin, A.P. “Secession and Self-Determination: A Legal, Moral, and Political Analysis”. 
36 Stan. J Int’l L. 253 (2000). 
Ruggie, J.G. Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization. 
New York: Routledge, 1998. 
Russell, R.B. A History of the United Nations Charter (1958). 
Sachs, J.D. The End of Poverty (2005). 
Salacuse, J.W. An Introduction to Law in French-Speaking Africa, Vol. I (1969).  
Salmond, J. Jurisprudence. 7th ed. (1924). 
Sartre, J.-P. Colonialism and Neocolonialism. London: Routledge, 2001). 
Schachter, O. Human Dignity as a Normative Concept. 77 AJIL 848 (1983). 
Schachter, O. International Law in Theory and Practice (1995). 
Schachter, O. “The Decline of the Nation-State and its Implications for International 
Law”. 36 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 7 (1997). 
Scheinin, M. “The Right to Self-Determination under the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights”, in P. Aikio and M. Scheinin (eds.), Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2000). 
Schoiswohl, M. Status and (Human Rights) Obligations of Non-Recognized De Facto Re-
gimes in International Law: The Case of ‘Somaliland’ (2004). 
Schrijver, N.J. “The Changing Nature of State Sovereignty”. 70 BYIL 1999 65 (2000).  
Schumpeter, J. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. 6th ed. (1987). 
Schwab, P. Africa: A Continent Self-Destructs (2001). 
Schwarzenberger, G. A Manual of International Law. 4th ed. London, 1960. 
Scott, J.B. “The Seventh International Conference of American States”. 28 AJIL 219, 226 
(1934). 
Seligman, A.B. The Idea of Civil Society (1992). 
Nicholas Hansen 
Modern Territorial Statehood 
Page 303 
Sharma, S.P. Territorial Acquisition, Disputes and International Law. The Hague: Nijhoff, 
1997.  
Shaw, M.N. “The Western Sahara Case”. 49 BYIL 119 (1978). 
Shaw, M.N. Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1986.  
Shaw, M.N. Africa Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia (1979). 
Shaw, M.N. International Law. 5th ed. (2003)  
Shaw, M.N. “Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries”. 3 EJIL 478 (1997). 
Shaw, M.N. The Definition of Minorities in International Law 20 IYHR 13 (1991). 
Shaw, M.N. “The Heritage of States: The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris Today”. 67 BYIL 
75 (1996). 
Shaw, M.N. Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues (1986). 
Simsarian, J. “The Acquisition of Legal Title to Terra Nullius”. 53(1) Political Science 
Quarterly 111 (1938). 
Skurbaty, Z. As if Peoples Mattered: A Critical Appraisal of ‘Peoples’ and ‘Minorities’ from 
the International Human Rights Perspective and Beyond. LL.D. thesis submitted to the 
Raoul Wallenberg Institute, University of Lund, 2000.  
Slaughter, A.-M. “Towards an Age of Liberal Nations”. 33 Harvard Int’l L.J. 393 (1992). 
Smith, A. National Identity (1991).  
Smith, D. “Sovereignty over Unoccupied Territories—The Western Sahara Decision”. 9 
Case W.Res.J.Int’l L. 135 (1977). 
Smith, D. The State of War and Peace Atlas (1997). 
Soper, P. “Some Natural Confusions About Natural Law”. 90 Mich. L.Rev. 2423 (1998).  
Stalin, J. “Marxism and the National Question”, in J. Stalin, Marxism and the National 
and Colonial Question. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1942. 
Steiner, H.J. and Alston, P. International Human Rights in Context: Law Politics Morals 
(1996). 
Sumner, B.T. “Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice”. 53 Duke L.J. 1779 
(2004). 
Talmon, S. Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular Reference to 
Governments in Exile (1998). 
Temperley, H.M.V. A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, vol. IV (1969). 
The Diagram Group, Encyclopedia of African Peoples (2000). 
Thede, N. Civil Society and Democracy, paras. 4-5, Seminar on the Interdependence Be-
tween Democracy and Human Rights, UN OHCHR, 25-26 November 2002, available from 
www.unhchr.ch (last accessed 21 August 2008). 
Thompson, J. Historical Injustice and Reparation: Justifying Claims of Descendents (Oc-
tober 2001).  
Thornberry, P. International Law and the Rights of Minorities (1991). 
Thornberry, P. “Self-Determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of Interna-
Nicholas Hansen 
Modern Territorial Statehood 
Page 304 
tional Instruments”. 38 ICLQ 867 (1989). 
Thucydides et al, History of the Peloponnesian War, Book One. London: Penguin, 1986. 
Tomuschat, C. Secession and self-determination, in M. Kohen (ed.) Secession: Interna-
tional Law Perspectives (2006). 
Tomuschnat, C. Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2003.  
Turp, D. “Québec’s Right to Secessionist Self-determination: The Colliding Paths of Can-
ada’s Clarity Act and Québec’s Fundamental Rights Act”, in J. Dahlitz (ed.) Secession and 
International Law: Conflict Avoidance – Regional Appraisals. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2003. 
Umozurike, O. “The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights”. 77 AJIL 903 (1983). 
United Nations Development Programme, Integrating Human Rights with Sustainable 
Human Development. UNDP policy document 16 (January 1998), as cited in S.P. Marks, 
The Human Rights Framework for Development: Five Approaches, Harvard School of Pub-
lic Health, FXB Center Working Paper No. 6 (2000). 
Valadez, J.M. Deliberative Democracy, Political Legitimacy and Self-Determination in 
Multicultural Societies (2001).  
van Creveld, M. The Rise and Decline of the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999. 
van der Stoel, M. Keynote Address to the Human Dimensions Seminar, Case Studies on 
National Minorities Issues, Warsaw, 24-28 May 1993, as reprinted in 1 CSCE ODHR Bulle-
tin 22 (1993). 
van der Vyver, J.D. “Religious Freedom in African Constitutions”, in A.A. An-Na‘im 
(ed.), Proselytization and Communal Self-Determination in Africa. Maryknoll: Orbis, 
1999.  
Vasak, K. and Alston P. (eds.) The International Dimensions of Human Rights. 2 vols. 
(1982). 
Vasak, K. Human Rights: A Thirty-Year Struggle: the Sustained Efforts to give Force of law 
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNESCO Courier 30:11 (November 1977).  
Verzijl, J.H.W. International Law in Historical Perspective (1970). 
Viljoen, F. International Human Rights Law in Africa (2007).  
von Pufendorf, S. VII De Jure Naturae et Gerntium Libri Octo (1934). 
Vukas, B. “States, Peoples and Minorities”. 231 Recueil des Cours (1991). 
wa Mutua, M. “The African Human Rights System in a Comparative Perspective”. 3 Rev. 
of African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 11 (1993). 
wa Mutua, M. “Conflicting Conceptions of Human Rights: Rethinking the Post-Colonial 
State”. 89 ASIL Proc. 487 (1995). 
Wade, H.W.R. “The Basis of Legal Sovereignty”, 172 Camb. L.J. 196 (1955). 
Watson, A. The Evolution of International Society. London: Routledge, 1992. 
Watson, A. The Limits of Independence (1997). 
Watson, J.S. “Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the Development of Human Rights 
Nicholas Hansen 
Modern Territorial Statehood 
Page 305 
Norms in International Law”. 1979 U.Ill. L.F. 609. 
Watts, A. International Law and the Antarctic Treaty System (1992). 
Weller, M. “The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia”. 86 AJIL 569 (1992).  
Westlake, J. Chapters on the Principles of International Law (1894). 
Whiteman, M.M. Digest of International Law.  
Wilson, R.R. “International Law In Treaties of the United States”. 31 AJIL 271, 284 (1937). 
Wilson, W. War and Peace, Presidential Messages, Addresses and Public Papers (1917-
1924) Vol. I, eds. R.S. Baker and W.E. Dodd, at 182 (New York and London: Harper and 
Brothers Publishers, 1927). 
Young, C. The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective (1994). 
Zakaria, F. The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (2003). 
Zakaria, F. “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy”. 76(6) Foreign Affairs (Nov/Dec 1997). 
Zimmermann, W. Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers (1996) 
 
Nicholas Hansen 
Modern Territorial Statehood 
Page 306 
TABLE OF LEGAL CITATIONS 
1951 ICJ Rep. 130. 
1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (ECOSOC Resolution 526A 
(XVII), 26 April 1954). 
1959 Antarctic Treaty, 402 UNTS 71 (entered into force on 23 June 1961). 
1971 ICJ Rep. 16. 
2 United Nations Monthly Chronicle 36 (1970). 
26 UN Ybk. 215-220 (1972). 
3 UN SCOR, 383 Mtg., 2 Dec. 1948, No. 128.  
31 ILM 1486 (1992). 
347 U.S. 475 (1954). 
347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
820 HC Debs., WA, col. 26, 28 June 1971. 
A.B. v. M.B., as cited in 17 ILR 110-111 (1950) 
Act to give effect to the requirement for clarity as set out in the opinion of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference, Statutes of Canada 2000, c.26. 
Action for Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction, and Motion for Interlocu-
tory Measures, Bertrand v. Bégin, 10 August 1995, Quebec 200-05-002177-995 (Sup. Ct.). 
Advisory Opinion on Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Na-
tions, 1949 ICJ Rep. 3 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
African Charter for Participation in Development (Arusha, 1990). 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Communication 75/92, Katangese 
Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire, Eighth Activity Report 1994-1995, Annex VI. 
An Act respecting the exercise of the fundamental rights and prerogatives of the Québec 
people and the Québec State, R.S.Q., c. E-20.2.  
Arbitral Award of the King of Spain (Nicaragua v. Honduras), 1960 ICJ Rep. 205. 
Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 21 ILM 58 (1982). 
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited Judgment, 1970 ICJ Rep. 3. 
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law, UN GA Resolution 60/147 (16 December 2005). 
Bennell v. State of Western Australia (2006) FCA 1243. 
Bertrand v. Bégin, [1996] RJQ 2393. 
Bertrand v. Québec (A.G.), [1995] 127 DLR (4th) 408. 
Cairo Declaration on Border Disputes among African States, AHG/Res. 16(I) 1964. 
Case Concerning Acquisition of Polish Nationality, 1923 PCIJ, Ser. B, No. 7. 
Nicholas Hansen 
Modern Territorial Statehood 
Page 307 
Case concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 1995 ICJ Rep. 102. 
Case concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), 1999 ICJ Rep. 1100. 
Case Concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), 1960 ICJ 
Rep. 53. 
Case Concerning the Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), 1960 ICJ 
Rep. 6. 
Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), 1994 ICJ Rep. 
6. 
CDDH (93) 22, Strasbourg, 8 September 1993, feddh 93.22. 
Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, 2 ILM 766 (1963). 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Helsinki Final Act (1975). 
Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions Arising from 
the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 31 ILM 1488 (1992). 
Covenant of the League of Nations.  
Customs Regime between Germany and Austria Case, Permanent Court of International 
Justice, PCIJ Ser. A/B (1931), No. 41. 
Decision on the Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa, AHG/Dec.150 
(XXXVI), 33rd Ordinary Session, Harare, June 1997. 
Declaration of Polish Delegate Beck to the League Assembly, League of Nations OJ, 
Spec.Supp. 122 at 42 (1934).  
Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of 
Government, OAU Doc. AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI) 
Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace, UN GA Res. 39/11, 12 November 1984. 
Declaration on the Right to Development, UN GA Res. 41/128, 4 December 1986.  
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Lin-
guistic Minorities, UN GA Res. 47/135, 18 December 1992.  
Declaration on Yugoslavia, 31 ILM 1486 (1992). 
Deutsche Continental Gas-Geshellschaft v. Polish State (1929), 5 Annual Digest of Public 
International Law Cases (ILR) 5, 14-15 (1929-30).  
Draft AU Charter on Elections, DOC. EX.CL/258 (IX) 
Draft Resolution of the Third Committee in UN Doc. A/C.3/L.294.  
Draft Resolution of the Third Committee in UN Doc. A/C.3/L.299 (25 November 1952) 
Draft Resolution of the Third Committee in UN Doc. A/C.3/L.304 (28 November 1952), 
and as amended by India in UN Doc. A/C.3/L.297/Rev.1. 
ECOSOC Resolution 1296 (XLIV). 
ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, Consultative relationship between the United Nations and 
non-governmental organizations. 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384 95 (1979). 
Nicholas Hansen 
Modern Territorial Statehood 
Page 308 
Eritrea - Ethiopia Boundary Commission: Decision Regarding Delimitation of the Border 
between The State of Eritrea and The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, in annex 
to Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. 
S/2002/423, 15 April 2002.  
Friendly Relations Declaration, UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV), 1970. 
Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger), Judgment, 2005 ICJ Rep. 120. 
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali), 1986 ICJ Rep. 554. 
Frontier of Walfisch (Walvis) Bay between Germany and Great Britain, XI Recueil des 
Sentences Arbitrales 306 (1911). 
GA Res. 2625 (annex), UN Doc. A/5217 (1970). 
GA Resolution 45/150 (21 Feb. 1991). 
Gámez-Bonilla Treaty of 7 October 1894, affirmed by Award of the King of Spain of 1906. 
GAOR 9th Sess. 4th Ctte. 419th Mtg. Para. 20 (1954). 
General Act and Declaration of Brussels of 2 July 1890, 17 Aust. Treaty Series (1920). 
General Assembly resolution 3203 (XXIX), on 17 September 1974.  
General Assembly Resolution 48/121, confirming the VDPA as originally published in 
UN document A/CONF.157/24 (Parts I and II). 
General Assembly resolution 543(VI) of 5 February 1952. 
General Comment No. 12(21) of the Human Rights Committee, Regarding Article 1, 
GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. 40, UN Doc. A/39/40 (1984) 142. 
General Comment No. 23(50) of the Human Rights Committee, Regarding Article 27, 
GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. 40, UN Doc. A/49/40 (1994), Vol. I 107.  
Grand Bay (Mauritius) Declaration and Programme of Action, OAU Doc. 
CONF/HRA/DECL (I). 
H.Con.Res. 467 (21 July 2004), resolving that Congress “declares that the atrocities unfold-
ing in Darfur, Sudan are genocide”. 
Human Rights Council decision S-4/101, Human Rights Council document A/HRC/4/80, 
7 March 2007. 
I R.S.A. 228 (1922).  
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Adopted and opened 
for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 
16 December 1966, entry into force 3 January 1976, in accordance with Article 27. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 
1966, entry into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with Article 49. 
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Interna-
tionally  
Island of Palmas Case (1928), 2 UN Reports of International Arbitral Awards 829, United 
States v. Holland (Judge Huber arbitrator), at 842. 
Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), 
Equatorial Guinea intervening (Merits), Judgement, 2002 ICJ Rep. 303. 
Nicholas Hansen 
Modern Territorial Statehood 
Page 309 
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras: Nicaragua inter-
vening) case, 1992 ICJ Rep. 386.  
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua interven-
ing), Judgement of 11 September 1992, 1992 ICJ Rep. 35. 
League of Nations, Commission of Jurists on Aaland Islands Dispute, League of Nations 
OJ, Spec.Supp. 4, at 8-9 (1920). 
League of Nations, Report presented to the Council of the League by the Commission of 
Rapporteurs, Council Doc. B7/21/68/106, at 28 (16 April 1921). 
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), advisory 
opinion, 1971 ICJ Rep. 16, 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 ICJ Rep. 136. 
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case (Denmark v. Norway), 53 PCIJ Rep. Ser. A/B 
(1933).  
Mabo & Others v. State of Queensland (No 2), 175 CLR (1992). 
Minority Schools in Albania, Ser. A/B. No 64 Advisory Opinion 17 (1935). 
Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (France v. United Kingdom),1953 ICJ Rep. 47. 
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933) 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 
881, 165 L.N.T.S. 
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), s 24AA, s 24MD 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal 
Republic of Germany v. the Netherlands), 1969 ICJ Rep. 3. 
Norwegian Fisheries Case, 1951 ICJ Rep. 116. 
OAU Doc. AHG/Decl.1(XXXVIII) (2002).  
Official Journal of the League of Nations 701-702 (September 1921). 
Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 62d session, supplement No. 4, UN 
Document E/1978/32 (1978). 
Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 10 (UN 
Doc. A/56/10). 
Opinion No. 4 on International Recognition of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina by the European Community and its Member-States, 11 January 1992, 31 ILM 
1501 (1992). 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, Island of Palmas case (Netherlands v. United States), 2 
RIAA 829 (1928). 
Possible Ways and Means of Facilitating the Peaceful and Constructive Solution of Prob-
lems Involving Minorities, Report of the Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34 (10 August 1993). 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, CAB/LEG/665, Adopted June 9, 1998 and 
entered into force January 1, 2004, at http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/court_en.html 
(last accessed 21 August 2008). 
Nicholas Hansen 
Modern Territorial Statehood 
Page 310 
Question of the Monastery of Saint-Naorum (Albanian Frontier) (Advisory Opinion), 
PCIJ Ser. B No. 9, 10. 
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.  
Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in document E/CN.4/2002/69. 
Report of the International Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of 
Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of The 
Aaland Islands Question, Official Journal of the League of Nations, Special Supplement 
No. 3, at 5 (October 1920). 
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 48th Session, 6 May-26 
July 1996, UN Doc. A/51/10, at para. 162 & Annex II.  
Report of the OAU Secretary-General on a Draft African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, OAU Doc. CM/1149 (1981), at para. 13.  
Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status, UN Doc. 
S/2007/168, 26 March 2007. 
Report of the Working Group on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1991/53 (1991). 
Restatement of the Law (3d) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987). 
Revised Statutes of Canada c.I-6 (1970). 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 14 June 1992, in 31 ILM 876 (1992). 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
Security Council Resolution 1430 (2002). 
Security Council Resolution 1674 (2006), 28 April 2006. 
Security Council Resolution 1706 (2006). 
Security Council resolution 751 (1992). 
Security Council resolution 814 (1993). 
Security Council resolution S/Res/169 (24 Nov. 1961). 
Social and Economic Rights Action Centre/Centre for Economic and Social Rights v. Ni-
geria, Communication 155/96.  
Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (Belgium v. Netherlands), 1959 ICJ Rep. 209. 
Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v. Malaysia), 2002 ICJ Rep. 
625.  
Statement of the Representative of the United Kingdom to the Third Committee, 12 Oct. 
1984 as cited in 55 BYIL 432 (1984). 
Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea 
(Nicaragua v. Honduras), available from http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/ 
120/14075.pdf (last accessed 8 October 2007). 
The General Act of the Berlin Conference of 26 February 1885  
Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland, signed at Ver-
sailles (29 June 1919). 
Nicholas Hansen 
Modern Territorial Statehood 
Page 311 
Treaty of Lausanne (Frontier between Turkey and Iraq) (the Mosul Boundary Case), PCIJ 
Ser. B No. 12, 21. 
Treaty of Nanking, Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Commerce Between Her Majesty the 
Queen of Great Britain and Ireland and the Emperor of China, 29 August 1842, G.B.-I.R.-
P.R.C., 93 Consol. T.S. 467.  
U.S. Restatement (Third). 
UN Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/47 on Promoting and consolidating 
democracy. 
UN Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/36 on Strengthening of popular par-
ticipation, equity, social justice and non-discrimination as essential foundations of de-
mocracy. 
UN Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/41. 
UN Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/43. 
UN Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/57. 
UN Doc. A/3077, para. 39 (1955). 
UN Doc. A/45/40, Vol. II, App. A (1990). 
UN Doc. A/AC.125/L.80. 
UN Doc. A/RES/60/1 (24 October 2005). 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/DR[XII]R6/24 (31 July 1983). 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/DR/R6/197 (Communication No. 197/1985), 27 July 1988. 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.253. 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/33. 
UN Doc. S/2000/1183, 40 ILM 260 (2001).  
UN Doc. S/RES/303 (6 December 1971). 
UN Doc. S/RES/307 (21 December 1971). 
UN General Assembly Resolution 48/163 (21 December 1993). 
UN General Assembly Resolutions 45/150 (1991) and 46/137 (1991). 
UNCIO, doc. 343, I/1/16, Vol. 6 296 (1945).  
UNCIO, doc. WD381, CO/156, Vol. 18 657-658. 
UNCIO, Vol. VI, Committee I/1, Sixth mtg., at 296 (1945). 
UNGA Resolutions 1514(XV), 1541(XV) and 2625(XXV). 
United Kingdom statement on behalf of the European Community, UN GAOR, 47th Sess., 
Third Committee, UN Doc. A/C.3/47/SR.45, 5 Oct 1992. 
United Nations Charter.  
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. A/61/L.67 (7 
September 2007) 
United Nations Millennium Declaration, UN Doc. A/RES/55/2 (18 September 2000). 
Nicholas Hansen 
Modern Territorial Statehood 
Page 312 
United Nations, Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: Situation of human 
rights in the Darfur region of the Sudan, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/3, 7 May 2004. 
United Nations, Report of the Panel Appointed by the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations to Gather Information on the Situation in Algeria in order to Provide the Interna-
tional Community with Greater Clarity on that Situation (1998). 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
US Supreme Court case The Antelope 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825). 
Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (1978). 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN document A/Conf.157/23 (1993). 
Western Sahara Case (Advisory Opinion), 1975 ICJ Rep. 12. 
Wrongful Acts, at Articles 40 and 41, in Report of the International Law Commission, 53d 
Session, GAOR 50th Session, Supplement No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10. 
Zakon o poryadke resheniya voprosov, svyazannikh s vykhodom soyuznoy respubliki iz 
SSSR, (Law on the resolution of issues of the secession of the Union Republics from the 
USSR). Records of Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR Supreme Council, No. 15, 
Moscow, 1990 (in Russian). 
 
